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# LETTERS

ON THE

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL,

THE

INTERMEDIATE STATE OF THE DEAD,

AND

A FUTURE RETRIBUTION,

IN REPLY TO

MR. CHARLES HUDSON,

WESTMINSTER, MASS.

---

BY WALTER BALFOUR.

---

G. DAVIDSON—CHARLESTOWN (MASS.)

1829.

BT
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Cop. 2

*District of Massachusetts, to wit:*

BE IT REMEMBERED, That on the twenty-second day of October, A.D. 1829, in the fifty-fourth year of the Independence of the United States of America, WALTER BALFOUR, of the said district, hath deposited in this office the title of a book, the right whereof he claims as Proprietor, in the words following, to wit:

"Letters on the Immortality of the Soul, the Intermediate state of the Dead, and a Future Retribution, in reply to Mr. Charles Hudson, Westminster, Mass. By Walter Balfour."

In conformity to the act of the Congress of the United States, entitled "An act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of Maps, Charts and Books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned;" and also to an act entitled "an act supplementary to an act entitled 'an act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned, and extending the benefits thereof to the arts of designing, etching and engraving, historical and other prints.'"

JOHN W. DAVIS,

*Clerk of the district of Massachusetts.*

1430
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# INTRODUCTION.

THE principal questions discussed in the following letters, are—Is the soul immortal? Is there an intermediate state of existence? And is the immortal soul to be punished in this state? Mr. Hudson advocates the affirmative of these questions, and I deny that the Scriptures teach such opinions. It is easily perceived if the soul is *not* immortal, the following, among other things, unavoidably follow:

1st, Mr. Hudson's system at once falls to the ground. The question with me has been, what saith the Scriptures on the subject of the soul's immortality? That no Scripture writer calls the soul immortal, is indisputable; nor is Mr. Hudson so bold as to assert the contrary. No, he takes this for granted; calls the soul immortal, and contends that this doctrine and a future retribution had their origin in divine revelations which are now lost. He contends for this, notwithstanding he asserts that Moses in his law did not teach even a future existence.

2d, If the soul is not immortal, the chain is broken, by which the multitude have been bound.

in slavery to kings and tyrants of the earth. It will be seen in the tenth letter that Mr. Hudson's doctrine of the immortality of the soul and its suffering and enjoying in a disembodied state, originated among the heathen, and was used to keep the ignorant multitude in subjection to their rulers, and to fight their battles. Kings and priests tyrannised over them; and by the hope of future reward on the one hand, and terror of future punishment on the other, their influence and authority over the people were maintained. Enslave men's minds and you can easily enslave their bodies.

3d, If the soul is not immortal, and does not suffer in a disembodied state, the superstitions and impositions of the Romish church are manifest to all the world. But for these doctrines the Catholic system never would have existed. Invocation of saints, prayers for the dead, and purgatory, all depend on them for their existence. Remove them, and these, with a train of attendant evils, are forever at an end. But, bad as this system has been, it has the advantage of Mr. Hudson's system. If the Catholic church sent souls to purgatory after death, she also provided masses, prayers, alms, and other means for their salvation from it. But Mr. Hudson provides no means for the salvation of souls from his purgatory except their own "*consideration and reflection.*" He does not pretend that the living can benefit souls in his hell, nor does it appear that a single soul reforms itself by consideration and *reflection* in the intermediate state.

4th, If the soul is not immortal, and does not suffer in a disembodied state, it is certain there is a radical mistake in all the missionary projects of the present day. It is not disputed, that all these projects receive their impetus from the belief that the soul is immortal, and if not saved, must go into future endless misery at death. Ask any one of those, who rest not day nor night in begging money for missions, what makes him so very zealous—The answer is, "*O, to save the immortal souls of the poor, perishing heathen.*" Who can blame them for their exertions in such a cause, if this doctrine be true? And is it not a disgrace to Universalists, who believe Mr. Hudson's system, not to exert themselves in attempting to save immortal souls? Indeed, his punishment, in duration, looks so much like endless punishment, that they ought to be fellow workers with our orthodox brethren in such a good cause. It will afford me sincere pleasure to see them remove such an inconsistency between their faith and practice, and wipe off this reproach. But if the soul is not immortal, and does not exist in a disembodied state, much money, and zeal, and labor are spent to obtain a visionary object. This no man will dispute. All I ask then, is, that my views be candidly investigated, for if true they deeply interest the community.

5th, If the soul is not immortal, and does not suffer in a disembodied state, an end is put to much misery suffered by the human race. If I am correct in my opinions, an end is put to all the *terror and misery* which ghosts have occa-

sioned to children, and persons of riper years. But I pass this, to notice, that what occasions the most severe misery to many is, how it is to fare with their souls after death. "Oh!" say thousands, "I could endure poverty, sickness, every affliction, without a murmur, if I only was assured it would be well with my poor soul after death." This occasions more real misery to multitudes, than heart can conceive; and the numerous cases of suicide which occur, loudly proclaim the truth of my statement. I appeal then to the humanity of every feeling heart, if it is not an incumbent duty to examine into the truth of my views, which at once puts an end to all this anxiety and misery. If correct, they remove an inconceivable load of distress from the mind, and direct it to a source of hope and consolation, solid, satisfying, and purifying.

6th, But on the supposition that the soul is immortal, and exists in a disembodied state, the Gospel of Christ is made void. In it life and immortality are brought to light, and brought to light *only* there. The life and immortality the Gospel brings to light, is by a resurrection from the dead. But this is not true, nor is there any need for life and immortality being brought to light by the Gospel, both these having been brought to light by the natural immortality of the soul. The immortality of the soul supersedes the necessity of Christ's resurrection, or ours, through him; for, according to this doctrine, we are immortal creatures, and must live forever if *Christ had never* risen from the grave. The evil

tendency of this doctrine on Christians is very manifest; for Christ's resurrection from the dead is seldom preached or talked of among them. The soul, the precious immortal soul, is the constant theme among both preachers and hearers. To have it saved, and prepared to go to heaven at death, is the sole concern of both. But I must be stupidly blind, if this was the theme of apostolic preaching, or the concern of Christians in apostolic times. If they preached to men the hope of future immortal life in being raised from the dead, and this founded on the fact of Christ's resurrection, we ought to remonstrate against any doctrine which eclipses it, or tends to hide it from the eyes of mankind.

7th, If the immortality of the soul is admitted, let us cease to wonder that men become infidels. Say deists, "You err, and are involved in a gross inconsistency, to tell us life and immortality are brought to light in the Gospel, for by your own showing, it is brought to light by the immortality of our souls. If our souls are immortal, a future endless life is certain to us, and what need is there, pray, to believe in Christianity? As to your endless hell torments, with which you threaten us, we know this to be a mere heathen notion, and if our souls are immortal, we have no fear but God will do well by us in a future state." In vain do Christians urge on deists the evidences of Christianity, having taught them the soul is immortal, for this makes it unnecessary. But if life and immortality are only brought *to light in* the Gospel of Christ,

deists and all others are left without the shadow of hope beyond death, except what is derived from it. This gives importance to the resurrection of Christ from the dead, and I must be greatly mistaken if this is not the grand doctrine of the New Testament.

If the inquiry is made—What is Mr. Hudson's *immortal soul*, which he intends to punish in a disembodied state? He answers, it is the "*mind*." But how he is to punish *mind* without a body he does not inform us. I am just as incapable of conceiving how mind can suffer without body, as how body can suffer without mind. There is no evidence of this from experience or observation, and I think I may defy any man to prove from Scripture that the mind *thinks* or *suffers* after its union with the body is dissolved. The ancients did not think the soul could suffer after death without a body, hence provided it with one. "Aquinas infers the soul's capability of purgatorial pains from its being the substantial form of the body." Des Cartes wrote to confute the doctrine of substantial forms, and his book was condemned by the Inquisition of Rome. Why? Because the Catholic church perceived that if his system was admitted, the soul was immaterial, and could not suffer purgatorial pains. This was sapping the foundation of the Catholic church and ruining the revenue of the clergy. Probably Mr. Hudson perceived the difficulty of punishing the immortal soul without a body, hence, on p. 68, he says it is clothed with some "*vehicle*" after death.

If the subjects of discussion between me and Mr. Hudson are unworthy of investigation, then there are no subjects of religion which demand a moment's notice. No subjects can more deeply interest us as individuals; for every man has, or has not, an immortal soul, which does, or does not, at death enter into a state of happiness or misery. If Mr. Hudson's opinions are Scriptural, a new era ought to commence among Universalists, in their *zeal* and *exertions* for the salvation of *immortal souls.* No sect in the community acts so inconsistently as they do, if his opinions are true. What domestic or foreign missions are they engaged in for the salvation of men's immortal souls? But why not engage in them with great zeal, unless some thousand years punishment in Mr. Hudson's *hell* is all a farce? Religion out of the question, common humanity says—save them from so many years mental misery, if money, zeal and exertion can effect it.

My first eight letters are a reply to Mr. Hudson's book; and he will admit I have overlooked nothing material in it, or slightly passed over what he deems his strongest proof texts and arguments. I have followed him in his course from its commencement to its conclusion. Of the success of my labors the reader must judge. I am sorry to say he pursued a different course with my Essays. To the five additional letters I solicit the reader's careful attention; particularly to the tenth and eleventh. The doctrines of the immortality of the soul, and a future retribution are not *taught in the* Old Testament, by Mr.

Hudson's own showing; and in these two letters we think it proved they had their origin in heathenism. He contends they had their origin in revelations now lost, without affording any proof that they ever existed. On the contrary we think it is shown by a profusion of evidence, that such opinions arose from the vain speculations of heathen philosophers; were imbibed by the Jews in their intercourse with them; were early introduced into the Christian church, by converts from Judaism and heathenism; and have been transmitted to us as a part of Christianity ever since. It is shown in the eleventh letter, that Luther held the opinions for which I contend.

This controversy was first begun by Mr. Hudson. It now remains with him whether it shall here end. I never wished to provoke a controversy among Universalists, and I have no desire to continue it. Should he choose to reply, or any one else, I request that proof be adduced from *Scripture* that the soul is immortal, and has a conscious existence in a disembodied state. Until this is settled, it is useless to discuss—is it to suffer in this state? Or what is to be the nature or duration of its punishment? To the Scriptures I appeal to decide this question, and trust we shall hear no more about *lost revelations* to support it. We have given the history of the soul's immortality and its punishment after death, but this is done merely to show that Mr. Hudson's opinions are of heathen origin. Let it be shown from the Bible that they are not.

# LETTER I.

---

Sir,

In concluding my remarks on your Letters (Essays, p. 359) I said—"as we did not begin, we have no desire to prolong this controversy, and therefore leave Mr. Hudson to his own choice concerning it." You have chosen to prolong this controversy, and your present performance, the result of that choice, shall now receive attention. It is divided into eight parts, to each of which I shall devote one Letter.

I am sorry you did not deem it proper, to leave all minor topics out of the discussion, and confine yourself entirely to the grand points at issue. It is also to be regretted, that personal reflections should be indulged. If I gave you any just occasion for this, I regret it. I am conscious I never wished to give you offence, and am convinced the cause of truth can never be promoted, by provoking language or personal reflections.

I published my First and Second Inquiries, without any reference to you, or your opinions. I intended to do the same with my Essays. It was the appearance of your Letters, which hastened their publication, and in *some degree* changed the shape of them.

Your *direct* attack, on me and others, occasioned thi alteration. You will not affirm, that this attack wa made under the exercise of the most kind Christia feelings, or was free from personal remark and irri tating language. Your present Book is not less ex ceptionable in these respects. Considering, that am a man of like passions with yourself, it is not th easiest thing in the world, to reply to such publica tions, without some degree of retaliation. Com plaints from you about this, come with an ill grace seeing you first gave the provocation. Certainly never gave you just cause to attack me, and if yo deemed my opinions unscriptural, why not correc my errors in the spirit and language of a Christian Should I then give you *attic salt* for *Roman wormwood* you have no right to complain, for it is hardly *righteous retribution.* But I shall study to overcom evil with good.

On p. 5, 6, you complain of my want of *candor fairness*, and *the spirit of my performance.* But of thi our readers can judge, and no doubt have judged al ready, as our books have been for some time befor the public. I leave them also to judge, whether I de serve your censure, p. 6, for defending myself an Mr. Ballou against your unprovoked attack. I am not aware, that either of us gave you any provoca tion, and surely you might have published your sen timents, without any direct attack on us. No sur prise would have been excited, had this been done b a believer in *endless misery*, but done by you, a *pro fessed Universalist*, does not indicate the most friend ly feelings, and is calculated to stir up strife amon brethren.

The first division of your book, termed your "*in troduction*," is taken up in noticing several charges brought against you. My most serious charge, i stated in the following words, p. 311 of my Essays

"5th. This goes to confirm what many believe, that Mr. Hudson wrote his book more to gratify an old *grudge* against Mr. Ballou, than any interest he felt in the doctrine he comes forward to defend. We doubt at least, if he would be willing to take his oath that this had no influence in his mind while writing his Letters." Such, Sir, is my charge; but how do you rid yourself of it? Do you own the charge as just, and justify yourself in entertaining a grudge against Mr. Ballou? No. Do you repel it by declaring it false? No. Do you deny it had any influence in your mind while writing your Letters? No. How then do you clear yourself of it? Why—by saying "*I will not spend time in remarking on this subject*," p. 19. A short mode indeed, of getting rid of such a serious charge. But if you spent time about any thing, it ought to have been spent here. If no such grudge ever existed, or now exists against Mr. Ballou, why not repel my charge? Why not say—"*I can take my oath that no such grudge against him ever existed, or influenced me in writing my Letters, and that this charge is utterly false.*" The charge, Sir, is not denied by yourself. If it is false, why not explicitly deny it, and remove all misapprehension on this subject?

But the connection in which I stated this charge, showed it was not made at random. I stated, on what I then deemed, and still deem, good authority that your statement of Mr. Ballou's sentiments was rather a caricature than a true likeness of them. And in p. 306 of your Letters you declared you wrote in the dark as to the ground on which he based his scheme. Your re-quoting the whole connection, and what you say, p. 16—18, shows you labor in vain to get rid of my charge. You never supposed, Sir, that I charged you with misrepresenting every part of Mr. Ballou's system. No, Sir, I only said your statement was a caricature of it. And after

seeing your confession, p. 306, that you wrote in the dark, I made the following apology for you (Essays p. 311.) "In the course of reading Mr. Hudson's Letters we concluded this caricature of Mr. Ballou's sentiments was drawn designedly, but when we came to this, it somewhat accounted for it in another way. Few painters could take a very good likeness of a man to draw it in the dark. We are truly sorry Mr. Hudson should undertake to write against any man's sentiments until he understands them." What you quote inclosed in brackets, which for brevity's sake I omitted, does not mend this matter. No, Sir; your words are, "*I am still in the dark relative to the ground on which you base your scheme.*" Whether "the purity of the soul, divine instruction, the resurrection, or something else" was the base of Mr. Ballou's scheme, you were in the dark about it when you wrote your Letters, and still continue in the dark about it.— But permit me to ask, was it like a loving brother, to write against Mr. Ballou, until you understood the *ground on which he based his scheme?* And especially when an explanation from him might have been easily obtained? Is this the course true friendship dictates? Granting your love of truth exceeded your love to him, still love to Mr. Ballou would have led you to put the best construction on his language, for love thinketh no evil. If his explanation, confirmed your suspicions of his false sentiments, even then to expose them ought to have been a matter of sorrow not of severity; not to make him ridiculous before men, but to turn him from his errors. Your confession that you wrote in the dark, was understood by others, as I stated in my Essays. In fact, Sir, I have never heard it disputed that your Letters were written to gratify an old grudge against Mr. Ballou. That such a grudge existed, influenced you in writing your Letters, and still remains, may be considered indis-

putable, for it is not denied by yourself. You see then, that I continue of the same mind, though you tell me, p. 18, that it is at the risk of my "*judgment or integrity*." I put both these, Sir, at hazard, and you are welcome to take them from me if I lose this game.

Another charge I brought against you, is thus stated, Essays, p. 307: "One of three things must be certain: 1st, Mr. Hudson's views of what constitutes a Christian must be extremely vague. He calls Mr. Ballou his reverend and dear Christian brother, and with the same breath tells him, he limits the benefits of the Gospel to this state of existence; that his system is only a negation and his faith disbelief. Who then is not a Christian if Mr. Ballou is one? 2d, Or Mr. Hudson acts the hypocrite. If he does not believe Mr. Ballou to be a Christian, why does he address him as such? If he does, why such inconsistent statements? 3d, Or he grossly misrepresents Mr. Ballou's sentiments." See the whole paragraph. But how do you manage with this? You ask me—"Must we be uncivil to a man because we think him in error?" I answer no. But I ask you in turn, was it being *civil* to Mr. Ballou to call him your reverend and dear Christian brother, and with the same breath tell him, he "limits the benefits of the Gospel to this state of existence," and "your system is only a negation, and your faith disbelief—a creed which would better become a sceptic than a professed Christian?" I must be very ignorant, Sir, of what constitutes *civility*, if this deserves the name. But to get rid of this inconsistency, you tell me, that I addressed "believers in endless misery" by the term "brethren," yet denounced "their conduct and system as a cheat, a soul-saving trade." Yes, Sir; but did I brand them as *infidels?* If I had, I should not have called them "*reverend and dear Christian brethren*:" and more es-

pecially, if I entertained an old grudge against them. This would be adding insult to injury. You may then take your choice of admitting that your "views of what constitutes a Christian are extremely vague," or, that there is something in all this treatment of Mr. Ballou which looks very like "hypocrisy." You see then this charge "falls on your head" without "*extenuation*," and with "the aggravated burden" of incivility towards Mr. Ballou.

On p. 310 of my Essays, I called your statement of Mr. Ballou's system quoted from p. 10, 15, of your Letters, "a gross" and "wilful misrepresentation of his sentiments." Well; do you admit the truth of this charge? No. Do you allow you might have misunderstood him? No. Do you concede your language was *rash*, not to say *harsh*, in saying he "limited the benefits of the Gospel to this state of existence," and that "his system is only a negation, and his faith disbelief—a creed which would better become a sceptic than a professed Christian?" No. So far from this, you say—"Now instead of pleading guilty to this charge, I insist that this was no misrepresentation of Mr. Ballou's system," p. 7, 8. You even proceed to confirm the correctness of your statements by an attempt at proof. But for you to assert in your Letters, and again assert here, that he maintains men are saved by death and not by Christ, is an outrage on the understandings of all who statedly or occasionally hear him preach. They know this, Sir, to be grossly false. Even your own statement of his sentiments, partial as it is, sufficiently refutes you. Quoting from his Lectures, p. 14, you say, Mr. Ballou says himself, "that Christ came into *this* world to save us in *another*, is contrary to all the representations which are found in the Scriptures." Does not the very denial, that Christ came into this world to save us in *another*, plainly imply, that he believed

Christ to be the Saviour of men? By this very denial, Mr. Ballou is for once orthodox, for orthodox people believe Christ did not come into this world to save men in *another*. But I ask you, do either of them mean by this, that the benefit of Christ's salvation does not extend beyond death? You know the contrary is true of them both. But I am not surprised you take offence at this sentence of Mr. Ballou's; for unless most people are saved in *another* world, they cannot be saved at all according to your system, as all not adequately punished for their sins and reformed here, you take to hell to save and reform there. That you advocate *salvation* in *another* world, is notorious, and so far as I can learn from your writings, it is not to be accomplished by Christ, by death, by the resurrection, but by their own "*consideration and reflection.*" But if you can only prove, Sir, that men are to be saved in *another* world, and saved in this way, I will thank you to do it, for here I candidly confess ignorance. In your Letters and present Book, you are explicit enough, that men are to go to hell to be saved, but leave them there without any rational Scriptural means of salvation, unless they can save themselves by consideration and reflection.

But from p. 8—10, you maintain, that I misrepresented your meaning, when you said to Mr. Ballou, "your system is only a negation, and your faith disbelief—a creed which would better become a sceptic than a professed Christian." You say, p. 9—"what I said was a mere inference from a supposed position; and this inference would apply to myself, as much as to Mr. Ballou, if I assumed that position." Yes, Sir; but Mr. Ballou was the person who assumed the position—that he had no faith in a punishment beyond death. His faith about this was a *negation*, what you call *disbelief*. Nor did you restrict his scepticism to

this one point, but drew the broad and unqualified conclusion—"your *system* is only a negation, and your faith disbelief—a creed which would better become a sceptic than a professed Christian." But we shall see on p. 84, that you repeat the charge of infidelity, and it is repeated in a way, which leaves no room to doubt your meaning. But must we be branded by you as infidels, because we will not believe your creed? And is it of the least consequence, whether you tell us this by inference, by a supposed position, or in plain language? Count us sceptics, call us sceptics, but only lay aside all hypocrisy and quibbling in the doing of it?

Another charge I made against you was, that you "quoted only a *few sentences* and *scraps of sentences* from Mr. Ballou's writings." You admit this charge true, but say, you quoted more of his writings than I did from your Letters. Can you deny, Sir, that I quoted your principal statements respecting your future punishment, in p. 315—325 of my Essays? Can you say half as much as this respecting your quotations of Mr. Ballou's views? You say "I endeavored to give a fair representation of his views and arguments. Besides, when I quoted Mr. Ballou's arguments I stated them in a logical form so as to exhibit their whole strength." But, Sir, we have heard persons conversant with Mr. Ballou's writings, express a very different opinion. What you call stating the arguments of your opponents in *a logical form*, I call, stating them in the form best adapted to the reply you mean to give to them. It is the fairest way to state a man's arguments in his own words; and until you explicitly deny you wrote under the influence of an old grudge against Mr. Ballou, who will credit your assertion? Few writers will thank you for your generosity, in shaping their arguments after your own form, and calling this a *logical form.*

I am happy you own there is nothing of this kind of *generosity* in my Essays. No, Sir, I quoted all your principal statements respecting future punishment, and in your own words, presented what I deemed an answer, and left our readers to judge for themselves.

It was also a charge of mine, that you made "no allowance for Mr. Ballou's change of opinions in the course of thirty years." In reply to this, you say, p. 10, "let it be observed—when a man publishes his opinions, the public have a right to consider them as his opinions, until he recalls them in a public manner, &c." The public, Sir, have more candor and discretion. If you should next year, believe in no future punishment or in endless misery, if they learned this without your publishing a recantation of your belief in limited punishment, they would not consider this as your opinion still. But the question here is, not what the *public* had a right to consider, but what *you* ought to have considered if you was sincere in calling Mr. Ballou your reverend and dear Christian brother. The public had a right to expect something different from Mr. Hudson, who professes great friendship for Mr. Ballou. But after reading what you say of him, many will say—"*an enemy hath done this.*" Can they well avoid this? Joseph's brethren could not speak peaceably to him, and the reason was, they hated him. Had you sincerely loved Mr. Ballou, likely your Letters never would have been written; or if written, very different would have been their spirit and shape. Had you no suspicions in your own mind that Mr. Ballou had changed some of his opinions in the course of thirty years? You now tell us he has, and that he has noticed this in the last edition of his book on the Atonement.

But you say, p. 11, "moreover had Mr. Ballou been in the habit of changing his opinions *annually* as Mr. Balfour has done of late, I should have been

more at a loss to know his opinions." I forgive you this personal reflection. When you made it, you did not reflect, how deeply it wounded some brethren who believe in future limited punishment. I can name some who were first believers in endless punishment. They then changed and became restorationists. They changed again, and became believers in no future punishment. But they changed once more, and are now believers in future punishment. This sets me at an immeasurable distance behind them, for all my changes are the following. I was brought up in the doctrines of the Church of Scotland, consequently a believer in endless misery. When I came to judge for myself, I became an Independent or Congregationalist, I then became a Baptist, and am now a Universalist, and one of those who have no faith in your future punishment. Such are my principal changes, and I am not ashamed of them. It remains for you to prove your personal reflection, that of late I have changed my "opinions *annually*." On the point in question, I have only made one change in my whole life time, and that is from a belief in endless punishment to a belief in no punishment after death. But what vexes you is, in changing from endless misery, I did not embrace your kind of Universalism. Had I done this, I would have been spared this personal reflection. Perhaps you will feel somewhat differently towards me, if I make my next *annual* change to your doctrine of future limited punishment. Why should you despair of this, for surely if there be any force at all in your arguments, such a yearly *changeling* is likely to be made a convert to your opinions. If it be your glory, that you have never changed your opinions, it is my glory that I have; and to my dying hour may it be my glory, to change my opinion when convinced I am in error. I envy no man who has never changed his *religious opinions*.

On p. 11, 12, you quote the following from my Essays, p. 310—"I am informed by persons well acquainted with Mr. Ballou's opinions, that Mr. Hudson knows he does not hold such sentiments as he imputes to him. Moreover, that even the quotations he makes from his various writings for thirty years, is rather a caricature than a just representation of the sentiments he ever held in any part of his life." In answer to this you say, that I am "disposed to publish every evil surmise that comes to my ears." It is rather amusing, Sir, to see how you get over these charges. You do not deny them. No, you say "Mr. B. is welcome to all the honor and his cause to all the support to be derived from such a course." You add, "the sentence I have quoted contains two distinct charges; one, that I knew that Mr. Ballou did not hold the sentiments I impute to him, and the other that I gave only a caricature of what he ever believed." Well, let us see how you clear yourself of these two charges. You say—"as to the first charge, I disdain to take any notice of it; for I do not wish to contend with those who are disposed to wield their daggers in the dark. But in relation to Mr. B. the only person with whom I am now at issue, I would ask, is it manly or honorable in him to publish such evil surmises without giving the names of their authors? Is this the course which he would wish to have others pursue with him? I put these questions to his own conscience. Even if he knew it to be true, what has this to do with the question in dispute? We hardly expected this from him, especially after he had told us that he was determined to keep to the point at issue." Answer. I have kept you to the point at issue, and am determined to keep you to this point also. If this "*has nothing to do*" with "the question in dispute," why did you introduce it in your Letters? And if you were tired of it, why

did you not drop it in your present publication? I hope you will then have done with it, should you write again. It would not, indeed, Sir, be manly or honorable to publish evil surmises, but the first question to be settled is—*are they so?* You do not deny their truth, and I can give names of men for their truth, whose testimony I credit in preference to your statements to the contrary. I was not wielding daggers in the dark, but in the light of their testimony; and if you insist upon names being given, I stand ready to produce them. But there is no occasion for this, until you explicitly deny my charges. I put the question to *your conscience*—did you not know but Mr. Ballou holds all the sentiments you have imputed to him? To rid yourself, Sir, of this charge, you must say something different, than "I disdain to take any notice of it," and accuse me of "wielding daggers in the dark."

But "the second charge is, that you gave only a caricature of Mr. Ballou's sentiments." Yes, Sir, and how do you clear yourself of the accusation? Why—by asking—"how does Mr. B. know that this accusation is true?" I answer, Sir, explicitly yes; and the evidence on which I believe it follows. 1st, I believe it on the testimony of men, who have read Mr. Ballou's writings, are familiar with his opinions, and some of them differ from me, and agree with you on the subject of future punishment. What I have read myself confirms their testimony. 2d. I believe it on the testimony of my own senses. I have heard Mr. Ballou repeatedly preach, have conversed with him, and from this I know your statement of his sentiments to be false. 3d. There are too many intelligent men who statedly hear him preach, to believe your account correct. I must either believe it incorrect or consider them fools or fanatics, who can sit to hear the opinions you impute to him. I prefer

thinking you misrepresented his opinions. But 4th. Public opinion is against your statements. If Mr. Ballou held such opinions, long ere this time, he must have sunk into disgrace in the city of Boston. This would have saved you much time and trouble. What man could publish the sentiments you charge him with, and in such a community be patronised by a large and respectable society? You mistake, Sir, in thinking Boston folks are so full of notions; and that all correct *discernment* of Mr. Ballou's opinions have departed to Westminster. They will smile at your attempt to teach them what the man's sentiments are, whom they have heard so often, and with whom they have daily intercourse. But 5th. If you had an old grudge in your mind against Mr. Ballou, which you do not deny, it confirms all the above evidence, that I was not far from being correct, when I said, "you gave only a caricature of Mr. Ballou's sentiments." But you tell me "this could be ascertained only by examining Mr. Ballou's writings." Indeed. If you choose to caricature and burlesque a man's sentiments, must I travel over all his writings to refute your statements? This is a new and easy method to make a reading community. All we have got to do, is to caricature a writer's opinions, and people must either read all he has written, or admit the caricature to be a correct likeness of them. Your caricature of Mr. Ballou's opinions, was too "*hideous a monster*," for any man in Boston or its vicinity to believe a true likeness, unless the man is his inveterate enemy. If I am correctly informed, you have not been able to make people in the country believe it. Indeed, wherever your books go, the simplest man will suspect at the first glance, it is a monster of your own drawing.

But in justification of yourself, you allude p. 14, to a piece published, called the "*Declaration*." *

you refer to the famous Declaration and Appeal, in which you had a hand, it was *generally* condemned by Universalists. It was an ill-timed, ill-managed, and ill-betided affair, for those concerned in it. It only injured those from whom it proceeded. Is it any proof that Mr. Ballou or his friends, allowed the sentiments you imputed to him were correct, because they did not contradict and refute them? If it is, then the charges I have brought against you are correct, seeing you have not denied them. You allow he did not "admit the inferences drawn from the statement of the system." Well, to use your own words, "is it manly or honorable," to draw inferences from a man's sentiments, which he does not admit, but rejects with abhorrence? This is seldom done except where a predisposition to find fault exists.

But you say, p. 19, "there is one thing in Mr. B's book which. I did not anticipate. It is this—he has in several instances, (p. 307. 309. 359,) stated what passed between us in private conversation." Well, Sir, did I misrepresent what passed in these conversations? No; you do not even insinuate this. But if I am given to misrepresentation, why let such an excellent opportunity escape me, where I might have done it without the possibility of detection by the public? But passing this, I ask, were there any secrets, or injunctions to secresy, respecting these conversations? No; for you declare yourself—"nothing was said but what I am perfectly willing the world should know." Why then be offended, that they are told it? And wherein does my crime consist? You inform us—"still I regard it as ungentlemanly to publish private conversations unless the nature of the subject requires it, which was not the case here." But about this, Sir, I differ from you in opinion. The subject did require it, for your book was deficient in information, and I supplied from our private conver-

sation, all the light I had from you on the subject.—But as I had no suspicion, that this could possibly give you offence, I beg pardon, assuring you it was unintentional.

To conclude my remarks on this division of your book. In the following Letters, I shall oppose some of the doctrines you advance, but I assure you, it will afford me the highest pleasure to hear that you "*go and be reconciled to your brother.*" Who, Sir, can die in peace, with hostile feelings towards even a brute? And if your doctrine be true, it is a fearful thing to die, with such feelings towards the man you call your dear Christian brother. What I have said in his defence, will be none of the sins, which *after death* will give me painful reflections.

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# LETTER II.

SIR,

You call the second division of your Book, a "*statement and examination of Mr. Balfour's system.*" But this is a very partial examination. You said, p. 5, "in reviewing this production, I shall confine myself principally to those parts which relate to the subject of a future retribution." If you meant to answer my Essays, you ought first to have proved that man has an *immortal soul*, to suffer your retribution in a disembodied state. But you call the soul *immortal*, assert its suffering in this state without proving that such a *state*, or such a *soul* exists. You thought it best to assume the main questions in debate. But *this, Sir, will not* answer. I am not such

a fool, or your readers such simpletons to be thu imposed on. Assuming these things, looks very sus picious. But these things must be satisfactorily prov ed, for if they are not, your system falls to the ground You have not, nor can you produce a single text, i which the *soul* is called *immortal.* Nor have yo shown from one text, that any *soul* went to hell a death, or is in *hell* suffering after it.

But I proceed to your "statement and examina tion" of my system such as it is. Your *statement* i very brief, and is not strictly correct so far as it goes I was explicit in stating, as the Bible does, that th *spirit* or *life* at death "returns to God who gave it." But your first words are—"Mr. B. holds that the sou of man is mortal." This, Sir, is something very dif ferent. Man at death returns to his original condi tion, the body to the dust, and the spirit to God wh gave it. But again, you say—"he further holds, tha at some future unknown period all men will be rais ed from the dead to a state of immortal happiness." Yes, and you might have added, "will be raised im mortal to enjoy it." You state further, that I be lieve "all punishment or misery must be confined t this world." Yes, Sir, and for a good reason, be cause the Scriptures do not teach any beyond it Your purgatorial punishment after death I consider o heathen origin. Such, Sir, is your very brief state ment of my system; and is, what you call, statin other people's views in a *logical form.* This may sui the object you have in view, and the conclusions a which you wish to arrive. What these conclusion are, we shall see by attending to what you call you "*examination*" of my system.

It ought to be distinctly kept in view, that you principal object is to establish a *future retribution* In order to this, it is essential to have *immortal soul to punish* and *reform* after death. Your labor in thi

division of your Book is merely preparing the way for this final object. My system stands in your way, and something must be done, either to remove it, or make it appear to be a mass of senseless absurdity and contradiction. The last you chose, because it was no doubt the easiest task.

After stating my system as above, you say, p. 21, "let us now inquire in what he makes salvation consist? If men are saved, they must be saved from something; and what is this something from which men are saved? Mr. B. shall answer—from sin, ignorance, idolatry, the course of this world, and from the condemnation in which sin involves us here, and at last from death and the grave: see p. 112, 113. 162. 207, 208. 297. It appears then, that salvation on his plan consists in being delivered from the troubles of this world, and from the grave. Let us examine these positions separately? How are men saved from sin and the course of this world?" From this you go on reasoning, and on p. 23, draw the conclusion, "our author then is drawn to this conclusion; men must be saved by death, or else come short of salvation." Well, how do you arrive at such a conclusion? Your own statement of the question about salvation is, "how are men saved from sin and the course of this world?" But who could ever learn from my writings, that men are saved from these by death, or else must come short of salvation? You clear me of this yourself; for in stating what I say about salvation from sin and the course of this world, you declare "Mr. B. says by preaching Christ and the resurrection." The difficulty about salvation on my system, you state thus, p. 22—"Now I would gladly inquire, how are the heathen, who never hear of the Gospel, and those in Christian lands, who do not believe the Gospel, or obey its requirements to be saved? Mr. B. tells us that they cannot be saved without faith in the resur-

rection; and this faith the heathen do not possess; consequently they are not saved at all. He admits what our observation teaches us, that all infants, idiots, the whole heathen world, and in fact all who do not believe in the resurrection so as to lead a holy life, are not saved in this state; p. 113. 236. 238. The greater part of mankind, then, are not saved from sin or its consequences; or in other words are not saved at all." The whole difficulty about salvation, is then before us; and it must surely be stated in a *logical form*, seeing it is stated at length and in *your own words*. If it is incorrectly stated, you have yourself to blame.

Well, it seems we both admit—"what our observation teaches us; that all infants, idiots, the whole heathen world, and in fact all who do not believe in the resurrection so as to lead a holy life, are not saved in this state." Now let it be distinctly kept in view, what these persons are not saved from in this state. By your own statement of the question it is—"how are men saved from sin and the course of this world?" You declare that I must either save them by death from this, or they are not saved at all. And why? Because I oppose your notion of saving them after death in hell. Let us look at this question in all its bearings—"*how are men saved from sin and the course of this world?*" 1st. You will admit, what our observation teaches us, that death puts an end to, or saves men from sinning in this state of existence.—About this there can be no difference of opinion. If a man sins any after death it must of course be in some other world than this. But 2d. So far as I can learn from your books, you do not advocate, that men will sin any after death in a future state of existence. Until you do advocate this, I have a right to conclude, that you believe death saves men from sinning both here and hereafter. Or in other words, it

puts a final end to their sinning, both in time and eternity. I am here admitting for argument's sake, that your intermediate state exists, and that men have immortal souls, which at death go into it. On such a supposition, it is impossible sin can be committed there by an indulgence of the fleshly lusts, for the flesh is not there to be indulged. If sin is committed in the intermediate state, it must be by gratifying the lusts of the mind or soul, for this is all that goes into this state by your own showing. The reason why you do not advocate that the soul will sin there probably is, if you did, it might be difficult for you to show why it might not sin forever, and its suffering in hell be of endless duration. In fact, it might come to pass, that it sinned more than it suffered, and the pains of hell not only be endless, but forever on the increase. It is incumbent on you to show, why a soul cannot sin as well as suffer in hell without a body. You tell us, p. 66, that Paul makes "the man complete without the body, as complete as an individual is without the house in which he resides." If he can suffer, Sir, in hell, after he goes out of his house, the body, what is to prevent his sinning also? In fact he must sin, unless you have adopted the opinion, which you blamed Mr. Ballou for, that all sin originates in, and ends in the fleshly nature of man. But I take you on your own ground, that men will not sin after death, and inquire

3d. How are men saved from the love of sin if they die in unbelief and impenitence? Saved from the love of sin where? It must be in a future state, for death saves them, or puts an end both to the love and practice of sin in this world. If you contend, the love of sin is carried into a future state, why not also contend, that men will practice what they love there? If you deny sin will be practised there, how do you know it will be loved? If sin is loved in hell,

will it not be difficult to keep damned souls from its practice, for what is loved is generally practised every where.

4th. The only other possible sense, in which your question can be considered, is—how are men saved from the punishment of their sins, if they die in a state of unbelief and impenitence? You think, that on my system they must be saved by death, or they are not saved at all. Accordingly you advocate, that all not adequately punished for their sins in this world must be punished in a future state. This is the grand point for which you contend. And you think it presents a serious difficulty to my system. But, Sir, was you not aware it presented no difficulty at all to it, as I shall now show.

1st: Your difficulty wholly arises, from assuming several things which you well know I do not admit. I have been reasoning with you, for the sake of argument, on the ground that there is an intermediate state; that men have immortal souls; and that at death, they go into it just as they died. But have you forgot that I have no faith in any of these opinions? Are not these the very chief points of dispute between us? But you assume these things as true, and admitted by me; yea, as if I had no right to question their truth. But, Sir, until these points are satisfactorily proved, or are at least admitted by me as true, they present not the least difficulty to my views.—Your whole difficulty arises from your unfounded assumptions. On my system the question is not, how do men die, but in what state are they raised at the resurrection in the last day? Prove, Sir, that men are raised sinners, or will sin after this, and then talk of a difficulty to my system. I deny that the soul is immortal. I deny your intermediate state has any existence except in the imaginations of men. And I hope to show before I have done, that these, and the

sufferings of the soul in a disembodied state, are opinions which originated in heathenism. Before you talk to me about an intermediate state, first prove such a state exists? Before you ask me how men that die in unbelief and impenitence are to be saved from the love, practice, or punishment of sin, you must first prove they have got immortal souls, which need be saved from these, either by death or after it in a disembodied state. If any believe in the doctrine of immortal souls, and take them all to heaven at death, I leave you to settle this difficulty with them at your leisure. It is no concern of mine.

2d. Your difficulty is predicated on this, that many die in a state of unbelief and impenitence; they never lived a holy life in this world, and consequently you take them to hell to bring them to faith and penitence there. You seem to intimate, as if I granted, that faith and obedience here, are absolutely necessary to partaking of the immortal life by Jesus Christ beyond death and the grave. But here lies another of your mistaken assumptions. If I believed this, I should exclude all infants, idiots, the heathen, and all who die in unbelief, from it. I maintain that faith and obedience are absolutely necessary to a participation of the privileges and blessings of Christ's kingdom on earth, and the enjoyment of the hope of future immortality in this life. But it is not faith and obedience, Sir, but being raised immortal in the resurrection, equal unto the angels of God, which fits men for the resurrection state. It is being children of the resurrection, not sons of God by faith in Christ Jesus, prepares men for this state of things. Without this, the believer is no more fitted for it than the unbeliever. And if faith and obedience here, be absolutely necessary, pray what degree of these entitle them to it? For the faith and obedience of some

believers, can hardly be distinguished from the unbelief and disobedience of unbelievers.

3d. Another mistake of yours, and from which your proposed difficulty arises, is, what constitutes an *adequate* punishment of sin. You seem to allow, some are *adequately* punished for every sin they commit, in this world. But those who die in *overt acts* of sin, yea, all not *adequately* punished here, must be punished after death. But who is the best judge, God or Mr. Hudson, what is an *adequate* punishment for sin? No doubt you will answer, God. The inquiry then must be, what does God consider an *adequate* punishment of sin? The Scriptures, not our fancies or preconceived opinions, must determine this question. I begin then with Adam, the first man that sinned. What did God consider an *adequate* punishment of his sin? Was it a punishment in a future state? If it was, then the threatening, Gen. 2: 16, 17, involved a punishment after death, and all the difference between you and our orthodox brethren is, they say *death* included *endless misery*, you say, only *limited punishment*. But unless Adam went to hell for a limited time to be punished, the word of Jehovah failed. This seems unavoidable, unless you can show, that Adam received an adequate punishment here, or that he will receive no punishment after death. But how could the threatening involve punishment after death, if it might all be endured in this state of existence? But my dear Sir, the threatening could not involve a punishment after death, for the following obvious reasons. Adam knew nothing about a future state. He had no promise of life in it, hence could neither forfeit such a life, or incur a punishment in a state which was not revealed to him. Life and immortality are brought to light by the Gospel. So far as we can learn from his history, he knew nothing concerning your doctrines of an immortal

soul, an intermediate state of existence, and happiness or misery after death for souls in it. Now, Sir, if this be the fact of the case, as it certainly is, I demand of you to show, how his posterity came by their immortal souls, and what makes the sins of his posterity so enormous, that punishment after death must be inflicted upon them. If the father of our race did not, yea, could not by his sin incur such a punishment, on what account is it incurred by his sinful children? Does God treat them worse than he did him?

But let us pursue this subject. Did God alter his mind, and annex to his laws a penalty beyond death afterwards? This you cannot consistently advocate, for you have told us, that Moses' law does not even teach a future existence; and that it would be downright contradiction to say, the penalties of his law extended into a future state. I demand then, that you show, when, where, or by whom, God gave a law to the world, the penalties of which do extend into a future state. You must either produce this law, or your system of punishment in a future disembodied state, sinks to rise no more. By your own showing, such a law was not given by God through Moses to the Jews. It is certain no written law whatever was given by God to the Gentiles. And what Paul considered an adequate punishment of their superstitions and abominable vices, he thus states, Rom. 1: 32, "They who commit such things are worthy of death." But where does he, or any sacred writer say, either of Jews or Gentiles, that they were worthy of a punishment beyond it?* But if you will advocate, that men are worthy of punishment beyond

* See also Rev. 2: 22, 23, where the highest degree of punishment threatened the wicked in the Church of Thyatira is *death* Their crimes were similar to those of the Gentiles, Rom. 1. and their punishment is similar. No punishment is threatened beyond death to either of them But why not, if it is true, for the heathen believed in punishment after death?

death for their crimes committed here, why not also advocate, that they are worthy of future immortal life for their virtues, and at once have done with God's grace and Jesus Christ in the affairs of salvation. But if *virtue, good works*, call it by what name you please, has any influence to procure for men an immortal endless life, infants, idiots, the heathen, all who die in unbelief, yea, all believers themselves, must be forever excluded from it. Has any of them, Sir, done more than what was their duty to do?

But, Sir, on the one hand I maintain, that no man by his belief or obedience, can procure for himself a future immortal life. On the other I maintain, that no man by his unbelief and disobedience can forfeit such a life, and subject himself either to a limited or endless punishment in a future state. No; all without exception were given to Christ of his father, and he is to raise them all up at the last day, John 6: 39. Matt. 11: 27. He is appointed heir of all things, Heb. 1: 2. All things are put in subjection to him, Heb. 2: 6—9. And he is to reign until all are subdued and death is destroyed, 1 Cor. 15: 20—29. It is not being sons of God here by faith in Christ Jesus, but being "children of the resurrection, prevents men from dying any more, and which makes them equal unto the angels. On your system it is contended, all are raised immortal in the resurrection, and that immortality after this is to suffer. But you must lso admit, that immortal infants, immortal idiots, immortal unbelievers, yea, immortal imperfect Christians must then exist, for you declare all are to be raised just as they died.

Pause and consider, that a future immortal life, is the very grace given us in Christ Jesus before the world began, 2 Tim. 1: 9, 10. It was made manifest by his appearing, and neither the unbelief of the aged, the infantile weakness of the babe, or idiocy,

can disinherit them. The change from corruption to incorruption, from mortality to immortality, fashioned like unto Christ's glorious body, and made equal unto the angels, will cure all evils whether moral or physical. Without this change, Sir, the best saint that ever lived, as well as the worst sinner, is unfit for the resurrection state. It is probable you may then ask, of what use is it for men to believe, seeing their immortality is certain? I answer this question by asking you another; and what answer you give to it will serve me. Of what use is it for a child to obey his parent, if it is certain he will not disinherit him? Or I may ask—of what use is it for a man to live a virtuous life, if he shall not end his days in the alms-house, the state prison, or on the gallows? It is just as certain that in the keeping of God's commandments there is a great reward, as that the ways of transgressors are hard. Nor is it the *dread* of either limited or endless punishment, which prevents the last or secures the first, but the *hope* of this immortal life. It is "every man who hath this hope in him, purifieth himself even as God is pure." If this hope fails to make men holy, in vain, Sir, do you attempt to make them so, by the terrors of a future retribution.

But it is time, Sir, that I turn the tables upon you, to show, how your supposed difficulty against my system, seriously affects your own. You said above, "he admits what our observation teaches us that all infants, idiots, the whole heathen world, and in fact all who do not believe in the resurrection so as to lead a holy life, are not saved in this state." If our observation teaches us all this, all such persons must be saved by death, saved in a future state, or not saved at all, by your own showing. That they are not saved by death you deny, and hence no time need be spent about this. Let us not forget the kind of

salvation your difficulty refers to. It is, as shown above, salvation "from sin and the course of this world." And this kind of salvation I said was effected by—"faith in the resurrection of Jesus." With such a salvation, you say, "our observation teaches us that all infants, idiots, the whole heathen world, and in fact all who do not believe in the resurrection so as to lead a holy life, are not saved in this state." Agreed. Permit me then to ask

1st. Do you believe in infant damnation? How can you avoid this, unless you save them by death, a thing you deny. Where then do you save them? In hell? This cannot be, for they have never sinned nor walked after the course of this world so as to need such a salvation. Besides, your hell could be no hell to them, for it consists in painful mental reflections on bad deeds done in the body. And as they do not need to be purged from their sins in hell, so they are incapable of moral improvement, for at death their minds were as infantile as their bodies. Here then is a class of beings which do not need salvation from sin or the course of this world. But be it remembered, Sir, this gives them no title to a future immortal life. How then do you dispose of them? Do you confer it on them by an act of God's free grace? It cannot be grace, if their *innocence* or *any thing else*, was taken into view, as a consideration in the bestowment of it.

2d. I ask, do you believe in idiot damnation? Certainly. You have told us, that our observation teaches us that they are not saved in this state. It is a fixed principle in your system, that *souls* or *minds* go into a future state just as the persons died. Well, idiots, such persons lived, idiots they died, and idiots they must forever remain, unless you have some process in a future state, by which you transform them into rational beings. It cannot be by any moral

process, for it is contrary to your analogy, that moral culture ever converted an idiot into a sensible man. And we shall see afterwards, that you deny the possibility of any *physical* means, producing a moral change. Unless you are kind enough to permit God to change them by his power, their condition is utterly and eternally hopeless; being alike incapable of enjoying heaven, or suffering in your hell, which consists in painful reflections on the deeds done in the body. In fact, from the very condition in which idiots are born, they set your hell at defiance.

3d. Do you believe in the damnation of all the heathen world? Certainly you must, for heathens they lived, and heathens they died. They never heard of Jesus' name to be saved by him. Beyond all doubt then, on your system, the whole heathen world have gone to hell. Why should they be exempted from it any more than those who perished in the flood, who you say, were still in hell when you wrote your letters.

4th. Do you believe in the damnation of all who die in unbelief in Christian lands? Certainly you do, for this is one of the things you told us above, which "our observation teaches us." The great majority of those daily dying around us then go to hell, for most people think, a majority in Christian lands live and die in unbelief. The thought, Sir, is appalling; it ought deeply to affect us, even on your system of a limited future punishment. All who have gone to hell are still there, yea, are to be raised in the resurrection just as they died, if you tell us the truth. And how long their punishment is to last after this, God only knows, for on this question you give us no information. Even allowing this little eternity of punishment is at last to end, the thought is enough to take sleep from our eyes, lead us to weeping and

wailing, and to warn each other, lest we come into this place of torment.

5th. Do you believe in the damnation of all believers in Christ? It appears you do not, but on your system, Sir, it is unavoidable. In your Letters, p. 91, you thus write: "We know by what we feel in ourselves, and see in others, that one overt act of wickedness leaves the mind in a state of condemnation and misery; and as many commit the most atrocious crimes the instant they leave this world, it is reasonable to suppose that they will enter into a state of remorse and inquietude after death. To me this has all the force of moral demonstration." You say also, p. 11, "the question is not whether men are punished in this world, but whether they receive *all* their punishment here; not whether they are punished here for their sins *generally*, but whether they are punished for *every* sin they commit; not whether some are fully recompensed on earth, but whether this is true of the whole human kind. All passages and arguments therefore which go to prove that men are punished in this state, have no bearing in the case; they must prove that *every individual receives all his punishment in this world, or that he will receive none after death*, or else they prove nothing in this controversy." Such is your own statement. It teaches universal damnation to "a moral demonstration," unless you can prove, that believers receive all their punishment in this world, or that they will receive none after death. That some believers on your system must go to hell, is beyond all fair debate, for some of them have certainly died in "*overt acts of wickedness*." And why you should exempt the rest who have died with much sin about them, I leave for you to explain at your leisure. Do you believe God winks at the little sins about believers, (not very little neither,) and takes them all to heaven at death?

ought not they to be punished more than others, seeing they knew better, and are designed as examples to others?

But universal damnation, is too strong meat for yourself, or the strongest orthodox man. You are the first man I ever knew, who advocated idiot damnation. When infant damnation was popular, still it was allowed, there were *elect* infants, who were saved from hell. Now, orthodox people are becoming so tender-hearted, that they are for saving them all from hell. Even their *adult children*, who die *in overt acts of wickedness*, and *in a state of unbelief*, they send to hell with great reluctance. And as to believers, it seems to be contended both by you and them, that it is their *faith and obedience* which saves them from hell. Orthodox people, Sir, do not thank you for your tender mercies in saving people *in hell*. On the contrary, they look on your sentiments as unscriptural and ridiculous. I heard Dr. Beecher hold up this notion in such a ridiculous light one evening, that he excited a general laugh throughout his audience. And you may see in what light Mr. Stuart views salvation in hell, by consulting his late Essay on *Aion*, in the Spirit of the Pilgrims.

Well, having got them into hell, it is very natural to ask, how do you accomplish their salvation there? To use your own words you must either save them "by Christ or without him." 1st. Do you save them in hell "*by Christ?*" This is very doubtful. On 1 Peter 3: 18, 19, you tell us Christ went and preached to the spirits in *hell*, but by your own showing, he produced no revival of religion there, nor did he convert a single damned soul. Poor encouragement, Sir, for any missionary to visit this "*infernal prison*" after him. You do not risk a conjecture, that preachers will be raised up among themselves. If they have not *regular preaching* there, it cannot be for

want of clergymen, for some of them no doubt died in *overt acts of sin*, and many died who did not receive an *adequate punishment* for every sin they committed. To send Bibles and tracts to hell, to convert the damned, seems impossible. No man certainly knows where hell is, the road to it, or would undertake their transportation. To suppose they will contrive to furnish themselves with these in hell, is incredible. And to assert, God will furnish them with means of salvation in hell, is without evidence from the Bible. Until you inform us, by what rational means the damned are to be saved by Jesus Christ, I must conclude you intend to save them all without him. But unless you contrive to make infants and idiots sinners in a future state, you leave them without a hell or improvement forever.

2d. Do you save souls in hell without Christ? This I must think is your belief, until you inform us by what rational and Scriptural means you make damned souls acquainted with him. I am confirmed in this opinion, from the means you do provide for the reformation of souls in hell. You say expressly, p. 91, of your Letters, "it is not our belief that this punishment will be inflicted by the immediate hand of God, and as it were out of the common course of his moral dealings, but it will grow necessarily out of the moral natures God has given us; that it will be the legitimate fruit of that guilt of which the mind will be conscious, in consequence of past transgressions." On the same page, you definitely state what your hell is, putting the words in italics, lest they should escape our notice. "*Those who die impenitent will, after death, enter into a state of misery, consisting of anxiety, guilt, and remorse, which will continue until repentance or reformation is effected.*" But infants and idiots have got nothing to repent of. They have got neither moral guilt to make a hell to them, or moral

virtue to fit them for, or make their heaven. It makes no essential difference, Sir, whether you call hell a *place* or a *state*.

It is very obvious from these and other quotations I might make, that you mean to save and reform *souls* in hell. But "*consideration and reflection*," are all the means of salvation you provide for them. And if I do not greatly misunderstand you, their "*consideration and reflection*," are not to be about Christ, but on the evil deeds done in the body. Indeed how can they consider or reflect about Christ without hearing of him? Now, Sir, I bring the debate to a short issue between us. Produce one text which says a single soul in hell was ever saved there by believing in Christ, or by any other means of moral improvement, and I throw up my brief, and relinquish the cause into your hands. But if such a text is not to be found, is it not foolish in you to preach, and still more foolish for any person to believe such a doctrine. You are dissatisfied with Mr. Ballou's views of salvation. You are not better pleased with mine. I leave it for you to say, if you ought not to be still more dissatisfied with your own.

To the above remarks you will likely object.—"1st. Infants and idiots, never needed to be saved from sin and the course of this world, for they have no moral guilt about them." Agreed. But how can their mere innocence entitle them to an immortal life beyond death? Want of moral guilt may secure them against hell, but how can this introduce them into heaven? Adam's innocence gave him no claim to this, nor was such a life after death promised him, or even known by him. Life and immortality are brought to light by the Gospel. On what ground then do you bestow this life on infants and idiots? Granting your system is true, how do you make it hang together with *any* degree of consistency?

2d. You may object—"a future life in happiness or misery, depends on men's reception or rejection of Christ in this world." This will not answer, unless infants, idiots, the heathen, and all who die in unbelief are excluded from heaven, and taken to your hell until they believe in Christ and obey him. I may add, according to this objection, man is indebted to Jesus Christ for his immortality, and it depends entirely on himself, whether it shall be a life of immortal happiness or misery. But this is giving up that people are created with immortal souls. Besides, it is leaving it to the mere whim and caprice of man, if any will be saved at all. If all men should choose to reject Christ, God it seems has loved us, and Christ has died for us to no purpose. God, instead of swearing by himself, that every knee shall bow to him, ought to have sworn by the will or caprice of men.

3d. Your other position from my system is, "that men are saved from death and the grave," p. 23. But you say "this only increases the difficulty" stated in his first position. How? Because "the resurrection cannot with any propriety, on his plan, be said to deliver men from sin and the course of this world. It may introduce men into happiness, but it cannot deliver them from sin." Strange! How can men be introduced into happiness by the resurrection unless delivered from sin, if sin is the cause of their unhappiness? But, Sir, if men are raised "*immortal*" and "*glorious*," yea, "*equal unto the angels in heaven*," where will you find any sin about them in the resurrection? Should you say, this only respects the *righteous*, it will not relieve your difficulty; for if the most righteous are raised just as they died, it must be with much ignorance, prejudice, sin, and corruption about them. Who dies equal unto the angels in heaven? But how can they be raised so, un-

less they died so, if according to your system men are raised in the same state in which they died? I then demand of you to explain, in what way the very best saints get rid of all the sin and corruption they had about them at death? If you can satisfactorily explain this, it will serve my purpose respecting the worst villain who ever ended his days at Tyburn. But if saints and sinners are raised in the resurrection just as they died, your hell and heaven are not first rate schools for improving the morals of immoral souls in an intermediate state. If your hell was very much fitted to lead people to repentance and reform their morals, some who died abandoned sinners might be raised the first rate saints. Your hell is not to be compared to the Catholic purgatory for a speedy reformation of souls. Nor, are your means of reforming them one half so rational as theirs. If souls may be reformed in hell, I can see no objection against praying for their reformation, any more than praying for the salvation of souls in India, or any other quarter of the globe. If souls after death go to hell in the centre of this earth, as Dr. Allen seems to think, why not pray for the salvation of immortal souls in the centre as well as on the surface of the globe? The only difficulty I can see is, we cannot follow up our prayers for their salvation by any other active exertions. We cannot send the means of salvation to them.

But you say, p. 24—"if death destroys the whole man, as he contends, he can no more be a sinner after death, than a nonentity can be; and to say that a nonentity is delivered from sin, by being brought into conscious existence, is to use words without any signification." I thank you, Sir, for this concession. If man has no conscious existence after death, as I contend, then you allow he is not "a sinner after death." It is your system says, men are sinners

after death, yea, even after the resurrection. I leave it then for you to say—is it not worse than using words without signification, to speak of a man being a nonentity after he is raised from the dead? And I press you for the proof, that men are to be sinners after they are raised from the dead immortal, glorious, and equal unto the angels in heaven. Cease, Sir, from turning the subject into ridicule as you do, p. 24. You will find employment enough without a resort to this. Common sense teaches, that *death* can no more deliver the best saint from all sin and corruption, than it can the worst sinner. On your system, I should like to know, how death can free the former more than the latter, and why you take the one to heaven with a little sin about him, yet send the other to hell because he has a great deal?

But you say further, p. 24. "But another difficulty arises; this is saving men by a physical and not by moral causes. It is a given principle in philosophy, that moral causes produce moral effects, and physical causes produce physical effects." In illustration of this principle you refer us to "the chilling breezes of the north, the burning heat of a vertical sun," and "a fever," that these "never change the heart or dispositions of men." You then add, "now let us apply this plain principle to the case before us. Mr. B. admits that many die impenitent, and consequently cannot become penitent in the intermediate state; for between death and the resurrection they have no conscious existence. But he contends that they will be raised to happiness. But the resurrection is not a moral but a physical operation, and consequently will produce only a physical effect."—Strange! very strange philosophy indeed, for 1st, God created angels, and who disputes that they were created by a physical cause. But according to your philosophy they were not created moral beings, for a

physical cause can only produce a physical effect. Again, Adam was created by a physical cause, but according to your philosophy, God did not create him a moral being, for you say, "moral causes produce moral effects, and physical causes produce physical effects." Neither angels or men, Sir, according to your reasoning, were created moral beings. Inform us then if you please, how God after he made them by a physical operation, transformed them into moral beings.

Again; in the resurrection, men according to your philosophy, whether they died saints or sinners, cannot be raised as the angels of God in heaven. Why? Because none of them died equal unto the angels of God in heaven either as to soul or body; and you assure us all are to be raised just as they died; and that "a physical operation can only produce a physical effect." It is very evident then, that the best saints are to be raised with all their sins, ignorance, superstition, and prejudice about them. By your own showing then, they are neither fit for heaven in the intermediate state, nor after they are raised from the dead. To your hell they must all go, to be purged from their imperfections, so as to be fitted for heaven. If you deny this, state to us explicitly, how you purge them at death, and take them to heaven. Should you resort to some physical operation to effect this, perhaps the same operation may effect a purgation of all the rest of mankind. But perhaps *God's philosophy* is somewhat different from yours. Why should it be thought a thing incredible with you, that God should raise the dead, immortal, glorious, and equal unto the angels of God, whatever was their moral or physical state at death? Do you limit his power to your philosophy?

"*Consideration and reflection*," are the wonder working moral causes, by which you are to accomplish

the salvation of the wicked, both in the intermediate state and after the resurrection. As you are opposed to all physical operations in effecting their salvation, it is perhaps on this account you tell us, no external application of punishment is used in reforming the damned. Nor is any punishment to be inflicted on them by the immediate hand of God. In fact you say, "the north wind, the heat of a vertical sun," or "a fever" in hell, would just as soon convert a sinner there, as any physical application of punishment by either God or man. Well, admitting your hell exists, and damned souls are to be reformed there, let us candidly inquire, if the means of salvation you provide, are adapted to attain this end. We shall judge of this from your own account concerning their success. So far as I can learn from your writings, "*consideration and reflection*," are your moral means of salvation in hell. But by your own account, those means in *hades* your first hell, prove only like water spilt on the ground in reforming wicked souls. The souls of those who perished in the flood were still in hell when you wrote your Letters. And though you contend, Christ went and preached to these damned souls, not one of them was saved or reformed by his preaching. Again; you assure us, that all are to be raised just as they died, which shows the total failure of your means of salvation in hades. Well, *gehenna* is your second hell. Let us see what "*consideration and reflection*" effects there? Into it wicked souls go just as they died, for such means did not save them in *hades*. But what reason have you to think, these means will operate to more advantage in *gehenna?* In *gehenna*, *immortal souls* are now united to *immortal bodies*, and these two-fold *immortal hardened sinners* seem two-fold more the children of hell than before. Reason would deem their case hopeless. Your first hell, and means of reforma-

tion there, are worse than this world. Here, Jesus Christ made a few converts by his preaching. But in *hades* he made none. Do you mean to send him to *gehenna* to preach after the resurrection? But how do you know that his preaching will be attended with any better success? And, if "*consideration and reflection*" produced no good effect on sinners in *hades*, why should it do this in *gehenna?* Remember, in *hades* you only had *immortal souls* to reform. But in *gehenna*, you have got these *immortal souls*, united now to *immortal bodies*, and these *doubly immortal sinners* are to be purged and reformed by the very same *thing* which did them no good in *hades*. Let us suppose your system true. Is not the ferocious tiger as likely to be changed into a lamb, while sucking his paws and musing on his past depredations and present hunger, as that sinners in *gehenna*, will be reformed and fitted for heaven by such means?

But the object you had in view by your foregoing reasonings, is thus brought out in your next sentence. "All moral effects are produced by consideration and reflection, which of course require a period of time for their operation." Two of the principal articles of your creed, are here developed. 1st. That your moral means of reformation in hell are "consideration and reflection." 2d. That effects produced by such means require a period of time for their operation even in hell. As my Bible is silent about reformation in hell, or that it is to be accomplished by "*consideration and reflection*," pray where did you find these articles of your creed? It must have been from your lost revelations. But if you know so well what they contained, why not publish an edition of them, that we may all see what they say, and judge for ourselves? If *gehenna*, Sir, be your *hell* after the resurrection, it is certain the punishment of it is inflicted by the hand of God. This you own when

you come to comment on Matt. 10: 28. Luke 12: 4, 5. And certainly you will allow, that those texts do not speak of any reformation in *gehenna*, either by consideration and reflection, or any thing else.

I advocated, as Paul did, 1 Cor. 15, "that the resurrection will be instantaneous." But in opposition to this you say, p. 25, "infinite creatures, an instantaneous change of disposition is impossible.—The resurrection, as such, being a physical operation, will not affect the disposition of the creature. The simple act of raising a man to life would no more change his character than waking a man from sleep would change his character." It seems then, all things are not possible with God. But you should notice, Sir, the question is not, will "the simple act of raising a man to life change his character." No, the question is, will the instantaneous change wrought by God in raising the dead immortal and glorious, produce no such change? Or, are they all to be raised with the same character and disposition in which they died? The latter you assert. But if this be true, how are any raised as angels of God in heaven? By what moral operation do you accomplish this? The change at the resurrection, Sir, is to be instantaneous, in the twinkling of an eye, whether accomplished by a *physical* or *moral* operation, and these are the only operations which you mention. But where do you find, that after God has raised the dead by a physical operation, he reforms them by your slow process of "*consideration and reflection*" to make them equal unto the angels in heaven? You must then either admit, that God changes the best saint that ever died, by a physical operation in the resurrection, or take all saints to hell to make them equal unto the angels by a moral operation. A *physical operation*, Sir, can no more produce a *moral change* in a saint than in the worst sinner, by your own showing.

But in confirmation of your conclusions, you have the following remarkable words, p. 25. "We readily admit that the resurrection and the state into which it introduces men, may present moral causes or considerations which lead to a change of heart or disposition, but this cannot take place in an instant." How the *mere resurrection*, can present moral causes or considerations which lead to a change of heart, is not easily perceived. Did you not, Sir, in the very sentence which precedes this say, "the simple act of raising a man to life would no more change his character, than waking a man from sleep would change his character?" And is it not a fixed principle in your philosophy, that the resurrection is a physical operation, and can only produce a physical effect? "The state into which it introduces men," you say, "may present moral causes or considerations which lead to a change of heart or disposition," and these are "consideration and reflection." But you tell us, this "*cannot take place in an instant.*" But, if you choose, Sir, to contradict the apostle, I cannot help it, for all the change he or any other sacred writer mentions as taking place at the resurrection, is in the twinkling of an eye, which I call an *instant.* It will be difficult for you to show, that any change takes place after this, either on saint or sinner, by a slow moral process, or instantaneous physical operation. But where do you find it written, that men when introduced into the resurrection state, will need a change of heart or disposition by any process whatever? Could this be proved by any text of the Bible, why not quote it at once, and save yourself and readers all this metaphysical reasoning about it? If "*consideration and reflection*," or any other *slow moral process in hell*, is to effect a reformation of sinners there, why not adduce Scripture authority for it? But instead of doing this, you wish to make your readers

believe I am your authority for this. After saying, moral reformation in hell cannot "take place in an instant," you add, "Mr. B. himself must admit this," for "he asserts, that every man is converted, reconciled to God, and fitted for heaven by exercising faith in Christ." But, Sir, I have said no such thing, for though faith in Christ is absolutely necessary to conversion, and the enjoyment of the *hope* of immortality, yet faith in Christ without the change effected in the resurrection, does not fit them or any one else for heaven. If I believed what you ascribe to me, I should believe that infants, idiots, yea, all who die in unbelief, are excluded from heaven, which forms a vast majority of mankind. As you are opposed to saving any persons by *death*, by the *resurrection*, by a *physical operation*, yea, even by *an instantaneous operation*, pray how do you save any of these from your hell in a future state? You must either save them by death without Christ, or take them kindly to hell to save them after it by your slow moral process. To change them in a moment on your system, is *impossible*. You say it is "begging the question and contradicting all analogy." If analogy is your Bible, I ask, "if persons are not reformed in this state of existence, how does analogy teach you, that they will be reformed in the next state, or in any future state *ad infinitum?*" And if you can prove this by analogy, why not also prove by the same principle that they will be reformed in hell by the same means as persons on earth? And why not by the same principle prove, that these means in hell, will prove successful in some, and unsuccessful in others, in reforming sinners as is the case on earth? Be pleased also to tell us, how far you are to go, and where you are to stop, in proving things by your principle of analogy?

But you say, p. 26, respecting "*the physical act* of

raising the dead to life. If this saves men, then it is a physical and not a moral salvation; the body may be placed beyond the reach of pain, but the mind may be left in darkness, and the conscience may sting like an adder. The cause in this case being physical, the effect must be of the same nature."—But how, Sir, can the minds of infants and idiots sting like an adder after death, for they have no minds or even guilt to sting them? Until a physical operation is wrought upon them, they are incapable of all moral instruction. Even on the principle of analogy, how can you prove that the mind of an adult, will after death sting like an adder, yet the body be without pain? If both felt pain before death, analogy rather teaches, both will feel pain after it. If you say, facts teach that the body cannot feel after death, I then ask, what facts teach you, that the mind will? If death puts an end to the pain of the one, show by facts or any other mode of proof, that it does not also put an end to the pain of the other. If you could have proved this from Scripture, you had no occasion to introduce the principle of analogy, and spend so much metaphysical reasoning on this subject. This point proved, Sir, and the question is settled between us. But as you cannot prove this from Scripture, the principle of analogy and these reasonings are introduced to amuse your readers, and cover your defect of Scripture testimony. But who cares for your reasonings, on a subject, concerning which, no mortal man can know any thing, except from the testimony of God. I may add, if men are to be raised with the same moral characters and mental dispositions as they died, why not raise them also with the same bodily defects, diseases and infirmities? If one man died deaf and dumb, another died of the stone, and another had the leprosy at his death, why not raise all these persons in the same bodily condition?

And is not this just as rational, and as Scriptural too, as to say, if a man died a noted liar, a drunken sot, or a bold blasphemer, he is to be raised in the same moral condition? What proof can you produce that the resurrection is to cure all the physical evils of the body, yet all the moral maladies of the mind remain? According to your system, the incorruption and glory of the resurrection state, is only to respect the body. If it respects both mind and body, the persons who died wicked, are only to be made incorruptible and glorious sinners both as to mind and body, for we shall see afterwards, you advocate immortality is to suffer. But is not this, and all similar reasoning introduced in support of a favorite theory, which you find lacks proof from Scripture? And may not the words of our Lord be here applied "ye do err not knowing the Scriptures or the power of God?"

On p. 27, you say, "but our essayist will probably say, that men are saved by being instructed after the resurrection." From this you proceed to p. 32, to make your readers believe, that I advocate men are to undergo a course of moral instruction after the resurrection. Such an idea, Sir, never entered my mind, and you must have been very scarce of proof, to draw such an inference from my words. You are aware this is your own inference, for you say—"it is true he does not declare this in plain words, but he says that which necessarily involves it." You then give us five pages of your metaphysical reasoning, with the express purpose of *involving* me in this. But you upset the whole of it by saying, p. 32, "but Mr. B. attempts to support the idea that sinners will be instantaneously brought to penitence by the case of Saul." But, Sir, if I did this, how could I support all you have been attempting to fasten on me in the five preceding pages? As to what you say, respecting the case of Saul, p. 32—34, two

brief remarks are only necessary. 1st. I introduced the case of Saul to illustrate my subject, but you wish your readers to believe, that I introduced his case, and reasoned on your principle of analogy, and that I justify you in your use of it. But I must have been a fool to support your system. No reader of my Essays will readily believe this.

2d. Your object in all your labored reasonings respecting Saul, is very manifest. It was to give a plausible appearance to two essential points in your system. 1st. It took three days to convert Saul, and reasoning by analogy you tell us, "sinners at the resurrection may remain in anxiety and grief three days," or for a longer period of time. 2d. That immortality may suffer. Your system absolutely requires this, hence you say, p. 33, 34, "if an immortal being can suffer three days, he may three years, or three centuries; at least immortality will not prevent it." And why not say, he may suffer forever, for immortality so far from preventing it, will only fit him for enduring it? Immortality and endless misery, are as fitted for each other, as immortality and endless happiness. And why not also say, the immortal God may suffer, for at least "immortality will not prevent it." But all this goes on the assumption, *that Saul when he suffered was an immortal being*, a thing said of no man, until raised immortal in the resurrection. If you reason by *analogy* from his case about future suffering, you must make it of short duration. But by your own account, the persons who perished in the flood, have been suffering in hell for nearly four thousand years. Perhaps about this, you reckon in the prophetic style, in putting one day for a thousand years. But even on this view, some of those who have gone to hell, ought to have been released a thousand years ago.

In closing your remarks on this division of your

book, you apologise for your reasonings to your readers, that they will think them—"*too nice and critical, too abstruse and metaphysical.*" Such an apology is very necessary, for it may be doubted if you understood some of them yourself. But you caution us not to be *violently opposed* to them, for this is only to show our "*ignorance and indolence.*" If we are so ignorant and foolish as to find fault with them, we are told—"the fault is chargeable upon the system I have been examining. That system has recourse to so many intricate windings that it cannot be justly exposed without following it to its hiding places." But if all this should be admitted as true, of what use are you to your readers, if in dragging my system forth to the light, you envelope yourself in the mist of "*nice, critical, metaphysical reasonings?*" When my system, right or wrong, requires me to pursue such a course, I shall strongly suspect it unscriptural, and of no consequence to mankind.

In closing my remarks on this division of your book permit me to say, 1st. All the world, the uttermost parts of the earth were the boundaries of the apostles' parish. Their commission did not extend to *hell*, either to *hades* or *gehenna*. But according to your system, their sound is not only to go into all the earth, their words to the ends of the world, but it is even to be heard in hell. If it is not, the salvation of the damned is hopeless, from your "*consideration and reflection.*"

2d. If damned souls do not sin in *hades* and *gehenna*, will you be kind enough to inform us, what prevents their sinning there as well as here, and why they may not sin as much as they suffer and so their sinning and suffering be of endless duration. Some of the most intelligent orthodox men now, predicate endless punishment on the ground of endless sinning.

3d. But admitting your system in all its parts to

be infallibly correct, would it not be well for you to be brought to "*consideration and reflection*" in this world? Should you happen to die with an old grudge in your mind against Mr. Ballou, it is certain you must go to hell by your own showing. This, Sir, ought to alarm you, for you do not pretend to say, how long time it may take in hell, to purge this single old grudge out of you, by "*consideration and reflection.*" Get rid of it, yea, receive an *adequate* punishment for all your other sins, for hell is your inevitable portion if you do not, by your own statements.—In one word, I advise you to keep out of hell. Should you once get there, perhaps you may have misgivings of heart respecting the truth of your own doctrine. The bitterest ingredient in your cup of misery there, may probably be the horrible thought, that you shall never drink the last of it.

4th. The question in debate between you and me is, not about the duration of future misery. No, Sir, I deny that God ever threatened men with a punishment for either soul or body after death. First find your *immortal souls* to punish after death. Second, find your hell to punish them in. When these questions are settled, it will be time enough to discuss the question, how long shall their punishment last?

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# LETTER III.

SIR,

I SHALL now notice the third division of your book, styled—"*Rules of Interpretation.*" You set out by observing—"in the first place it will be impor-

tant to adopt just rules of interpretation in order rightly to understand the Scriptures." Certainly. But after quoting, p. 47 of my First Inquiry, in proof of this, you add, "Mr. B. has two rules of interpretation to which he is in a great measure indebted for his whole system." These are

1st. "*Etymology*." You discuss this from p. 37—41. But, so far from essentially differing from you, I almost *entirely* agree to your statements. You quote from me, what I quoted from Dr. Campbell, on the word *anastasis* rendered resurrection, to show our mutual agreement. All the exception I make is the following. Concluding your remarks on the word *anastasis*, you say—"this shows that the primitive meaning of a term cannot determine its sense, especially in the Scriptures." Instead of the word *especially* in this sentence, I would use the word *always*. I am at a loss to perceive, why "the primitive meaning of a term, cannot determine its sense" in the *Scriptures*, as well as in any other writings. *Etymology* is not a certain rule, *always* to determine the sense of a term either in the Scriptures or any other writings, but what man, yourself not excepted, does not avail himself of it? From what you say, one might conclude, you rejected this rule altogether.—But to show that I place too great dependance on "the primitive meaning of words," you quote p. 68 of my First Inquiry thus: "Since neither sheol nor hades, nor even the word hell, in English, *originally* signified a place of endless misery, we ask, is it not a perversion of the divine oracles, to quote any of the texts in which sheol or hades occurs to prove it?" But Sir, was this conclusion made on the ground of the mere *etymology* of those words? No; the sixty-seven preceding pages show, that I drew my conclusion, not relying on the *etymology* of those words, but their *Scripture usage*. This conclusion was drawn in

my concluding remarks, after having examined all the texts in the Bible where these words are used, and it was found no sacred writer expressed by them a place of future punishment for the wicked. If your cause be the cause of truth, why accuse me of resting my cause merely on etymology, when every man who has read my First Inquiry, knows it to be utterly false? But do you tell us, what was the primitive meaning of *sheol* and *hades* or our English word hell? And can you tell us when the primitive sense of these words was laid aside, and made to express your place of punishment in a future state? And if this was not the primitive meaning of these terms, will you be kind enough to tell us what the name of your *hell* was, before their sense was changed to express it? Who was the first Scripture writer, Sir, who applied them in this new sense? Answer these questions if you can?

2d. "*Scripture usage.*" Yes, Sir, I rely on this rule. Let us see what you say concerning it. 1st. You say, p. 41, 42, "when he relies upon Scripture usage he gives up the etymology of words, and when he relies upon etymology, he gives up Scripture usage. Those rules in many cases are in direct opposition to each other. Now surely implicit confidence cannot be placed in two rules which are frequently at war with each other." On this it may be observed, 1st. As this is a mere *group* of assertions, without the slightest attempt at proof, it deserves no notice. It is too late in the day, Sir, for *assertions* to pass for truth. 2d. As to the first of your assertions, my whole writings prove the reverse of it is the truth. I am surprised you risked such an assertion which is so easily detected by my readers. The very instance you refer to, respecting *sheol*, *hades*, and *hell*, shows it false. Do I give up either etymology or Scripture usage in remarking on these words? What

reader of my book will believe your assertion? You do not believe it yourself. 3d. It is not to be doubted, that could you have found one instance in my writings, in proof of your assertion, it would have been produced. I demand of you to produce such an example, or take back this assertion as counterfeit coin in controversy. As to your other assertions, they do no particularly concern me. It may however be remarked, when a man makes such sweeping assertions concerning rules of interpretation, it becomes him at least to illustrate them by some examples. But perhaps examples were not easily found, to prove, that *etymology* and *Scripture* usage are "*frequently at war with each other.*" You ought to be ashamed of such assertions, for if I relied on the *etymology* of the words rendered hell, and gave up Scripture usage, why did I introduce the passages where these words occur? But are they not all introduced and considered? And if I relied on *Scripture usage*, why did I introduce etymology? Are not both these rules introduced, and on the same subject? What can I think of the man who makes such statements?

You say p. 42, "but what is this Scripture usage of which he makes so much account? Why, it is counting the number of times a word occurs in the Scriptures, and if it can be shown that it is used in a certain sense in a majority of instances, it is concluded that it must always have this sense. For instance, a word occurs *twenty* times, *eleven* times it is used literally, hence in the other *nine* instances, it is used literally, whether the context or subject admit it or not. This is literally determining truth by vote! And should there be no majority, there could be no decision." Here again you give us a longer string of assertions. All I have to do is to assert, that they are all and individually false. But I do more; I pledge myself to relinquish the cause I advocate into

Mr. Hudson's hands, if he will take his oath, that he believes his own assertions to be true; or will find one man in ten who ever read my books, that will say his assertions are correct. What man, Sir, of the least candor will say, that I determine truth by vote, or the number of times a word occurs in Scripture? I have no occasion to thank you, for not adducing examples from my writings, to expose my ridiculous practice. No; could one example have been found, it would have been exposed, and dwelt on for the amusement of the reader. I am happy that such an example you could not find. Let my readers then judge, what sort of antagonist I have to deal with, who asserts what he cannot prove, but what my writings disprove. But you say—"against this rule of interpretation we have many objections." So have I; but you only mention two. 1st. "This rule as well as the other just noticed, entirely overlooks the context." On p. 43 you add, "but Mr. B's Scripture usage sets all these principles at defiance. According to that rule, the subject, the context, and scope of the writer, have nothing to do with the subject, and consequently there is no impropriety in dissecting a passage and mutilating the sacred Scriptures." Your second objection is, "if Scripture usage must always determine the sense of terms, then no writer can advance any thing which has not been taught before." On these objections I have to remark, 1st. A man may by attending to Scripture usage overlook the context, but the question is—*have I done it?* Could you have proved this by examples from my books, it would have saved you all said in p. 44, 45, respecting "*John the Baptist*," and that "*the greater part of the Scriptures apply to this world.*" But either your powers failed here, or my books furnished no materials for them to work on.

You assert and insinuate, but produce no examples that this is my mode of interpreting Scripture.

2d. As an honorable man, show where I have said, that "Scripture usage must *always* determine the sense of terms," without any other rule of interpretation being taken into view. I demand of you, to produce an example from my writings, where Scripture usage is made my rule, to the neglect of the context, subject, or scope of the writer; and as you assert, "sets all these principles at defiance." Your *honor* and *integrity* are here implicated. What intelligent man, when system is out of view, does not avail himself of Scripture usage? You know how to avail yourself of this rule, when you deem it in your favor.

3d. In looking over my books, I have not been able to find an instance, where I have interpreted a text in violation of the context and scope of the writer. But before I have done, I shall notice one or two instances, where I have not sufficiently used these rules of interpretation to my advantage, which probably may create a wish, that you had not said I set "all these principles at defiance." By the use of these principles, I can increase the evidence in support of my opinions, but I have noticed little or nothing I would correct by them.

4th. In your second objection you say, "if Scripture usage must always determine the sense of terms, then no writer can advance any thing which has not been taught before." Strange! If this was true, a word used in ten texts in the same sense, is only repeating ten times the same thing, without any additional information. Very few writers would put their reputation at hazard, by risking such an assertion. To conclude. If I had only *two* rules of interpretation, *etymology* and *Scripture usage*, and in my use of them perverted the Scriptures, it was incumbent on you to show this by examples, and not palm

on your readers such assertions. When our readers have read our books they can judge for themselves on which side this perversion lies.

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# LETTER IV.

Sir,

The fourth division of your book is styled "*state of the dead.*" You commence by saying, "Mr. B's first Essay is designed to prove that man has no immortal soul," and, "that there is no existence between death and the resurrection." Well, do you proceed to prove that man has *an immortal soul?* No Sir, though this may be called the *soul* of your system, and though you often call the soul *immortal*, yet you neither have, nor can you produce proof of it from Scripture. So far from this, you only promise to "take a *brief* view" of my arguments in support of my position.

On p. 48, you *merely refer* to what I said in my Essays, p. 14, 15, where "the dead, whether good or bad, are said to go '*to their fathers*' or to *sleep* with their fathers." But let the reader turn to those pages, where he will see, that this is said of all without distinction, yea, of whole generations. In the margin of several of the texts referred to, it is, "to lie down with their fathers." But, Sir, are all *immortal souls* gathered together, and do they lie down together in a future state? No, according to your system, they are separated at death; good souls you send to heaven, and wicked souls you send to the prison of hell to be reformed by "*consideration* and reflection."

That going to their fathers, and sleeping with their fathers, refer to their *souls*, you contend. You say—"the very idea of going to them supposes that they were somewhere, which of itself shows that they were not out of existence." On this, Sir, notice then, 1st. That you consider *souls* after death to be in some *place*, for you say they were "*somewhere*." 2d. But notice, whatever place this was, they were all *asleep*, and they all *slept together*. This does not agree with sending some souls to heaven and others to hell. Do you believe immortal souls are *asleep* in heaven? And is it your opinion, that *immortal souls* you send to *hell*, are *dead* or *asleep* there? How then can you either punish or reform them by "*consideration and reflection?*" But 3d. Job tells us they are all *asleep in the dust together*, chap. 7: 21. Is either *heaven* or *hell* in the dust?

I said, "when persons are said to go to their fathers, Gen. 15: 15, and to go down to their children, who were dead, Gen. 37: 35, nothing more seems to be meant, than, that they had gone to *sheol* or *hades*, where all the dead are represented as in one vast congregation." To this you reply—"but does it follow that man has no existence, because he goes to hades, the state of the dead—a state in which the rich man experienced pain, and Lazarus happiness? He that sees force in this reasoning must have acute penetration," p. 48. Answer. That man must be *dull* indeed, Sir, who does not perceive, that your *nice critical metaphysical* powers, could not here devise a reply. You admit they went to *hades*, they went to *sleep* there with their fathers, and you have declared, that "this supposes they were *somewhere*, they were not out of existence." Well it was *somewhere*, and it is but of minor importance where it was, for the principal question to be settled is—*were they in a state of conscious existence?* No Sir, they were *asleep* or *dead*. But

it seems, though *asleep* or *dead* with their fathers, who were *asleep* or *dead* with them, yet you think they were all in existence. But how could they be both *dead* and *alive* at the same time, and in the *same place*, which you admit was *hades*, and refer us to the rich man and Lazarus, to prove it a place of happiness and misery? The man who wrote this must have been nodding.

But you notice some of the numerous texts I quoted and referred to, and say they are not to my purpose. Your first is Ps. 88: 12, where *sheol* or the grave is called—"the land of forgetfulness." You say, "this forgetfulness in all probability relates not to the dead but to the living." You then quote Ps. 31: 12, with a view to prove this. But both these texts were referred to by me, the one to prove that the dead were in a state of forgetfulness themselves, and the other, that they were forgotten by the living. You only risk a contrary opinion as a mere *probability*.—What man except yourself, thinks the dead are *annihilated*, because they are in a state of forgetfulness? But you refer to verses 4, 5 of Ps. 88, where, concerning the dead it is said—"*whom thou rememberest no more*." But how does God remember the dead no more? He remembers them no more as he does the living, as the context shows. And unless you deny the doctrine of the resurrection, "*no more*," simply means, he remembers them no more as he does the living until the resurrection. At this period he will remember all the dead, as could be easily shown from Scripture.

Again, you say p. 49—"On p. 17, he quotes Ps. 6: 5, for in death there is no remembrance of thee—to prove the whole man becomes extinct at death." But if the living forget the dead, is this any proof that they are extinct with them? And how can it prove, that the deity becomes extinct, if he even should for-

get the dead forever, and they also forever forget him? But such is the way you reason here on this subject.

You next quote Ps. 115: 17. p. 50. "The dead praise not the Lord, neither any that go down into silence." You immediately add—"Now the evident meaning of this passage is, the dead cannot join with the living in praising God, or cannot praise him in the same manner." You then refer to Isai. 38: 18, 19, in corroboration of this explanation. But who disputes with you, that the dead cannot praise God in "*the same manner*" as the living do? What you have got to prove is—that the dead praise God *in any manner*. But do these texts, or any others assert, that the dead praise God in a *different manner* from the living, or *in any manner whatever?* No, Sir, could you have found proof of this, it would have settled the question at once, and saved you an immense deal of trouble. If the dead praised God in *any manner*, David never would have said, that they "*go down into silence.*" But you add, the dead "cannot instruct their children and others as the prophets did." Very true, but can you show, *that the dead are either engaged in instructing others*, or *receiving instruction themselves in hades?* In short, can you prove, *that they are employed in instructing, praising God, or serving him in any conscious active manner?* It is surprising you do not find employment for them, in carrying forward your process of reformation in hell. But I presume you was afraid to go so far as this, for you are as silent about it, as the dead of whom we are speaking. If you could only find proof of this in the Bible, I allow it is a more rational mode of converting the damned, than the means you prescribe. But all these texts, and Ps. 30: 9, which you refer to, and indeed the whole Bible fail you, for it affords no proof on such subjects.

You proceed thus on p. 51. "But the passage on which Mr. B. seems mostly to rely is, Ps. 146: 3, 4. 'Put not your trust in princes, nor in the son of man, in whom there is no help. His breath goeth forth, he returneth to his earth: in that very day his thoughts perish.' Whenever he feels himself in distress for his favorite system, this passage is brought into view. As he regards this as his strongest text, we will give it a particular investigation." You mistake, Sir, in calling this my strongest text. But it was of some consequence to you so to represent it, for you happened to find a criticism, which you fancied took it out of my hands. But the following remarks will set you right about this. We had seen this criticism of Parkhurst's, but took no notice of it for several reasons, very different from that insinuated by you, p. 53. 1st. We had abundance of texts in proof of the point in question allowing this text was laid entirely aside. See all the texts quoted and referred to in my Essays. A host of texts is left behind, were I to allow it had no bearing on the subject. But

2d. Supposing the word rendered *thoughts* in the common version, translated *projects*, *schemes*, or *splendors*, as you wish it to be, it does not in the slightest degree alter the text in your favor. If at death, a man's *projects*, *schemes*, or *splendors* perish, still you have got it to prove, that after death he retains his *thoughts*. No one doubts that the former perish at death, but does this passage intimate, that the last is continued with him? But the last it ought to prove, if it is any thing to your purpose. But

3d. This passage stands directly against your system and in favor of my views. Concerning man it says—"his breath goeth forth, he returneth." But to where does he return? To heaven or hell to think, to be happy, or miserable? No, Sir, his breath, soul,

*spirit* or *life* goeth forth, and the Scriptures say, it "*returns to God who gave it.*" It is added—"he returneth to his earth," which all allow refers to the body. This text then like Eccl. 3: 19—21, describes how the whole man is disposed of at death, and both declare, that it returns to its original condition, the body to the dust, and the breath or life to God who gave it. When it is said, that the spirit "returns to God who gave it," it is never intimated, that it returns to him, to exist and think, either in a happy or miserable condition. It returns to him who is the author of life, who gives it and takes it away at his pleasure; and is to give man life again by a resurrection from the dead.

4th. It still remains even to be proved, that the term rendered *thoughts* in the common version, ought to be understood *projects*, *schemes*, or *splendors* as you allege. But as it does not affect my views, or support yours, it would be turning aside from the point at issue to discuss this question here. Did you not contend above, that words are used in different senses in Scripture? If this word is then both used for *thoughts* and *splendors*, how do you prove, that the former is not its usage in this text? But it is nothing to your purpose, were it proved that in every text it meant *splendors*.

On p. 54, you quote Prov. 14: 32, and 11: 7, "the righteous hath hope in his death," and "when a wicked man dieth his expectation shall perish." It is agreeable to the fact of the case, that the righteous hath hope in his death, for in his death he hopes to be raised again from the dead. It is also agreeable to the fact, that the expectations of the wicked perish at death, and what these are, you may see from Ps. 49: 10—20, with other passages. But I am sorry to see you alter the first text to suit your theory thus: "the saint has hope or enjoyment *after* death." Be-

ware, Sir, of taking such liberties with the Bible, for surely you must know, there is an important difference between *in* death and *after* death. If it meant *after* death, it would be enjoyment not hope, for what a man seeth or enjoyeth why doth he yet hope for it? What would you not say of me, did I thus alter the Bible to suit my system?

Your next text quoted from my Essays, is Eccl. 9: 4—6. "The dead know not any thing." You have accused me of depending on *etymology* and *Scripture usage*, and neglecting the context and scope of the writer. I shall now show you, that I have not sufficiently availed myself of the context of this passage in my favor. Taking it into view let us ask, 1st. Where do men go to when they die? Verse 3 answers thus—"after that they go to the dead." 2d. Let us ask—where have the dead gone to? Verse 10 answers, to "the grave (sheol) whither thou goest." But 3d. Let us ask—what is the condition of the dead who have gone to sheol or the grave? Verse 10 answers, "there is no work nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom in *sheol* or the *grave* whither thou goest." It is further answered verse 6, "their love, and their hatred, and their envy, is now perished." And verse 5 answers still further, "*the dead know not any thing.*" This, Sir, is a very different account from yours, concerning the dead in *sheol* or *hades*. Instead of not knowing any thing, you maintain that the dead there are either in happiness or misery. And instead of being engaged in no work, nor device, knowledge, or wisdom, you tell us the wicked are at work in reforming themselves by "*consideration and reflection*," which no doubt requires all their device, knowledge, and wisdom to accomplish. And instead of their love, and hatred, and envy being perished in *sheol*, you tell us, that they go there just as they died, with all their bad moral qualities about them. Moreover,

they are to be raised in the resurrection with the same bad moral qualities, which shows how little improvement they have made in *sheol* or *hell*, under your process of moral reformation. But 4th. Let us ask—why does Solomon make such statements concerning the condition of those in sheol? Verses 7—10 shows, it was to teach us a proper enjoyment of the things of this life, and to do with alacrity, whatsoever our hands find us to do. As the first cannot be enjoyed, so neither can the last be done after death. But 5th. Let us ask, why did Solomon say verse 4, that "a living dog is better than a dead lion?" You say his "meaning undoubtedly is, that a living dog is more serviceable in this state than a dead lion can be." A sage remark truly, to impute to such a wise man as Solomon, and he too writing by inspiration. A living dog is more serviceable than either a *living* or *dead* lion, for a lion is a *destructive*, not a *serviceable* animal to man. The connection and matter of verses 4, 5 shows, that Solomon introduced this to illustrate that a living man is more serviceable, and has more enjoyment, than one that is dead. Hence he says, for "to him that is joined to all the living there is hope." But "the dead know not any thing," nor do they enjoy "any more a reward, neither have they any more a portion forever in any thing that is done under the sun," verses 5, 6. But, Sir, if your doctrine was believed by Solomon—why did he not praise the dead who died righteous in all cases? If such go to heaven at death, a dead man is better off than a living one, let his present condition be ever so prosperous. But see what he says, Eccl. 4: 1—3, which we shall quote presently.

This passage, which I have now examined with its context, is so conclusive againt your system, that I see no possible way you can find to evade its force. I hope, Sir, we shall not hear any thing more about

overlooking the context and scope of the writer. Nor will you likely repeat the remark—"Mr. B's argument from this passage is confuted by the passage itself," and "*our essayist, I think, will not explain this to mean, that a lion will experience more misery after death, than a dog does in this state,*" p. 55. This last remark, Sir, is burlesquing your own doctrine, but as it is done by yourself, you can take no offence.

But on p. 56, you have the boldness to say—"we have now examined Mr. B's principal texts in support of his system, and find that they are nothing to his purpose; nay, we have seen that in almost every instance the passage itself taken in its connexion, confutes his expositions. Surely his cause must be desperate to rest it upon texts which relate entirely to some other subject." All the texts Sir, you have considered or *even referred to*, are Ps. 88: 12. 31: 12. 6: 5, and 115: 17. Isai. 38: 18, 19. Ps. 30: 9, and 146: 3, 4. Prov. 14: 32, and 11: 7. Eccl. 9: 4—6. But the one half of these you have not attempted to examine. Those you have examined I have re-examined, and our readers may now judge of the *modesty* and *correctness* of your assertions. Certainly you must have been conscious when you made them, that you had not examined a tenth part of my *principal* texts, but had passed them by without comment or quotation; yea, without intimating to your readers I had adduced them.

I referred you to about fifty texts where persons at death are said to "*sleep with their fathers.*" The one half of these texts say, the worst of men did this, whether their dead fathers had been good or bad men; their characters in this world, had no concern in this matter. To give up the ghost, was to die, Gen. 25: 8. And to "*sleep with their fathers,*" was to be dead as they were. To be "buried with their fathers, was to be laid in the sepulchres with them.

See Gen. 49: 29, and 25: 8. Ps. 49: 19. This is called "lying down with their fathers," Gen. 47: 30. Acts 13: 36. Not to be buried at all, or with their fathers, was viewed as a mark of dishonor. The very best of men desired to sleep with, or "be laid in the sepulchres of their fathers." But I demand of you, why persons were so desirous to "*go to their fathers*," to "*sleep with their fathers*," and *to be with them after death*, if they believed any of their fathers had gone to hell? You say, as already quoted, "the very idea of going to them, supposes that they were *somewhere*, which of itself shows that they were not out of existence." And "the rich man experienced pain, and Lazarus happiness in hades." Why then were they all so anxious to go to their fathers after death, if your doctrine be true? Will you assert that all those persons, and their fathers who had died before them, had received an "*adequate*" punishment for all their sins and went to heaven? Some of them were wicked men, and died too in the very act of atrocious crimes. If ever any deserved to go to hell, they went there. I press the question upon you then, why any, and even the best of men, desired to go to, and to sleep with such fathers, if they went to your hell after death? Job, Sir, was even foolish enough to pray "O that thou wouldst hide me in hell." But if your view of the parable of the rich man and Lazarus is correct. Job and others did not know what they were saying. The rich man had pity enough on his brethren to say "I pray thee therefore, father that thou wouldst send Lazarus to my father's house: for I have five brethren; that he may testify unto them, lest they also come into this place of torment." Luke 16: 27, 28. Job, a good man, on earth prays, that God would hide him in *hell*; but a wicked man in *hell* prays, that his brethren might not come there. It seems *hell* in Job's day, was not partitioned into two,

as a repository for good and bad immortal souls, or if it was, he did not know it.

On p. 56, 57, you advert to the heathen believing the immortality of the soul, and quote the following lines from me, to show that they used as strong terms as the Scripture writers respecting the dead in the texts I quoted.

> Once dead and silent in the grave,
> Senseless remain; one rest they keep,
> One long, eternal, unawakened sleep.
>
> We sleep in everlasting night.
>
> An iron sleep o'erwhelms his swimming sight,
> And his eyes close in *everlasting night.*

But on this I ask you first; did the heathen use this language about the body or the soul? It could not be about the soul, for you aver, that they believed in its immortality. It was entirely about the body, for they had no idea of its resurrection, but deemed this incredible; and mocked at it when Paul preached it at Athens. But what *Scripture* writer says of the dead, that their sleep is—"*one long, eternal unawakened sleep,*" that they—"*sleep in everlasting night?*" If they had, Sir, pray what stronger language could they have used to express their disbelief in a resurrection? But if they had, it would be nothing to your purpose, until you prove that they spoke as the heathen did, respecting the *immortality of the soul.* But not one of them calls *the soul immortal.* And surely you will not assert, that their hope of immortality depended on this being true? But I ask further, if the Scripture writers used the same language the heathens did respecting the body after death, which is not true, why did they not also use their language respecting the immortality of the soul? If both were, as you assert, "*the common* language of

*the day*," show us if you can, why they used neither? And if they agreed with the heathen, that *hades* was a receptacle of souls after death, a place in which they would be punished or rewarded, why did they not teach these opinions? I demand of you, to account for their silence about these things, if you assert that they held such opinions. But you search the Bible in vain, Sir, for the language of your system, "*immortality of the soul, future retribution, punishment after death*," &c. Consider, I beseech you, how you came by such language, or the doctrine it expresses.

On p. 57, you say—"Mr. B. thinks that 1 Cor. 15: 18. 29, 30. 32, is conclusive in proof of his views. He says p. 160, 161, these words are irreconcilable with the belief of the soul's existence in an intermediate state." This is a mistake. The pages of my Essays you quote from, are p. 193, 194. As I am condemned by you without a hearing, I shall quote the whole connexion, and see how this matter stands. My words are—"We shall conclude our remarks, by noticing some things in this chapter, which show Paul had no faith in the immortality of the soul and its existence in a disembodied state. In verses 17, 18, he declares that 'they also who are fallen asleep in Christ are perished,' if Christ be not risen from the dead. His argument proceeds on this ground, that if there be no resurrection, there is a final end to man at death. Man's resurrection entirely depends on this—is Christ risen from the dead? Further,

"The apostle says, verse 29, 'else what shall they do who are baptized for the dead, if the dead rise not at all? Why are they then baptized for the dead?' Now I ask, why put such questions, if he believed the soul was immortal, and would enjoy endless happiness in a disembodied state? With such a hope, persons acted wisely in being baptized for the

dead, allowing their bodies should never be raised. But they acted very foolishly in being baptized, allowing there was no resurrection, and the apostle's questions are pertinent on this view of the passage. But again; the apostle says, verse 30, 'and why stand we in jeopardy every hour?' But why not stand in jeopardy every hour, if at death their souls went to heaven and enjoyed endless happiness? This was reason sufficient to expose themselves to death, if they should never rise from the dead. But the apostle declares, that if there be no resurrection, it would be foolishness in them to hazard life in the cause of Christianity. But again, he says, verse 32, 'if after the manner of men I have fought with beasts at Ephesus, what advantageth it me, if the dead rise not? Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die.' These words are irreconcilable with the belief of the soul living in a disembodied state. Was it no advantage to Paul, that his soul would enjoy an endless life of happiness, even if his body slept eternally in the grave? The question, 'what advantageth it me if the dead rise not,' plainly shows, that he expected no advantage for soul or body, if there was no resurrection. Besides, when he said, 'let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die,' what did he mean? If he merely meant, that our bodies die, but that our souls go to heaven, pray what force can there be in his argument? But if he meant, as seems obvious, that we perish like the brutes, if Christ is not risen, there is the greatest force and propriety in it. It would be no advantage for him to suffer, if the dead did not rise, for unless this was the case there was no future life. The best thing any man could do, was to enjoy the present life seeing there was no existence beyond death."

You meet these remarks by saying, Paul's "argument is this:—if you cannot believe a proposition

attested in this manner, you ought to reject all evidence, and give up all belief. If such a cloud of witnesses do not command your credence, you may well become sceptics. Or, to use his own language, on which Mr. B. relies—if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching (that is, all our preaching, even the doctrine of a future life in *any form*) vain, and your faith is also vain. Then they also which have fallen asleep in Christ are perished." Alas! my friend Hudson, this clumsy parenthesis spoils the whole; for, 1st. You cannot prove that Paul or any other sacred writer taught "*the doctrine of a future life in any form*," but by a resurrection from the dead. I yield at once if you will show that any Scripture writer preached the doctrine of a future life, on the ground that the *soul is immortal.* What fairer offer do you wish me to make? But 2d. Some of the Corinthians had renounced the doctrine of the resurrection, and said there was "no resurrection of the dead," verse 12. But did they also renounce the doctrine of the soul's immortality? You say they ought to have done this, for if the evidence of Christ's resurrection did not command their credence, they might well become sceptics. They never ought to have believed the soul was immortal, as it has no foundation in Scripture. But the probability is, they renounced the doctrine of the resurrection, and returned to their old heathen opinion, hoping for future existence on the ground that the soul was immortal. The heathen, Sir, had no idea, that the immortality of their souls had any concern with either Christ's resurrection, or their own. Those who renounced the doctrine of the resurrection, saw no reason to retain it as their hope of future life, for they had such a hope before the gospel was preached to them. But 3d. If the soul is immortal, it never could have died, allowing Christ had slept forever in the grave. Those who

had fallen asleep in Christ never could have perished, so that you tell us Paul was very much mistaken in making such an assertion.

Our readers may now judge of the following vaunting sentence, with which you conclude your remarks on this part of Scripture. "This view of the subject takes the passage out of our author's hands and leaves him not a solitary text to support his structure." This, Sir, may be true, when sweeping a cobweb from St. Paul's, will occasion the fall of the building. But what must my readers think of your next bold assertion? "We have now examined all of Mr. B's positive evidence in favor of his view of an intermediate state, and have endeavored to show that his arguments are founded in mistaken views of those Scriptures." This, Sir, can do no harm, for no man who has read my book, will believe a word of it true, but must be surprised you could risk such an assertion on paper. I am not without hope, that what has been said above, will even lead you to confess that the mistaken views of Scripture are on your side of the question. At any rate, your mere assertions prove nothing.

But you add, on p. 58, 59—"the residue of his labors in proof of the mortality of the soul, consists in examining the words rendered soul and spirit in the Scriptures. And here he indulges in his old propensity, and traces words to their primitive roots, and decides their meaning by Scripture usage; principles of interpretation which we have already examined and found defective. As his principles of interpretation are false, the theory built upon them must fall. However, we shall notice his reasoning upon those words as we pass along." This, Sir, deserves no answer; for it is mere empty declamation and assertion. It even contradicts your bold assertion above, for here you *tell us*, my examination of "the

words rendered soul and spirit," are to receive a passing notice, when above you said, you had examined "*all my positive evidence.*" What was this examination, if it formed no part of my positive evidence? But it is so positive that you rather decline a *positive* encounter with it. But you must lay your bones to the task, and show, that the terms *soul* and *spirit* are used in Scripture to express a part of man, which is *immortal*, and *suffers or enjoys in a disembodied state.* Your declining this, only shows your inability to answer. You are the first writer I ever met with, who disclaimed ascertaining the meaning of Scripture words by "*Scripture usage.*" I hope to live and die, Sir, indulging this "*old propensity.*" If we do not indulge it, there is an end to all correct Scriptural interpretation.

But seeing you disclaim understanding the meaning of Scripture words by their Scripture usage, let us see by what new dictionary you explain them. You say, p. 59—"In order to a right understanding of this subject, it is important to know the opinions of those to whom the Scriptures were addressed, and for whose benefit they were written. Every public teacher will accommodate his language to the wants of his pupils, if he is possessed of wisdom and faithfulness. We all know that the same terms and phrases will convey very different ideas to persons entertaining different opinions. Now it is a well known fact, that the Jews, with the exception of the small sect of Sadducees, believed in the immortality of the soul. This opinion was also entertained by the Gentiles, to whom the apostles labored. This was then the state of those to whom Christ and the apostles preached, and for whose benefit the Scriptures were written. They believed in the immortality of the soul, and in a separate state. Now if the sacred writers knew that the great mass of the people

were laboring under a gross error on this subject, they would undoubtedly have corrected it."

On this, Sir, I remark, that the sacred writers did know that the great mass of the people were laboring under this gross error, and did correct it in several ways. 1st. They corrected it by preaching through Jesus the hope of future life and happiness. This was in point blank contradiction to the way in which the heathen expected it. Will you risk your reputation, by asserting in plain words, that the sacred writers taught men to hope for future life on the ground that their souls were immortal? The apostles corrected this error, and corrected it too in the most effectual manner, by preaching through Jesus the hope of future life. This was the truth, but the heathens had changed this truth of God into a lie. It is truth destroys error, as light dispels darkness. But 2d. The apostles corrected this "*gross error*," by declaring in plain pointed terms, that the hope founded on the immortality of the soul was no hope at all. Paul, Eph. 2: 12, expressly says to the Ephesians "that at that time ye were without Christ being aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers from the covenants of promise, *having no hope*, and without God in the world." The apostle no more admitted, that the Ephesians in their heathen state had a true hope, than that they had a true God. They were not only *atheists* but *hopeless* in the world. And he declares the same, 1 Thes. 4: 13, in exhorting the Thessalonian Christians not to sorrow like the heathen "*who have no hope*." Was all this, Sir, no correction of their "gross error on this subject?"

But on the above quotation I have also to remark, 1st. It is a mere string of assertions, to say as you do, that the sacred writers accommodated their language to the wants of their pupils; and that as Jews and heathens "with the exception of the Sadducees"

believed in the immortality of the soul our Lord and his apostles did not correct, but spoke in accordance with this opinion." Was it in accordance with this opinion, to tell them they had "*no hope*," as has just been shown? But if they did accommodate their language to the wants of their pupils, how happens it, they never called the *soul immortal*, spoke of it as existing in *a disembodied state*, and of its being reformed there by "*consideration and reflection?*" Your assertions about this might be excused, if we found in our Bibles such phrases as *immortal souls*, *imperishable spirits*, *never dying souls*, *future retribution*; with various others, so common among Christians in our day. It remains for you to account, why they did not, seeing it was the very best phraseology they could have used, to suit their pupils, Mr. Hudson, yea, most Christians in the nineteenth century. They were so accommodating as to speak of Beelzebub and mammon as gods; satan and demons as evil beings, with other instances I might name, but never spoke of the soul as immortal, or that it exists to suffer or enjoy in a disembodied state. The parable of the rich man and Lazarus is no exception to this remark, for nothing is said about their *souls*, but all said agrees to the body.

2d. You say it is "important, in order to a right understanding of this subject, to know the opinions of those to whom the Scriptures were addressed, and for whose benefit they were written." Have you indeed abandoned the correct Protestant maxim, that—"the Bible is the best interpreter of itself?" And send us to heathen and Jewish opinions to understand it? What can be done with the man who tells us, p. 60—"now if it were found on examination, that the Scriptures are totally silent upon this subject, it would be much more natural to conclude that man had an immortal soul, than that he had not." What then may not be found out, what may we not believe,

if the Bible had never existed? But what are most of us to do in the nineteenth century, if the Bible does not teach us that we have got immortal souls. It cannot be expected, such *ignorant* people as we are, can tell what your lost revelations contained, and our ignorance is so stubborn, as not to be removed by your assertions. But, Sir, for once I agree that it is "important, in order to a right understanding of this subject, to know the opinions of those to whom the Scriptures were addressed." But *to know the origin and progress of such opinions*, will prove the total ruin of your whole system of *immortal souls and future punishment*. This we shall see in the sequel. But how, sir, were the Scriptures written for the *benefit* of those who held such opinions? It could not be to confirm them in such opinions, for you declare, Moses' law did not teach a future existence, nor did its penalties extend into a future state. It must then have been for their *benefit*, to correct their false opinions and turn them to the truth. It is true, the Bible does not correct formally all the false opinions of men any more than their vices. To have done this, the world itself could not have contained the books which must have been written. It strikes at the root of both evils with truth; and false opinions and vices, are only occasionally referred to and refuted. But you say, p. 60, the "integrity and faithfulness of Christ and his apostles," are impeached in every instance, where Jews or heathens held a false opinion, if they did not refute it. They did refute the false hope of the heathen, founded on the immortality of the soul, by declaring it was no hope at all. And they refuted their notion of life and happiness in an intermediate state, by preaching life and immortality by a resurrection from the dead.

But you add on p. 60, 61, "one consideration here has great weight. *We know* that the gospel was pro-

mulgated amongst its enemies, who attacked it in almost every form. Accordingly we find that the apostles in their epistles labored to defend the truth against their attacks. Now as the doctrine of the soul's immortality was generally believed, if Christ had taught any doctrine in opposition to it, this would have been attacked, and we should have found the apostles repelling these attacks and defending the mortality of the soul. But nothing like this can be found. On the contrary there are several passages in the epistles which clearly teach the doctrine of a separate existence." Answer. If this deserves the name of reasoning, why not add to your creed all the heathen opinions, not attacked and refuted by Christ and his apostles? And much more ought you to add to it, all those opinions which they seem rather to countenance. Such as the heathen opinions concerning the devil and satan, demons, witchcraft, and various others. I then return you your own words with some variation. "Now as all these doctrines were generally believed, if Christ had taught any doctrines in opposition to them, these would have been attacked, and we should have found the apostles repelling these attacks, and defending the doctrines Christ taught in opposition to them." According to your logic, Sir, if we do not find the apostles repelling attacks on what they advanced against heathen opinions, we must conclude all such heathen opinions are the truth. I feel guilty in wasting time to refute such reasonings. But to the point, Sir. Has it not been shown, that the apostles denounced the hope of the heathen, as no hope at all? And did they not preach through Jesus the hope of life and immortality exclusively by a resurrection from the dead? Again, did not their sufferings from both Jews and Gentiles show, that their doctrine opposed the prevailing opinions. If it did not, why did they suf-

ter for preaching life and immortality by a resurrection from the dead, in addition to life by the immortality of the soul, for this only made the hope of the heathen doubly sure? Why were they not as popular, as the preachers in our day, who preach up the immortality of the soul and punishment in a disembodied state? But why all this labored reasoning? And why so fond of predicating your doctrine on such a ground if you could show that the sacred writers call the *soul immortal*, or say it suffers after death? The reason is obvious, you could find no proof from them for such opinions.

But it is somewhat amusing to observe, how artfully you drop the phrase "*soul's immortality*," and substitute the phrase "*separate existence*," and thus repeat it, p. 61—"There are several passages which teach a separate existence in the most express manner; and Mr. B. with all his ingenuity and learned apparatus, cannot evade their force." Why shift the question, Sir, from proving "*the immortality of the soul*" to that of "*a separate existence?*" The reason is, of the former you could find no proof, but you think you have got three passages "which teach a separate existence in the most express manner; and Mr. B. with all his ingenuity and learned apparatus, cannot evade their force." It would have been as well to leave your boasting until you was putting off your armor. Was you afraid your readers would never have found out what great things you had done, unless you had told them? And must they be told this before you begin, lest your express proofs of a separate existence should escape their observation? Well, without further preface let us look at them, and see what can be done, without either "*ingenuity*" or "*learned apparatus*." Your first proof text is

Phil. 1: 21—24. "For me to live is Christ, and

to die is gain. But if I live in the flesh, this is the fruit of my labor: yet what I shall choose I wot not. For I am in a strait betwixt two, having a desire to depart, and to be with Christ which is far better: nevertheless to abide in the flesh is more needful for you." When Paul wrote these words he was uncertain whether his bonds would terminate in life or death. But it deserves notice, he does not say—"Christ shall be magnified in my *immortal soul*." No, he says, "Christ shall be magnified in my *body*, whether it be by life or by death," verse 20. How? He answers this, verse 21, "for me to live is Christ, and to die is gain." If he lived, Christ would be magnified in his *body* by his labors in the gospel; and if he died, he would be magnified in his *body*, in sealing his testimony with his blood. But you will ask—"how could it be gain for Paul to die if at death he was to have no *conscious* existence until the resurrection?" I answer that this difficulty arises from not considering what was Paul's situation. He was then in bonds, and if he lived, "bonds and afflictions" awaited him. I stated, and again state, that for a man to die under such circumstances, yea, under circumstances less distressing, is in Scripture viewed as a favor from the Lord. Moses viewed his death so, and prayed for it, Num. 11: 15. It was viewed as a favor to the king of Judah to be removed by death, that he might not see the evil God was to bring on others. See 2 Kings, 22: 20. 2 Chron. 34: 28.—And it is granted as a favor to the righteous to be taken away by death from the evil to come. See Isai. 57: 1, 2. Rev. 14: 13. Solomon, Sir, expressly says, Eccl. 4: 1—4, "So I returned, and considered all the oppressions that are done under the sun: and beheld the tears of such as are oppressed, and they had no comforter; and on the side of their oppressors there was power; but they had no com-

forter. Wherefore I praised the dead which are already dead, more than the living which are yet alive. Yea, better is he than both they which hath not yet been, who hath not seen the evil work that is done under the sun." Was not Paul, Sir, in the very situation which Solomon here describes? And does not Solomon teach us in very plain language, that it is *better* for such persons to die than to live suffering such oppressions? But I shall give you some more evidence of this in remarking presently on verse 23.

In verse 22, Paul says—"but if I live in the flesh this is the first fruit of my labor: yet what I shall choose I wot not." The choice referred to, you allow is between abiding in the flesh and departing to be with Christ. To live in the flesh, was the fruit of his labor, which Macknight thus interprets. "*Flesh* includes the idea of weakness and affliction. Wherefore *to live in the flesh* is to live burdened with those afflictions to which men are subject by means of the body."—For Paul thus to live, was more needful for the Philippians. This weighed with him on the one hand. But he was in a strait, for on the other, he had a desire "to depart and to be with Christ; which is far better." Such you state was his strait: and Paul says—"yet what I shall choose I wot not." You say—"he had two objects of an opposite nature in view—his own happiness, and the benefit of his brethren." You state your difficulty more fully thus, p. 61, 62. "Now it is evident from the whole scope of this passage, that Paul expected to be with Christ immediately on his departure. The whole force and pertinency of the passage is lost on any other interpretation. If there is no conscious existence between death and the resurrection, he could not be with Christ any sooner by dying than by living; consequently there could be no opposition between his two desires. He could accomplish both

objects at the same time—could do that which was needful for his brethren, and be with Christ just as soon as though he died that instant. On Mr. B's plan the apostle's strait was merely imaginary; his dilemma was only a vagary of his own brain. Thus it will be seen that we must give up the notion here opposed, or accuse the apostle of a disordered mind. And what adds to the strength of our argument is, it requires no labored comment to make its strength appear. Our interpretation is the most natural and easy that can be given. Besides, Paul was writing to those who believed in the soul's immortality, and in a separate existence. To them of course it would contain the most express proof of those doctrines." You see, Sir, I state your difficulties, in your own *logical form* and *in your own words*. On the above quotation I remark—1st. Your bold unsupported assertion, that "Paul was writing to those who believed in the soul's immortality, and in a separate existence" deserves no notice. Admitting the Philippians believed so in their heathen state, is this any proof that they continued to believe so after they became Christians? If they did, how could they agree with the apostle, who declared, that the hope they had in their heathen state was—"*no hope?*" Reconcile if you can, such a belief after they became Christians with the apostle's doctrine? But

2d. You assert that your—"interpretation is the most natural and easy that can be given." So say the Catholics, transubstantiation is the most natural and easy which can be given to the words—"*this is my body.*" And so say our orthodox brethren, that *endless punishment* is the most natural and easy interpretation which can be given to Matt. 25: 46. 2 Thes. 1: 9, and other passages. But do you admit all this? The truth is, that is the most natural and *easy* interpretation of a passage, which from child-

hood we have been taught is the right one. But 3d. If the "*soul's immortality*" and "*a separate existence*" were Scripture doctrines before Paul's day, why is he the first and almost the only writer which you adduce in proof of your opinions? 2 Cor. 5: 1—9, and Luke 23: 43, are the only other two texts you adduce. If your doctrines were common to all the sacred writers, why did you tell us in your Letters that a future existence was not taught in the law of Moses? Your doctrine of a *future retribution* could not influence the Jews by your own showing, and if the world did well enough without your hell in its infancy, what need is there for it now? If the Jews knew any thing about your "*separate existence*" and "future retribution" they had not Moses to thank for the information, for you declare—"it would be downright contradiction to admit that the law was enforced by penalties extending into a future state." The Jews, yea, all posterity, are under eternal obligation to the heathen, for transmitting this precious information, which originated in divine revelations now lost. I would advise you to say nothing more about those lost revelations. It is ridiculous, Sir, to talk about their contents, until it is first proved that they once existed. Your time would be much better employed in finding those lost revelations, than in teaching people to rest their faith on such a sandy foundation, and quoting two or three texts to give a plausible appearance to your opinions. But

4th. Let us look at this passage and the difficulty you present from it? Paul was in a strait to choose between death and life. But if he expected to be with Christ in heaven, enjoying its happiness *immediately* after death, why should he hesitate a moment in choosing this, in preference to living to suffer cruel persecution? You will say, it was his love to the cause of Christ and his Christian brethren. But why

should not his brethren then, have said as people do now—"*our loss is his gain.*" It is imputing something like vanity to the apostle, that Christians could not get along, unless he sacrificed the happiness of heaven to continue with them. That the cause of Christ must sink, if he did not prefer this to his *immediate* enjoyment of Christ in heaven. But as I intend to meet your difficulty, in its breadth, length, and all its force, let us inquire

1st. Where Christ was when Paul uttered the words before us? No doubt you will say he was in heaven. Agreed. To this place he went when he ascended, Acts 1. Mark 16: 19. Nor do I find, that he has left this place and gone any where else since. On the contrary we are told, Acts 3: 21, that "the heavens must receive or *retain* him until the times of restitution of all things." For Paul then to be with Christ at death, he must immediately go to heaven. In fact this is what you labor to establish. Permit me then to ask, how you reconcile this view of the passage with the statement given us p. 48, concerning the rich man and Lazarus? You say—"but does it follow, that man has no existence, because he goes to hades, the state of the dead—a state in which the rich man experienced pain, and Lazarus happiness?" Is Jesus Christ, Sir, still in hades? Is heaven to which he ascended in hades? Is the right hand of God on which he sat down in hades? And is the presence of God in which he appears for us in hades? I really thought that Christ was *not left in hades;* but according to your doctrine he is still there. Instead of *ascending* to heaven, he *descended* again into hades, and Paul, Lazarus, and all good men at their death must have descended there also to be with him. But have you forgot, that *hades* for depth, and *heaven* for height, are uniformly contrasted in Scripture? So that if Christ went to heaven in his ascension, and

Paul at his death went there to be with him, neither of them could be in *hades*. But the Scriptures show, and you show it yourself, that the rich man and Lazarus, yea all, whether good or bad, go at death to *hades*. It is true, like the ancient heathen, you divide *hades* into two distinct apartments, the one for good, and the other for bad souls, but this does not help you out of your present difficulty. If Christ is in heaven, which is indisputable, and if you send Paul at death to be with Christ there, it is evident you send him to a different place from that of Lazarus at his death. Should you contend that heaven where Christ is, is only a part of hades, then bad as well as good souls depart to be with Christ at death, for all, good or bad go to one place, and this place is *hades*. Joseph, Jacob, Job, the very best of men went to hades at their death. Show us if you can, that any of them went to a different place at death. Either then heaven is in hades, Christ is in hades, yea, God is in hades, or Paul went to a different place at death from all who died before him.

2d. But I inquire, when Paul said I have "a desire to depart* and to be with Christ" what about

* I am very unwilling to disturb your mind with any "*learned apparatus*" and you can pass the following over if it displeases you.—The word in verse 23, rendered *depart*, is *analuo*. Parkhurst says —"*Chrysostom* explains *analusai* by *enteuthen pros ouranon methistasthai, removing* from hence to heaven;" and "*Theodoret* by *ten enteuthen apallage*, a departing hence." But whether Ewing, does not give a better explanation, I leave for others to determine. He says *analuo* signifies "*I analyse.*" And he says, *analusis*, which is derived from *analuo*, signifies, "*resolution of any thing into its first principles.*" Ewing's view is in perfect accordance with Eccl. 3: 19—21. Ps. 146: 3, 4, and other texts which speak of men at death being reduced to their first principles, the body to the dust, and the *spirit* or *life* to God, who breathed it into man at his creation, Gen. 2: 7. Eccl. 12: 7. *Analusis* occurs in 2 Tim 4: 6, "for I am now ready to be offered, and the time of my *departure* is at hand." See this passage with verses 1, 7, 8, considered in my Essays, p. 230. 287. Allowing the common view of these verses correct, Paul did not expect a crown of righteousness at death, or on his departure to be with Christ, but *at the day of judgment* at the end of this world which

him did he expect should depart to be with Christ? You contend it was his *immortal soul.* But, Sir, you assume the very question to be proved, that Paul had an *immortal soul* to depart to be with Christ. This I do not allow you to assume. And I defy you to show, that Paul in this or any other place of his writings, asserts he had such a *soul*, to depart at death to be with Christ. Nor does Paul intimate *that what departed to be with Christ at his death was to be in a state of conscious existence or in happiness.* All this, Sir, is very confidently assumed by you, which is not like a candid inquirer after truth. I am perfectly aware you will then ask me, what departed from Paul to be with Christ at his death, for the apostle plainly intimates, that something was to depart? To this I answer, his *life*, *breath*, or *soul* departed. This is what departed from other persons at death, of whose death we have an account in Scripture. Nothing else departed from Rachel when she died, Gen. 35: 18, even by Parkhurst's own showing, as noticed in my Essays. All that a man hath will he give for his life, Job 2: 4. Comp. Gen. 47: 13—27. Life is of such importance, that when it departs, the person himself is said to depart, for what is left behind, is only a dead carcass, which can be of no benefit to the living, Luke 2: 29. John 13: 1. 2 Tim. 4: 6. Nor

shows the common views of *both* passages cannot possibly be correct. Again, on 2 Cor. 5: 1—9, your next proof text, it will be seen that Paul did not expect to be present with the Lord in a conscious state of existence, until "mortality is swallowed up of life at the resurrection." It is shown here how Paul was *with Christ* on his departure, yet not in a state of conscious existence. This will be seen further on Luke 23: 43, which is your third proof text of a separate existence, and confirms the view given of the passage before us. And it was observed in my Essays, p. 56—"to be with another person, and even with him after death, does not necessarily imply being happy nor even in a state of conscious existence. For example, Samuel is represented as saying to Saul, "to-morrow shalt thou and thy sons be with me." But did this mean that Saul and his sons would be alive or happy with him in a disembodied state?"

do you find that any sacred writer said at the death of any person, that an *immortal soul* departed either to heaven or hell to be happy or miserable. In fact, no *immortal soul* can depart from man at death, for no such soul was ever infused into him. Man became a living *soul*, by God breathing into him the breath of life. It is impossible then, to breathe out of him, any more than God breathed into him. If any thing more than this leaves a man at death, it becomes you to show, when, how, or from whom he received it; for your assumptions and assertions are just good for nothing on this subject.

But you will say—"Was this all Paul meant should depart from him at death to be with Christ? And does a man's life depart to be with Christ when it leaves the body?" I answer yes, and the Scriptures warrant me in saying so. Solomon declares that at death the *spirit* or *breath* "shall return unto God who gave it," Eccl. 12: 7. And Paul declares, "our life is hid with Christ in God." And you allow, Christ is with God in heaven. Stephen said, Acts 7: 59, "Lord Jesus receive my spirit." And at verse 55, we learn, Christ was in heaven, for he saw "Jesus standing on the right hand of God." When Jesus died, he commended his *spirit* or *life* into the hands of his father. And why? Because God was to bring him again from the dead. But our life is hid with Christ in God, and it is Christ who is to raise all up again at the last day. Hence the dead are said to *sleep* in Jesus, for their lives are to be restored again to them, and death be swallowed up of life at the resurrection. Such as *sleep* in Jesus are then to be brought with him. But if they *sleep* in him, how can they be alive in a state of conscious existence with him, for *sleep* is only another term in Scripture for *death?* And what seems to put all this beyond doubt, is, no Scripture writer ever speaks of *soul* or *spirit* after death

existing in a disembodied state, or its suffering or enjoying in your *separate state of existence.* You may now see, Sir, that your objection is of no force when you say "if there is no conscious existence between death and the resurrection Paul could not be with Christ any sooner by dying than by living; consequently there could be no opposition between his two desires. He could accomplish both objects at the same time—could do that which was needful for his brethren, and be with Christ just as soon as though he died that instant." Not a word of this is true as the above remarks show.

But I now proceed to your objection, p. 63, against my views, and it is the strongest thing which can be advanced against them. You say "Paul says, in this passage, to die is *gain;* is *far better* than to live. But how could it be *far better*, on his system, to be annihilated, than to remain in the flesh?" Answer. Where have I said, Sir, that Paul or any one else is *annihilated?* Every man, yourself not excepted, must allow I advance no such opinion. But this is only one, out of many instances I pass over, where you state other people's views in your own *logical form.* But, I proceed to meet your objection. Keeping the remarks made on verse 21, in view, I remark 1st. Admitting Paul has a conscious existence in a separate disembodied state, by your own statements respecting the rich man and Lazarus, he and Christ must be in hades, for this is your repository for departed spirits both good and bad. On your views, Paul was not any sooner than on mine *with Christ in heaven*, by dying than by living. But

2d. The question is, in what sense was Paul with Christ at death, allowing there is no separate conscious existence? This I have shown above, and it need not be repeated here. But on your views, Paul was not with Christ in heaven in *any sense* unless you

prove that heaven is in hades, or, that Paul went at death to a different place than hades, where at death you sent Lazarus and the rich man. But I appeal to yourself, when Stephen, Paul, and others died, were they not with Christ in a sense in which they could not do any thing for their brethren? How then could you say "there could be no opposition between Paul's two desires" if my views be correct? On my *plan* Paul's strait was not *imaginary* as you assert.—Nor was he disordered in his mind, but spoke like a rational man. The moment he breathed out his life he was useless to his brethren. He fell *asleep* in Jesus, was *with Jesus* as all the dead are, for he is Lord of the dead and living. But if persons at death *sleep in Jesus*, how can they be in a state of conscious existence with him? Are they both *asleep* and *awake* at the *same time*, and with *the same person*, and *in the same place?* But

3d. The whole *pith* of your objection is, "how could Paul say to die is *gain;* is *far better* than to live in the flesh, if at death he was to have no more conscious existence until the resurrection." I meet your objection, Sir, by a direct appeal to Scripture. Jonah says, chap. 4: 3, "O Lord, take, I beseech thee, my life from me; for it is *better for me to die* than to live." It is added verse 8, "And it came to pass, when the sun did arise, that God prepared a vehement east wind; and the sun beat upon the head of Jonah, that he fainted, and wished in himself to die, and said, *it is better for me to die than to live.*" Here, Jonah says twice, that it *was better for him to die than to live.* But will you affirm he said this, because he expected at death to be immediately with Christ in heaven? I am confident you will not. No, it was on account of the sufferings he was then enduring. And will not all allow, that Paul's sufferings were far greater than Jonah's? But he did not go so far as

Jonah, for he was in a strait whether to choose life or death. To abide in the flesh, was more needful for his brethren, but Jonah did not view the matter in this light respecting the Ninevites. Should you object, that Jonah said this in a fit of peevishness, but Paul spoke in the calm exercise of his judgment and piety, I refer then to Job 7: 13—17. He says—"when I say, my bed shall comfort me, my couch shall ease my complaint; then thou scarest me with dreams, and terrifiest me through visions; so that my soul chooseth strangling and death rather than my life. I loath it: I would not live alway: let me alone; for my days are vanity." Here, Sir, is the man whose patience is set forth as an example to us, saying the very same thing. And you will allow, Paul had as much cause as he had to say so, from his severe and accumulated afflictions. Job did not speak thus because he expected at death to be immediately with Christ in heaven. No Sir, for he thus prays, chap. 14: 13—16—"Oh that thou wouldst hide me in the grave (sheol or hades) that thou wouldst keep me secret, until thy wrath be past; that thou wouldst appoint me a set time, and remember me. If a man die, shall he live again? All the days of my appointed time will I wait, till my change come. Thou shalt call, and I will answer thee: thou wilt have a desire to the work of thine hands." But I quote Paul himself, who speaks in the same or similar manner on another occasion. Some accused him of mercenary motives in preaching the gospel; and in 1 Cor. 9, he shows, that they who preach the gospel should live of the gospel. But he adds, verse 15, "I have used none of these things; neither have I written these things, that it should be so done unto me: for it were *better for me to die*, than that any man should make my glorying void." But who ever thought, Sir, Paul said that it was better

for him to die, because he would be immediately with Christ in heaven?

Here then, Sir, are two good men, who said it was *better* for them to die than to live, when suffering afflictions. And here is Paul himself saying, it was better for him to die than to live, when his *character* was merely impeached for mercenary motives in preaching the gospel. And have not men, and some good men, not only thought it better for them to die, but have actually died by their own hands, to rid themselves of similar evils? Instances of suicide frequently occur, where the persons by their own creed, rush out of this world into eternal torments in another. "*A wounded spirit who can bear?*" We lament such instances, but seldom take deep interest in the situation of persons laboring under such distress and *alienation* of mind, or endeavor to soothe and relieve them from their distresses. Our lamentations come too late to be of use to them. The religion of the Bible never occasioned a case of suicide, either as to its principles of belief, or sufferings endured for it. The first is able to support the mind under the last.

I have dwelt at some length on this passage, because with you and others, it is deemed the strongest evidence against my views in my Essays. I have met I think all your objections fairly, and solved all your difficulties conclusively. If I have not, I shall be happy to see it pointed out where I have overlooked or evaded any of them. I should think the palpable contradiction pointed out between your views of this passage, and what you said on p. 48, concerning the rich man and Lazarus, ought to lead you to a re-examination of the whole subject. This remark equally applies to the other two texts you adduce in proof of a separate existence as will be seen afterwards.

But you proceed to say—"if he says men do not

receive an equitable retribution here, he must either deny the plain Scripture doctrine of a just retribution, or admit that a retribution is extended into a future state." As you have talked a great deal in your writings about "*an equitable retribution*," a "*just retribution*," and "*a future retribution*," it is high time we paid a little attention to what is meant by these phrases. By a "*future retribution*" you mean a punishment after death. And by a "*just retribution*," and an "*equitable retribution*" you mean, that a man must be punished "*adequately*" for every sin he commits. If he is not so punished here, he must receive this after death. I am confident you will allow this is a correct account of your views on this subject. This is what you call—"*the plain Scripture doctrine of a just retribution.*" But, Sir, if it was so very *plain*, there would be no dispute between you and me on the subject. On the contrary, it appears to me plain, that the Scriptures teach a *just* and *equitable* retribution is confined to this world. I shall merely *state* here a few of my reasons for thinking so, in addition to those occasionally hinted at in the course of my remarks. 1st. If it is not, Paul himself likely would have had his fears in the prospect of his death. What *equitable* retribution did he ever receive for every sin he committed, and for all his opposition to Christ? And where does he intimate that he should escape your *future retribution*, because he had received all his punishment in this life? If Paul had believed as you do, he ought to have been willing to abide in the flesh for his own sake, until he was perfectly sure he had been punished enough for all his sins. By your own account, Sir, if he died before this, he must have gone to hell to be punished there after death. By your own showing, one sin, one *overt act* of iniquity not punished at Paul's death, would have sent him to hell, instead of heaven to be

with Christ. Nor by your own showing, could this sin be purged out of him in the intermediate state, for you tell us, all are to be raised just as they died. And how long even Paul must stay in hell after the resurrection, to be punished for this one unpunished sin in this life, you do not inform us.

2d. I should think it was not worth while to send any to hell to finish an *equitable retribution* for all their sins, when the thief on the cross could pay off the whole score by a few hours crucifixion. The pains of your hell, Sir, ought to be very moderate indeed, on the principles of justice. The antediluvians have been several thousand years suffering in hell by your account. But if the thief could suffer in a few hours his just retribution here, you ought to reduce the pains of hell in severity, according to the length of time you make people suffer there.

3d. If your doctrine be true, how comes it to pass that no persons ever prayed to God, or expressed a wish, that he would punish them enough here, so that they might escape the punishment of your hell hereafter? Do you find any thing like this in the Bible? According to your system, it ought to be your daily prayer, that God would punish you the moment you sinned, for should you happen to die guilty of one sin not adequately punished, by your own doctrine you must inevitably go to hell to be punished there. But I doubt if you ever prayed so in your life, or that going to hell gives you very much concern.

4th. I have no idea, Sir, of denying the "*plain doctrine of a just retribution.*" No Sir; I only deny that your view of it is a correct one. It is at war with the feelings and confession of all Scripture saints. Do they say the Lord had punished them *adequately* for every sin in this world? No Sir, they say, it is of the Lord's mercies we are not consumed; he hath afflicted us *less* than our iniquities deserve.

Did they expect to get the rest of their punishment after death in hell? If God punished men to the extent they deserve, the spirits he had made would fail before him. And if your doctrine was true, the mercy and forgiveness of God are entirely out of the question. Men, Sir, on your system are punished into heaven, yea are punished out of hell into it.—They serve out their time there as persons do in the state prison, and on the principles of justice have a right to demand their release.

5th. Your system of "*a just and equitable retribution*" is founded in mistaken views of Scripture.—They are founded on such texts as speak of God giving or rendering unto every one according to their works. I think I can show, that all such texts, have no reference to rendering to men according to their works in hell, but in this world. I have referred in a note in my second Letter, to Rev. 2: 22, 23, where such language is used, to show this. But whenever you are ready to show, such passages mean a punishment after death, I am prepared to show they do not. I have no idea of dropping the present subject, to discuss this question on your mere assertions about them.

2 Cor. 5: 1—9, is your second proof text for a *separate existence.* I will thank the reader to turn to it and read it. You say it is parallel to Philip. 1: 21—23, which has just been considered. If so, what was said on it, may answer here as a reply. Permit me briefly to remark 1st. That Paul says nothing about his *immortal soul* in this passage. This I think you nor no other man will dispute. Why then do you quote it in proof of the *separate existence* of his *immortal soul?*

2d. You are welcome to call the "*soul*" or "mind" a property of the house or body, or by any other name you please. What you are bound to prove is,

that it exists to *think*, *suffer*, or *enjoy*, *separate from the body*. Prove this and you have no further opposition from me. But you can no more prove this than that heat exists without caloric, to use your own words.

3d. It is *original* with you to say—"instead of making the man consist only of body and its properties, Paul makes the man complete without the body; as much so as an individual is without the house in which he resides." Why then was a body necessary to man if he is a complete man without it? Did the immortal soul need the body, as a man needs a house, to shelter it against the inclemency of the weather? Again, why advocate the resurrection of the body, if the soul is a complete man without it? And why punish the body for the sins a man commits in it, any more than the house in which a man commits murder? Indeed, what need is there for the resurrection of the body, for you say, p. 68—"the soul in the separate state is clothed with some substance or vehicle." Does this vehicle in the *separate state* partake of the happiness or misery of the immortal soul? But why should it, for here it had no share either in the virtues or crimes of the soul which it there clothes? But after all, it seems you cannot get along, either to punish or reward *immortal souls in a separate state* without some kind of body. The heathen, Sir, could not get along without it, and here you adopt this, as you do other parts of their system. But why not adopt their notion of *pre-existent souls* also? Is there not just as good ground to believe that souls pre-existed, were complete men, and were clothed with some vehicle before they entered the bodies of men, as that they shall be complete men and be clothed with some vehicle after death? If the *soul* or *mind* not only *thinks*, is a *complete man*, yea, *is clothed with some vehicle* after it goes out of the body,

it must have been all this before it entered it, unless you can show how a few years residence in this house made it all this, which it was not before. But who ever heard that a house had the power of making such a change in its inhabitant? It remains for you to tell us when, where, and by what means your "*souls or minds*" became complete men. Was it before they entered the body? Was it while they resided in the body? If it was, they are indebted to the body for making them complete men. Or, was it after they left the body they became complete men? If so, a man is not a complete man until he is dead, or gets rid of his house which is the body.

But if you will adopt the heathen notion, that souls are clothed with some vehicle or body after death, I am sorry you should impute this notion to Paul. Paul does speak of a *house* and *being clothed with a house from heaven.* But did you, or did you not observe, it is *one house* for all, and not a vehicle or house with which each individual soul is to be accommodated? It is a *building* not *buildings* of God eternal in the heavens. It is a "*house*" not *houses* from heaven with which your souls are to be clothed individually supposing your doctrine of immortal souls to be true. But it is evident from verse 4, that this house is not to clothe souls at death, but all are to be clothed with *it* when "*mortality is swallowed up of life.*" But in proof of this heathen notion, which you impute to Paul, you say—"when Moses and Elias appeared on the mount, they were clothed with some substance." You mistake Sir; for this account is expressly called a *vision;* and I have shown in my Essays, it was a vision, not of *immortal souls* in a separate state, but of the resurrection state. This you do not contradict. It was further shown in my Essays, p. 201, that Paul groaned being burdened, not for that he would be unclothed with his earthly house, but that he might

be clothed upon with the house eternal in the heavens. And it was further shown by comparing 1 Cor. 15: 53, 54, with this passage, that Paul did not expect this to take place at his death, but when mortality is swallowed up of life at the resurrection. Have you shown these things to be incorrect? Can you show that the remarks there made give a false view of the passage? You say indeed, p. 67—"if the soul is immortal, mortality is swallowed up of life whenever the mortal body is dissolved." But if this were true, what use is there for the resurrection? This remark leads to a denial of the resurrection. Can *mortality*, Sir, be swallowed up of life until *immortality* is put on? And does this corruptible put on incorruption, or this mortal put on immortality at death? Does Paul teach this, 1 Cor. 15? You will not say so. The Spartan *if* is no proof. "*If* the soul is immortal" is the very point in dispute. And *if* it is not immortal what comes of your argument, for I do not allow you to assume what demands proof? It is common to believers in your system, to make little account of the body. Why? Because the *soul*, the *precious immortal soul* and *its existence to suffer after death*, is essential to their system. Take this away and *soul* and *body* of their system is destroyed. But do the Scripture writers make so little account of the body as you do? They do not as could be easily shown if it were necessary.

But you say, what I have said on this passage in my Essays "is extremely vague and indefinite." This, Sir, is mere assertion, costs almost nothing, and was unnecessary could you have refuted my arguments. Were the proofs I advanced that Paul did not expect to be present with the Lord until the resurrection "vague and indefinite?" Cease from asserting this, until you give my words to the reader and let him judge for himself. This was proved, and

proving this renders the passage useless to you in establishing your "*separate existence*" from it. You consider it parallel to Philip. 1: 21—23, and is quoted to prove the same thing. As it has then been shown above, how Paul was with Christ at death, without being either a nonentity or in a state of conscious existence with him, I am saved the trouble of repeating the same thing here. I need hardly remind you, that the palpable contradiction pointed out between your views of the last passage, and your statements, p. 48, is equally evident here. But

You assert that "there is something in man not dependant upon the body." This is true in one sense, as I have shown on Philip. 1: 21—23. But it is not true in the sense you wish your readers to understand it. The *soul* or *life* God breathed into Adam was distinct from the body. When it is breathed out at death, it returns to God who gave it. Even while it is in the body, it is distinguished in Scripture by the terms *soul* and *life* in distinction from the body. It is the soul or life which animates the body, and not the body which animates it. But what you wish your readers to believe is, that there is an *immortal soul* in man distinct from his body, which is to exist after death in a state of conscious existence to suffer or enjoy. Unless this text teaches this, it is nothing to your purpose. You assert it does, for you say—"the words are while we are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord. We are willing rather to be absent from the body, and present with the Lord. This teaches that men may be absent from the body, and still have a conscious existence; still be with him who was in a conscious state." But what of all this, Sir, for it avails you nothing that they were with Christ who was in a conscious state, while the passage does not say they were in a conscious state themselves. This it does not say, but

you are careful to assert it. At least you insinuate this, and wish your readers to draw such a conclusion. But I have shown how persons are said to be *with Christ*, yet not in a conscious state of existence, in my remarks on Philip. 1: 21—23. Look again, Sir, at Paul's words in both passages. He neither says he was to be with Christ in a state of conscious existence, nor expresses any thing about the happiness he expected to enjoy. This is rather strange if he had any such expectation. Not a syllable do you advance to disprove this except saying—"if the soul is immortal, mortality is swallowed up of life whenever the mortal body is dissolved;" which is just proving the point in dispute with the thing to be proved. What about Paul was absent from the body and present with the Lord, has been shown on Philip. 1: 21—23. That it is not a mere property of the body, perishes with it, or exists with the Lord in a state of consciousness, has also been shown. But you really seem to have been conscious that you could not make out your case from this passage, for you call on me to prove a negative; repeat again that this passage was "addressed to those who believed in the soul's immortality;" assert "Paul must have been unwise and unfaithful" had he believed as I do; and wind up by boldly asserting the passage teaches your doctrine.

A word or two with you on the use of the *verb* and *ean* rendered *if*, shall close my remarks on this passage. You are candid enough to admit "the correctness of this principle," that "the present tense is often put for the future, to show the certainty of the event." If you will look again at Isai. 53, and other texts to which I referred, I think you must perceive your mistake, in saying they are not to my purpose. As to rendering *ean when*, instead of *if*, it would be foolish in me to enter into any dispute with you about

it. 1 John 3: 2, to which you refer as an example of its Scripture usage, not only confirms my views, but it gives a deadly stab to your whole system.—John says "we know that *when* (*ean*) Christ shall appear, we shall be like him." But does Christ appear at every saint's death to make either *soul* or *body* like him? If Paul, Sir, went to heaven at death, as you assert, how could he be like Christ, for by your own showing in this criticism, it is *when* Christ shall appear this is to take place? And what this likeness to Christ is to be, Paul tells us, Philip. 3: 21. "Who shall change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body, according to the working whereby he is able to subdue all things unto himself." Even *then*, Sir, it is not the *vile immortal soul*, but the vile *body*, which is to be fashioned like unto Christ's glorious body. You are very unfortunate in your criticisms, for such is the way you dash your own system to pieces.

Luke 23: 43, is your third and last text in proof of a "*separate existence*." "To-day shalt thou be with me in paradise." You consider this text similar to the two preceding, and I might consider my remarks on them a sufficient answer. But I notice 1st. That you accuse me, p. 70—72, of making garbled quotations from Parkhurst. But in answer to what you say, I ask, who ever supposed, that in quoting a writer opposed to your sentiments, in order to be just, you must quote what he says respecting his own. You quote both Parkhurst and Robinson, but do you quote what they say against your views? No Sir, you do the very thing you condemn in me, you quote their concessions in favor of your opinions. Happy is the man who condemneth not himself in the thing which he alloweth. You would not have quoted either of these writers had you found nothing favorable to your system. And you well know, that I can quote them

both against your doctrine of *limited future punishment.* Why did you not quote them, Sir, about *endless punishment*, and not garble their sentiments? It was no concern of mine if Parkhurst was at variance with himself, unless I had undertaken to expose and refute his contradictions. You are in the same condemnation, and I would say—"physician heal thyself." But your implicit dependance on Robinson and Parkhurst, and your quotations from them, have led you into a snare, out of which you cannot very easily escape, as will appear presently.

Let us now attend to this passage. Christ said to the thief—"to-day shalt thou be with me in paradise." In order then to find out where paradise is, we must try to find out where Jesus Christ went that day. *To-day* must be confined to the very day in which both died, for you have been contending with great zeal, that Paul went *immediately* at death to be with Christ in heaven. But recollect in p. 48, you contended, that the rich man and Lazarus both went to hades at death. I leave it for you to tell us in your next book, if *hades* and *heaven* are one and the same place. Here you tell us from Robinson that "*paradeisos*, in the Jewish necrology, (is) *that* part of hades in which the souls of the pious enjoyed happiness until the resurrection, Luke 23: 43, where Jesus speaks in a manner adapted to the penitent thief." You quote for substance the same from Parkhurst. But I am astonished, for these views are at point blank variance with your interpretations of the two preceding passages, where you labored to show Paul's *soul* went to heaven to be with Christ at his death. But passing this, let us admit Parkhurst and Robinson are correct, and that Christ and the thief both went to paradise the day they died. How then I ask do you reconcile this with your explanation of 1 Peter 3: 19, given in your Letters and present book?

You contend Christ went to *hell* and preached to damned souls who perished in the flood. Well, Sir, I ask did the soul of the penitent thief go there with him? If it did, how could either of their souls be that day in the part of *hades* in which Robinson says "the pious enjoy happiness until the resurrection?" To support any thing like consistency here, you must advocate that the souls of Jesus and the thief at death went to Robinson's repository of pious souls or to paradise. And that Jesus left the soul of the thief there, and went afterwards while his body lay in the tomb, and by his disembodied soul preached to the spirits in prison. All this Jesus must have done if your statements and Robinson's are correct. But how you are to reconcile all this with your views of the two preceding texts, is a mystery to me. Unless you can show us that Jesus' *soul*, yea, his *glorified body* are both in hades; or that part of it called *paradeisos*, in the Jewish necrology; that part of hades in which the souls of the pious enjoyed happiness until the resurrection," how can your views Sir ever be reconciled? Even proving this would not reconcile them.

But what saith the Scriptures? For you seem more concerned about what Parkhurst and Robinson have said, than what they have said on this subject. Where then did Jesus Christ go that day? That his body went to Joseph's tomb is admitted on all hands. And that he did not go to heaven that day seems plain, for he declared after his resurrection, that he had not yet ascended to his father, John 20: 17. On the contrary we are told, Acts 1, that it took place forty days after his resurrection. But it is Jesus' *soul* we have got to look after, to find out where it went that day. Jesus in his expiring moments, and soon after he spoke to the thief, said, "father, into thy hands I commend my spirit: and having said

this he gave up the ghost." If you understand *spirit* to mean an *immortal soul*, which I presume you do, then Jesus' spirit went that day to God in heaven. But who does not see, that this is at variance with your statements and quotations from Parkhurst and Robinson? For the soul of the thief must that day be in heaven with him. This very well agrees with your explanations of the two preceding texts. But if this is admitted as correct, it does not agree with your own statements concerning the rich man and Lazarus, p. 48, nor with *paradise* being the repository of pious souls until the resurrection, advocated by you, Robinson and Parkhurst above. There is an error in your views somewhere, for your statements respecting the place of *souls* after death, are utterly irreconcilable. At one time, you send good and bad souls to *hades* at death, and on the foregoing texts you have been contending Paul's *soul* went to heaven and was with Christ there immediately after death. But let us examine and see if both these statements are not incorrect.

Jesus declares that the father gave him his *life* or *spirit*, and at death he resigns it to him saying: "father, into thy hands I commend my spirit." The Scriptures repeatedly state that Christ laid down his life for us. It was not forced from him, and this is agreeable to the facts stated, for after all things were accomplished Jesus *gave* or *yielded* up the *ghost* or his *life*. His *life*, *soul*, or *spirit* departed, the same as Rachel's, Stephen's, and others mentioned in Scripture. But where did it go to is the question? It returned as Solomon tells us to God who gave it. Was it then in a state of conscious existence? There is no evidence of this, but some evidence to the contrary. 1 Peter 3: 18, 19, is the only text on which such an idea can be predicated, to which we shall pay attention afterwards. Should you advocate still, that our

Lord's soul existed in a disembodied state, either in heaven with God, or preaching in hell to the damned, you must allow it returned and reanimated our Lord on the third day. Other souls, Sir, returned from heaven and hell also, for several persons were raised again from the dead. But no one, our Lord not excepted, ever stated what they saw, heard, felt, or did while in the state of the dead. It seems disembodied souls lose all recollection on their reunion with the body.

But what is said of Jesus Christ at his death and after it, is the same or similar to that said of all that die, with the exception of that, which was peculiar to him as the Messiah. He commended his spirit or life to God from whom he received it. He yielded up the ghost or life, or in other words he died. And he went to hades or the state of the dead, as do all the human race. Hence Peter, Acts 2, quotes the 16th Psalm, saying "thou wilt not leave my soul in hell (hades) neither wilt thou suffer thine holy one to see corruption." That is, thou wilt not leave me in the state of death. He was not left in hades; he saw no corruption, which is the state of persons there, for God brought him again from the dead the third day. He was the first begotten from the dead. Others had been raised before him and by him, but he was the first that rose to die no more. He was the first fruits of the resurrection. The first who returned from *hades* to return no more to it. But be it remembered, Sir, the Scriptures no where intimate that his *immortal soul* came either from heaven or from its preaching in hell, to reanimate his body in Joseph's tomb. No Sir; we are simply told God raised him from the dead, he brought him again from the dead, he was quickened by the spirit or power of God.

Permit me to ask, why did you not quote the

Scriptures, instead of Robinson and Parkhurst as authority, that *hades* is the place of "pious souls until the resurrection?" The Scriptures, Sir, are at variance with such an idea, as the Scripture usage of *sheol* and *hades* clearly proves, and shown in my First Inquiry by a consideration of all the passages where those words occur. Dr. Whitby, as we shall see afterwards, says, you are indebted to the heathen Greeks for inventing the notion, that *hades* or *sheol* is a repository for good and bad souls after death.—Erect your ebenezer to the Greeks, not to God, for your *hell* after death.

Where then was the thief *that day* with our Lord? It was not in heaven, for Jesus did not go there that day. It was not in Robinson and Parkhurst's repository of "*pious souls until the resurrection*," for Whitby shows this is a mere heathen notion, and is contrary to the Scriptural usage of both *sheol* and *hades*. It was in the state of the dead. This agrees to the fact, for Jesus was that day in the state of the dead. It also agrees to what I quoted in my Essays from Parkhurst, p. 52, with which you are not pleased. And in opposition to which view you give us the following remarks with a sneer, p. 71: "the thief in true penitence calls upon Christ, and Christ tells him he shall die! A fine promise this to a humble penitent!" Your sneer I pass entirely over. Mr. Hudson on 1 Peter 3: 18, 19, contends Jesus was that day in hell preaching to the damned in their "*infernal prison*." Well, "the thief in true penitence calls upon Christ, and Christ tells him he shall be that day with him in hell preaching to damned spirits in this *infernal prison*. A fine promise this to a humble penitent!" Perhaps, Sir, this "humble penitent," by the pains of crucifixion had not received an *adequate, just retribution* for every sin he had committed, and hence went to hell for three days with our Lord, to pay off

the remainder of his score there. Or perhaps Jesus Christ took him there with him, just to show him what he deserved, had he not settled his whole account on the cross.

Some of these remarks are rather ludicrous. But it is not me, but your system which makes them so. To be then serious with you on such a serious subject. This "*fine promise to a humble penitent*" was good enough for him. It was the same kind of promise given to persons at least as good as he was or ever had been. See 2 Kings 22: 20. 2 Chron. 34: 28. Isai. 57: 1, 2. Rev. 14: 13. Eccl. 4: 1—4, noticed on Philip. 1: 21—24, above. It was a promise good enough for Paul, as shown in the preceding passages. Jesus promised him what that day he was to be himself, in the state of the dead, where he should be at rest until the resurrection. Jesus could not promise him any thing better than this, unless he promised him something more than all the humble penitents who had died before him. You seem very kind to people who end their days on the gallows or the cross, who by a few hours pain can settle the whole account of their crimes, and swing off to heaven. From the gallows to endless glory is not uncommon even in our day. Jesus Christ could not promise him immediate glory in heaven, for Jesus did not go there himself that day. And if Jesus Christ is not risen from the dead, and shall raise all up at the last day, I bid an eternal farewell to life or happiness of any kind after death.

I leave our readers now to judge, if my cause "is desperately weak" as you assert. It is not yet reduced so low as to require support from *assertions* without proof; Jewish and heathen opinions; Robinson or Parkhurst's unsupported declarations; nor is it involved in such palpable contradictions as have been pointed out in your system.

On p. 73, 74, you quote the following sentence from me—"man's mental powers grow with the body and decay with it." You give us no less than nine pages of quotation from Mr. Colton of Kings college, Cambridge, in reply to it. Two or three remarks are more than a sufficient reply. 1st. Mr. Colton's reasonings amount to nothing in settling the question of the soul's immortality. This question can never be settled but by divine revelation. The ancient heathens reasoned about the soul, but reasoned in endless mazes lost. Mr. Colton does not *pretend* to appeal to the Scriptures on this subject. Nor does he *pretend* to have settled any thing by his reasonings. On the contrary in concluding his remarks he confesses his ignorance of the "mysterious union of body to mind." He says we labor under a "gulph of insurmountable ignorance" as to their union. And adds, as to the union of life with body and mind "super-added to both, let us affirm of both of them, that we know nothing of either, *but by their effects*, which effects, however, do most fully and firmly establish their existence." But as I do not deny their existence, all his reasonings have no bearing upon my opinions.. Nor do I see for what purpose you introduced this quotation. As you assert the contrary, I will thank you to show what part of it affects my opinions. But

2d. Mr. Colton sets out by stating the argument thus: "*the mind is infantile with the body; manly in the adult, sick and debilitated by disease, enfeebled in the decline of life, doating in decrepitude, and annihilated by death.*" The first link of this analogical chain Mr. Colton admits to be universally true. The mind, you have told us, is the immortal soul. But how you are to manage with infantile immortal souls in your separate state, you nor Mr. Colton give us no information? And why do you and Mr. Colton not also

speak of idiot immortal souls, yea, the immortal souls of brutes, some of which discover minds little inferior to some tribes of men? But Mr. Colton to get rid of *infantile immortal souls*, says, p. 79, 80—"I should rather affirm that the body is infantile with the mind, than that the mind is infantile with the body." But he does not consider his own reasoning conclusive. Mr. Colton says—"we do not contend that the mind has no beginning, but that it shall have no end, and it appears that the body is appointed to be the first stage of its existence." But from what this appears he is not pleased to inform us, nor do you supply his lack of information. Men, Sir, might talk and reason forever on such a subject, but it amounts to nothing; for what can any of us know but from what God has made known in the Bible? We might reason in the same way respecting the brute creation.

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## LETTER V.

SIR,

THE fifth division of your book is called a "*statement of the question in debate.*" You state it thus: "*Is all punishment confined to this state or not?*" If "much dispute has arisen about the statement of this question," it arises from the unreasonable demand suggested in your next sentence. You say—"we who believe in a future retribution, contend that the question is reciprocal; that both parties have a positive, and both are under obligation to defend it. For either party to say they have no positive, is con-

fessing that their doctrine is only negation, and their faith unbelief; and that they themselves are sceptics, and not Christians." On this very extraordinary account I remark

1st. If your statement is correct, there cannot be a *negative*. To use the word *negative*, is a gross impropriety in the use of words. Will you condescend to tell us what a negative is? No truth is more generally admitted, for it has become proverbial, "*that no man can, or is bound to prove a negative.*" The impossibility arises from the very nature of the case. This I shall illustrate by an example. Dr. Allen, in his Lecture, has intimated that the place of future punishment is in the moon, &c. Well, I deny it. But will you say that Dr. Allen has a claim on me to produce a text of Scripture to prove that men are not to be punished in the moon? And must I admit his theory to be correct, if I cannot produce such a text? According to your statement I must admit it. But will not every reasonable man say—"if Dr. Allen asserts that men are to be punished in the moon, it is incumbent on him to produce evidence of this. The proof lies with him, for the doctrine asserted is his; and unless he can produce Scripture for his doctrine, I treat it as an idle notion. I do the very same with your doctrine. You assert men are to be punished after death in a disembodied state. I deny it. But have you a right to call on me to adduce a text of Scripture that they are not, or else believe your doctrine? What reasonable man, Sir, would ever make this demand, unless he found it impossible to prove his own doctrine?

2d. I call on you to quote any respectable authority who reasons as you do on this subject. Quote the writer who says any man is bound to prove a *negative*. Quote the author who asserts that the negative and positive sides of the same question are both

positive? Quote the writer, Sir, either sacred or profane, who maintains as you do, that unless a man can adduce a text of Scripture to prove an assertion false, he must admit that assertion to be the truth.

3d. But I have the authority of an inspired apostle, that my mode of proving a negative is correct. Paul, Heb. 7: 13, 14, considered the silence of Scripture sufficient proof of a negative. Nor am I aware, inspired as he was, that he was capable of proving it in any other way. But, had you been at Paul's elbow when he wrote, you ought to have told him, "for you to say you have no positive in this question is confessing your doctrine is only negation, your faith disbelief, and that you are a sceptic and not a Christian." Paul happened to consider *the silence of Scripture* sufficient proof of his negative. You must then allow me to think it is sufficient proof of mine, and Paul and I both stand condemned by you as *sceptics*.

4th. But where would your statement and reasonings land us, were we to adopt them and generally act upon them? Men may assert any thing as true doctrine, and if we cannot produce a text of Scripture showing it false, we must of consequence admit it to be true. Take an example from your own books, which furnishes abundance of them. You assert that people are to be reformed in hell by "*consideration and reflection*." But are we obliged to believe you, unless we can adduce a text which expressly declares the contrary?

In p. 15 of your Letters, you said to Mr. Ballou, "your system is only a negation and your faith disbelief—a creed which would better become a sceptic than a professed Christian." In p. 9, 10 of your present book you say—"I did not tell Mr. Ballou that his faith was only disbelief," and allege that I misrepresented your meaning. But now, on p. 84,

you tell us, "for either party to say they have no positive, is confessing that their doctrine is only negation, and their faith disbelief; and that they themselves are sceptics and not Christians." This is giving a degree of importance to your doctrine I never supposed it would assume. There cannot a doubt remain, that you now call all of us sceptics, who do not believe in your future punishment. We are "*sceptics and not Christians.*" This now will surely remove all doubt that calling Mr. Ballou your reverend and dear Christian brother, was all a piece of hypocrisy. Well, treat us henceforth with just what civility you please, but let us never hear a word from your lips that you consider us *Christian brethren.* Refrain from this, and I shall esteem you for consistency, but if you do not, I shall only view your conduct a piece of hypocrisy. Universalist societies to whom such "*sceptics and not Christians*" minister, ought either to own themselves *sceptics*, or consider themselves insulted by your accusation.

But you say of me, "his statement of all questions is what saith the Scriptures?" Yes; this is my statement of all *religious questions*, and I am glad to see you approve of it. But you add—"it is a mere evasion. What saith the Scriptures in relation to what? *Confining all punishment to this world?* No, he will not admit this to be the question." You mistake, Sir, for though I do not think it a correct or reasonable statement of the question, yet for the sake of peace, let it stand as a statement of the question. But if this be *my* question, *yours* must be—"*what saith the Scriptures respecting punishment beyond this world?*" 1st. I begin with my *own* as stated by yourself—"*what saith the Scriptures respecting confining all punishment to this world?*" Well, I search the Scriptures with care, and find punishments of various kinds and degrees mentioned, all confined to this world. In

confirmation of this result, I find you say, p. 70, "the law of Moses did not even teach a future state of existence, and it would be downright contradiction to admit that the law was enforced by penalties extending into a future state when the law did not reveal such a state." By your own confession, the law of Moses is against your future punishment, and in favor of my views, that all punishment is confined "*to this world.*" Most intelligent men now allow that all the punishments mentioned in the Old Testament are of a temporal nature. But I continue my search of the Scriptures, to find some punishment mentioned beyond this world. After all the search I can make, I do not find it. What then, Sir, am I to do? Must I believe in your doctrine of future punishment? It is impossible, unless I believe without evidence. No Sir, I reject it, and on the same ground, Paul did another thing, Heb. 7, referred to above. No other alternative is left me, but either to believe your doctrine without evidence, or, "rest under the imputation of *believing in unbelief*," with which you charge me. I prefer the latter, and leave you to cry *sceptic*, *infidel*, or *atheist* if you please. I believe in *unbelief* here, just as you do when you tell me you do not believe there is such a creature as a *salamander*.

2d. *Your* question is—"*what saith the Scriptures respecting punishment beyond this world?*" This is your doctrine, and I call for your proofs of it. But I am told at the outset, if I am not able to find a text saying, all punishment is confined to this world, I must admit it true. But if the doctrine be Scriptural, it is as susceptible of proof as any other important doctrine taught in the Bible. For example, if a man denies that the Scriptures teach any punishment in this world, and I believe that it does, I am bound to adduce proof of it. If I cannot, he is not bound to believe me. But I ought to tell him—Sir, either adduce a

text from the Bible which declares that it does not teach any punishment in this world, or own the truth of my doctrine. In such a case, I should consider myself as absurdly unreasonable. But if a man did deny this, would I be at any loss to prove from the Bible that it taught the doctrine of punishment in this world? None. And if your doctrine of "*punishment beyond this world*" was just as easily proved, why trouble yourself or your readers, with all you say about the statement of the question?

Respecting me you say, p. 85—"I have not in all his writings seen a single attempt to prove that all men are duly and equitably recompensed here." No Sir, and for very good reasons. You must tell me precisely what you mean by being "*duly and equitably recompensed here.*" If you mean that every man receives a full punishment for all the sins he commits, or in other words, is punished into heaven, I tell you I believe no such doctrine. Tell me what you mean precisely, and I will tell you explicitly what I believe about it. But you say—"we have already seen that he admits that St. Paul, as virtuous as he was, received *far more* misery than happiness in this state, even after he had become converted to Christianity." Please Sir state my opinions in my own words, and not in your *logical form*, for no such opinion was ever stated by me. *Sceptic* as I am, I have no such contemptible views of Christianity. I trust from what has been stated in former Letters, you can be at no loss now to understand my views of this subject.

On p. 86—88, you introduce a supposed case of A and B, relative to murder and the civil law. You admit, that if "A should assert, that by the laws of our country every murderer should be hung, and after that should endure one year's punishment, he must produce the statute which contained this penal-

ty." You add "if he could produce a statute which only said that the murderer should hang till he was dead, would not every person say that he was defeated in his position?" Certainly. Let us then see, Sir, how you evade the force of this supposed case, in regard to your doctrine of punishment after death. You say—"the civil law consists *only* of a law and a penalty. But this is not true of the Scriptures; they treat of man in every situation, of his creation, character, duty and final destination. Here then is a striking difference. The one treats of all men in every situation, the other treats upon nothing but the punishment which must be inflicted in case of transgression; the latter is confined to this world, the former extends into the future." But what of all this parade of words and distinctions, for I ask you Sir, does not the divine law as well as the civil, contain a law and a penalty? And have you not told us yourself, that the *penalties* of Moses' law did not extend into a future state? If the Scriptures do—"treat of man in every situation of his creation, character, duty and final destination," how does all this alter the case, as to your extending the penalty of the divine law beyond death? Instead of this making a "*striking difference*," it makes no difference at all; for still the question is, what is the penalty of the divine law? If you say it extends beyond death, you must produce the statute which contains such a penalty, just as A must do in the case you suppose, and consider correct. If the divine law treats of "all men in every situation," so does the civil law, for it condemns all to death for murder without regard to their situation in life. You really seem to write sometimes without thinking. You positively assert in the above quotation, that the civil law treats upon nothing but the punishment which must be inflicted in case of transgression," yet set out by telling us

"the civil law consists of a law and a penalty." But what does it signify if the divine law treats of a thousand things the civil law does not, if the divine law does not treat of your future punishment? If the civil law "is confined to this world," it still remains to be proved, that the threatenings of the divine law "extend into the future."

But from your preceding reasonings you draw the following conclusions, p. 88. "Now as the Bible treats upon salvation and final happiness, nay as this is the great doctrine to which all things else are subservient, we may naturally expect that this doctrine will be taught in the clearest manner. As many die in the perpetration of some horrid crime, it appears certain that they must be punished after death. But if this is not the case, we have a right to ask for proof; and if no proof can be produced, we feel justified in saying that such an one will be obnoxious to punishment after death." Answer. Who ever disputed "that final happiness is taught in the clearest manner" in the Bible? Or who disputes that this is "the great doctrine to which all things else are subservient?" The point in dispute is, is your punishment after death taught in the Bible in the clearest manner? If it was, you had no occasion to beg the question in the above quotation. I may ask also, is it taught in the clearest manner in the Bible, that your future punishment and salvation in hell is one of the "*all things*" which is made subservient to "*final happiness?*" But in begging the question, you tell us some—"*must be punished after death.*" Well, who are they? They are those who "die in the perpetration of some horrid crime." But, is this certain? Yes, you tell us—"as many die in the prepetration of some horrid crime it appears *certain* that they *must* be punished after death." About this *kind of sinners* you seem *certain* that they *must* be punished. And

why not also all who die in the perpetration of *little* sins? Why single out *horrid* sinners, and send them to hell to be punished after death, and yet send Christian *little* sinners to heaven? If all are not sent to final happiness on the ground of God's grace, and not on the difference of crime, farewell salvation to us all. There is not a principle in your book, which I hold in more heartfelt detestation than the one here advocated; and I am certain, either your views or mine are radically wrong as it respects the ground on which future existence and happiness rests. But I ask, from what does "*it appear certain*, that any are to be *punished after death?*" I defy any man to point out the thing from which you draw such a conclusion, except that the persons "*die in the perpetration of some horrid crime.*" This is all the premises from which you draw your *certain* and *must be* conclusion. But one thing I suggest for your sober and serious consideration. It is this. The Scriptures relate cases of persons who died in the perpetration of very horrid crimes. But no Scripture writer says what you here say about such persons. Either then they were very ignorant, not to know this thing about which you are so *certain*, or if they knew it, were not so faithful as you are in declaring it to mankind. If they knew it, what apology can you make for their unfaithfulness? If they did not, how came *you* to be so *certain* about it? If you are correct, Annanias and Sapphira, with many other Christians, went from this world to hell, and so far as I can learn from your system, are still there. Very *horrid sinners* you send to hell, but on Luke 23: 43 above, you sent the man to heaven who died on the cross for his *overt acts of iniquity.* A few hours punishment settled his whole account. When shall we arrive at the end of your contradictions?

# LETTER VI.

SIR,

I PROCEED to examine the sixth division of your book called "*a future judgment.*" Your first sentence is extraordinary; you say—"let it be observed here, that the Scriptures were addressed to those who believed in a future judgment." Most people imagine it is by the Scriptures *alone* we can know whether there is or is not to be a future judgment. But it seems they are mistaken, for the faith of those to whom the Scriptures were addressed anticipated divine revelation, and we should think superseded its necessity on this subject. Permit me to ask, how such persons came by their belief before the Scriptures were addressed to them? Should you say it originated in a divine revelation which is now lost, please inform us, who revealed this to you, or show that such a revelation ever existed.

It was very sagacious in you to take this ground, for if the Scriptures do not teach your "*future judgment,*" the doctrine is secure without them. It is certain from your own showing, p. 70 of your Letters, that Moses in his law did not teach it. This part of Scripture then, does not—"use language which seems naturally to teach this doctrine," and as all your proofs are drawn from the New Testament, I conclude it is your opinion, "*a future judgment*" is not taught in all the Old Testament. If it is, no doubt but you would have resorted to it for proof. But were the Old Testament writers all believers in a future judgment, addressed their revelations to such as believed in it, and yet as silent as the grave about it? The man, Sir, who can believe this, must have an *old propensity* for believing. It would be sinful to

think he would become a *sceptic* about any thing.—But if the Old Testament Scriptures were addressec to such as believed in "a future judgment, yet saj nothing about it, what made it necessary to revea this doctrine in the New Testament? Again; do th New Testament writers introduce this doctrine as a new revelation to the world? Do they say it orig inated in a divine revelation which happened to ge lost? Is this carelessness in God (pardon the expres sion) in correspondence with his care over the reve lation now in our hands? Is the subject of "*a futur judgment*" of so little consequence, that God shoulc permit the revelation about it to be lost, and not re veal it again until the days of the Gospel dispensa tion? And was his confidence in *corrupt tradition* sc great that he transmitted it for several thousand year in this channel until the gospel day should arrive? But admitting he did, how is this to be reconcilec with God's injunctions to the Jews, to give no heec to any traditions whatever, but to his written law bj Moses? And if the Jews believed in "*a future judgment*," received through corrupt tradition, why did our Lord say they had made void God's law by thei traditions, without making any exception whatever? If it was made void by this tradition, by your own showing it was made void by a truth, believed in all ages by those to whom the Scriptures were addressed. But I am such a confounded *sceptic*, that I believe all traditions not taught in Scripture tend to make them void, and you allow "*a future judgment* was not a tradition taught in the law of Moses." But further. The law of Moses, in which you own "*a future judgment*" is not taught, was delivered with great preparations and solemnity to the Jews, Exod. chaps. 19, 20. But when, where, by whom, or with what solemnity is "*a future judgment*" revealed to mankind? You must say—"*I cannot tell.*" So God makes a mighty

solemnity about a *trifle*, but about your *future judgment* he makes none. No, he slips it into the world, first by revealing it, but allows this revelation to be very soon lost. He does not allow Moses to insert it in his law. And when he again reveals it, as you seem to think in the New Testament, no solemnity is made about it. The very texts on which you rest the proof of it are *few*, and to say the least about them, are far from being conclusive. Let us proceed to examine them. Your first text is

Acts 24: 25, "and as he reasoned of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come, Felix trembled," &c. This text was examined at length in my Essays, p. 278—286. Your reply is chiefly taken up with my criticism on the term *mello*. As similar remarks must be made on your next proof text, where Mr. Loveland will come in for a share of attention, my remarks here shall be brief. 1st. Who, Sir, ever disputed, that *mello* signifies *future*, and even *a future far distant?* Certainly I never did. You concede—"the word *mello*, then, simply signifies to *delay*, to *be future*, and this future may be immediately connected with the present, or very remote, according to the nature of the subject." Conceding that "*this future may be immediately connected with the present*," shows the correctness of my statements, and Dr. Campbell's criticism. What is the point of his criticism on which my statements were founded? He says—"there is just such a difference between *estai* and *mellei esesthai* in Greek as there is between *it will be*, and *it is about to be* in English. This holds particularly in threats and warnings." The future here must be connected with the present. This will be seen from noticing distinctly what is the precise point of his criticism. Is it that *mello* alone signifies *about to be?* No. Is it that *mello, with an infinitive following* signifies this? No Sir, it is—*that mello, with an*

*infinitive following* signifies this "*particularly in threats and warnings.*" It was only to such passages as contained *threats and warnings* that I applied this criticism. You do not seem to have perceived its point, or if you did, you evaded it. Mr. Loveland perceived it, but finding nothing to blunt it, denies that the passage contains a threat or a warning, as we shall see afterwards. You say "examples can be produced, showing this rule to be defective." How defective, Sir? That *mello*, with an infinitive following does not signify *it is about to be*, in texts which contain threats or warnings? No Sir, though you and Mr. Loveland ransacked the Scripture usage of *mello*, a single example of this kind you could not find. Could Mr. Loveland have found but one such example, he never would have attempted to deny this text contained a threat or warning to Felix. Love of system ought not to drive us quite so far as this. By doing so, he forgot that he was robbing you of one principal text in proof of your "*future judgment.*"

2d. But if Paul in this text teaches your future judgment, why did he use *mello*, with an infinitive following? He was liable to be misunderstood. By your own showing, *mello*, with an infinitive following "may be immediately connected with the present." But your day of judgment when Paul wrote, was at some thousand years distance. Even now, some tell us at the distance of three hundred and sixty thousand years. Paul's language conveyed the idea, *it was about to be*, as all I think ought to admit. Does the Holy Spirit speak with so little precision as this? Who then can blame some of the first Christians for thinking the end of the world was to happen during their day?

3d. If you could have found a text to meet my *criticisms*, Rom. 5: 14. Gal. 3: 23. 1 Tim. 1: 16,

would not have been adduced, for none of them contain a threat or a warning. You may toil, and sweat and sigh over it till you die, but you never can rid yourself of the force of this criticism against your views of this and other passages. And why? Because, Sir, it is true.

4th. You despatch all my other arguments by a few brief sentences, chiefly in the way of ridicule, and wrap the matter up as usual in the following manner. "To conclude, I will state that the passage before us naturally teaches a future judgment. St. Luke could not in honesty have written such language to people who believed in a future retribution, unless he meant to teach that doctrine." But does your saying—"*I will state*" all this, make it true? I thought the point in dispute was—did the Scripture writers—"teach a future retribution?" But you assume it as true, and think if you say—"*I will state*" it to be true, it must make it true. I am really sick at listening to this mode of proof, and seeing the sacred writers impeached, as fools or dishonest men, if they do not teach your doctrines. It indicates you have become bankrupt in argument.

5th. You say, p. 93, "Now in the passage before us, *tou mellontos* is a participle, so according to his own authority it signifies *future*, what is to come, agreeable to the sense of the common version." Who ever disputed, Sir, that it signifies future? Is not "*about to be*" future? Is not *mellontos* a part of the verb? And who could suppose you would conceal the infinitive following? The whole Greek phrase is—"*tou mellontos esesthai*. Does not the infinitive follow here? Was not Paul delivering a threat or a warning to Felix? And is not this the point of the criticism I quoted from Dr. Campbell? Did you evade it, or was all this oversight? If the latter I excuse it, but if the former, it speaks a volume against.

you and the system for which you are contending. You ask me on the same page—"does he understand *mello* in verse 15 to signify *about to be?*" I have only to ask as a reply, was Paul, in verse 15, delivering a *threat or a warning?* No Sir, he was not; and it shows how you evade the point of my criticism, which you cannot meet. But meet it you must, or forever give up this and other texts in proof of your "*future judgment.*"

Acts 17: 31 is your next proof text. "Because he hath appointed a day, in which he will judge the world in righteousness," &c. This text was considered fully in my Essays, p. 222—228. The following criticism was introduced, as on the last text. Parkhurst says—"*mello* signifies, with an infinitive following, *to be about* to do a thing, *futurus sum.*" Dr. Campbell, on Matt. 3: 7, also says, *mello* often means not only *future* but near. There is just such a difference between *estai* and *mellei esesthai* in Greek, as there is between *it will be*, and *it is about to be*, in English. This holds particularly in threats and warnings." Is *mello* then used with an infinitive in this passage? Yes. Is a threat or warning delivered in this passage? Yes, you do not dispute it; though Mr. Loveland denies it. Let us inquire, 1st. What is the meaning of the Greek term *mello?* Ewing says—"*mello* signifies I am about to be or do, I delay." What do you say? You say, p. 92—"the word *mello* more naturally signifies *future* than about to be." But is not *about to be* future, however near it may be to the present?

2d. Did I ever contend that *mello always* signifies about to be? No. So far from this I perfectly agree to what is said by you, p. 92, "the word *mello* then simply signifies to delay to be *future*, and this future may be immediately connected with the present or very remote, according to the nature of the subject."

Wherein then lies the dispute between us? This will be seen by asking

3d. Did I ever contend that *mello alone* signifies *about to be?* No Sir, I said, and the *criticism said*, it was "*mello, with an infinitive following*, which signifies *to be about* to do a thing, *futurus sum.*" And Dr. Campbell said, that this held *particularly in threats and warnings.* I quoted Acts 3: 3, and 18: 14. Rev. 3: 2, as examples, showing it is so rendered in our common version. The general usage of *mello*, with *an infinitive following*, shows the correctness of the criticism. But you assert 1 Tim. 1. 16, is an example of this rule's being defective, which is a mistake. The exceptions it seems were not very *plenty.* If they were, you had no occasion to commit a mistake in selecting an instance to show the rule defective. But the *point* of my criticism did not depend entirely on *mello* being used with an *infinitive following.* No Sir, it depended on its being so used "*particularly in threats and warnings.*" Why overlook, or deliberately conceal this *point* of the criticism, which has such a powerful bearing on this and the preceding text? Produce, Sir, but one text, were *mello*, with an *infinitive following*, is used, and where a *threat or a warning is given*, and does not signify *about to be*, but a distant future, and I will allow you have done something. Your not being able to find such an example, shows the immovable ground of my interpretations, and the correctness of the criticism on which they are founded.

But I shall now notice your remarks particularly on this passage. 1st. You say on p. 96, "the Roman empire did not become Christian till the reign of Constantine, in A. D. 313, so that Mr. B's *about to be*, in this case did not take place till *about three hundred years after* the declaration was made." Strange! Beyond all measure strange! ! "The Roman em-

pire did not become Christian till the reign of Constantine in A. D. 313!" It seems then it was Constantine not Christ, which made the Roman empire Christian. But Sir, Christ had judged, ruled, and had so far subdued the people in the Roman empire previous to A. D. 313, that Constantine deemed it the best of policy to make Christianity the religion of the whole empire. Constantine never would have thought of this, unless the mass of the people had been so far subdued by Christ as to answer his political purposes. The judging or ruling of Jesus Christ in the Roman empire so far from beginning with Constantine in the year 313, is the very date of the decline of his reign. At this date, Christianity was made by law the religion of the Roman empire, and from this period it gradually descended to the grave of corruption, in which it lay buried for ages, as all history abundantly testifies. It is but a short time since any thing was done to raise Christianity from this grave, and sorry am I to say, your labors are spent in making Christianity still wear the grave clothes of this corruption. Christ by his truth, subdued multitudes in the Roman empire in Paul's day. The sound of the gospel had gone into all the earth to the ends of the world (*oikoumene.*) The apostles by their preaching had turned the world (*oikoumene* or Roman empire) upside down, Rom. 10: 18. Acts 17: 6. But the Roman empire, according to your statement, was made Christian by Constantine A. D. 313, which shows what views you have of Christianity. Like Dr. Ely and others, you seem to be hankering after a national religion, nor can Christ rule or govern by his truth in any land, until this is the case. If this is not the truth, to what purpose are the above statements? But

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Mr. B's criticism on *mello*, by Rev. S. C. Loveland, published in the Christian Repository, vol. ix. p. 123—130, from which I will make an extract, being persuaded that it will be acceptable to the reader." Very acceptable, Sir, at least to me, and you must now stand and look on while I attend to Mr. Loveland's remarks. He says—"that the word *mello* often has the sense of a future action, about to take place, is not disputed. The same is true of the common future tense; as usually understood in our language. It may be *near* or *at a distance* as the nature of the subject may require. The Latin meaning of *mello*, as already quoted from Parkhurst, is *futurus sum*, which literally signifies *to be future*, and this future may be *near* or *remote* as the subject to which it applies requires. Let Mr. B. or any other Latin scholar, prove that the Latin *futurus* and the English *future* are not perfectly synonymous, and we promise with good fortune to attend to him. To *futurus sum*, Schrevelius adds *cunctor*, *to delay*, to *prolong time*, which constitutes his whole definition of *mello*." I have no occasion to dispute this. Nor are you done in agreeing with me in my opinions, for you immediately add, "although the word (*mello*) may have the meaning which Mr. B. has given it, yet if it has not this meaning *exclusively* it does not *of itself* show that it had no reference to a day of general judgment at the close of time. An argument founded merely on a single definition of an ambiguous term, every logician knows is at the best, extremely doubtful. Mr. B. has quoted from Parkhurst and Campbell, suffer me now to quote in addition from Jones' Greek Lexicon what we believe to be a fair definition of the word. '*Mello, I take time to do a thing, am bent upon, prepare to do, am about to do.*'" Such, Sir, are your statements, and I thank you kindly for them. For 1st. You admit that *mello may* have the mean-

why not also all who die in the perpetration of *little* sins? Why single out *horrid* sinners, and send them to hell to be punished after death, and yet send Christian *little* sinners to heaven? If all are not sent to final happiness on the ground of God's grace, and not on the difference of crime, farewell salvation to us all. There is not a principle in your book, which I hold in more heartfelt detestation than the one here advocated; and I am certain, either your views or mine are radically wrong as it respects the ground on which future existence and happiness rests. But I ask, from what does "*it appear certain*, that any are to be *punished after death?*" I defy any man to point out the thing from which you draw such a conclusion, except that the persons "*die in the perpetration of some horrid crime.*" This is all the premises from which you draw your *certain* and *must be* conclusion. But one thing I suggest for your sober and serious consideration. It is this. The Scriptures relate cases of persons who died in the perpetration of very horrid crimes. But no Scripture writer says what you here say about such persons. Either then they were very ignorant, not to know this thing about which you are so *certain*, or if they knew it, were not so faithful as you are in declaring it to mankind. If they knew it, what apology can you make for their unfaithfulness? If they did not, how came *you* to be so *certain* about it? If you are correct, Annanias and Sapphira, with many other Christians, went from this world to hell, and so far as I can learn from your system, are still there. Very *horrid sinners* you send to hell, but on Luke 23: 43 above, you sent the man to heaven who died on the cross for his *overt acts of iniquity*. A few hours punishment settled his whole account. When shall we arrive at the end of your contradictions?

# LETTER VI.

SIR,

I PROCEED to examine the sixth division of your book called "*a future judgment.*" Your first sentence is extraordinary; you say—"let it be observed here, that the Scriptures were addressed to those who believed in a future judgment." Most people imagine it is by the Scriptures *alone* we can know whether there is or is not to be a future judgment. But it seems they are mistaken, for the faith of those to whom the Scriptures were addressed anticipated divine revelation, and we should think superseded its necessity on this subject. Permit me to ask, how such persons came by their belief before the Scriptures were addressed to them? Should you say it originated in a divine revelation which is now lost, please inform us, who revealed this to you, or show that such a revelation ever existed.

It was very sagacious in you to take this ground, for if the Scriptures do not teach your "*future judgment,*" the doctrine is secure without them. It is certain from your own showing, p. 70 of your Letters, that Moses in his law did not teach it. This part of Scripture then, does not—"use language which seems naturally to teach this doctrine," and as all your proofs are drawn from the New Testament, I conclude it is your opinion, "*a future judgment*" is not taught in all the Old Testament. If it is, no doubt but you would have resorted to it for proof. But were the Old Testament writers all believers in a future judgment, addressed their revelations to such as believed in it, and yet as silent as the grave about it? The man, Sir, who can believe this, must have an *old propensity* for believing. It would be sinful to

quote Parkhurst and Campbell as before. But unluckily for Mr. B. *mellontos* is not a verb, but a participle, which Parkhurst says means '*future, what is to come.*' So one witness has failed him and he is left with Dr. Campbell alone." We really hope this is not a fair specimen of your Greek scholarship. Is it any wonderful discovery Sir, to tell us, "*mellontos* is not a verb, but a participle," for who does not know that a participle is part of the verb? But *unluckily*, not perhaps *intentionally*, you conceal what you ought to have told your readers, that the entire Greek phrase here is "*kai tou krimatos tou mellontos esesthai.*" Is not the participle *mellontos* here followed by an infinitive? This you cannot deny, for it now stares you right in the face. But why did you conceal this? What answer you will return to this question I leave to your own candor. At first I imputed this to oversight in your haste to refute my views. But I shall proceed to show that you perceived, yea felt the point of the argument.

On p. 99, 100, you thus quote my criticism from Dr. Campbell. "The Dr. says 'there is just such a difference between *estai* and *mellei esesthai* in Greek, as there is between *it will be* and *it is about to be* in English. This holds particularly in threats and warnings.' Mr. B. says 'it is certain that Paul was threatening or warning Felix,' and he thinks this renders his interpretations *doubly sure here.*" Not a doubt can remain, that you felt the point of my argument, but evaded encountering it. I infer this from the following circumstances. 1st. From your very next sentence: you say "but mind, this is all by the help of Dr. Campbell, for just now Parkhurst stepped aside." And is it of any consequence, Sir, by whose help it was done? It concerned you to produce examples, where *mello*, with an infinitive following, and *in texts* where *threats or warnings are given*, signify a

solemnity about a *trifle*, but about your *future judgment* he makes none. No, he slips it into the world, first by revealing it, but allows this revelation to be very soon lost. He does not allow Moses to insert it in his law. And when he again reveals it, as you seem to think in the New Testament, no solemnity is made about it. The very texts on which you rest the proof of it are *few*, and to say the least about them, are far from being conclusive. Let us proceed to examine them. Your first text is

Acts 24: 25, "and as he reasoned of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come, Felix trembled," &c. This text was examined at length in my Essays, p. 278—286. Your reply is chiefly taken up with my criticism on the term *mello*. As similar remarks must be made on your next proof text, where Mr. Loveland will come in for a share of attention, my remarks here shall be brief. 1st. Who, Sir, ever disputed, that *mello* signifies *future*, and even *a future far distant?* Certainly I never did. You concede—"the word *mello*, then, simply signifies to *delay*, to *be future*, and this future may be immediately connected with the present, or very remote, according to the nature of the subject." Conceding that "*this future may be immediately connected with the present*," shows the correctness of my statements, and Dr. Campbell's criticism. What is the point of his criticism on which my statements were founded? He says—"there is just such a difference between *estai* and *mellei esesthai* in Greek as there is between *it will be*, and *it is about to be* in English. This holds particularly in threats and warnings." The future here must be connected with the present. This will be seen from noticing distinctly what is the precise point of his criticism. Is it that *mello* alone signifies *about to be?* No. Is it that *mello, with an infinitive following* signifies this? No Sir, it is—*that mello, with an*

*infinitive following* signifies this "*particularly in threats and warnings.*" It was only to such passages as contained *threats and warnings* that I applied this criticism. You do not seem to have perceived its point, or if you did, you evaded it. Mr. Loveland perceived it, but finding nothing to blunt it, denies that the passage contains a threat or a warning, as we shall see afterwards. You say "examples can be produced, showing this rule to be defective." How defective, Sir? That *mello*, with an infinitive following does not signify *it is about to be*, in texts which contain threats or warnings? No Sir, though you and Mr. Loveland ransacked the Scripture usage of *mello*, a single example of this kind you could not find. Could Mr. Loveland have found but one such example, he never would have attempted to deny this text contained a threat or warning to Felix. Love of system ought not to drive us quite so far as this. By doing so, he forgot that he was robbing you of one principal text in proof of your "*future judgment.*"

2d. But if Paul in this text teaches your future judgment, why did he use *mello*, with an infinitive following? He was liable to be misunderstood. By your own showing, *mello*, with an infinitive following "may be immediately connected with the present." But your day of judgment when Paul wrote, was at some thousand years distance. Even now, some tell us at the distance of three hundred and sixty thousand years. Paul's language conveyed the idea, *it was about to be*, as all I think ought to admit. Does the Holy Spirit speak with so little precision as this? Who then can blame some of the first Christians for thinking the end of the world was to happen during their day?

3d. If you could have found a text to meet my criticisms, Rom. 5: 14. Gal. 3: 23. 1 Tim. 1: 16,

would not have been adduced, for none of them contain a threat or a warning. You may toil, and sweat and sigh over it till you die, but you never can rid yourself of the force of this criticism against your views of this and other passages. And why? Because, Sir, it is true.

4th. You despatch all my other arguments by a few brief sentences, chiefly in the way of ridicule, and wrap the matter up as usual in the following manner. "To conclude, I will state that the passage before us naturally teaches a future judgment. St. Luke could not in honesty have written such language to people who believed in a future retribution, unless he meant to teach that doctrine." But does your saying—"*I will state*" all this, make it true? I thought the point in dispute was—did the Scripture writers—"teach a future retribution?" But you assume it as true, and think if you say—"*I will state*" it to be true, it must make it true. I am really sick at listening to this mode of proof, and seeing the sacred writers impeached, as fools or dishonest men, if they do not teach your doctrines. It indicates you have become bankrupt in argument.

5th. You say, p. 93, "Now in the passage before us, *tou mellontos* is a participle, so according to his own authority it signifies *future*, what is to come, agreeable to the sense of the common version." Who ever disputed, Sir, that it signifies future? Is not "*about to be*" future? Is not *mellontos* a part of the verb? And who could suppose you would conceal the infinitive following? The whole Greek phrase is—"*tou mellontos esesthai*." Does not the infinitive follow here? Was not Paul delivering a threat or a warning to Felix? And is not this the point of the criticism I quoted from Dr. Campbell? Did you evade it, or was all this oversight? If the latter I excuse it, but if the former, it speaks a volume against.

you and the system for which you are contending. You ask me on the same page—"does he understand *mello* in verse 15 to signify *about to be?*" I have only to ask as a reply, was Paul, in verse 15, delivering a *threat or a warning?* No Sir, he was not; and it shows how you evade the point of my criticism, which you cannot meet. But meet it you must, or forever give up this and other texts in proof of your "*future judgment.*"

Acts 17: 31 is your next proof text. "Because he hath appointed a day, in which he will judge the world in righteousness," &c. This text was considered fully in my Essays, p. 222—228. The following criticism was introduced, as on the last text. Parkhurst says—"*mello* signifies, with an infinitive following, *to be about* to do a thing, *futurus sum.*" Dr. Campbell, on Matt. 3: 7, also says, *mello* often means not only *future* but near. There is just such a difference between *estai* and *mellei esesthai* in Greek, as there is between *it will be*, and *it is about to be*, in English. This holds particularly in threats and warnings." Is *mello* then used with an infinitive in this passage? Yes. Is a threat or warning delivered in this passage? Yes, you do not dispute it; though Mr. Loveland denies it. Let us inquire, 1st. What is the meaning of the Greek term *mello?* Ewing says—"*mello* signifies I am about to be or do, I delay." What do you say? You say, p. 92—"the word *mello* more naturally signifies *future* than about to be." But is not *about to be* future, however near it may be to the present?

2d. Did I ever contend that *mello always* signifies about to be? No. So far from this I perfectly agree to what is said by you, p. 92, "the word *mello* then simply signifies to delay to be *future*, and this future may be immediately connected with the present or very remote, according to the nature of the subject."

Wherein then lies the dispute between us? This will be seen by asking

3d. Did I ever contend that *mello alone* signifies *about to be?* No Sir, I said, and the *criticism said*, it was "*mello, with an infinitive following*, which signifies *to be about* to do a thing, *futurus sum.*" And Dr. Campbell said, that this held *particularly in threats and warnings.* I quoted Acts 3: 3, and 18: 14. Rev. 3: 2, as examples, showing it is so rendered in our common version. The general usage of *mello*, with *an infinitive following*, shows the correctness of the criticism. But you assert 1 Tim. 1. 16, is an example of this rule's being defective, which is a mistake. The exceptions it seems were not very *plenty.* If they were, you had no occasion to commit a mistake in selecting an instance to show the rule defective. But the *point* of my criticism did not depend entirely on *mello* being used with an *infinitive following.* No Sir, it depended on its being so used "*particularly in threats and warnings.*" Why overlook, or deliberately conceal this *point* of the criticism, which has such a powerful bearing on this and the preceding text? Produce, Sir, but one text, were *mello*, with an *infinitive following*, is used, and where a *threat or a warning is given*, and does not signify *about to be*, but a distant future, and I will allow you have done something. Your not being able to find such an example, shows the immovable ground of my interpretations, and the correctness of the criticism on which they are founded.

But I shall now notice your remarks particularly on this passage. 1st. You say on p. 96, "the Roman empire did not become Christian till the reign of Constantine, in A. D. 313, so that Mr. B's *about to be*, in this case did not take place till *about three hundred years after* the declaration was made." Strange! Beyond all measure strange! ! "The Roman em-

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Mr. B's criticism on *mello*, by Rev. S. C. Loveland, published in the Christian Repository, vol. ix. p. 123—130, from which I will make an extract, being persuaded that it will be acceptable to the reader." Very acceptable, Sir, at least to me, and you must now stand and look on while I attend to Mr. Loveland's remarks. He says—"that the word *mello* often has the sense of a future action, about to take place, is not disputed. The same is true of the common future tense; as usually understood in our language. It may be *near* or *at a distance* as the nature of the subject may require. The Latin meaning of *mello*, as already quoted from Parkhurst, is *futurus sum*, which literally signifies *to be future*, and this future may be *near* or *remote* as the subject to which it applies requires. Let Mr. B. or any other Latin scholar, prove that the Latin *futurus* and the English *future* are not perfectly synonymous, and we promise with good fortune to attend to him. To *futurus sum*, Schrevelius adds *cunctor*, *to delay*, to *prolong time*, which constitutes his whole definition of *mello*." I have no occasion to dispute this. Nor are you done in agreeing with me in my opinions, for you immediately add, "although the word (*mello*) may have the meaning which Mr. B. has given it, yet if it has not this meaning *exclusively* it does not *of itself* show that it had no reference to a day of general judgment at the close of time. An argument founded merely on a single definition of an ambiguous term, every logician knows is at the best, extremely doubtful. Mr. B. has quoted from Parkhurst and Campbell, suffer me now to quote in addition from Jones' Greek Lexicon what we believe to be a fair definition of the word. '*Mello, I take time to do a thing, am bent upon, prepare to do, am about to do*,'" Such, Sir, are your statements, and I thank you kindly for them. For 1st. You admit that *mello may* have the mean-

ing I have given it, and the authorities you quote show that it *actually has this meaning*. But 2d. If "every logician knows," what you say he does, either you are not a *logician*, or, you know that if *mello* has not the sense you attach to it "*exclusively*, it does not *of itself* show that it had reference to your "day of general judgment at the close of time." You say, "an argument founded merely on a single definition of an ambiguous term, every logician knows, is at the best extremely doubtful." But 3d. You said above—"that the word *mello* often has the sense of a future action, about to take place is not to be disputed." But if it has this sense, yea has it *often*, why did you only say above, it "*may* have the meaning which Mr. B. has given it." You blow *positively* and *doubtfully* about this almost with the same breath. But, if "*mello often* has the sense of a future action, about to take place," and if this "is not to be disputed," wherein does your opposition to my views and Dr. Campbell's criticism consist? It lies in this, *mello* "if it has not this meaning *exclusively*, it does not *of itself* show that it had no reference to a day of general judgment, at the close of time." For "an argument founded merely on a single definition of an ambiguous term every logician knows, is at the best extremely doubtful." But Sir, as a candid man, your logic out of the question, did you not know that I rested no part of my argument on "a single definition of an ambiguous term?" Nor was it rested on *mello exclusively* meaning a future which is near. Nor was it even rested on *mello*, with *an infinitive following*, signifying this. No Sir—did you not know it was rested on *mello*, with an infinitive following, *particularly in texts where threats or warnings are given?* This was the point of my criticism, and on this was my argument founded. Did you not know all this? But

your logic failed you, Jones failed you, and we shall now see that your Scripture examples also fail you.

You proceed thus: "For a Scripture illustration and proof of these definitions and remarks we offer the following passages." I have quoted above every syllable of your "*definitions and remarks*," and we shall now see how your passages illustrate and prove them. You quote Matt. 11: 14. Mark 13: 14. Luke 21: 7. Acts 26: 22. Rom. 5: 14. 1 Tim. 1: 16, and Heb. 11: 8. Such, Sir, are your texts, and what do you quote them to prove? To prove that *mello*, with an infinitive following, and in texts were a *threat or a warning is given*, is used to express a distant future? No Sir, a single example of this kind you have not produced, nor a single example can you find to produce. But until such an example is produced you are beating the air, for my criticism, my argument, and the interpretations given, remain unaffected by all you can do or say. Your texts prove what was never disputed by me. Why then did you adduce those texts to prove a point which I never thought of disputing? Could you suppose Sir, that this evasion of the point of my argument would escape my notice, or of any discerning reader? Your sarcasm and ridicule on some of the above texts, were ill-timed, and will likely give you pain enough without any retaliation in kind from me. As you have quoted texts aside from proving the point at issue, you can "*reconcile those passages*" or not, just as you please, for I have no concern with them; nor need I notice what you quote from *Hedericus* on p. 99, for the quotation is made on the ground of your own mistake, which I have just been exposing.

But you say, p. 99—"when Mr. B. comes to the passage in Acts 24: 25, which speaks of Paul's reasoning of a 'judgment to come,' he tells us that it should read a judgment *about to be*, and proceeds to

why not also all who die in the perpetration of *little* sins? Why single out *horrid* sinners, and send them to hell to be punished after death, and yet send Christian *little* sinners to heaven? If all are not sent to final happiness on the ground of God's grace, and not on the difference of crime, farewell salvation to us all. There is not a principle in your book, which I hold in more heartfelt detestation than the one here advocated; and I am certain, either your views or mine are radically wrong as it respects the ground on which future existence and happiness rests. But I ask, from what does "*it appear certain*, that any are to be *punished after death?*" I defy any man to point out the thing from which you draw such a conclusion, except that the persons "*die in the perpetration of some horrid crime.*" This is all the premises from which you draw your *certain* and *must be* conclusion. But one thing I suggest for your sober and serious consideration. It is this. The Scriptures relate cases of persons who died in the perpetration of very horrid crimes. But no Scripture writer says what you here say about such persons. Either then they were very ignorant, not to know this thing about which you are so *certain*, or if they knew it, were not so faithful as you are in declaring it to mankind. If they knew it, what apology can you make for their unfaithfulness? If they did not, how came *you* to be so *certain* about it? If you are correct, Annanias and Sapphira, with many other Christians, went from this world to hell, and so far as I can learn from your system, are still there. Very *horrid sinners* you send to hell, but on Luke 23: 43 above, you sent the man to heaven who died on the cross for his *overt acts of iniquity.* A few hours punishment settled his whole account. When shall we arrive at the end of your contradictions?

# LETTER VI.

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It was very sagacious in you to take this ground, for if the Scriptures do not teach your "*future judgment,*" the doctrine is secure without them. It is certain from your own showing, p. 70 of your Letters, that Moses in his law did not teach it. This part of Scripture then, does not—"use language which seems naturally to teach this doctrine," and as all your proofs are drawn from the New Testament, I conclude it is your opinion, "*a future judgment*" is not taught in all the Old Testament. If it is, no doubt but you would have resorted to it for proof. But were the Old Testament writers all believers in a future judgment, addressed their revelations to such as believed in it, and yet as silent as the grave about it? The man, Sir, who can believe this, must have an *old propensity* for believing. It would be sinful to

sermons! And if your reasoning in the above quotation is correct, we are now put into a way of getting rid of most threats and warnings in the Bible.

Our readers may now judge for themselves of the truth of your assertions, if Parkhurst first left me as a witness, then Dr. Campbell left me, and whether I am "*now without testimony.*" In parting with you, permit me to express my regret, at the lengths you have gone in opposing a criticism, which, "so long as Scripture usage of words is allowed a correct rule of interpretation," never can be shown incorrect. You may call this being—"*very positive*," but it is after something like reasons have been offered for the assertion. Should you be inclined to bring this case again into court, I have Parkhurst, Campbell, and others to bring on the stand, and I can now add your name to the list of my witnesses, to testify in my favor. Adieu for the present. Let us now return to Mr. Hudson.

You say, p. 101—"Mr. B's next criticism is upon the word world. He says 'the Greek word here for *world* is not *kosmos*, nor *aion*, but *oikoumene*.'" It seems you are determined to be at variance with me, even when there is hardly a shade of difference in our sentiments. You say I define *oikoumene* to signify—"the Roman empire including Judea." But had you only quoted the following from p. 222 of my Essays, you could not have pointed out a shade of difference from that you give us from Parkhurst. I said—"in Luke 21: 26, it (*oikoumene*) is rendered *earth*, and in all the other places by the term *world*. In Luke 2: 1. 4, 5. Acts 24: 5. 19: 27. 11: 28, it refers to the Roman empire, which included Judea, and most of the then known world. It particularly referred to the heathen or Gentile nations, whom the great dragon, called the devil and satan, deceived," Rev. 12: 9. comp. 16: 14. But you say, p. 101—

solemnity about a *trifle*, but about your *future judgment* he makes none. No, he slips it into the world, first by revealing it, but allows this revelation to be very soon lost. He does not allow Moses to insert it in his law. And when he again reveals it, as you seem to think in the New Testament, no solemnity is made about it. The very texts on which you rest the proof of it are *few*, and to say the least about them, are far from being conclusive. Let us proceed to examine them. Your first text is

Acts 24: 25, "and as he reasoned of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come, Felix trembled," &c. This text was examined at length in my Essays, p. 278—286. Your reply is chiefly taken up with my criticism on the term *mello*. As similar remarks must be made on your next proof text, where Mr. Loveland will come in for a share of attention, my remarks here shall be brief. 1st. Who, Sir, ever disputed, that *mello* signifies *future*, and even *a future far distant?* Certainly I never did. You concede—"the word *mello*, then, simply signifies to *delay*, to *be future*, and this future may be immediately connected with the present, or very remote, according to the nature of the subject." Conceding that "*this future may be immediately connected with the present*," shows the correctness of my statements, and Dr. Campbell's criticism. What is the point of his criticism on which my statements were founded? He says—"there is just such a difference between *estai* and *mellei esesthai* in Greek as there is between *it will be*, and *it is about to be* in English. This holds particularly in threats and warnings." The future here must be connected with the present. This will be seen from noticing distinctly what is the precise point of his criticism. Is it that *mello* alone signifies *about to be?* No. Is it that *mello, with an infinitive following* signifies this? No Sir, it is—*that mello, with an*

2d. I stated, Essays, p. 223—"nor do I find a single instance where *krino* means to condemn to future punishment in another state of existence, though it is used in reference to temporal punishment." This was a bold statement, Sir, but I find you decline contradicting it. Why decline it?

3d. I showed, p. 223, 224, that Paul in this very passage quotes the words, "he shall judge the world in righteousness," from Ps. 9: 8. See all the texts I quoted and referred to, showing that the Old Testament predicted God was to judge or govern the world in righteousness by Jesus Christ. But Sir, of these texts, or what I said on them, you take not the slightest notice, or inform your readers I quoted them.—Now Sir, I appeal to yourself—if Paul in this passage borrowed his language from the Old Testament, did he not use the term *judge* in the same sense as the writer did from whom he quotes? *Krino* is the term used in the Seventy version, whence he made his quotation, and he only points out what the Old Testament writers meant by their language. But, as a future judgment is not taught in the Old Testament, Paul could not quote any proof from it. Nor do you, for all your proofs are drawn from the New. But you are for letting Paul explain his own meaning rather than call on the Seventy to do it. Well, taking this matter as you wish to have it, prove if you can, that Paul ever attached your meaning to the term *krino*. If he uses it in more than *thirty* instances, you might surely find two or three of them, to prove your point. You tell us, "Parkhurst gives eleven general definitions to *krino*." But if he gave as many thousands, what does this prove unless it is shown that it is used in reference to a day of future general judgment? His giving—"*to judge*, or *try in a solemn or judicial manner*, as the *first* meaning of the word," and his *merely* referring to this text *proves* nothing. You

would not have been adduced, for none of them contain a threat or a warning. You may toil, and sweat and sigh over it till you die, but you never can rid yourself of the force of this criticism against your views of this and other passages. And why? Because, Sir, it is true.

4th. You despatch all my other arguments by a few brief sentences, chiefly in the way of ridicule, and wrap the matter up as usual in the following manner. "To conclude, I will state that the passage before us naturally teaches a future judgment. St. Luke could not in honesty have written such language to people who believed in a future retribution, unless he meant to teach that doctrine." But does your saying—"*I will state*" all this, make it true? I thought the point in dispute was—did the Scripture writers—"teach a future retribution?" But you assume it as true, and think if you say—"*I will state*" it to be true, it must make it true. I am really sick at listening to this mode of proof, and seeing the sacred writers impeached, as fools or dishonest men, if they do not teach your doctrines. It indicates you have become bankrupt in argument.

5th. You say, p. 93, "Now in the passage before us, *tou mellontos* is a participle, so according to his own authority it signifies *future*, what is to come, agreeable to the sense of the common version." Who ever disputed, Sir, that it signifies future? Is not "*about to be*" future? Is not *mellontos* a part of the verb? And who could suppose you would conceal the infinitive following? The whole Greek phrase is—"*tou mellontos esesthai*." Does not the infinitive follow here? Was not Paul delivering a threat or a warning to Felix? And is not this the point of the criticism I quoted from Dr. Campbell? Did you evade it, or was all this oversight? If the latter I excuse it, but if the former, it speaks a volume against.

you and the system for which you are contending. You ask me on the same page—"does he understand *mello* in verse 15 to signify *about to be?*" I have only to ask as a reply, was Paul, in verse 15, delivering a *threat or a warning?* No Sir, he was not; and it shows how you evade the point of my criticism, which you cannot meet. But meet it you must, or forever give up this and other texts in proof of your "*future judgment.*"

Acts 17: 31 is your next proof text. "Because he hath appointed a day, in which he will judge the world in righteousness," &c. This text was considered fully in my Essays, p. 222—228. The following criticism was introduced, as on the last text. Parkhurst says—"*mello* signifies, with an infinitive following, *to be about* to do a thing, *futurus sum.*" Dr. Campbell, on Matt. 3: 7, also says, *mello* often means not only *future* but near. There is just such a difference between *estai* and *mellei esesthai* in Greek, as there is between *it will be*, and *it is about to be*, in English. This holds particularly in threats and warnings." Is *mello* then used with an infinitive in this passage? Yes. Is a threat or warning delivered in this passage? Yes, you do not dispute it; though Mr. Loveland denies it. Let us inquire, 1st. What is the meaning of the Greek term *mello?* Ewing says—"*mello* signifies I am about to be or do, I delay." What do you say? You say, p. 92—"the word *mello* more naturally signifies *future* than about to be." But is not *about to be* future, however near it may be to the present?

2d. Did I ever contend that *mello always* signifies about to be? No. So far from this I perfectly agree to what is said by you, p. 92, "the word *mello* then simply signifies to delay to be *future*, and this future may be immediately connected with the present or very remote, according to the nature of the subject."

Wherein then lies the dispute between us? This will be seen by asking

3d. Did I ever contend that *mello alone* signifies *about to be?* No Sir, I said, and the *criticism said*, it was "*mello, with an infinitive following*, which signifies *to be about* to do a thing, *futurus sum.*" And Dr. Campbell said, that this held *particularly in threats and warnings.* I quoted Acts 3: 3, and 18: 14. Rev. 3: 2, as examples, showing it is so rendered in our common version. The general usage of *mello*, with *an infinitive following*, shows the correctness of the criticism. But you assert 1 Tim. 1. 16, is an example of this rule's being defective, which is a mistake. The exceptions it seems were not very *plenty.* If they were, you had no occasion to commit a mistake in selecting an instance to show the rule defective. But the *point* of my criticism did not depend entirely on *mello* being used with an *infinitive following.* No Sir, it depended on its being so used "*particularly in threats and warnings.*" Why overlook, or deliberately conceal this *point* of the criticism, which has such a powerful bearing on this and the preceding text? Produce, Sir, but one text, were *mello*, with an *infinitive following*, is used, and where a *threat or a warning is given*, and does not signify *about to be*, but a distant future, and I will allow you have done something. Your not being able to find such an example, shows the immovable ground of my interpretations, and the correctness of the criticism on which they are founded.

But I shall now notice your remarks particularly on this passage. 1st. You say on p. 96, "the Roman empire did not become Christian till the reign of Constantine, in A. D. 313, so that Mr. B's *about to be*, in this case did not take place till *about three hundred years after* the declaration was made." Strange! Beyond all measure strange! ! "The Roman em-

pire did not become Christian till the reign of Constantine in A. D. 313!" It seems then it was Constantine not Christ, which made the Roman empire Christian. But Sir, Christ had judged, ruled, and had so far subdued the people in the Roman empire previous to A. D. 313, that Constantine deemed it the best of policy to make Christianity the religion of the whole empire. Constantine never would have thought of this, unless the mass of the people had been so far subdued by Christ as to answer his political purposes. The judging or ruling of Jesus Christ in the Roman empire so far from beginning with Constantine in the year 313, is the very date of the decline of his reign. At this date, Christianity was made by law the religion of the Roman empire, and from this period it gradually descended to the grave of corruption, in which it lay buried for ages, as all history abundantly testifies. It is but a short time since any thing was done to raise Christianity from this grave, and sorry am I to say, your labors are spent in making Christianity still wear the grave clothes of this corruption. Christ by his truth, subdued multitudes in the Roman empire in Paul's day. The sound of the gospel had gone into all the earth to the ends of the world (*oikoumene.*) The apostles by their preaching had turned the world (*oikoumene* or Roman empire) upside down, Rom. 10: 18. Acts 17: 6. But the Roman empire, according to your statement, was made Christian by Constantine A. D. 313, which shows what views you have of Christianity. Like Dr. Ely and others, you seem to be hankering after a national religion, nor can Christ rule or govern by his truth in any land, until this is the case. If this is not the truth, to what purpose are the above statements? But

2d. You immediately add—"since the above was written, I have perused with pleasure a refutation of

Mr. B's criticism on *mello*, by Rev. S. C. Loveland, published in the Christian Repository, vol. ix. p. 123—130, from which I will make an extract, being persuaded that it will be acceptable to the reader." Very acceptable, Sir, at least to me, and you must now stand and look on while I attend to Mr. Loveland's remarks. He says—"that the word *mello* often has the sense of a future action, about to take place, is not disputed. The same is true of the common future tense; as usually understood in our language. It may be *near* or *at a distance* as the nature of the subject may require. The Latin meaning of *mello*, as already quoted from Parkhurst, is *futurus sum*, which literally signifies *to be future*, and this future may be *near* or *remote* as the subject to which it applies requires. Let Mr. B. or any other Latin scholar, prove that the Latin *futurus* and the English *future* are not perfectly synonymous, and we promise with good fortune to attend to him. To *futurus sum*, Schrevelius adds *cunctor*, *to delay*, to *prolong time*, which constitutes his whole definition of *mello*." I have no occasion to dispute this. Nor are you done in agreeing with me in my opinions, for you immediately add, "although the word (*mello*) may have the meaning which Mr. B. has given it, yet if it has not this meaning *exclusively* it does not *of itself* show that it had no reference to a day of general judgment at the close of time. An argument founded merely on a single definition of an ambiguous term, every logician knows is at the best, extremely doubtful. Mr. B. has quoted from Parkhurst and Campbell, suffer me now to quote in addition from Jones' Greek Lexicon what we believe to be a fair definition of the word. '*Mello, I take time to do a thing, am bent upon, prepare to do, am about to do*,'" Such, Sir, are your statements, and I thank you kindly for them. For 1st. You admit that *mello may* have the mean-

why not also all who die in the perpetration of *little* sins? Why single out *horrid* sinners, and send them to hell to be punished after death, and yet send Christian *little* sinners to heaven? If all are not sent to final happiness on the ground of God's grace, and not on the difference of crime, farewell salvation to us all. There is not a principle in your book, which I hold in more heartfelt detestation than the one here advocated; and I am certain, either your views or mine are radically wrong as it respects the ground on which future existence and happiness rests. But I ask, from what does "*it appear certain*, that any are to be *punished after death?*" I defy any man to point out the thing from which you draw such a conclusion, except that the persons "*die in the perpetration of some horrid crime.*" This is all the premises from which you draw your *certain* and *must be* conclusion. But one thing I suggest for your sober and serious consideration. It is this. The Scriptures relate cases of persons who died in the perpetration of very horrid crimes. But no Scripture writer says what you here say about such persons. Either then they were very ignorant, not to know this thing about which you are so *certain*, or if they knew it, were not so faithful as you are in declaring it to mankind. If they knew it, what apology can you make for their unfaithfulness? If they did not, how came *you* to be so *certain* about it? If you are correct, Annanias and Sapphira, with many other Christians, went from this world to hell, and so far as I can learn from your system, are still there. Very *horrid sinners* you send to hell, but on Luke 23: 43 above, you sent the man to heaven who died on the cross for his *overt acts of iniquity.* A few hours punishment settled his whole account. When shall we arrive at the end of your contradictions?

# LETTER VI.

SIR,

I PROCEED to examine the sixth division of your book called "*a future judgment.*" Your first sentence is extraordinary; you say—"let it be observed here, that the Scriptures were addressed to those who believed in a future judgment." Most people imagine it is by the Scriptures *alone* we can know whether there is or is not to be a future judgment. But it seems they are mistaken, for the faith of those to whom the Scriptures were addressed anticipated divine revelation, and we should think superseded its necessity on this subject. Permit me to ask, how such persons came by their belief before the Scriptures were addressed to them? Should you say it originated in a divine revelation which is now lost, please inform us, who revealed this to you, or show that such a revelation ever existed.

It was very sagacious in you to take this ground, for if the Scriptures do not teach your "*future judgment,*" the doctrine is secure without them. It is certain from your own showing, p. 70 of your Letters, that Moses in his law did not teach it. This part of Scripture then, does not—"use language which seems naturally to teach this doctrine," and as all your proofs are drawn from the New Testament, I conclude it is your opinion, "*a future judgment*" is not taught in all the Old Testament. If it is, no doubt but you would have resorted to it for proof. But were the Old Testament writers all believers in a future judgment, addressed their revelations to such as believed in it, and yet as silent as the grave about it? The man, Sir, who can believe this, must have an *old propensity* for believing. It would be sinful to

speak of idiot immortal souls, yea, the immortal souls of brutes, some of which discover minds little inferior to some tribes of men? But Mr. Colton to get rid of *infantile immortal souls*, says, p. 79, 80—"I should rather affirm that the body is infantile with the mind, than that the mind is infantile with the body." But he does not consider his own reasoning conclusive. Mr. Colton says—"we do not contend that the mind has no beginning, but that it shall have no end, and it appears that the body is appointed to be the first stage of its existence." But from what this appears he is not pleased to inform us, nor do you supply his lack of information. Men, Sir, might talk and reason forever on such a subject, but it amounts to nothing; for what can any of us know but from what God has made known in the Bible? We might reason in the same way respecting the brute creation.

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## LETTER V.

SIR,

THE fifth division of your book is called a "*statement of the question in debate.*" You state it thus: "*Is all punishment confined to this state or not?*" If "much dispute has arisen about the statement of this question," it arises from the unreasonable demand suggested in your next sentence. You say—"we who believe in a future retribution, contend that the question is reciprocal; that both parties have a positive, and both are under obligation to defend it. For either party to say they have no positive, is con-

fessing that their doctrine is only negation, and their faith unbelief; and that they themselves are sceptics, and not Christians." On this very extraordinary account I remark

1st. If your statement is correct, there cannot be a *negative*. To use the word *negative*, is a gross impropriety in the use of words. Will you condescend to tell us what a negative is? No truth is more generally admitted, for it has become proverbial, "*that no man can, or is bound to prove a negative.*" The impossibility arises from the very nature of the case. This I shall illustrate by an example. Dr. Allen, in his Lecture, has intimated that the place of future punishment is in the moon, &c. Well, I deny it. But will you say that Dr. Allen has a claim on me to produce a text of Scripture to prove that men are not to be punished in the moon? And must I admit his theory to be correct, if I cannot produce such a text? According to your statement I must admit it. But will not every reasonable man say—"if Dr. Allen asserts that men are to be punished in the moon, it is incumbent on him to produce evidence of this. The proof lies with him, for the doctrine asserted is his; and unless he can produce Scripture for his doctrine, I treat it as an idle notion. I do the very same with your doctrine. You assert men are to be punished after death in a disembodied state. I deny it. But have you a right to call on me to adduce a text of Scripture that they are not, or else believe your doctrine? What reasonable man, Sir, would ever make this demand, unless he found it impossible to prove his own doctrine?

2d. I call on you to quote any respectable authority who reasons as you do on this subject. Quote the writer who says any man is bound to prove a *negative*. Quote the author who asserts that the negative and positive sides of the same question are both

positive? Quote the writer, Sir, either sacred or profane, who maintains as you do, that unless a man can adduce a text of Scripture to prove an assertion false, he must admit that assertion to be the truth.

3d. But I have the authority of an inspired apostle, that my mode of proving a negative is correct. Paul, Heb. 7: 13, 14, considered the silence of Scripture sufficient proof of a negative. Nor am I aware, inspired as he was, that he was capable of proving it in any other way. But, had you been at Paul's elbow when he wrote, you ought to have told him, "for you to say you have no positive in this question is confessing your doctrine is only negation, your faith disbelief, and that you are a sceptic and not a Christian." Paul happened to consider *the silence of Scripture* sufficient proof of his negative. You must then allow me to think it is sufficient proof of mine, and Paul and I both stand condemned by you as *sceptics*.

4th. But where would your statement and reasonings land us, were we to adopt them and generally act upon them? Men may assert any thing as true doctrine, and if we cannot produce a text of Scripture showing it false, we must of consequence admit it to be true. Take an example from your own books, which furnishes abundance of them. You assert that people are to be reformed in hell by "*consideration and reflection.*" But are we obliged to believe you, unless we can adduce a text which expressly declares the contrary?

In p. 15 of your Letters, you said to Mr. Ballou, "your system is only a negation and your faith disbelief—a creed which would better become a sceptic than a professed Christian." In p. 9, 10 of your present book you say—"I did not tell Mr. Ballou that his faith was only disbelief," and allege that I misrepresented your meaning. But now, on p. 84,

you tell us, "for either party to say they have no positive, is confessing that their doctrine is only negation, and their faith disbelief; and that they themselves are sceptics and not Christians." This is giving a degree of importance to your doctrine I never supposed it would assume. There cannot a doubt remain, that you now call all of us sceptics, who do not believe in your future punishment. We are "*sceptics and not Christians.*" This now will surely remove all doubt that calling Mr. Ballou your reverend and dear Christian brother, was all a piece of hypocrisy. Well, treat us henceforth with just what civility you please, but let us never hear a word from your lips that you consider us *Christian brethren.* Refrain from this, and I shall esteem you for consistency, but if you do not, I shall only view your conduct a piece of hypocrisy. Universalist societies to whom such "*sceptics and not Christians*" minister, ought either to own themselves *sceptics*, or consider themselves insulted by your accusation.

But you say of me, "his statement of all questions is what saith the Scriptures?" Yes; this is my statement of all *religious questions*, and I am glad to see you approve of it. But you add—"it is a mere evasion. What saith the Scriptures in relation to what? *Confining all punishment to this world?* No, he will not admit this to be the question." You mistake, Sir, for though I do not think it a correct or reasonable statement of the question, yet for the sake of peace, let it stand as a statement of the question. But if this be *my* question, *yours* must be—"*what saith the Scriptures respecting punishment beyond this world?*" 1st. I begin with my *own* as stated by yourself—"*what saith the Scriptures respecting confining all punishment to this world?*" Well, I search the Scriptures with care, and find punishments of various kinds and degrees mentioned, all confined to this world. In

confirmation of this result, I find you say, p. 70, "the law of Moses did not even teach a future state of existence, and it would be downright contradiction to admit that the law was enforced by penalties extending into a future state when the law did not reveal such a state." By your own confession, the law of Moses is against your future punishment, and in favor of my views, that all punishment is confined "*to this world.*" Most intelligent men now allow that all the punishments mentioned in the Old Testament are of a temporal nature. But I continue my search of the Scriptures, to find some punishment mentioned beyond this world. After all the search I can make, I do not find it. What then, Sir, am I to do? Must I believe in your doctrine of future punishment? It is impossible, unless I believe without evidence. No Sir, I reject it, and on the same ground, Paul did another thing, Heb. 7, referred to above. No other alternative is left me, but either to believe your doctrine without evidence, or, "rest under the imputation of *believing in unbelief*," with which you charge me. I prefer the latter, and leave you to cry *sceptic*, *infidel*, or *atheist* if you please. I believe in *unbelief* here, just as you do when you tell me you do not believe there is such a creature as a *salamander.*

2d. *Your* question is—"*what saith the Scriptures respecting punishment beyond this world?*" This is your doctrine, and I call for your proofs of it. But I am told at the outset, if I am not able to find a text saying, all punishment is confined to this world, I must admit it true. But if the doctrine be Scriptural, it is as susceptible of proof as any other important doctrine taught in the Bible. For example, if a man denies that the Scriptures teach any punishment in this world, and I believe that it does, I am bound to adduce proof of it. If I cannot, he is not bound to believe me. But I ought to tell him—Sir, either adduce a

text from the Bible which declares that it does not teach any punishment in this world, or own the truth of my doctrine. In such a case, I should consider myself as absurdly unreasonable. But if a man did deny this, would I be at any loss to prove from the Bible that it taught the doctrine of punishment in this world? None. And if your doctrine of "*punishment beyond this world*" was just as easily proved, why trouble yourself or your readers, with all you say about the statement of the question?

Respecting me you say, p. 85—"I have not in all his writings seen a single attempt to prove that all men are duly and equitably recompensed here." No Sir, and for very good reasons. You must tell me precisely what you mean by being "*duly and equitably recompensed here.*" If you mean that every man receives a full punishment for all the sins he commits, or in other words, is punished into heaven, I tell you I believe no such doctrine. Tell me what you mean precisely, and I will tell you explicitly what I believe about it. But you say—"we have already seen that he admits that St. Paul, as virtuous as he was, received *far more* misery than happiness in this state, even after he had become converted to Christianity." Please Sir state my opinions in my own words, and not in your *logical form*, for no such opinion was ever stated by me. *Sceptic* as I am, I have no such contemptible views of Christianity. I trust from what has been stated in former Letters, you can be at no loss now to understand my views of this subject.

On p. 86—88, you introduce a supposed case of A and B, relative to murder and the civil law. You admit, that if "A should assert, that by the laws of our country every murderer should be hung, and after that should endure one year's punishment, he must produce the statute which contained this penal-

ty." You add "if he could produce a statute which only said that the murderer should hang till he was dead, would not every person say that he was defeated in his position?" Certainly. Let us then see, Sir, how you evade the force of this supposed case, in regard to your doctrine of punishment after death. You say—"the civil law consists *only* of a law and a penalty. But this is not true of the Scriptures; they treat of man in every situation, of his creation, character, duty and final destination. Here then is a striking difference. The one treats of all men in every situation, the other treats upon nothing but the punishment which must be inflicted in case of transgression; the latter is confined to this world, the former extends into the future." But what of all this parade of words and distinctions, for I ask you Sir, does not the divine law as well as the civil, contain a law and a penalty? And have you not told us yourself, that the *penalties* of Moses' law did not extend into a future state? If the Scriptures do—"treat of man in every situation of his creation, character, duty and final destination," how does all this alter the case, as to your extending the penalty of the divine law beyond death? Instead of this making a "*striking difference*," it makes no difference at all; for still the question is, what is the penalty of the divine law? If you say it extends beyond death, you must produce the statute which contains such a penalty, just as A must do in the case you suppose, and consider correct. If the divine law treats of "all men in every situation," so does the civil law, for it condemns all to death for murder without regard to their situation in life. You really seem to write sometimes without thinking. You positively assert in the above quotation, that the civil law treats upon nothing but the punishment which must be inflicted in case of transgression," yet set out by telling us

"the civil law consists of a law and a penalty." But what does it signify if the divine law treats of a thousand things the civil law does not, if the divine law does not treat of your future punishment? If the civil law "is confined to this world," it still remains to be proved, that the threatenings of the divine law "extend into the future."

But from your preceding reasonings you draw the following conclusions, p. 88. "Now as the Bible treats upon salvation and final happiness, nay as this is the great doctrine to which all things else are subservient, we may naturally expect that this doctrine will be taught in the clearest manner. As many die in the perpetration of some horrid crime, it appears certain that they must be punished after death. But if this is not the case, we have a right to ask for proof; and if no proof can be produced, we feel justified in saying that such an one will be obnoxious to punishment after death." Answer. Who ever disputed "that final happiness is taught in the clearest manner" in the Bible? Or who disputes that this is "the great doctrine to which all things else are subservient?" The point in dispute is, is your punishment after death taught in the Bible in the clearest manner? If it was, you had no occasion to beg the question in the above quotation. I may ask also, is it taught in the clearest manner in the Bible, that your future punishment and salvation in hell is one of the "*all things*" which is made subservient to "*final happiness?*" But in begging the question, you tell us some—"*must be punished after death.*" Well, who are they? They are those who "die in the perpetration of some horrid crime." But, is this certain? Yes, you tell us—"as many die in the prepetration of some horrid crime it appears *certain* that they *must* be punished after death." About this *kind of sinners* you seem *certain* that they *must* be punished. And

why not also all who die in the perpetration of *little* sins? Why single out *horrid* sinners, and send them to hell to be punished after death, and yet send Christian *little* sinners to heaven? If all are not sent to final happiness on the ground of God's grace, and not on the difference of crime, farewell salvation to us all. There is not a principle in your book, which I hold in more heartfelt detestation than the one here advocated; and I am certain, either your views or mine are radically wrong as it respects the ground on which future existence and happiness rests. But I ask, from what does "*it appear certain*, that any are to be *punished after death?*" I defy any man to point out the thing from which you draw such a conclusion, except that the persons "*die in the perpetration of some horrid crime.*" This is all the premises from which you draw your *certain* and *must be* conclusion. But one thing I suggest for your sober and serious consideration. It is this. The Scriptures relate cases of persons who died in the perpetration of very horrid crimes. But no Scripture writer says what you here say about such persons. Either then they were very ignorant, not to know this thing about which you are so *certain*, or if they knew it, were not so faithful as you are in declaring it to mankind. If they knew it, what apology can you make for their unfaithfulness? If they did not, how came *you* to be so *certain* about it? If you are correct, Annanias and Sapphira, with many other Christians, went from this world to hell, and so far as I can learn from your system, are still there. Very *horrid sinners* you send to hell, but on Luke 23: 43 above, you sent the man to heaven who died on the cross for his *overt acts of iniquity.* A few hours punishment settled his whole account. When shall we arrive at the end of your contradictions?

# LETTER VI.

SIR,

I PROCEED to examine the sixth division of your book called "*a future judgment.*" Your first sentence is extraordinary; you say—"let it be observed here, that the Scriptures were addressed to those who believed in a future judgment." Most people imagine it is by the Scriptures *alone* we can know whether there is or is not to be a future judgment. But it seems they are mistaken, for the faith of those to whom the Scriptures were addressed anticipated divine revelation, and we should think superseded its necessity on this subject. Permit me to ask, how such persons came by their belief before the Scriptures were addressed to them? Should you say it originated in a divine revelation which is now lost, please inform us, who revealed this to you, or show that such a revelation ever existed.

It was very sagacious in you to take this ground, for if the Scriptures do not teach your "*future judgment*," the doctrine is secure without them. It is certain from your own showing, p. 70 of your Letters, that Moses in his law did not teach it. This part of Scripture then, does not—"use language which seems naturally to teach this doctrine," and as all your proofs are drawn from the New Testament, I conclude it is your opinion, "*a future judgment*" is not taught in all the Old Testament. If it is, no doubt but you would have resorted to it for proof. But were the Old Testament writers all believers in a future judgment, addressed their revelations to such as believed in it, and yet as silent as the grave about it? The man, Sir, who can believe this, must have an *old propensity* for believing. It would be sinful to

think he would become a *sceptic* about any thing.—But if the Old Testament Scriptures were addressed to such as believed in "a future judgment, yet say nothing about it, what made it necessary to reveal this doctrine in the New Testament? Again; do the New Testament writers introduce this doctrine as a new revelation to the world? Do they say it originated in a divine revelation which happened to get lost? Is this carelessness in God (pardon the expression) in correspondence with his care over the revelation now in our hands? Is the subject of "*a future judgment*" of so little consequence, that God should permit the revelation about it to be lost, and not reveal it again until the days of the Gospel dispensation? And was his confidence in *corrupt tradition* so great that he transmitted it for several thousand years in this channel until the gospel day should arrive? But admitting he did, how is this to be reconciled with God's injunctions to the Jews, to give no heed to any traditions whatever, but to his written law by Moses? And if the Jews believed in "*a future judgment*," received through corrupt tradition, why did our Lord say they had made void God's law by their traditions, without making any exception whatever? If it was made void by this tradition, by your own showing it was made void by a truth, believed in all ages by those to whom the Scriptures were addressed. But I am such a confounded *sceptic*, that I believe all traditions not taught in Scripture tend to make them void, and you allow "*a future judgment* was not a tradition taught in the law of Moses." But further. The law of Moses, in which you own "*a future judgment*" is not taught, was delivered with great preparations and solemnity to the Jews, Exod. chaps. 19, 20. But when, where, by whom, or with what solemnity is "*a future judgment*" revealed to mankind? You must say—"*I cannot tell.*" So God makes a mighty

solemnity about a *trifle*, but about your *future judgment* he makes none. No, he slips it into the world, first by revealing it, but allows this revelation to be very soon lost. He does not allow Moses to insert it in his law. And when he again reveals it, as you seem to think in the New Testament, no solemnity is made about it. The very texts on which you rest the proof of it are *few*, and to say the least about them, are far from being conclusive. Let us proceed to examine them. Your first text is

Acts 24: 25, "and as he reasoned of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come, Felix trembled," &c. This text was examined at length in my Essays, p. 278—286. Your reply is chiefly taken up with my criticism on the term *mello*. As similar remarks must be made on your next proof text, where Mr. Loveland will come in for a share of attention, my remarks here shall be brief. 1st. Who, Sir, ever disputed, that *mello* signifies *future*, and even *a future far distant?* Certainly I never did. You concede—"the word *mello*, then, simply signifies to *delay*, to *be future*, and this future may be immediately connected with the present, or very remote, according to the nature of the subject." Conceding that "*this future may be immediately connected with the present*," shows the correctness of my statements, and Dr. Campbell's criticism. What is the point of his criticism on which my statements were founded? He says—"there is just such a difference between *estai* and *mellei esesthai* in Greek as there is between *it will be*, and *it is about to be* in English. This holds particularly in threats and warnings." The future here must be connected with the present. This will be seen from noticing distinctly what is the precise point of his criticism. Is it that *mello* alone signifies *about to be?* No. Is it that *mello, with an infinitive following* signifies this? No Sir, it is—*that mello, with an*

probability of being rejected in a future state, the apostle enforces by this consideration; 'for we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ; that every one may receive the things done in his body.' This clearly shows that the judgment will be after death, when men are absent from the body." If this judgment takes place "*when men are absent from the body*," it must be when they are in a disembodied state, for after the resurrection they are not absent from the body. In this case the body will escape your judgment altogether, unless you have *two judgments*, one before and another after the resurrection. But if your judgment takes place when men are absent from the body, it is not a *general resurrection*. And it may be asked, what need there is for a resurrection, for it is the *immortal soul* which is to be judged, and why not also suffer for all the sins committed in the body?

3d. You say—"it would be useless and absurd to labor for future acceptance, if there was no possibility of any one's being rejected. The consideration of his laboring that he might be accepted, when absent from the body, supposes that there was danger of not being accepted, and that those who did not labor thus, would experience this rejection." Well, all infants, idiots, the heathen, and most professed Christians, must be rejected, for they do not labor for this acceptance. And it may be asked, "doth Mr. Hudson fear God for naught?" By no means. He serves him from terror, and because he is to be handsomely rewarded for his services in a future state. But the above quotation was stated before in your Letters, and was answered as follows in my Essays, p. 300, 301, which can be seen by turning to those pages, and which to save room I forbear quoting.

Permit me to ask, have you met these self-evident

would not have been adduced, for none of them contain a threat or a warning. You may toil, and sweat and sigh over it till you die, but you never can rid yourself of the force of this criticism against your views of this and other passages. And why? Because, Sir, it is true.

4th. You despatch all my other arguments by a few brief sentences, chiefly in the way of ridicule, and wrap the matter up as usual in the following manner. "To conclude, I will state that the passage before us naturally teaches a future judgment. St. Luke could not in honesty have written such language to people who believed in a future retribution, unless he meant to teach that doctrine." But does your saying—"*I will state*" all this, make it true? I thought the point in dispute was—did the Scripture writers—"teach a future retribution?" But you assume it as true, and think if you say—"*I will state*" it to be true, it must make it true. I am really sick at listening to this mode of proof, and seeing the sacred writers impeached, as fools or dishonest men, if they do not teach your doctrines. It indicates you have become bankrupt in argument.

5th. You say, p. 93, "Now in the passage before us, *tou mellontos* is a participle, so according to his own authority it signifies *future*, what is to come, agreeable to the sense of the common version." Who ever disputed, Sir, that it signifies future? Is not "*about to be*" future? Is not *mellontos* a part of the verb? And who could suppose you would conceal the infinitive following? The whole Greek phrase is—"*tou mellontos esesthai*." Does not the infinitive follow here? Was not Paul delivering a threat or a warning to Felix? And is not this the point of the criticism I quoted from Dr. Campbell? Did you evade it, or was all this oversight? If the latter I excuse it, but if the former, it speaks a volume against

you and the system for which you are contending. You ask me on the same page—"does he understand *mello* in verse 15 to signify *about to be?*" I have only to ask as a reply, was Paul, in verse 15, delivering a *threat or a warning?* No Sir, he was not; and it shows how you evade the point of my criticism, which you cannot meet. But meet it you must, or forever give up this and other texts in proof of your "*future judgment.*"

Acts 17: 31 is your next proof text. "Because he hath appointed a day, in which he will judge the world in righteousness," &c. This text was considered fully in my Essays, p. 222—228. The following criticism was introduced, as on the last text. Parkhurst says—"*mello* signifies, with an infinitive following, *to be about* to do a thing, *futurus sum.*" Dr. Campbell, on Matt. 3: 7, also says, *mello* often means not only *future* but near. There is just such a difference between *estai* and *mellei esesthai* in Greek, as there is between *it will be*, and *it is about to be*, in English. This holds particularly in threats and warnings." Is *mello* then used with an infinitive in this passage? Yes. Is a threat or warning delivered in this passage? Yes, you do not dispute it; though Mr. Loveland denies it. Let us inquire, 1st. What is the meaning of the Greek term *mello?* Ewing says—"*mello* signifies I am about to be or do, I delay." What do you say? You say, p. 92—"the word *mello* more naturally signifies *future* than about to be." But is not *about to be* future, however near it may be to the present?

2d. Did I ever contend that *mello always* signifies about to be? No. So far from this I perfectly agree to what is said by you, p. 92, "the word *mello* then simply signifies to delay to be *future*, and this future may be immediately connected with the present or very remote, according to the nature of the subject."

Wherein then lies the dispute between us? This will be seen by asking

3d. Did I ever contend that *mello alone* signifies *about to be?* No Sir, I said, and the *criticism said*, it was "*mello, with an infinitive following*, which signifies *to be about* to do a thing, *futurus sum.*" And Dr. Campbell said, that this held *particularly in threats and warnings.* I quoted Acts 3: 3, and 18: 14. Rev. 3: 2, as examples, showing it is so rendered in our common version. The general usage of *mello*, with *an infinitive following*, shows the correctness of the criticism. But you assert 1 Tim. 1. 16, is an example of this rule's being defective, which is a mistake. The exceptions it seems were not very *plenty.* If they were, you had no occasion to commit a mistake in selecting an instance to show the rule defective. But the *point* of my criticism did not depend entirely on *mello* being used with an *infinitive following.* No Sir, it depended on its being so used "*particularly in threats and warnings.*" Why overlook, or deliberately conceal this *point* of the criticism, which has such a powerful bearing on this and the preceding text? Produce, Sir, but one text, were *mello*, with an *infinitive following*, is used, and where a *threat or a warning is given*, and does not signify *about to be*, but a distant future, and I will allow you have done something. Your not being able to find such an example, shows the immovable ground of my interpretations, and the correctness of the criticism on which they are founded.

But I shall now notice your remarks particularly on this passage. 1st. You say on p. 96, "the Roman empire did not become Christian till the reign of Constantine, in A. D. 313, so that Mr. B's *about to be*, in this case did not take place till *about three hundred years after* the declaration was made." Strange! Beyond all measure strange! ! "The Roman em-

pire did not become Christian till the reign of Constantine in A. D. 313!" It seems then it was Constantine not Christ, which made the Roman empire Christian. But Sir, Christ had judged, ruled, and had so far subdued the people in the Roman empire previous to A. D. 313, that Constantine deemed it the best of policy to make Christianity the religion of the whole empire. Constantine never would have thought of this, unless the mass of the people had been so far subdued by Christ as to answer his political purposes. The judging or ruling of Jesus Christ in the Roman empire so far from beginning with Constantine in the year 313, is the very date of the decline of his reign. At this date, Christianity was made by law the religion of the Roman empire, and from this period it gradually descended to the grave of corruption, in which it lay buried for ages, as all history abundantly testifies. It is but a short time since any thing was done to raise Christianity from this grave, and sorry am I to say, your labors are spent in making Christianity still wear the grave clothes of this corruption. Christ by his truth, subdued multitudes in the Roman empire in Paul's day. The sound of the gospel had gone into all the earth to the ends of the world (*oikoumene.*) The apostles by their preaching had turned the world (*oikoumene* or Roman empire) upside down, Rom. 10: 18. Acts 17: 6. But the Roman empire, according to your statement, was made Christian by Constantine A. D. 313, which shows what views you have of Christianity. Like Dr. Ely and others, you seem to be hankering after a national religion, nor can Christ rule or govern by his truth in any land, until this is the case. If this is not the truth, to what purpose are the above statements? But

2d. You immediately add—"since the above was written, I have perused with pleasure a refutation of

Mr. B's criticism on *mello*, by Rev. S. C. Loveland, publisbed in the Christian Repository, vol. ix. p. 123—130, from which I will make an extract, being persuaded that it will be acceptable to the reader." Very acceptable, Sir, at least to me, and you must now stand and look on while I attend to Mr. Loveland's remarks. He says—"that the word *mello* often has the sense of a future action, about to take place, is not disputed. The same is true of the common future tense; as usually understood in our language. It may be *near* or *at a distance* as the nature of the subject may require. The Latin meaning of *mello*, as already quoted from Parkhurst, is *futurus sum*, which literally signifies *to be future*, and this future may be *near* or *remote* as the subject to which it applies requires. Let Mr. B. or any other Latin scholar, prove that the Latin *futurus* and the English *future* are not perfectly synonymous, and we promise with good fortune to attend to him. To *futurus sum*, Schrevelius adds *cunctor*, *to delay*, to *prolong time*, which constitutes his whole definition of *mello*." I have no occasion to dispute this. Nor are you done in agreeing with me in my opinions, for you immediately add, "although the word (*mello*) may have the meaning which Mr. B. has given it, yet if it has not this meaning *exclusively* it does not *of itself* show that it had no reference to a day of general judgment at the close of time. An argument founded merely on a single definition of an ambiguous term, every logician knows is at the best, extremely doubtful. Mr. B. has quoted from Parkhurst and Campbell, suffer me now to quote in addition from Jones' Greek Lexicon what we believe to be a fair definition of the word. '*Mello, I take time to do a thing, am bent upon, prepare to do, am about to do*,'" Such, Sir, are your statements, and I thank you kindly for them. For 1st. You admit that *mello may* have the mean-

ing I have given it, and the authorities you quote show that it *actually has this meaning*. But 2d. If "every logician knows," what you say he does, either you are not a *logician*, or, you know that if *mello* has not the sense you attach to it "*exclusively*, it does not *of itself* show that it had reference to your "day of general judgment at the close of time." You say, "an argument founded merely on a single definition of an ambiguous term, every logician knows, is at the best extremely doubtful." But 3d. You said above—"that the word *mello* often has the sense of a future action, about to take place is not to be disputed." But if it has this sense, yea has it *often*, why did you only say above, it "*may* have the meaning which Mr. B. has given it." You blow *positively* and *doubtfully* about this almost with the same breath. But, if "*mello often* has the sense of a future action, about to take place," and if this "is not to be disputed," wherein does your opposition to my views and Dr. Campbell's criticism consist? It lies in this, *mello* "if it has not this meaning *exclusively*, it does not *of itself* show that it had no reference to a day of general judgment, at the close of time." For "an argument founded merely on a single definition of an ambiguous term every logician knows, is at the best extremely doubtful." But Sir, as a candid man, your logic out of the question, did you not know that I rested no part of my argument on "a single definition of an ambiguous term?" Nor was it rested on *mello exclusively* meaning a future which is near. Nor was it even rested on *mello*, with *an infinitive following*, signifying this. No Sir—did you not know it was rested on *mello*, with an infinitive following, *particularly in texts where threats or warnings are given?* This was the point of my criticism, and on this was my argument founded. Did you not know all this? But

your logic failed you, Jones failed you, and we shall now see that your Scripture examples also fail you.

You proceed thus: "For a Scripture illustration and proof of these definitions and remarks we offer the following passages." I have quoted above every syllable of your "*definitions and remarks*," and we shall now see how your passages illustrate and prove them. You quote Matt. 11: 14. Mark 13: 14. Luke 21: 7. Acts 26: 22. Rom. 5: 14. 1 Tim. 1: 16, and Heb. 11: 8. Such, Sir, are your texts, and what do you quote them to prove? To prove that *mello*, with an infinitive following, and in texts were a *threat or a warning is given*, is used to express a distant future? No Sir, a single example of this kind you have not produced, nor a single example can you find to produce. But until such an example is produced you are beating the air, for my criticism, my argument, and the interpretations given, remain unaffected by all you can do or say. Your texts prove what was never disputed by me. Why then did you adduce those texts to prove a point which I never thought of disputing? Could you suppose Sir, that this evasion of the point of my argument would escape my notice, or of any discerning reader? Your sarcasm and ridicule on some of the above texts, were ill-timed, and will likely give you pain enough without any retaliation in kind from me. As you have quoted texts aside from proving the point at issue, you can "*reconcile those passages*" or not, just as you please, for I have no concern with them; nor need I notice what you quote from *Hedericus* on p. 99, for the quotation is made on the ground of your own mistake, which I have just been exposing.

But you say, p. 99—"when Mr. B. comes to the passage in Acts 24: 25, which speaks of Paul's reasoning of a 'judgment to come,' he tells us that it should read a judgment *about to be*, and proceeds to

think he would become a *sceptic* about any thing.—But if the Old Testament Scriptures were addressed to such as believed in "a future judgment, yet say nothing about it, what made it necessary to reveal this doctrine in the New Testament? Again; do the New Testament writers introduce this doctrine as a new revelation to the world? Do they say it originated in a divine revelation which happened to get lost? Is this carelessness in God (pardon the expression) in correspondence with his care over the revelation now in our hands? Is the subject of "*a future judgment*" of so little consequence, that God should permit the revelation about it to be lost, and not reveal it again until the days of the Gospel dispensation? And was his confidence in *corrupt tradition* so great that he transmitted it for several thousand years in this channel until the gospel day should arrive? But admitting he did, how is this to be reconciled with God's injunctions to the Jews, to give no heed to any traditions whatever, but to his written law by Moses? And if the Jews believed in "*a future judgment*," received through corrupt tradition, why did our Lord say they had made void God's law by their traditions, without making any exception whatever? If it was made void by this tradition, by your own showing it was made void by a truth, believed in all ages by those to whom the Scriptures were addressed. But I am such a confounded *sceptic*, that I believe all traditions not taught in Scripture tend to make them void, and you allow "*a future judgment* was not a tradition taught in the law of Moses." But further. The law of Moses, in which you own "*a future judgment*" is not taught, was delivered with great preparations and solemnity to the Jews, Exod. chaps. 19, 20. But when, where, by whom, or with what solemnity is "*a future judgment*" revealed to mankind? You must say—"*I cannot tell.*" So God makes a mighty

solemnity about a *trifle*, but about your *future judgment* he makes none. No, he slips it into the world, first by revealing it, but allows this revelation to be very soon lost. He does not allow Moses to insert it in his law. And when he again reveals it, as you seem to think in the New Testament, no solemnity is made about it. The very texts on which you rest the proof of it are *few*, and to say the least about them, are far from being conclusive. Let us proceed to examine them. Your first text is

Acts 24: 25, "and as he reasoned of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come, Felix trembled," &c. This text was examined at length in my Essays, p. 278—286. Your reply is chiefly taken up with my criticism on the term *mello*. As similar remarks must be made on your next proof text, where Mr. Loveland will come in for a share of attention, my remarks here shall be brief. 1st. Who, Sir, ever disputed, that *mello* signifies *future*, and even *a future far distant?* Certainly I never did. You concede—"the word *mello*, then, simply signifies to *delay*, to *be future*, and this future may be immediately connected with the present, or very remote, according to the nature of the subject." Conceding that "*this future may be immediately connected with the present*," shows the correctness of my statements, and Dr. Campbell's criticism. What is the point of his criticism on which my statements were founded? He says—"there is just such a difference between *estai* and *mellei esesthai* in Greek as there is between *it will be*, and *it is about to be* in English. This holds particularly in threats and warnings." The future here must be connected with the present. This will be seen from noticing distinctly what is the precise point of his criticism. Is it that *mello* alone signifies *about to be?* No. Is it that *mello, with an infinitive following* signifies this? No Sir, it is—*that mello, with an*

*infinitive following* signifies this "*particularly in threats and warnings.*" It was only to such passages as contained *threats and warnings* that I applied this criticism. You do not seem to have perceived its point, or if you did, you evaded it. Mr. Loveland perceived it, but finding nothing to blunt it, denies that the passage contains a threat or a warning, as we shall see afterwards. You say "examples can be produced, showing this rule to be defective." How defective, Sir? That *mello*, with an infinitive following does not signify *it is about to be*, in texts which contain threats or warnings? No Sir, though you and Mr. Loveland ransacked the Scripture usage of *mello*, a single example of this kind you could not find. Could Mr. Loveland have found but one such example, he never would have attempted to deny this text contained a threat or warning to Felix. Love of system ought not to drive us quite so far as this. By doing so, he forgot that he was robbing you of one principal text in proof of your "*future judgment.*"

2d. But if Paul in this text teaches your future judgment, why did he use *mello*, with an infinitive following? He was liable to be misunderstood. By your own showing, *mello*, with an infinitive following "may be immediately connected with the present." But your day of judgment when Paul wrote, was at some thousand years distance. Even now, some tell us at the distance of three hundred and sixty thousand years. Paul's language conveyed the idea, *it was about to be*, as all I think ought to admit. Does the Holy Spirit speak with so little precision as this? Who then can blame some of the first Christians for thinking the end of the world was to happen during their day?

3d. If you could have found a text to meet my criticisms, Rom. 5: 14. Gal. 3: 23. 1 Tim. 1: 16,

would not have been adduced, for none of them contain a threat or a warning. You may toil, and sweat and sigh over it till you die, but you never can rid yourself of the force of this criticism against your views of this and other passages. And why? Because, Sir, it is true.

4th. You despatch all my other arguments by a few brief sentences, chiefly in the way of ridicule, and wrap the matter up as usual in the following manner. "To conclude, I will state that the passage before us naturally teaches a future judgment. St. Luke could not in honesty have written such language to people who believed in a future retribution, unless he meant to teach that doctrine." But does your saying—"*I will state*" all this, make it true? I thought the point in dispute was—did the Scripture writers—"teach a future retribution?" But you assume it as true, and think if you say—"*I will state*" it to be true, it must make it true. I am really sick at listening to this mode of proof, and seeing the sacred writers impeached, as fools or dishonest men, if they do not teach your doctrines. It indicates you have become bankrupt in argument.

5th. You say, p. 93, "Now in the passage before us, *tou mellontos* is a participle, so according to his own authority it signifies *future*, what is to come, agreeable to the sense of the common version." Who ever disputed, Sir, that it signifies future? Is not "*about to be*" future? Is not *mellontos* a part of the verb? And who could suppose you would conceal the infinitive following? The whole Greek phrase is—"*tou mellontos esesthai*." Does not the infinitive follow here? Was not Paul delivering a threat or a warning to Felix? And is not this the point of the criticism I quoted from Dr. Campbell? Did you evade it, or was all this oversight? If the latter I excuse it, but if the former, it speaks a volume against.

this I have only to substitute *hades* for *mnemeion*, *parable* for *vision*, with a few other alterations, and again address you with your own words: "the term *hades*, is defined by Parkhurst, Campbell, and others to denote a concealed or unseen place. And Dr. Campbell says 'in my judgment it ought never in Scripture to be rendered *hell*, at least in the sense wherein that word is now universally understood by Christians. In the Old Testament, the corresponding word is *sheol*, which signifies the state of the dead in general, without regard to the goodness or badness of the persons, their happiness or misery.' Wakefield renders *hades* in the 23d verse of the parable, *grave*. There is not the least intimation that the term is ever used to signify a place of punishment after death. Nay, this term occurs eleven times in the New Testament, and it is not even pretended that it is used different from the sense given by the authorities above, this parable excepted. And even if we go to the Old Testament, the word *sheol* rendered pit, grave, and hell, is defined by Parkhurst and others—*the common receptacle of the dead*. This term, with hades, the corresponding word in the New Testament, I believe in every instance where they are not used figuratively, are used to signify the common receptacle of the dead, except in Luke 16: 23, and that too in a passage which is almost universally allowed to be a parable, which contains a representation the furthest possible from being literal. Now are we authorised to explain *hades* in this parable in opposition to the best authorities? Nay, in opposition to the Old Testament also, not one text excepted? Such a method of interpretation may serve the purposes of party, but I fear will not be likely to lead us into truth." Do not you explain hades in this parable "in opposition to the uniform usage of this word in the whole New Testament?" Yea, "*in oppo-*

Wherein then lies the dispute between us? This will be seen by asking

3d. Did I ever contend that *mello alone* signifies *about to be?* No Sir, I said, and the *criticism said*, it was "*mello, with an infinitive following*, which signifies *to be about* to do a thing, *futurus sum.*" And Dr. Campbell said, that this held *particularly in threats and warnings.* I quoted Acts 3: 3, and 18: 14. Rev. 3: 2, as examples, showing it is so rendered in our common version. The general usage of *mello*, with *an infinitive following*, shows the correctness of the criticism. But you assert 1 Tim. 1. 16, is an example of this rule's being defective, which is a mistake. The exceptions it seems were not very *plenty.* If they were, you had no occasion to commit a mistake in selecting an instance to show the rule defective. But the *point* of my criticism did not depend entirely on *mello* being used with an *infinitive following.* No Sir, it depended on its being so used "*particularly in threats and warnings.*" Why overlook, or deliberately conceal this *point* of the criticism, which has such a powerful bearing on this and the preceding text? Produce, Sir, but one text, were *mello*, with an *infinitive following*, is used, and where a *threat or a warning is given*, and does not signify *about to be*, but a distant future, and I will allow you have done something. Your not being able to find such an example, shows the immovable ground of my interpretations, and the correctness of the criticism on which they are founded.

But I shall now notice your remarks particularly on this passage. 1st. You say on p. 96, "the Roman empire did not become Christian till the reign of Constantine, in A. D. 313, so that Mr. B's *about to be*, in this case did not take place till *about three hundred years after* the declaration was made." Strange! Beyond all measure strange! ! "The Roman em-

pire did not become Christian till the reign of Constantine in A. D. 313!" It seems then it was Constantine not Christ, which made the Roman empire Christian. But Sir, Christ had judged, ruled, and had so far subdued the people in the Roman empire previous to A. D. 313, that Constantine deemed it the best of policy to make Christianity the religion of the whole empire. Constantine never would have thought of this, unless the mass of the people had been so far subdued by Christ as to answer his political purposes. The judging or ruling of Jesus Christ in the Roman empire so far from beginning with Constantine in the year 313, is the very date of the decline of his reign. At this date, Christianity was made by law the religion of the Roman empire, and from this period it gradually descended to the grave of corruption, in which it lay buried for ages, as all history abundantly testifies. It is but a short time since any thing was done to raise Christianity from this grave, and sorry am I to say, your labors are spent in making Christianity still wear the grave clothes of this corruption. Christ by his truth, subdued multitudes in the Roman empire in Paul's day. The sound of the gospel had gone into all the earth to the ends of the world (*oikoumene.*) The apostles by their preaching had turned the world (*oikoumene* or Roman empire) upside down, Rom. 10: 18. Acts 17: 6. But the Roman empire, according to your statement, was made Christian by Constantine A. D. 313, which shows what views you have of Christianity. Like Dr. Ely and others, you seem to be hankering after a national religion, nor can Christ rule or govern by his truth in any land, until this is the case. If this is not the truth, to what purpose are the above statements? But

2d. You immediately add—"since the above was written, I have perused with pleasure a refutation of

Mr. B's criticism on *mello*, by Rev. S. C. Loveland, published in the Christian Repository, vol. ix. p. 123—130, from which I will make an extract, being persuaded that it will be acceptable to the reader." Very acceptable, Sir, at least to me, and you must now stand and look on while I attend to Mr. Loveland's remarks. He says—"that the word *mello* often has the sense of a future action, about to take place, is not disputed. The same is true of the common future tense; as usually understood in our language. It may be *near* or *at a distance* as the nature of the subject may require. The Latin meaning of *mello*, as already quoted from Parkhurst, is *futurus sum*, which literally signifies *to be future*, and this future may be *near* or *remote* as the subject to which it applies requires. Let Mr. B. or any other Latin scholar, prove that the Latin *futurus* and the English *future* are not perfectly synonymous, and we promise with good fortune to attend to him. To *futurus sum*, Schrevelius adds *cunctor*, *to delay*, to *prolong time*, which constitutes his whole definition of *mello*." I have no occasion to dispute this. Nor are you done in agreeing with me in my opinions, for you immediately add, "although the word (*mello*) may have the meaning which Mr. B. has given it, yet if it has not this meaning *exclusively* it does not *of itself* show that it had no reference to a day of general judgment at the close of time. An argument founded merely on a single definition of an ambiguous term, every logician knows is at the best, extremely doubtful. Mr. B. has quoted from Parkhurst and Campbell, suffer me now to quote in addition from Jones' Greek Lexicon what we believe to be a fair definition of the word. '*Mello, I take time to do a thing, am bent upon, prepare to do, am about to do.*'" Such, Sir, are your statements, and I thank you kindly for them. For 1st. You admit that *mello may* have the mean-

ing I have given it, and the authorities you quote show that it *actually has this meaning*. But 2d. If "every logician knows," what you say he does, either you are not a *logician*, or, you know that if *mello* has not the sense you attach to it "*exclusively*, it does not *of itself* show that it had reference to your "day of general judgment at the close of time." You say, "an argument founded merely on a single definition of an ambiguous term, every logician knows, is at the best extremely doubtful." But 3d. You said above—"that the word *mello* often has the sense of a future action, about to take place is not to be disputed." But if it has this sense, yea has it *often*, why did you only say above, it "*may* have the meaning which Mr. B. has given it." You blow *positively* and *doubtfully* about this almost with the same breath. But, if "*mello often* has the sense of a future action, about to take place," and if this "is not to be disputed," wherein does your opposition to my views and Dr. Campbell's criticism consist? It lies in this, *mello* "if it has not this meaning *exclusively*, it does not *of itself* show that it had no reference to a day of general judgment, at the close of time." For "an argument founded merely on a single definition of an ambiguous term every logician knows, is at the best extremely doubtful." But Sir, as a candid man, your logic out of the question, did you not know that I rested no part of my argument on "a single definition of an ambiguous term?" Nor was it rested on *mello exclusively* meaning a future which is near. Nor was it even rested on *mello*, with *an infinitive following*, signifying this. No Sir—did you not know it was rested on *mello*, with an infinitive following, *particularly in texts where threats or warnings are given?* This was the point of my criticism, and on this was my argument founded. Did you not know all this? But

your logic failed you, Jones failed you, and we shall now see that your Scripture examples also fail you.

You proceed thus: "For a Scripture illustration and proof of these definitions and remarks we offer the following passages." I have quoted above every syllable of your "*definitions and remarks*," and we shall now see how your passages illustrate and prove them. You quote Matt. 11: 14. Mark 13: 14. Luke 21: 7. Acts 26: 22. Rom. 5: 14. 1 Tim. 1: 16, and Heb. 11: 8. Such, Sir, are your texts, and what do you quote them to prove? To prove that *mello*, with an infinitive following, and in texts were a *threat or a warning is given*, is used to express a distant future? No Sir, a single example of this kind you have not produced, nor a single example can you find to produce. But until such an example is produced you are beating the air, for my criticism, my argument, and the interpretations given, remain unaffected by all you can do or say. Your texts prove what was never disputed by me. Why then did you adduce those texts to prove a point which I never thought of disputing? Could you suppose Sir, that this evasion of the point of my argument would escape my notice, or of any discerning reader? Your sarcasm and ridicule on some of the above texts, were ill-timed, and will likely give you pain enough without any retaliation in kind from me. As you have quoted texts aside from proving the point at issue, you can "*reconcile those passages*" or not, just as you please, for I have no concern with them; nor need I notice what you quote from *Hedericus* on p. 99, for the quotation is made on the ground of your own mistake, which I have just been exposing.

But you say, p. 99—"when Mr. B. comes to the passage in Acts 24: 25, which speaks of Paul's reasoning of a 'judgment to come,' he tells us that it should read a judgment *about to be*, and proceeds to

quote Parkhurst and Campbell as before. But unluckily for Mr. B. *mellontos* is not a verb, but a participle, which Parkhurst says means '*future, what is to come.*' So one witness has failed him and he is left with Dr. Campbell alone." We really hope this is not a fair specimen of your Greek scholarship. Is it any wonderful discovery Sir, to tell us, "*mellontos* is not a verb, but a participle," for who does not know that a participle is part of the verb? But *unluckily*, not perhaps *intentionally*, you conceal what you ought to have told your readers, that the entire Greek phrase here is "*kai tou krimatos tou mellontos esesthai.*" Is not the participle *mellontos* here followed by an infinitive? This you cannot deny, for it now stares you right in the face. But why did you conceal this? What answer you will return to this question I leave to your own candor. At first I imputed this to oversight in your haste to refute my views. But I shall proceed to show that you perceived, yea felt the point of the argument.

On p. 99, 100, you thus quote my criticism from Dr. Campbell. "The Dr. says 'there is just such a difference between *estai* and *mellei esesthai* in Greek, as there is between *it will be* and *it is about to be* in English. This holds particularly in threats and warnings.' Mr. B. says 'it is certain that Paul was threatening or warning Felix,' and he thinks this renders his interpretations *doubly sure here.*" Not a doubt can remain, that you felt the point of my argument, but evaded encountering it. I infer this from the following circumstances. 1st. From your very next sentence: you say "but mind, this is all by the help of Dr. Campbell, for just now Parkhurst stepped aside." And is it of any consequence, Sir, by whose help it was done? It concerned you to produce examples, where *mello*, with an infinitive following, and in texts where *threats or warnings are given*, signify a

distant future. Here, Sir, was the pinch; you felt it, but evaded it, because no such texts were to be found. You have been calling in help from Jones, Hedericus, Parkhurst, in short from all quarters, but all to no purpose. I care not a straw, nor shall I *mind* by whose help you do this, *only let* it be done. On the same page you even call in Dr. Campbell to help you, as if he helped you against his own criticism. But does he say any thing at variance with it? No. Does he furnish you with such texts as you want? No Sir; and all this proves how keenly you felt your difficulty, hence you raised a dust, as if Dr. Campbell was in your favor against himself, to cover your retreat. 2d. I shall only notice one thing more, which proves conclusively, that you felt your difficulty in meeting the point of my argument. You proceed to beg the question, and even deny that this text contains any warning or threatening of Paul to Felix. You say—"St. Paul may have threatened or warned Felix, but does any one suppose that the text under consideration contains any part of his threatening or warning in the language addressed to him, provided this was the case? Is it not rather a *summary* declaration of what Paul preached in the language of the historian, than any part of Paul's words in his own language?" Sir, *can any one suppose* after this, that you could meet the point of my criticism, or can you deny that you felt it? No Sir; could you have met it, you never would have denied that the passage contains a threat or a warning. To get rid of the difficulty, you rob Mr. H. of one of the principal texts in support of his system. I hope then in all time to come, both of you will cease to quote it for such a purpose. But Sir, if this text contains no threat or warning, how many foolish sermons have been preached from it. What is worse, how many simple people have been rendered miserable by those

*infinitive following* signifies this "*particularly in threats and warnings.*" It was only to such passages as contained *threats and warnings* that I applied this criticism. You do not seem to have perceived its point, or if you did, you evaded it. Mr. Loveland perceived it, but finding nothing to blunt it, denies that the passage contains a threat or a warning, as we shall see afterwards. You say "examples can be produced, showing this rule to be defective." How defective, Sir? That *mello*, with an infinitive following does not signify *it is about to be*, in texts which contain threats or warnings? No Sir, though you and Mr. Loveland ransacked the Scripture usage of *mello*, a single example of this kind you could not find. Could Mr. Loveland have found but one such example, he never would have attempted to deny this text contained a threat or warning to Felix. Love of system ought not to drive us quite so far as this. By doing so, he forgot that he was robbing you of one principal text in proof of your "*future judgment.*"

2d. But if Paul in this text teaches your future judgment, why did he use *mello*, with an infinitive following? He was liable to be misunderstood. By your own showing, *mello*, with an infinitive following "may be immediately connected with the present." But your day of judgment when Paul wrote, was at some thousand years distance. Even now, some tell us at the distance of three hundred and sixty thousand years. Paul's language conveyed the idea, *it was about to be*, as all I think ought to admit. Does the Holy Spirit speak with so little precision as this? Who then can blame some of the first Christians for thinking the end of the world was to happen during their day?

3d. If you could have found a text to meet my criticisms, Rom. 5: 14. Gal. 3: 23. 1 Tim. 1: 16,

would not have been adduced, for none of them contain a threat or a warning. You may toil, and sweat and sigh over it till you die, but you never can rid yourself of the force of this criticism against your views of this and other passages. And why? Because, Sir, it is true.

4th. You despatch all my other arguments by a few brief sentences, chiefly in the way of ridicule, and wrap the matter up as usual in the following manner. "To conclude, I will state that the passage before us naturally teaches a future judgment. St. Luke could not in honesty have written such language to people who believed in a future retribution, unless he meant to teach that doctrine." But does your saying—"*I will state*" all this, make it true? I thought the point in dispute was—did the Scripture writers—"teach a future retribution?" But you assume it as true, and think if you say—"*I will state*" it to be true, it must make it true. I am really sick at listening to this mode of proof, and seeing the sacred writers impeached, as fools or dishonest men, if they do not teach your doctrines. It indicates you have become bankrupt in argument.

5th. You say, p. 93, "Now in the passage before us, *tou mellontos* is a participle, so according to his own authority it signifies *future*, what is to come, agreeable to the sense of the common version." Who ever disputed, Sir, that it signifies future? Is not "*about to be*" future? Is not *mellontos* a part of the verb? And who could suppose you would conceal the infinitive following? The whole Greek phrase is—"*tou mellontos esesthai*. Does not the infinitive follow here? Was not Paul delivering a threat or a warning to Felix? And is not this the point of the criticism I quoted from Dr. Campbell? Did you evade it, or was all this oversight? If the latter I excuse it, but if the former, it speaks a volume against.

you and the system for which you are contending. You ask me on the same page—"does he understand *mello* in verse 15 to signify *about to be?*" I have only to ask as a reply, was Paul, in verse 15, delivering a *threat or a warning?* No Sir, he was not; and it shows how you evade the point of my criticism, which you cannot meet. But meet it you must, or forever give up this and other texts in proof of your "*future judgment.*"

Acts 17: 31 is your next proof text. "Because he hath appointed a day, in which he will judge the world in righteousness," &c. This text was considered fully in my Essays, p. 222—228. The following criticism was introduced, as on the last text. Parkhurst says—"*mello* signifies, with an infinitive following, *to be about* to do a thing, *futurus sum.*" Dr. Campbell, on Matt. 3: 7, also says, *mello* often means not only *future* but near. There is just such a difference between *estai* and *mellei esesthai* in Greek, as there is between *it will be*, and *it is about to be*, in English. This holds particularly in threats and warnings." Is *mello* then used with an infinitive in this passage? Yes. Is a threat or warning delivered in this passage? Yes, you do not dispute it; though Mr. Loveland denies it. Let us inquire, 1st. What is the meaning of the Greek term *mello?* Ewing says—"*mello* signifies I am about to be or do, I delay." What do you say? You say, p. 92—"the word *mello* more naturally signifies *future* than about to be." But is not *about to be* future, however near it may be to the present?

2d. Did I ever contend that *mello always* signifies about to be? No. So far from this I perfectly agree to what is said by you, p. 92, "the word *mello* then simply signifies to delay to be *future*, and this future may be immediately connected with the present or very remote, according to the nature of the subject."

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your logic failed you, Jones failed you, and we shall now see that your Scripture examples also fail you.

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But you say, p. 99—"when Mr. B. comes to the passage in Acts 24: 25, which speaks of Paul's reasoning of a 'judgment to come,' he tells us that it should read a judgment *about to be*, and proceeds to

Luke 12: 4, 5. "And I say unto you my friends, be not afraid of them that kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do. But I will forewarn you whom ye shall fear: fear him, which, after he hath killed, hath power to cast into hell; yea, I say unto you fear him." Our remarks on this text may be brief, as you allow it teaches for substance the same as the preceding. I shall however, as on the last text, notice whatever is stated in it. 1st. Who then spoke these words? Jesus Christ. 2d.

thing is stated with this variation "and lose (*apolesas*) himself, or be cast away." How cast away? I answer as the unbelieving Jews were, Rom. 11. 15, and comp. 1 Cor. 9. 27. Again Luke 9. 56—"For the son of man is not come to destroy (*apolesai*) men's lives (*psuhas*) but to save them."

Such are all the texts, where *apollumi* is applied to the destruction of the *psuhe*, *life* or *soul*. On the whole of them it may be remarked, that the same word in these texts rendered *life*, is rendered *soul* in the text before us. I am aware it is also rendered *soul* in these texts, and from them many a sermon has been preached to set forth the value of the *immortal soul* and the danger of losing it. But such preachers surely never examined the contexts of such passages, for the scope of the writers require it to be uniformly rendered life. It is so rendered in the contexts by our translators and is rendered uniformly life throughout the above passages in most modern versions.—To say *psuhe*, *soul* in any of the above texts means an *immortal soul* is a gross perversion of them and makes them teach the greatest absurdities. For example—"he that findeth his *immortal soul* shall lose it: and he that loseth his *immortal soul* shall find it." Again "whosoever shall seek to save his *immortal soul* shall lose it: and whosoever shall lose his *immortal soul* shall save it." I might go over all the above texts in the same way, but enough has been given as a specimen. But understand *psuhe* to mean *life*, and all absurdity and incongruity are avoided. The contexts of the passages show it ought to be rendered life, and who can deny that this is the general meaning of *psuhe* in the New Testament, and also of *nephish* its corresponding word in the Old? But what puts this beyond doubt is the nature of the subject on which our Lord spoke to his disciples. If any of them should seek to save their lives by apostasy, they should lose them, for only they who endured to the end should be saved, Matt. 24: 13. Such as deserted his cause had no reason to expect his protection, but with the unbelieving Jews should not escape the damnation of hell. What would it profit them, if they gained the whole world and lost their lives? Hence in the passage before us they are cautioned against the fear of man, and are commanded to fear him who is able to destroy both *life* and *body*, or the "whole body" in hell. And what hell could this be but the *hell* the unbelieving Jews could not escape?

To whom were they addressed? To his own disciples, verses 1—5. 3d. On what occasion were they delivered? In view of their labors and sufferings in the kingdom of God. 4th. What was our Lord's object in thus addressing them? To caution them against the fear of man and impress them with the fear of God. 5th. What does the passage say concerning those whom they should not fear? It says "be not afraid of them that kill the body," which you will allow simply means—be not afraid of them who can put you to death. This was all they could do, for it is added—"and after that have no more that they can do." 6th. What does the passage say respecting him whom they ought to fear? It says—"fear him, which, after he hath killed, hath power to cast into hell; yea, I say unto you, fear him." This is the part which demands attention. Let us then inquire

1st. What is meant by *hell* or *gehenna?* As you will allow the same thing is meant as in the foregoing text, I here refer to my remarks there, and particularly to my First Inquiry where all the texts in which gehenna is used are considered.

2d. What does this passage say is to be cast into *gehenna* or hell? It says, "fear him, which, after he hath killed, hath power to cast into hell." Cast what into hell? The connection of the two verses shows it is the *body;* for Luke says nothing at all about the *soul*, as is done by Matthew. But you will no doubt say—God can do something after he hath killed the body, which man cannot do, for is it not said—"fear him, which, after he hath killed, hath power to cast into hell?" You will say it is the *soul* of which Matthew speaks in the passage just considered. Agreed; for this is granting what I have always contended for, that Luke included in the term *body* all that Matthew expressed by the terms *soul* and *body*. Had Luke

been the only historian of our Lord's discourse what would you have done for the want of your *immortal soul* to punish in hades in a disembodied state or after the resurrection in gehenna? Why then did Luke omit all mention of the *soul* and only speak of the *body?* I answer, that both these were modes of expression common among the Jews to express the whole man. This has been seen on the preceding text.

Luke here says God "after he hath killed hath power to cast into hell." As you will allow that the phrase "*hath power*" expresses the same as the word *able* in the foregoing passage I need only refer to the remarks there made. Nor will it be questioned by you that the phrase "*cast into hell*" means the same as is expressed by Matthew—"to destroy both soul and body in hell." But what deserves your special notice is, that in no text where gehenna is mentioned, is the slightest intimation given, that persons after being "cast into hell," or "destroyed soul and body in hell," are alive there. So far from its being said they are in misery there, not a hint is dropped that they are in a state of conscious existence. Now Sir, if this be the fact of the case, and who can dispute it, these texts are entirely silent concerning that, which constitutes the *soul and body* of your system. It fails entirely of support from these texts, on which your punishment in gehenna after the resurrection is built. But Sir, your system requires you not only to prove that *soul* and *body* are *alive in gehenna after being cast into it or destroyed*, but also *that they suffer pain or misery there.* Yea, it requires you to prove that in gehenna they are to be *reformed* by "consideration and reflection," after having been destroyed soul and body. I must express my surprise, that you should attempt to support such a system from these texts,

and am not without hope that after the above investigation you will abandon it.

Luke 16: 19—31, is your next proof text for "a future retribution." The reader will please turn to it in his Bible. I had said so much on this text, previous to writing my Essays, that I deemed it unnecessary to enter into it there, but I find this is construed by you that I considered my exposition of this parable faulty and therefore would not defend it. I am sorry to see this, for I am persuaded you are conscious it is false. I turn your attention once more to it and shall inquire

1st. What is the meaning of the term *hades?* "And in hell (*hades*) he lifted up his eyes being in torments." Wakefield, in his note on this verse, says, "*in the grave*: *en to ade;* and conformably to this representation, he is spoken of as having a body, verse 24. It must be remembered, that *ades* no where means hell, *gehenna*, in any author whatsoever, *sacred* or *profane:* and also, that our Lord is giving his hearers a parable (Matt. 13: 34) and not a piece of *real history*. To them who regard the narration as exhibiting a *reality*, it must stand as an unanswerable argument for the *purgatory of the papists*. The universal meaning of *ades* is *the state of death:* because the term *sepulchrum*, or grave, is not strictly applicable to such as have been consumed by fire, &c. see verse 30." For similar definitions respecting the meaning of this word, see Parkhurst on the words *sheol* and *hades*. See also Dr. Campbell's 6th Dissertation, and Whitby on Acts 2, as quoted in my First Inquiry. Wakefield in this quotation tells you "that *hades* no where means hell, *gehenna*, in any author whatsoever, *sacred* or *profane*. And contrary to you states—"our Lord is giving his hearers a *parable* and not a piece of real history." Moreover he says, the view you take of this parable "stands as an unanswerable argument

for the purgatory of papists." What, Sir, is the essential difference between your *hell* and the Catholic *purgatory?* I know there is some difference, for the Catholic priests if well paid, can pray souls out of purgatory speedily. But so far as I understand your system, you neither pray them out, nor even reform them there. As they went into it at death, they come out of it at the resurrection.

As to the Scriptural usage of *hades* and its corresponding word *sheol* in the Old Testament, they are never used to designate the "*place of departed spirits*," as you affirm. Indeed, this is the only text where *hades* is mentioned, on which you attempt to build this doctrine. But, on John 5: 28, 29 above, it was shown, that you demolished it with your own hands. And it has been repeatedly noticed you advocate that Moses did not teach a future retribution, or even future existence, consequently could not teach that *sheol* or *hades* was the "*place of departed spirits.*" Let us then inquire

2d. From what source did this opinion originate? The rise and progress of your opinions will be detailed afterwards. At present I shall only quote the following from Dr. Whitby. He says on Acts 2—"Had the penmen of the Old Testament meant by *hades* any receptacle of souls, they could not truly have declared there was no wisdom or knowledge in *sheol*, Eccl. 9: 10. No remembrance of God there, Ps. 6: 5. No praising of him in *sheol*, Isai. 38: 18. For those heathen who looked upon it as the receptacle of souls, held it to be a place in which they would be punished or rewarded." Here, Sir, your hell is traced to heathen origin by an orthodox man. Let us then notice how correctly you have imbibed the heathen opinions on this subject.

1st. The heathen believed *hades* was a *receptacle of souls after death.* So do you, for you call it "*the*

*place of departed spirits.*" It is one place for all departed spirits; for the souls of the rich man and Lazarus you sent both to *hades* at death, p. 48. And on the same page you inform us that *hades* is—"*somewhere*," without telling us where. But Dr. Allen, in his Lecture, p. 5, says—"*sheol* is the invisible place of the dead, or a vast subterranean receptacle, because the abode of departed spirits was supposed to be the deep, central, or lower parts of the earth."—This was the opinion of the heathen. But about this the Dr. speaks doubtfully, for on p. 71, he says, "the lost spirits may have their hell in the earth in flames, the sun, a comet, or dispersed widely from each other in the vast extent of the universe."—I commend you for your caution in only saying your hell is "*somewhere.*" Also, in being silent about the nature of the place. Dr. Allen's hell "*is a raging fire*," which is the good old orthodox hell, and certainly best corresponds to this parable, if it is a history of facts; for the rich man said his tongue was tormented in the flame of it. But you do not say whether it is a dark place or a light place, a hot place or a cold place, a high place or a low place, but only say it is a place "*somewhere.*"

2d. The heathen divided *hades* into two distinct apartments, one for good, and the other for bad souls after death. So do you. The apartment for good souls you told us, p. 71, 72, from Robinson and Parkhurst, is paradise, the place where the pious enjoy happiness until the resurrection. And the place for bad souls, you tell us is *tartarus*, and call it the "*infernal prison*" of *hades.* And you also tell us it is "the place where fallen angels and wicked spirits are kept until the day of judgment."

3d. The heathen believed good and bad souls were punished and rewarded in *hades.* So do you; for in p. 48, you told us, that in *hades* "the rich man ex-

perienced pain, and Lazarus happiness." It is true, you are not very *orthodox* in your opinions on this point, in the heathen sense of that word, for you deny all external application of punishment in hell. Your punishment there is "*a state of anxiety, guilt and remorse*," which will hardly pass for *orthodoxy* among many Christians. How you came to learn that this constitutes the pains of hell from this *parable*, or any other part of the Bible, is beyond my comprehension. And how you could learn it from any other source, I will thank you to inform us.

4th. In the above quotation, Dr. Whitby declares that the penmen of the Old Testament taught no such opinions. And you add your testimony to his, for you have told us Moses taught neither a *future state* nor a *future retribution*. By your own showing then, wherever the heathens obtained such opinions, it was not from Moses they derived them. It is impossible they could derive them from the *Bible*, for it contains no such opinions. That all go to *sheol* or *hades*, or the state of death, it abundantly testifies. See among others the following texts: Job 17: 16. Gen. 37: 35. 42: 38, and 41: 29. Isai. 28: 10. 18. Job 17: 13, and 14: 13. Ps. 88: 3. Num. 16: 30. 33. Ps. 31: 17. 9: 17, and 89: 48. The Saviour himself was not exempted, see Psalm 16. Acts 2. It is called the house appointed for all the living, Job 30: 33. Man's long home, Eccles. 12: 5. All go to this one place, Eccles. 3: 20. And if there was no other text in the Bible to show that it is not a place of either happiness or misery, Eccles. 9: 5—11 is sufficient. But the Scriptures abound with information respecting the state of those in *sheol* or *hades*. They are *asleep* or *dead*, and their sleep is in the dust, Job 7: 21, and 17: 16. It is a place of quietness and rest to all, whether poor or rich, young or old, the oppressor or the opprest, Job 3: 12—20. Isai. 57: 2. Rev. 14: 13. There

persons cannot praise God, and all knowledge, device, wisdom, and work are at an end. Ps. 31: 17. 94: 17, and 115: 17. Eccles. 9: 10. The only exceptions which can be made to these statements are Isai. 14: 3—24. Ezek. 32: 17—32, and this parable on which your theory is built. As to these two texts from the Old Testament, you do not avail yourself of them, but certainly they teach as plainly as this parable that persons are alive in *sheol*. Had they said any thing about *punishment* there I have no doubt but you would have quoted them as conclusive proof of your system. Allusion is made to the heathen opinions in them. But as no allusion is made to *punishment*, as in the parable, you fix on it as a foundation for your system.

But the following important questions claim your attention. 1st. Had the Jews in our Lord's day imbibed the above heathen opinions mentioned by Whitby? Yes. This you have contended for throughout your book, but assert those opinions were derived from early revelations which are lost. But that the Jews derived those opinions from the heathen is shown by Dr. Campbell in his 6th Dissertation and other writers I might name. This point is beyond all controversy.

2d. Did our Lord in this parable allude to those heathen opinions imbibed by the Jews? This cannot be questioned. Macknight in a note on this parable says—"verse 23, *seeth Abraham afar off, and Lazarus in his bosom.* Because the opinions as well as the language of the Greeks had by this time made their way into Judea, some imagine that our Lord had their fictions about the abodes of departed souls in his eye, when he formed this parable. But the argument is not conclusive. At the same time it must be acknowledged, that his descriptions of those things are not drawn from the writings of the Old Testament, but

have a remarkable affinity to the descriptions which the Grecian poets have given of them. They, as well as our Lord, represent the abodes of the blessed as lying contiguous to the region of the damned, and separated only by a great impassable river or deep gulf, in such a sort that the ghosts could talk with one another from its opposite banks. In the parable, souls whose bodies were buried, know each other, and converse together, as if they had been embodied. In like manner, the Pagans introduce departed souls talking together, and represent them as having pains and pleasures analogous to what we feel in this life; it seems they thought the shades of the dead had an exact resemblance to their bodies. The parable says, the souls of wicked men are tormented in flames; the Grecian mythologists tell us they lie in Pyriphlegethon, which is a river of fire, where they suffer the same torments they would have suffered while alive, had their bodies been burnt."

Such are the concessions of Macknight, and what he says at variance with this is mere assertion. That our Lord not only alluded to such heathen opinions among the Jews, but that he borrowed this very parable from the Jewish writings is shown by Dr. Whitby on this parable. He says—"that this is only a parable, and not a real history of what was actually done, is evident, 1st. Because we find this very parable in the Gemara Babylonicum, whence it is cited by Mr. Sheringham, in the preface to his Joma. 2d. From the circumstances of it, viz. the rich man's *lifting up his eyes in hell*, and *seeing Lazarus in Abraham's bosom*, his discourse with Abraham, his complaint of being *tormented with flames*, and his desire that Lazarus might be sent *to cool his tongue;* and if all this be confessedly *parable*, why should the rest, which is the very parable in the Gemara, be accounted history? As for the judgment of *antiquity* in this case, they

who owned this as an history, owned the whole so to be, thinking the soul to be corporeal, as Tertullian did, and that there was *some discretion, or resemblance of men as to their shapes after death;* which was the sentiment of Ireneus, proving from this very instance, that souls, when they have put off the body, *do yet preserve the shape or character of the body* to which they were united; as Tertullian before from the same instance had inferred, *the shape and corporeal lineaments*, and also Thespesias, returning to life represents *the colors of souls*, and saith that there be *ulcers and scars of their passions left upon them by which they are discerned.* Whereas they who renounced these opinions as false and ridiculous, declared that this was not an *history*, but only a representation; *that after the separation of the soul from the body, she could receive no advantage from any man*, and that *it was foolish to think it an history;* and this they also gather, because there was to be no future retribution before the general resurrection. And whereas against this it is objected, that the proper name Lazarus shows it to be an history; it is answered, that the name Lazer, being only the contraction of Eliezer, is the same with Ani Achad, a poor man in the Gemara, as being in sense *one that hath no help*, or one who hath God only for his help. 2d. That though this parable contains something suitable to the opinions of the Jews touching the state of souls after death, yet doth it not respect their state immediately after death, but the punishments that wicked men are to suffer after the resurrection of the dead, *at the last day*, saith Theophylact. For as Cicero says of the fables by which the poets represent the punishment of evil souls, that *though they know their bodies have been burnt, yet they do not represent them suffering such things in the infernal regions, which neither can be done nor suffered, or even understood to be so without bodies:* so it is plainly here in the

forementioned instances produced to prove this a parable."

3d. Was it our Lord's design in using this parable borrowed from the Jewish writings, to give sanction to such opinions? This is what you advocate. But this I do not allow you to assume, and demand proof of it. This you have long enough asserted, but proof of it you have never produced. I never expect to see this proved, for there is much evidence against it as I shall now show. 1st. If our Lord adopted this parable, and made it his own as you assert, and thus sanctioned such heathen opinions, his teaching was very different from that of Moses by your own confession. You deny that Moses taught a future retribution, or even future existence. 2d. Our Lord's sanctioning this, is contrary to all the Old Testament, as Whitby, Campbell and many others show. Does it teach, Sir, that *sheol* or *hades* "*is a place of departed spirits*" where they are punished or rewarded? No. If it had, we may be sure you would have quoted it. 3d. It is contrary to the uniform usage of *hades* in the New Testament, and all our Lord's teaching on the subject of a future state. *Hades* is spoken of in ten other places in the New Testament, but not one of the places gives the most distant hint that it is a repository for good and bad souls after death. Nor does our Lord intimate in any of his discourses that such a repository exists, or that men have immortal souls which at death become its inhabitants. 4th. It is contrary to all the teaching of the apostles afterwards, who certainly must have understood what our Lord meant to teach in this parable. Do any of them ever intimate that *hades* is the "*place of departed spirits*" as you boldly assert? And had they understood our Lord as sanctioning such heathen opinions imbibed by the Jews, why did not they also sanction them? This they never did. And why they

should not inculcate such an important doctrine as this, I leave you to explain, had they understood this parable as you do. 5th. It is contrary to the context and scope of our Lord's discourse. You will not assert that he was discoursing on the subject of a future state when he introduced this parable. He was speaking to the Pharisees on a different subject as may be seen from verses 14—18. And why, Sir, should he here warn such men about a punishment in *hades*, when he did not warn them against "*the damnation of gehenna*" in a future state, Matt. 23: 33, but of the judgments of God coming on their nation? 6th. It is contrary to the object and design of parables. The design of parables is to inculcate some one important truth which is generally intimated at the beginning or end of the parable uttered. See as an example, Luke 10: 30—37, with many others I might here produce. But you make the parable not a parable, but a description of a place of future punishment. Or rather, you do not seem to know in what light to view it. You are not willing to call it a parable, nor have you confidence to say it is a history of facts. It is part literal, part figurative, and how to distinguish between the one and the other puzzles you.

The question then returns—what was our Lord's design in borrowing this parable from Jewish writings, if not to sanction such opinions? His very borrowing it from their writings shows how deeply they were imbued with those opinions, and the last verse of the parable shows our Lord's object and design in availing himself of it. "If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither would they be persuaded though one rose from the dead." The writings of Moses and the prophets testified of him as the Messiah, and if they did not believe their writings concerning him, one coming from *hades* their pretended repository of

souls after death could not persuade them to believe in him. He availed himself here of their popular opinions, just as he did on other occasions, to show them the strength of their unbelief. He spoke to them of satan binding a woman eighteen years. And on many occasions he spoke of demons as evil spirits. But, Sir, did our Lord sanction such heathen opinions? If he did not, why contend he did so in this parable?

It is very likely you will object to this and say—does not our Lord seem to sanction such opinions by borrowing this parable? You have actually asserted that in borrowing it he made it his own, as Paul did the language of the heathen poets. And you perhaps may add, there was a danger of his being so understood. But in reply I would remark, there was no danger of all this, and for the following reasons. 1st. Such opinions had no foundation in the sacred books of the Jews by your own showing, and that these books were the standard of faith and practice to them you will admit. The word of God was then as now, a perfect rule to all who chose to walk in truth, and not in the popular opinions of the day. If the Jews had not been deeply imbued with such heathen notions themselves, they would have been the first to remonstrate against our Lord, in adopting such a parable from the heathen to teach such doctrines so contrary to their sacred books. 2d. The whole strain of our Lord's teaching on the subject of a future life stood as a safeguard against supposing he sanctioned such opinions, or that he adopted them and made them his own. If it is contended that he did so in this case, it must also be contended that he adopted and made it his own that the devil, satan, demons, are evil beings, and that Beelzebub and mammon are gods. 3d. But that our Lord did not adopt this parable and make it his own, is evi-

dent from a fact which cannot be disputed. It is this: our Lord's own disciples did not so understand him, and certainly they knew what was his design in borrowing the parable, and what he meant to teach by it better than any of us. Do you ask how I know this? I answer, the apostles never intimated that *hades* is "the place of departed spirits." The teaching of the apostles in the Acts and the Epistles is the best commentary on our Lord's parables and teachings, but do they, Sir, ever intimate that *hades* is a repository for good and bad souls after death? Never. And to suppose they believed as you do from this parable, yet avoid all mention of such doctrines appears to me utterly incredible.

In concluding my remarks on this parable, I ask you, Sir, where does the Scriptures speak of—"*departed spirits?*" Where do the sacred writers call *hades* the "*place of departed spirits?*" And is it not a contradiction in terms for you to tell us with the same breath, that hades is "*the place of departed spirits*," and also of the "*literally dead?*" Are persons both literally dead and alive in *hades?* You say, p. 155, "the rich man's suffering was in a future state, was in *hades*—a term defined by all critics to signify the state of the literally dead, or place of departed spirits; and that though it occurred in Scripture over seventy times, it was not pretended that it ever applied to the present state, two or three disputed texts excepted." Take, Sir, all the seventy and more texts, yea, take the whole Bible and if you will find *one* text which says "*hades is the place of departed spirits*," I yield you at once the subject in dispute.—If you decline this generous offer, let all judge if your cause is not indefensible. You will find plenty of texts to prove that *hades* is the state of the literally dead, for our translators have rendered *sheol* and *hades grave*, as well as hell, in the common version.

But is it not surprising, Sir, if they believed *hades* "*the place of departed spirits*," that they should never have rendered it so in any part of the Bible? No Sir, they never connect *sheol* or *hades* with *soul* or *spirit* after death in any shape whatever. Even in this parable not a word is said about the soul or spirit of any man.

On p. 153—155 you say—"it is said of the rich man that he lifted up his *eyes*, had a *tongue*, held *conversation*, and desired Lazarus to dip his finger in water. Now all this in substance and even more is said of that God who is a spirit. He is said to have hands, fingers, arms, face, mouth, &c. See the pages referred to. But the fallacy of all this is obvious, for 1st. You assume that it is just as certain man has an *immortal spirit*, which exists after death, as it is that God is a spirit. But, Sir, will you never have done with assuming the question in debate? Prove such a spirit exists in *hades* before you begin to ascribe such members to it. 2d. But if such members are not ascribed to man's spirit in this state of existence, why do you ascribe such members to it after death before you have proved it exists there? But you say, p. 153—"if we read that a man is dead, the knowledge we have of a dead man immediately suggests the idea that what is said of his *acts* after death, must be predicated of his spirit and not of his body, &c." Answer. I should like to read your history of the *acts* of a *dead man*, and you may include in it all the acts both of his *soul* and *body*. The next thing I should expect to hear, would be your history of the *acts* of an unbegotten babe. It is your previous notions from the heathen which lead you to speak of the *acts* of a *dead man*. See how they talked of the acts of a dead man, in the lines quoted from Virgil, p. 84 of my Essays. The Bible, Sir, says—"*the dead know not any thing*." And that there is "no work, de-

vice, knowledge nor wisdom in *sheol* or *hades*." But you contradict all this.

Concerning the passage before us you say, p. 156, "if it be a history, it teaches us what had taken place, and if a parable what would." A wonderful difference indeed, between a history and a parable. Just such a difference as there is between what *has* happened and what *shall* happen. So according to your reasonings and interpretation, if a certain man did not go down from Jerusalem to Jericho and fall among thieves, it is certain he shall go down: and all said shall happen to him. See Luke 10: 30—37. But this, Sir, does not agree to what you say that a part of the passage ought to be understood as literal and a part of it figurative. But you are determined now to stand with one foot on—"*what had taken place*," and the other on "*what would*," which just sets all sober rules of interpretation at defiance. I cease to wonder at what shall come next. No correct opinion can be formed of the passage until we decide whether it is a parable or history. And if you will consider it part literal and part figurative, give us some rule to decide what is or is not to be understood figuratively. But as this is not done I conclude it cannot be done.

I perceive, Sir, that you sneer at some of the facts I stated in my First Inquiry. But like all others who have attempted to answer it, you take special care not to engage with them. No; you give us a few more assertions, and say—"Peter tells us that men are punished in "*tartarus*;" which any one may see is false by simply reading the passage you allude to, and which was considered in my Essays, p. 272—275. Please refute my interpretation of it, and not pass it off without notice in your next book. I thank you for confessing so freely, that this is the only place where *hades* is thought to express punishment, and

when once you have proved that Luke 20: 34, 35, is the only place in the Bible where the resurrection state is mentioned, the cases will be similar and your argument admitted. And when you have *proved*, that man has an *immortal soul*, which continues to *think* after death, we shall begin to think there may be some truth in your opinions.

1 Peter 3: 18, 19, is your last proof text of a "*future retribution.*" "For Christ also once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God, being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the spirit; by which also he went and preached unto the spirits in prison; which sometime were disobedient, when once the long suffering of God waited in the days of Noah, while the ark was a preparing." You commence by saying, 1st. "Our first object will be to examine Mr. Balfour's exposition of this passage. He gives the common exposition, that the spirit of Christ preached to the old world through Noah." If my exposition is "*the common one*," you tacitly tell us yours is "*an uncommon one.*" At any rate, on this text you allow I jog on in the old beaten track, and do not trouble my readers with my "*learned apparatus.*"

2d. You tell us that my—"exposition is directly opposed to the language of the text as will be seen by comparing them together." How? You say—"Peter says Christ preached, Mr. B. says it was Noah." But how did I say Christ preached? Personally? No. How then did I say he preached? By his spirit? Yes. But did I say he preached by his *disembodied spirit?* No. Did I say he preached by his *pre-existent spirit?* No. What spirit did I then say he preached by? The spirit by which he was quickened or brought again from the dead. But how could Christ preach by any spirit in the days of Noah, you will ask, when Christ did not exist in the

days of Noah?. Answer. How could Christ preach to the Ephesians, chap. 2: 17, when he did not exist at Ephesus to preach? Again you say—"Peter says the preaching was to the spirits in prison, but Mr. B. says it was to men in the flesh." Answer. Do the Scriptures represent men in a state of ignorance and vice as in prison? Yes. See Isai. 42: 6, 7, and 49: 8, 9. Do the Scriptures ever speak of *hades* as a *prison* or "*the infernal prison*," as Mr. Hudson does? No, never; but he assumes this without proof. Do the Scriptures ever speak of *spirits* in *hades* or "*the infernal prison*" of *hades?* No, not in a single instance, except in this text from which Mr. Hudson assumes it. The very phrase "*infernal prison*" *smells of heathenism*, and if the Scripture writers believed in it, tell us, Sir, why they said nothing about it or your spirits in it. By your own showing Moses knew nothing about this prison, for you declare he did not even teach a future existence. It is evident, and you will allow it, that in the texts referred to, a state of ignorance and wickedness is spoken of as a prison. Do the Scriptures then ever speak of men in the flesh by the term *spirit* or spirits? Nothing can be more certain than this. It would be idle to show it here, for it is shown at length in my Essays, where *ruah*, *pneuma*, *nephish*, and *psuhe*, rendered *soul* and *spirit* in the common version are considered. Does Peter call those spirits *disembodied spirits?* No. Does any sacred writer ever speak of *disembodied spirits?* Never. Contradict and refute these facts and statements if you can. Before them your *infernal prison* and *disembodied spirits* vanish like a ghost when the morning light appears.

But again you say—"Peter teaches us that this preaching was *after Christ's crucifixion*, but Mr. B. says it was before the flood." Peter, Sir, says no

such thing. He says it was "when once the long suffering of God waited in the days of Noah, while the ark was a preparing." Besides, Peter says the preaching was "to spirits in prison which sometime were disobedient when once the long suffering of God waited in the days of Noah." Peter does not say as you assert, that it was after he was put to death in the flesh he went and preached to the spirits in prison. No Sir; his words are "being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the spirit: by which also he went and preached." By which what? Surely, Sir, by which spirit. Well, what spirit was it? As certainly by the spirit by which he was quickened or brought again from the dead. But was this by his pre-existent spirit? No. Was it by his disembodied spirit? This you *assert*, that it was by his disembodied spirit he went and preached to spirits in your *infernal prison*. But nothing is more explicitly declared in Scripture than that God raised Christ from the dead. It is agreeable to the fact that after Christ was put to death in the flesh he was quickened by the spirit or power of God. But can you really say it is agreeable to the fact that after he was put to death in the flesh, he went by his disembodied spirit and preached to damned spirits in *hades* or *its infernal prison?*

But you add "Peter tells us that the *disobedience* was in the days of Noah, but Mr. B. tells us it was the *preaching* which took place at that time." Answer. I told you in my Essays, and have just been telling you again, that both the *disobedience* and the *preaching* were in the days of Noah. It is certainly more rational and Scriptural, to preach to men when going on in disobedience with a view to reclaim them, than to send Jesus Christ's *disembodied spirit to hell* to preach to them some thousand years after death, and after their disobedience was at an end. Be it re-

membered you do not advocate that people sin in hell. You may now see that you are mistaken in supposing Peter "unfortunate" in the use of language, p. 158. It is your misfortune, if not your crime, as a public teacher, to pay so little attention to the usage of Scripture words, which is the best commentary I have yet found on the Bible. Had you only attended to the Scripture use of the terms *spirit*, *prison*, with some others, you would have interpreted this text and many others differently.

3d. You proceed to say, "but Mr. B's exposition is not only opposed to the language of Peter, but is at variance with itself." How? You add—"he tells us that the spirits preached to could not be *disembodied spirits*, because the Greek term *pneuma* here rendered *spirits*, does not occur in that sense in the Bible. This is his main dependance." Well, do you deny the correctness of this statement? No Sir; and for a very good reason, because the statement is indisputable. How then do you account for the indisputable fact that *pneuma*, spirit, is never used to designate a *disembodied spirit*, if your doctrine be true? Instead of controverting this statement of mine, you try to set your readers against me, by telling them that I am "a materialist; that he denies all spiritual existence distinct from the body;" and that Dr. Priestly says "no materialist can believe in the preexistent spirit of our Lord." "Mr. B's doctrine is, that Christ had no existence till he was born into the world." Answer. I as firmly believe as you do that God is a spirit distinct from body. I also believe angels are spirits, and that spirits have not flesh and bones as we have. I presume Dr. Priestly also believed this. If you will defame me, spare the dead, not here to answer for himself. Your unfounded assertions recoil, not with honor, on your own head. But you say, p. 159—"if he admits Christ's

pre-existence, then he allows that spirits exist disembodied state; then all he has said against *s ate existence* must be given up." Indeed! But Why do you impose on your readers by an amb ous use of the expressions "*disembodied state*" "*separate existence?*" How could Christ, in his *existent state*, be in a *disembodied state*, unless he formerly been in a *bodied state?* Surely when speak of *disembodied spirits*, we always mean sp who once existed in bodies. Do you believe Chr *pre-existent spirit* once inhabited a body which di Unless you do how can you speak of it as a *di bodied spirit?* You might with equal propriety sp of God being in a *disembodied state*, and that he *disembodied spirit*. Again; when you speak of " *arate existence*," it is evident you mean the existe of spirits in an intermediate state, who once exi in the body. But surely Christ never lived in s a *separate existence* in his pre-existent state. Say, was our Lord's *pre-existent state* the same as y *separate existence for disembodied spirits?* How t could you say "if he admits Christ's pre-existe then he allows that spirits exist in a disembod state?" What! Could not God, and angels, Christ's pre-existent spirit all exist if your *di bodied spirits*, *disembodied state* and *separate existence* never been heard of? Must all these things pr false unless your opinions be allowed correct?*

* But let your objection be stated in its strongest light: that Cl had no pre-existence. The difficulty then is, how he could pr in the days of Noah, or to use your own words, how "*a nonex preached.*" As a writer in the Christian Intelligencer lately st the same difficulty, I here offer the following reply. 1st. Nothir more common than to say, persons did things, when those th were done on their account. It is needless to cite examples. 2 Peter did wrong in saying Christ preached in the days of Noah fore he came into the world, Paul did equally wrong in saying Cl preached to the Ephesians after he had left it and gone to hea The first might with equal propriety be said to be done by Chri the last. If there be any difficulty in the one case, there is the s

You admit it was God raised Christ from the dead. But you tell us "this furnishes no proof that he was not raised by his disembodied spirit." After saying God "works by means, or through second causes" you add—"in like manner he raised Christ by the agency of Christ's spirit." By your own showing Christ's disembodied spirit could not raise his body from the dead until God was pleased to use it as an agent to effect it. Those who insulted him on the cross might then have said "he raised others, himself he cannot raise! How then shall he raise all up at the last day?" But, Sir, if Christ's disembodied spirit could go to hell and preach to damned spirits

difficulty in both. Christ no more preached personally, by his disembodied spirit, or by his glorified body and spirit to the Ephesians than he did this to the antediluvians. And when you tell us how Christ preached to the Ephesians after he went to heaven, I can likely tell you how he preached before he came into the world. Permit me then to substitute Paul for Noah and Mr. H. for Mr. B and return you your own words in reference to Eph. 2: 17. "Now if Paul was the preacher, and preached by the spirit of God, what agency had Christ in this preaching, even admitting that he existed at that time? Mr. H. tells us that Christ did not preach in *person*, consequently if he preached at all, he must have preached by his spirit." By what spirit did Christ then preach to the Ephesians? Not by his pre-existent spirit, for this is at present out of the question. Not by his disembodied spirit, for Christ was then in heaven. Not by his glorified body and spirit, for no one thinks he came to Ephesus and preached. By what spirit then did he preach to them? By his spirit, the spirit shed on the apostles, and promised to them before he ascended to heaven. This you will allow, but perhaps will still say, how could a nonentity preach? I reply by observing, 3d. The same Peter who wrote the passage in question, says, chap. 1: 11, that it was "*the spirit of Christ*" which testified beforehand the sufferings of Christ and the glory that should follow. Was this the pre-existent spirit of Christ? Was this the disembodied spirit of Christ? No.—What spirit of Christ then was it? All the Scriptures go to show it was "the spirit of God, the spirit of the Lord which was given to the prophets, and came upon them as occasions required." But why, then, Sir, does Peter call this spirit "the spirit of Christ?" And I ask you did not Peter call the spirit of God, "*the spirit of Christ*," because it was given to them on account of him, and concerning whom it enabled them to testify beforehand? And if this spirit of Christ was in the prophets, was it not in Noah a preacher of righteousness, and did not he preach by this spirit through Noah to the antediluvians?

as you affirm, what was to hinder it going to Joseph's tomb and re-animating his body? But the text you quote in proof demands attention, and you will find it proves an unfortunate affair for your system. It is John 10: 17—19, "I lay down my life (*psuhen*) that I might take it again. No man taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself: I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again. This commandment have I received of my father." Had you only consulted the Improved Version, you would have seen this text was against you. It says—"to lay down life was a voluntary act, to which Jesus submitted in full confidence that it would be speedily restored to him. The common version, which the primate here adopts is 'I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again;' which seems to imply, that our Lord's resurrection was the effect of his own power, a sense which the words in the original do not convey, and which is directly contrary to the most explicit declarations of the Scriptures; Acts 2: 24. 3: 15, and 17: 31. Rom. 6: 4. 1 Cor. 15: 15." See also Wakefield and Campbell to the same effect. But in addition to this I have a few questions to ask. Did our translators believe *psuhen*, in this text, meant Christ's *immortal soul*, yet rendered it life? Did Christ lay down his immortal soul for us? Was his immortal soul made an offering for sin? You have told us that the *immortal soul* is the *mind*. Did Christ, Sir, lay down his mind? And did he take his mind again? Well, what took his mind again? Did his dead body take his mind again? You must either relinquish this opinion or contend that Christ's mind, or immortal soul, laid down itself, took itself again, or that his body laid down his mind, and the dead body took it again. In fact, Sir, with equal truth may you assert that Lazarus' soul was used as an agent in his resurrection as that Christ's disem-

bodied spirit was an agent in raising him from the dead. He would have been left in *hades* as others were, if God had not raised him from the dead.

I have dwelt longer on this point than it deserved. But I wished it fully to appear that it was not by the agency of Christ's disembodied spirit he was raised from the dead, for the following reason. If it was not by Christ's disembodied spirit he was quickened or brought again from the dead, it was not by his disembodied spirit he went and preached, by your own showing. You contend it was by the same spirit he was quickened, he went and preached, whatever spirit that was. We should think it is now settled beyond all fair debate that he was quickened by God, or by the spirit or power of God. I hope then you will no longer contend that Christ went to hell and preached, and quote this passage in proof of it.

I might here close my remarks on this passage.—But I shall briefly advert to some of your sophisms and misstatements. 1st. On p. 160, you represent me as stating that "the spirit of God is distinct from that of Christ." I do, Sir, if by the spirit of Christ you mean his disembodied spirit. But if you mean the spirit given him without measure, I consider them the same.

2d. You say, p. 160, 161, "the question is not how Christ *was preached by others* but how he himself preached. Neither was St. Peter personifying Christ's doctrine, but he was speaking of the literal person of Christ—of the same Christ which was crucified and rose from the grave." Strange! Was the immortal soul of Christ crucified? Did it rise from the grave? This was surely written without reflection.

3d. You say of me—"he tells us that *pneuma* in Greek, rendered spirit, never signifies a spirit distinct from body." I do Sir; if you mean the *disembodied*

*spirit* of a man which lives, thinks, suffers or enjoys after death. But what you wish your readers to believe is, that I deny the existence of all spirits distinct from body. You wish them to think that I believe God to be only—"a gust of wind and that one gust of wind preached to another," p. 164. I am sorry for your own sake, to see such misrepresentation. This is too gross to be believed even by my enemies. I advise you to give up the trade of *caricaturing*, for you make horrid work of it. I cordially subscribe, Sir, to the very definitions you give of *pneuma* from Parkhurst and Loveland, p. 161.

4th. On p. 161, 162, you quote our Lord's words, Luke 24: 37—39, "handle me and see; for a spirit (*pneuma*) hath not flesh and bones as ye see me have." You rely on the definition our Lord here gives of a spirit. So do I. But you here insinuate, that I believe a spirit hath flesh and bones, notwithstanding you have just been telling us that I believe God to be a gust of wind. On p. 162, after quoting John 4: 24, you say I must acknowledge God to be a spirit "or adopt the monstrous conclusion that God possesses an organized body." It is difficult to tell what you are fighting with, for I have always believed "God is a spirit and they who worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth." But I wish to know what all this has to do with proving that men have *immortal souls*, which go to hell at death and may be preached to after it. And, Sir, if your quotation from Luke is good for any thing, it proves that some of your *immortal souls* visit this world after death, and may be seen with mortal eyes. Do they come from hell to be preached to here? and I ask, do you believe in ghosts? If you do, why are you ashamed to avow your belief? If you do not, what is this text to your purpose? I wish you would either swallow the whole dose of heathen opinions, such as ghosts, witchcraft,

a personal devil, demons, &c. or rid yourself of what you have already received.

5th. On p. 163, you state it as a difficulty to my views that *pneuma*, spirit, is made to signify—"the spirit of God, verse 18; but in verse 19, "men in the flesh." But this comes with an ill grace from you, for you tell us in another place that the term *dead* has two different senses in the words—"let the dead bury their dead." No man, Sir, would ever state this as a difficulty who has attended to what I have said in my Essays on the terms *ruah* and *pneuma*. The Scripture usage of these words abundantly shows that they are applied not only to God and to men in the flesh, but in various other ways. It is you, Sir, who does "violence to Peter's language;" for I defy you or any man to produce a single instance where *ruah*, *pneuma*, *nephish*, or *psuhe*, rendered *soul* and *spirit*, are used to designate a *disembodied soul or spirit*.—But you do such violence to Peter's language that you make him say, "spirits," in verse 19, not only means *disembodied immortal souls*, but that those souls were in hell, and preached to there by the *disembodied immortal soul of Jesus Christ*. But such a view of the text is at open war with the whole Scripture usage of *soul* and *spirit*, yea, the whole Bible.

6th. On p. 164, you give us the whole meaning of the passage thus. "Christ, after his crucifixion, went and preached to the spirits of those who were drowned in the flood. This is the plain sentiment of the passage; and the language will not consistently bear any other interpretation." Our readers can now judge if it is not susceptible of a much more rational and Scriptural interpretation. But on your view of it, I have a few questions to ask, which I should like to see answered. 1st. Why should Christ confine his preaching in hell exclusively to those "*drowned in the flood?*" It is not easily perceived

what particular claim they had on his compassion and labors, more than others who went to hell before or after the flood. 2d. But how did Christ manage in hell only to preach to those drowned in the flood? Were all the souls of the antediluvians confined in one *cell* in this "*infernal prison*," so that he could visit it and be out of the hearing of all the rest? Or did he distinguish between them and all others in his preaching, saying it was only to them and no others he proclaimed the glad tidings there. According to your account Christ's commission was "*go only to the lost sheep who perished in the flood.*" 3d. Must not Christ's preaching in hell have done a great deal of mischief? That it did no good is certain. You do not venture to assert it did any good, and the guilt and misery of the souls of the antediluvians must have been greatly increased by the rejection of his message. It must have made them two-fold more the children of hell than they were before, if it did not put the seal on their endless condemnation. And I appeal to yourself, if all the other damned souls there would not be led to "*consideration and reflection*," that their reformation and release were hopeless. Christ had come to hell, preached to others without any good effect, nor had he deigned to speak a word of comfort to them, or shed one ray of hope that he would ever visit the place again on the same business. You say people in hell are very much given to "consideration and reflection." But what must have been their reflections on seeing him depart and the doors of their "*infernal prison*" closed after him without a single convert made and released, or even a promise given of another visit? I suspect, Sir, had you been there it would have led you to "*consideration and reflection*" that your system is all an idle dream. By your own account hell is bad missionary ground. He who spoke as never man spoke fail-

ed of success there, and who will succeed after him? Your process of reformation, by your own showing, is attended with no success, for the souls of those who perished in the flood were still in hell when you wrote your Letters. Nor do you in your present book communicate any pleasing intelligence from hell that a revival of religion or any reformation has taken place there since. If you could give us any *certain* account of the success of the gospel there, or even your process of reformation, this would do more to make converts to your opinions than all you can say on the subject. But alas! You tell us, men are to be raised just as they died, which shows the strength of your faith in the success of your means to reform the damned in *hades*, in the intermediate state. 4th. Was it from your noticing that this text failed in proving that souls in hell were converted by Christ's preaching, you was led to invent "*consideration and reflection*" as the means of reforming them? But does not all this show your want of "*consideration and reflection?*" The people's souls who perished in the flood, had *considered* and *reflected* to no purpose for two thousand years, for when Christ went and preached to them in hell, not one of them would allow him to change their minds or their miserable condition. And if you state their case fairly, they will all come out of hell just as they went there, in the resurrection at the last day. Reformation there, Sir, is as slow as the growth of a stone. It is so slow, that I suspect you must either give up your present system, or believe in endless misery. The last I think the most rational and consistent system. 5th. But was it strictly just in God to send the souls of those who perished in the flood to hell? We seriously doubt this, for you tell us he did not reveal even a future state in Moses' law, or that its penalties extended into a future state. It does not look very

much like justice to send people to a hell, concerning which he had said nothing to them in his word. Say, Sir, is this like the justice of the just God?

7th. You say again, p. 165, in answer to an objection of mine. "Luke says no more of Christ's preaching through Noah, than of his preaching to disembodied spirits. But Mr. B. cannot be so ignorant as to suppose that nothing is taught in the New Testament but what is found in the gospel of Luke." Answer. I am so well informed on this subject as to know that no Scripture writer speaks of *immortal souls, disembodied spirits, future retribution* or of *Christ's preaching to souls in hell.* The text before us is the *solitary* text on which you predicate Christ's preaching there and our readers can now judge if it supports it. You indeed refer to 1 Peter, 4: 6, in confirmation of your opinions, but I quoted Whitby before to show it meant a different thing, and to Whitby and Macknight I refer you for a correction of your mistake.

In concluding my remarks on this division of your book it may be observed, that as you have two hells, you have also two "*future retributions.*" Your three first texts are adduced to prove a retribution for both soul and body after the resurrection in *gehenna*, and your two last, a retribution in *hades*, from death until the resurrection. For the sake of *disorder*, you have put the last first and the first last. Your first *hell*, *hades*, is to be destroyed, which perhaps requires a second to be provided. You tell us it is "*somewhere*," but you do not risk a conjecture that *gehenna* is *any where*, nor does the Bible speak of its destruction.—In your first hell damned spirits have been preached to by Christ, but without success, and that doubly immortal sinners shall ever be reformed in your second, appears to me extremely doubtful.

# LETTER VIII.

Sir,

The eighth and last division of your book is called "*objections, moral influence, and concluding remarks.*" I adopt your division, and begin 1st. *with objections.* These are not stating objections against my views, but an attempt to remove the objections I brought against yours. But I am surprised you troubled yourself with them, if the following tale some twenty times told in your book be true. You commence by saying—"having shown that Mr. B's system is absurd and contradictory, and his principal rules of interpretation deceptive; having shown that his whole system is without foundation, and that a future retribution is taught in the Scriptures, we might here close the discussion." The *court*, Sir, can now judge having heard the evidence on both sides. Let us see how you meet my "*objections.*"

The first is stated, p. 171, that I "place great stress upon the fact that men in a future state will be immortal." You add, that I "durst not hazard the assertion that immortality excludes all suffering." But who is obliged to hazard assertions in opposition to all your assumptions? If you assert *immortality* is to suffer, produce your proof of it, for who cares for your *assertions* or *may be* evidence on such a subject? Is it any proof, Sir, that though "an immortal being suffers he will not decay and finally perish," because "immortality consists in being constantly upheld by the deity?" This logic proves that mortality will not "decay and perish, for it consists in being upheld by the deity." And what kind of logic is it to *assume* that man "possesses an immortal soul in

this state and suffers misery here," and from this *assumption* conclude that an immortal being may suffer in the resurrection state? Your premises are assumed, and your conclusion does not follow. You ought to be ashamed to assert that immortality is to suffer, without producing proof of it from the Bible. And pray, Sir, tell us why such *immortal beings* will not sin as well as suffer; yea, why the immortal God may not sin and suffer, if your doctrine be true.—But you say, p. 171, 172—"I will state that the English word *immortality* simply denotes *endless life* and has not the least relation to virtue or vice, happiness or misery. The same is true of the Greek word *athanasia* or *athanatos*, which Parkhurst derives from *a not*, or *without*, and *thanatos*, *death*; so the word literally signifies *without death*." You add, "the term has no relation to character or condition. An immortal being may be either happy or miserable, virtuous or vicious. And as I said in my Letters, we cannot prove that God is good or happy, simply from the fact that he is immortal." Well, Sir, produce proof that the Bible speaks of *immortal, vicious, miserable sinners*. Such sinners, we should think, were just fitted to be sinners and sufferers forever. What is to prevent this? and I pray you inform us, how you are to change these *immortal, vicious, miserable sinners*, into *immortal, holy and happy saints in the resurrection state*. Death cannot effect any change in them, for they are now *immortal* or *without death*. That they shall ever ripen of their own accord, by "*consideration and reflection*" into such saints in hell, is to me of all absurdities the greatest absurdity. I wish, Sir, you had remembered your own words which I return you with a slight alteration. "For frail imperfect beings as we are—beings who cannot 'describe or fix one movement of our minds, or explain our own beginning or end,' to say that God shall punish an *im-*

*mortal being of his own forming in a future state*, and *still continue him in existence*, betrays a stupid kind of impiety."

2d. You say p. 174—"there are several passages of Scripture which relate to the subject of the resurrection, in which Mr. B. places great reliance. But as these passages were considered in my Letters, p. 240—276, I shall be very brief here." These texts were considered in my Essays, and also again considered in preceding Letters, so that here I am saved all trouble of a reply. But after merely alluding to Acts 24: 15. Luke 14: 14. John 5: 28, 29, you draw this conclusion—"these passages teach us that some will be punished after the resurrection." The last of these texts is the only one on which such an opinion can be founded, and let our readers judge from what has been advanced on it above, if you are not mistaken in your views of it. In p. 174, 175, you recur again to different orders being raised in the resurrection, and I beg the reader's notice how you draw conclusions from 1 Cor. 15: 22, 23. You say—"having stated that all men shall be raised by Christ, he (Paul) adds, verse 23, 'but every man in his own order.' This shows that all are not to be raised in the same happy condition. For if all are raised happy at the same time, it would entirely destroy the order of which Paul speaks." What order, Sir, would it destroy? Not a syllable does Paul say of your order of bad men in these verses, or throughout the chapter. Admit for argument's sake a million of orders, what in the words "but every man in his own order" shows you "that these orders are not to be raised in the same happy condition?" And admit a million of years should elapse between the resurrection of each of these orders, what in these words or the whole chapter intimates some of them are to be raised happy and others miserable? But in support of your

theory, or rather Dr. Chauncy's, you say, "further, the word rendered *order* in this passage is *tagma*, which Parkhurst renders band; 'every man in his proper band.' He defines *tagma* a *band*, *cohort*, *legion*. Now it would be absurd to say of Christ, who was raised alone, that he was raised in his own band or legion." Here, Sir, I might cry as you did above, "*garbled quotations to impose on the unlearned reader*," for Parkhurst also defines it, "*an order*," and says *tagma* comes from "*tato*, *to order*." And Ewing defines it "*an order*, *regular method*, a *band*, *cohort*, *legion*." By your own admission in another place, "*an order*" or "*regular method*" being its first and primary sense, it should be so understood here. Well, is not Christ the first in *order* or *regular method*, who rose from the dead to die no more? But you say "this is a mistake." I err then with the inspired writers, who declare Christ is the first begotten from the dead, the first fruits of the resurrection. According to your system, Christ was not the first fruits of the resurrection, for you say Paul was not speaking upon the resurrection of Christ, verses 22, 23, but upon the resurrection of mankind. And yet in the last of these verses, Paul says, "but every man in his own order, Christ the first fruits." The first fruits of what? Surely, Sir, of the resurrection.

From p. 178—183, you advert to what I stated against your reasoning on the principle of analogy between this state and the future. In reply to what you say, I ask can you adduce a single example that the Scripture writers reasoned on the principle of analogy between this state and the future? No, Sir; and for a good reason, because no such examples are to be found. Why then do you do it? 2d. What has Paul's personal identity, or, that the present and future life are enjoyed by the same individual, to do in proving the point in question? p. 179. And if

there are gratitude, knowledge, and virtuous affections in both states, something analogous between them, how does this warrant you to adopt the principle of analogy, p. 179, 180? But you say "every rule which has any exceptions must be restrained by reason and the nature of the case, and analogy can be thus retrained as well as other rules." But about this, every man, as when there was no king in Israel, may do that which is right in his own eyes, and, reasoning on your principle of analogy, the resurrection state is made pretty much the same as the present. Inspired example, Sir, would be a safe rule in this case, but this is not to be found. On p. 182, you ask in reference to the Sadducees, "concerning what, did they err? And in relation to what, did they misunderstand the Scriptures? Not the doctrine of analogy, for this is not mentioned in the passage or its connection; no they erred and misunderstood the Scriptures relative to the *resurrection*—the very thing which they had introduced, and on which Christ was speaking." Will you deny, Sir, that the Sadducees reasoned on the principle of analogy betwixt this state and the future, respecting the woman who had seven husbands? And who can have the face to deny, that in consequence of their reasoning on this principle, our Lord told them they erred not knowing the Scriptures or the power of God? They neglected the Scriptures, reasoned on this principle, and our Lord corrected their error by showing them there was no such analogy between the two states as they supposed.

From p. 183—198, you proceed to what I said in my First and Second Inquiries and Essays, showing that the immortality of the soul, and your future retribution, are doctrines of heathen origin. You say "this is no new method of destroying Christian doctrines. Volney and other infidels have long attempted this." You then seem to think that I must be

classed with infidels, because I attack your corruptions of Christianity! I have no idea, Sir, that men will be converted from infidelity by retaining these corruptions, for it is against these the attacks of infidels have long been directed. And can you aver that in ages past, what was called *Christianity*, was much better than "*revised paganism?*" Men, Sir, were justified in becoming infidels, if this was indeed Christianity. It is your system which has made men infidels, a system which originated in heathenism, was imbibed by the Jews, and was finally incorporated with Christianity. Some evidence I have given of this in former publications, and I shall afford you more in succeeding letters. I take Volney for my model, as you assert! Did Volney ever write an essay in defence of the resurrection of Christ? Did he ever show that the future hope of man rests on this one fact? But you highly approve of my Essay on this subject, and yet frighten your readers at me, that I take Volney for my model. It is a pity, Sir, when argument fails, that you should have recourse to this mode of warfare. I forgive you Sir, for I believe you neither understand my sentiments, or know my feelings on this subject.

You say p. 184, "we admit that the heathen and the Jews believed in a future retribution, and in the immortality of the soul. This, instead of opposing, goes to establish our views, as will be seen below." How? You say, 1st. Had such opinions been "erroneous they would have been condemned by Christ and his apostles." It has been shown above they did condemn them. 2d. You say, p. 185, 186, "the gospel was propagated amongst sharp-sighted enemies, who attacked with violence every doctrine which did not agree with their peculiar opinions.—Now if Christ had taught the mortality of the soul, and that all retribution is confined to this life, these

doctrines would have excited the prejudices of both Jews and Gentiles; they would have been clamorous against these new doctrines." They were precisely, Sir, what you say, for they counted the apostles' doctrine both *new* and *strange*. Did not the Athenians say to Paul, Acts 17: 19, 20—"may we know what this *new doctrine*, whereof thou speakest is? for thou bringest certain *strange things* to our ears: we would know therefore what these things mean." These *new* and *strange* doctrines, could not be the immortality of the soul and your future retribution, for you contend with these they were perfectly familiar. The context shows, these doctrines were the resurrection of Jesus from the dead, and the hope of future life to man by a resurrection from the dead. Will you risk your reputation, by declaring in plain language that any sacred writer ever preached the hope of future life to man in any other way, but by a resurrection from the dead? Show us the text which says they ever preached this life founded on the immortality of men's souls? Paul declared the hope the heathen had founded on this was *no hope*, Eph. 2: 12. But how could Paul say the hope they had founded on the soul's immortality was no hope, if he believed this a Scriptural doctrine?

You say—"a future retribution and the immortality of the soul was the prevailing belief in the days of Christ." Well, how came they by their belief? You say "if we inquire into the *origin* of those opinions, the argument will receive the highest confirmation." What then was this origin? You very justly say "this belief must have had some origin," p. 186. And you add "now the question before us is, from whence did these opinions arise?" On p. 187, 188 you advocate "that the Gentiles borrowed these opinions from the Jews." But have you really forgot that you told us, p. 70, that Moses' law did not

teach a future retribution nor even a future existence? Besides, Dr. Campbell, in his 6th Dissertation, and many other writers I might name, show, that the Jews imbibed their views of the state of souls after death from their intercourse with the heathen. In this, you not only contradict yourself, but the statements of these writers. But you put the question thus, p. 188: "The question then is, from whence did the Jews and Gentiles derive those opinions?" You add "we contend that a future life, in any form, can be learned only from divine revelation." Accordingly on p. 189, you come to the final conclusion—"we appear then to be driven to the necessity of admitting that these opinions must have arisen from divine revelation. This principle Mr. B. admits relative to the *resurrection*, and labors to show that the resurrection is taught in the Old Testament;" see p. 93. 313. Yes Sir; I contend that the resurrection is taught in the Old Testament, although I have never girded myself to the task of proving it. It pains me to see you spend from p. 189—192, in attempting to prove that the doctrine of the resurrection is *not* taught in the Old Testament; and at the expense of contradicting yourself, and telling us the Sadducees, Luke 22, were right, and our Saviour in the wrong in blaming them for not learning the doctrine of the resurrection from Exod. 3: 6. You deny that the Old Testament teaches this doctrine, and with the same breath say—"we admit that this passage contains a principle which involves a future life." But to confirm your statements, that the Old Testament does not teach the doctrine of the resurrection, you add, p. 192—"this is confirmed by the apostle, who declares that life and *immortality* are brought to light by the gospel." But if it was, it must have been brought to light to Abraham at least, for Paul, Gal. 3: 8, declares the gospel was preached

to Abraham. And the same apostle says, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, "all died in faith, not having received the promises, but having seen them afar off, and were persuaded of them and embraced them, and confessed that they were strangers and pilgrims on the earth." See Heb. 11, particularly verses 13—17. Such, Sir, are the views of the man whom you are pleased to tell your readers takes Volney for his model, and in opposition to Mr. Hudson, who labors to prove the Old Testament does not teach the doctrine of the resurrection; but that it, and the doctrines of the immortality of the soul and a future retribution originated in revelations which are lost, yet were doctrines not inserted in the law of Moses. No infidel by his writings, ever did the cause of Christianity so much harm as you do it by advocating such unscriptural opinions.

The reader will very naturally ask, what can be Mr. Hudson's object, in advocating that the Old Testament does not teach the doctrine of the resurrection? He discloses this by saying, p. 192—"we are therefore driven to the conclusion that this doctrine must have arisen from early revelations which are not handed down to us. And if this is true of the resurrection, it may be true of a future retribution and the soul's immortality." The soul's immortality and a future retribution he could not find in the Old Testament, but declared that the Scriptures were addressed to such as believed these doctrines; but being unwilling to abandon them, he classes the doctrine of the resurrection with them, and ascribes their origin to lost revelations. By this manœuvre he thinks to involve me in the same difficulty with himself. But infidel as Mr. Hudson wishes his readers to believe me, I challenge him to come forward and defend the position that the doctrine of the resurrection is not taught in the Old Testament. The hints

I have dropped showing that it is, are sufficient for my present purpose, and if admitted correct, his system falls to the ground by his own argument.

Aware, Sir, that by taking this ground there was danger of receiving heathen notions for revelations, you give us the following rule for our preservation. You say, p. 194, "I will lay down this as a rule by which to be governed in this case. When we find any effects which can be traced to no other causes, we may with safety ascribe them to this. Now in the case before us, we find a future retribution and the immortality of the soul believed by both Jews and Gentiles, and this belief can be traced to no other cause, and hence we may with safety ascribe it to this." In future Letters we shall see, that these doctrines, believed by both Jews and Gentiles, can be traced to *another cause* than lost revelations; and hence are freed from puzzling ourselves with your rule to guide us in the right way. But you say, p. 195, 196, that these doctrines came "no doubt from Noah, from whom they were handed down by tradition." But how came you to know this? And if Moses and the prophets believed these doctrines as you assert, why did they omit handing them down in their writings, for you confess they did not teach them?

In p. 197, 198, you notice some of my arguments in opposition to your reasonings on this subject.—You say "he tells us, if we conclude a future punishment true, because the Jews and Gentiles believed it, and Christ spoke in accordance with that belief, then we must admit endless punishment; for both Jews and Gentiles believed in that." You add "two remarks will show that this is not to his purpose. 1st. Mr. B. will not pretend that Christ spoke in accordance with the doctrine of endless misery, and so by his own confession the cases are not parallel."

Sir, I stated this argument as one you had to t from our orthodox friends. You will no doubt I can meet it, by showing that the term ever- ng in the Old Testament expresses limited dura- . Granted, Sir; and I recur to the Old Testa- t and show by your own confession that the im- tality of the soul and a future retribution are not ht there. What could you say, Sir, should our odox brethren tell you "the sense we put on the l everlasting is derived from early revelations ch are now lost, and the Scriptures were ad- sed to such as believed it meant endless dura- when applied to the punishment of the wicked?" you say, 2d: He happens also to be mistaken in esenting that the Jews and Gentiles generally be- ed in endless misery." In proof of this you refer several pages in Dr. Enfield's History of Philos- y; but as we shall see afterwards what he says it this, I pass it here. You add "even Mr. B. furnished us with evidence that the heathen did believe in endless misery. Virgil speaks of men's s being purified by fire, and Pythagoras held that souls of the unhappy would finally be relieved n punishment." But, Sir, there was as much dif- nce of opinion about this among the heathen as e is among you and our orthodox brethren, and do not distinguish between individual and pub- pinion on this subject. 1st. That the Jews in Lord's day believed in endless punishment you see by consulting Dr. Whitby on Rom. 2, and ed in my First Inquiry. The Jews believed the Gentiles would never be saved, but were all el for hell fire, yet believed that no Jew could st. 2d. That the Gentiles believed in endless shment is I think pretty evident from the 6th of Virgil's Æneid. In a note, on line 553, the slator says, "*vis ut nulla*, &c. By this Virgil in-

timates that the pains of tartarus were everlasting, and that neither gods nor men could release the prisoners who were once condemned to that place of torment. This is exactly conformable to Plato's doctrine." If it was exactly conformable to Plato's doctrine, that the pains of tartarus were everlasting, how can you deny that this was a very general opinion among the heathen? For his doctrines were very prevalent. That Plato's doctrines have been incorporated with Christianity who disputes? That they were, I shall show in a subsequent letter. But, Sir, the same translator, in a note on line 739, says further respecting the future punishment of the wicked as believed among the heathen. "If their defilements were slight and superficial, they were bleached away in the wind, or washed out in the water; those of a deeper dye were burnt out with fire." Are you not then mistaken? But permit me to ask, were not these means of purification after death among the heathen, as likely to reform souls as your "*consideration and reflection?*" Were they not as Scriptural as yours? And I may add, were they not as efficacious, for you have told us souls come out of your first hell, *hades*, just as they go into it?

On p. 198, in reference to another objection of mine, you say, "he tells us again on the same page, that in this manner we should prove that Beelzebub was the prince of demons, and that mammon was a god; the doctrine of witchcraft, &c." I find you cannot answer this objection; but in the very attempt you make, you again refute your own views of the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, as a slight alteration to suit the case will show. "He (Christ) never spoke upon *hades* as a place of punishment but once, and then he did not speak of it for his own sake, but to show the Jews the greatness of their unbelief." If Christ never spoke of Beelzebub but once, and

hat not for his own sake but for the sake of others, hy should not this be also said in regard to *hades* as place of punishment? But in spite of all I can say, ou are determined to assume the question in debate, or you here assert—"Christ spoke frequently on he subject of a future retribution, and introduced it or its own sake." But this is just assuming the question at issue, and if assertions are proof, you have roved your subject perhaps a hundred times since ou began your book.

On p. 198, you say—"as the residue of this reply vill be of a miscellaneous nature, I will notice Mr. 3's attempt to make my views appear contradictory nd absurd." On p. 199, 200, you labor hard to how, that I misrepresented you in my Essays; that ccording to your system no punishment is to be inlicted in hell by the immediate hand of God, but is to onsist in anxiety, guilt and remorse; that the more ardened a sinner was when he went to hell the less nisery he would feel; and that the mere tyro in rime would be the most miserable there. But you ay—"1st. It is a misrepresentation of my sentiment. stated that in a future state men would have a full iew of their characters and conduct, and have a nore lively sense of their guilt on the one hand, and heir obligation to God on the other. This I attempted to prove by several passages of Scripture."—Where pray have you stated all this? Where have ou "attempted to prove" all this "by several passages of Scripture?" Not in your Letters, Sir, for here, on p. 164, you expressly say "as to the mode nd manner of this judgment, God has not seen fit to nform us." And yet in the very next sentence you dd, "I think however we may rationally conclude hat the misery which the sinner will be called to experience at that time, will not be inflicted by the immediate hand of God; but that the misery will arise

from the sinner's own feelings." And to this you immediately add the very sentence you quote to prove that I misrepresented you. "If all his iniquity is brought to light, and even the motives of his heart are displayed before him, the obstinate sinner must be unhappy." So you attempted to prove by several passages of Scripture what you tell us "God has not seen fit to inform us." Yet with the same breath proceed to inform us all about it! The more, Sir, you struggle to get out of your contradictions, the more deeply you involve yourself in them. But I have a few questions to ask relative to your statements as they now stand. 1st. Where did you get your passages of Scripture, to prove that which God has not seen fit to inform us about? It must have been from your lost revelations. If it was not, from what source did you derive all your information about the nature of your punishment in hell? It was, Sir, from your own *think*, for you say, as quoted above, "*I think*, however, we may rationally conclude," &c. Thus you can *think*, and even "*rationally conclude*" about that which in the very sentence preceding you declare "God has not seen fit to inform us." 2d. I ask, how is "the obstinate sinner," the "old veteran in sin" in a future state to "have a full view of his character and conduct, a more lively sense of his guilt on the one hand and his obligation to God on the other?" How is "all his iniquity brought to light, and even the motives of his heart displayed before him to make him unhappy?" Do tell us who or what is to produce all this in hell? How came you by all this wonderful information? Neither your *think*, nor the Spartan *if* can avail, after confessing "God has not seen fit to inform us" on the subject. I repeat the question, who or what is to produce all this on your "obstinate sinner" in hell? You say, "the misery will arise from the sinner's own feel-

ings," and is not to be inflicted "by the immediate hand of God, or any other intelligent agent appointed by God." I have no doubt, Sir, but you may *think* all this, and the only reason you give for your thinking so is the following. You say "2d. It appears from the very nature of the case, that an old hardened sinner in a future state will have a more lively sense of his guilt," p. 200. You then by way of illustration refer us to the duelist, and say—"thus being left to himself, he will, from the very nature of the case, feel more compunction of conscience in a future state, than he felt in this." Why? You add, because there—"he will have no multitudes to toast, feast, and reward him. He will have no more opportunity to wield his instruments of death to avenge the wrongs which he himself has committed." But this is nothing more than your own *think*, and even after telling us—"God has not seen fit to inform us" on the subject. Why could you not have said—"*I think*, however, we may *rationally conclude* that the wicked in a future state must have some way of hardening their souls, for the hardened souls who went there at the flood, were the same hardened souls when I write my Letters. Christ even went to hell and preached to them, but left them as he found them seemingly incurable sinners."

On p. 200—202, you refer to my writings and say that I "*pride myself*" in being free from "the bias of education." But please quote where I have done this, for it is written, "thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor." I perfectly agree with you, that "abiding too closely by established opinions, and affecting to be wise above all others," are "propensities in men which serve to lead them astray." But by your own showing, I have taken the safest way to avoid both these evils, for you said, p. 84—"his statement of all questions is, 'what saith

the Scriptures?" When you point me to a better mode of avoiding these evils, I will adopt it. But you go on, not now to cast a *single sentence* of reflection in my face about my changes of opinion, but a couple of pages, 201, 202. My changes of opinion have been so many, that my *wisdom*, *stability*, and *sincerity* are called in question. It is not your fault, Sir, if any one henceforth thinks I possess a particle of any of these qualities. But here, as on most occasions, your *caricaturing* is over done. You approve even of my conduct in changing my opinions. You say—"it is wise in a man to change his opinions if he is fully convinced that they are false; but it is no mark of wisdom in a man to change his opinions frequently." I am then a wise man to change my opinions, if convinced they are false. If I have changed my opinions frequently, the reason must have been, that I unfortunately was not so wise as you, to perceive at *one glance* what were true and false opinions. Bless the Lord, Sir, for giving you such superior powers of understanding and discrimination, and pity me for my weakness. But you may by this time regret you touched on this topic, from what I stated in a former Letter as to my changes of opinion. Spare your own brethren.

On p. 202, 203, you labor to make your readers believe, that it was *me* not *you* who provoked this controversy by the publication of my First Inquiry.—But was you named in it? No. Was your sentiments alluded to, quoted, or was you in any way or manner brought into it? No. So far from this, knowing there was a difference of opinion among Universalists, I studiously avoided making the least allusion to it, but simply published the result of my own investigations. The following figure used by you shows that your statement of this is false. You say "if a villain should erect a target behind me, and

with deliberate aim, should discharge his musket at me, I should not regard it as a sufficient apology in him to say that he was firing at the target behind me, and that he should not have wounded me had I not been in his way." But, Sir, name the page on which I aimed at you or your system in my First Inquiry. I defy you to produce this. To avoid a controversy then with you, I must choose one of the two things, either not to fire at all, or in plain language not publish my book. Or, I must so charge my musket, or alter the matter of my book, that it shall do no harm to your system. But is not this, Sir, a hard case; a thing you never would submit to yourself? But it at last leaks out that my fire has *wounded* you. In the Christian Repository, you recollect a very different flag was hoisted, and surely you cannot have forgotten what you said about my First Inquiry in your Letters, p. 164—173. You say "*it seems to have been written without any definite object.*" See much more to the same purpose. But now we are told I took "*deliberate aim,*" and discharged my musket at you," yea, you confess you are "wounded." I offer all the apologies in the world to you and solemnly assure my readers that if I have wounded you, it was purely accidental. If you was standing before my target when I fired, I did not perceive you, and certainly did not take deliberate aim at you or any man. My target was the doctrine of *endless misery*, and if your system was identified with it, I was not careful to look out for its safety. But if your statements in your present book may be credited, your wound is not mortal. Mortal did I say, in fact you wish your readers to believe you are not wounded at all, but on the contrary that you have killed me and my system dead on the spot. It was only an accidental slip in the above sentence to confess you was wounded. After I had fired, or had published my First In-

quiry, I soon found you or some one else was wounded, for the fire was returned in the Christian Repository. My book received its *first* attack from professed *Universalists*, in that publication, which opened my eyes as to future prospects from such brethren. I have been their target to fire at ever since. I forgive them, for I am conscious I never intended to injure them.

On p. 202, 203, you express your displeasure at a practice becoming quite fashionable, viz. "faulting our present translation, and dabbling with the original." But you wish to be in the *fashion*, for you have dabbled with it in your present book, but rather to your disadvantage. Had you found the original aided your cause, perhaps you would have dabbled more with it. But complaints are heard every day of a similar nature from the orthodox against the Unitarians, and yet they dabble with the original whenever they find it aids their cause.

Accept my thanks, Sir, for your approbation of that part of my book which relates to the resurrection. But if you approve of it, I do not very well understand how you can retain some of your opinions. And how you approve of it, yet called me "*a sceptic and not a Christian*," p. 84, is not very easily reconciled but by admitting that my *wisdom*, *stability* and *sincerity* are questionable. Well, I commit myself to him who judgeth righteously, and leave you and all others to say, or insinuate just what they please about me. I carried "to the subject of Christ's resurrection" the same rules of interpretation as on other subjects, and if Dunlavy has proved what you say he has, my advice is, that you believe it and become a quaker, which will at least be one change of opinion in the course of your lifetime. We have read Dunlavy, and if you are satisfied with his evidence, it accounts for your confidence in many of

your present opinions. Very good reasons can be assigned why I did not make criticisms on the original in treating on Christ's resurrection. The passages did not appear to me requiring any. Our translators were not under any bias respecting the texts which treat of the resurrection, but that they were on the texts in dispute, and many others, I presume you will not deny.

2d. *Moral influence.* This you discuss, p. 205—208. You begin by saying—"what remains to be noticed is the moral tendency of the two systems. But as this subject was considered at considerable length in my Letters, I shall refer the reader to what was there offered. See p. 285—304." Well as this subject was replied to at considerable length in my Essays, I shall refer the reader to what was there offered. But you immediately add—"in its moral tendency, Mr. B's system is no different from the one examined in my Letters; and what was there said will apply to the system before us. If there is no motive to serve God but what is drawn from the retributions of this world, then Christianity in its moral influence is no different from atheism." Mark this, reader, and then look at the following, from p. 70 of Mr. Hudson's Letters. "The law of Moses did not even teach a future state of existence, and it would be downright contradiction to admit that the law was enforced by penalties extending into a future state, when the law did not reveal such a state." By Mr. Hudson's own positive statements, Moses' law "in its moral influence is no different from atheism."—Bad then as you view my system, it is better than the *atheistical* system of Judaism, for it holds up "the prospect of future happiness" to "stimulate men to virtue." Neither future rewards or punishments in Moses' law could influence the Jews to a moral life,

by your own statements. It is too bad, Sir, to tell us Moses' law "*is no different from atheism.*"

On p. 206, 207, you proceed to repel what I said against the moral tendency of your future retribution; that, "the heathen believed in a future retribution, and still were very corrupt." You say, 1st. "The Jews and the heathen might be vicious from the influence of some other principle than that of a future retribution." Vicious, Sir, from the *influence* of a future retribution! I never supposed that this influenced them to be vicious. What I urged was, and what you have got still to account for is, why a future retribution did not *restrain them* from their vicious habits, seeing you advocate its wonderful moral tendency on mankind. You look on it as the grand specific to cure the vice of a wicked world. I never advocated as you state, the "*mortality of the soul,*" and if I had, I never asserted what you did concerning your future retribution, its wonderful moral tendency on the world. All I did say, was to check your invidious boasting about the superior moral tendency of your system.

2d. You say "it is unjust to compare the morals of men in the dark ages of the world with men in enlightened times, or men in pagan nations with those who live in civilized countries under the light of science and the gospel." After going on to illustrate this, you add, "if Mr. B. wishes to make the comparison, let him compare those in the same age with each other." Agreed. But you are careful not to enter into this comparison between the morality of those in any age who did, and those who did not, believe in your future retribution. No, Sir, in your present book you make no invidious comparisons between the morals of believers in your limited future punishment and those whose "system is only a negation and their faith disbelief; a creed which would

better become a sceptic than a professed Christian." Either the morals of we "*sceptics and not Christians*" are turning better, or yours have become worse since you wrote your Letters.

3d. *Concluding remarks.* Your concluding remarks are brief. I shall simply go over what you have said, and wherein I differ from you, will be easily perceived by comparing your two last paragraphs with what I say. As I am about drawing my *direct remarks* on Mr. Hudson's book to a close, I request our readers to examine with care and attention the passages of Scripture in debate between us. Let them remember that the question is not what these texts have been made to mean in ages past, but what did the Scripture writers mean to convey by them? What would they naturally teach to those who believed the only hope of future life to man was by a resurrection from the dead? In order to judge correctly in this case, let them weigh all the arguments, and determine from all the texts brought forward, and take into view the rise and progress of Mr. Hudson's opinions detailed in succeeding Letters. If in examining this subject any reader should find his own heart and feelings remonstrate against the doctrine I have advanced, he ought to consider, that this is just what might be expected admitting it true, for the writer felt what many of his readers must also feel, all his prejudices and previous teaching opposed to it. When Paul taught and reasoned on the hope of future life by a resurrection from the dead, the Athenians mocked at it. For this hope he was bound with a chain, and for it he at last suffered death. No wonder then that a doctrine so opposed to heathen opinions, which were early incorporated with Christianity, and still are popular in the nineteenth century, should be opposed by Mr. Hudson and many well meaning people.

I will simply say, in conclusion, that I shall not imitate Mr. Hudson, for I do challenge a confutation of my opinions. Though I have no disposition to continue this controversy, unless it can be made profitable to the reader, I must say it ought to be continued, for all that is valuable to man in religion is involved in it. And so far from being convinced of the incorrectness of my views, I can say the more I examine the subject the more I am convinced of their truth. The subject is now submitted to the candor and judgment of an impartial public, believing that by reading, as well as by many running to and fro, knowledge will increase and truth prevail.

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# LETTER IX.

SIR,

I HAVE now finished my examination of your book. In addition to what is advanced in the preceding pages against your doctrines and in favor of my own opinions, a few more letters must be added to the present discussion. In this letter I shall examine the question—*was Adam created an immortal being?* Let us

1st. Notice some popular opinions concerning Adam's original condition. And 1st. It has been generally believed that Adam was created a *perfect being*. The Bible says—"God made man *upright*," but there is an essential difference between *uprightness* and *perfection*, as could be easily shown. Adam was created *upright*, or *innocent*, but he was not created so perfect but that he might sin as the event showed.

If he was capable of choosing good, he was also liable to be tempted to evil. Though he was not created a sinner, he was created so imperfect that he might become one. Had not this been the case he never would have sinned.

2d. It has also been generally believed, it was God's design in creating Adam, that he and all his posterity should continue forever upright, sinless creatures. But the event showed this could not be God's design, for if it was, he was frustrated in it. It would also follow that all God has done, or promises to do for man by Jesus Christ, was an after thought, an expedient resorted to, having been disappointed in his original design. Man never was designed to continue innocent or to spend his life in paradise. His expulsion from it was in perfect agreement with what God said to him at his creation. He was to multiply and replenish the earth, and subdue it. He was to have dominion over this lower creation. He was to till the ground, and by its produce was he to be supported. But all this could not be done in the garden.

3d. It has also been generally believed that had Adam continued innocent, after a long life of happiness in Eden, God would have translated him to an endless life in heaven. The Bible affords no evidence of this. Adam had no promise of life beyond the life he enjoyed. Besides, life and immortality are brought to light only in the gospel. As Adam had no need of a Saviour before he sinned, so he had no need for a revelation about salvation in his innocent condition.

4th. It has also been generally believed Adam's original condition was a very happy one. Hence many have deplored the wretched condition into which Adam has brought his posterity. Adam's fall has been a subject of long and loud lamentation, and

the human race have lost a great deal by it. But certainly this is a great mistake, for no sacred writer deplores the fall of Adam as a ruinous event to our race. So far from this, Adam was a figure of Christ, Rom. 5: 12—21, and the benefits by the second Adam, far exceed the loss by the first. Adam's original state, his fall and its consequences, have only been introductory to a greater display of the divine character, and of greater good to man by Jesus Christ.

5th. It has been very generally believed that Adam was created with an immortal soul and if he had not sinned he never would have died. This seems to be your belief, for your whole system is predicated on it. But against this view of the subject I have several things to offer. Had Adam been created immortal how could he die, for can that which is immortal die? We read of this mortal putting on immortality, but what sacred writer speaks of this immortal putting on mortality? You said, p. 172, "immortality simply denotes *endless life*." You add—"the same is true of the Greek word *athanasia*, or *athanatos*, which Parkhurst derives from *a*, *not*, or *without*, and *thanatos*, death; so the word literally signifies *without death*. He then gives but one definition, viz. *immortality*, *exemption from death*." By your own showing then, if Adam was created immortal, he must have been exempted from death. But let us examine Moses' account of the formation of man.

In Gen. 2: 7, it is said, "and the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul." When it is said "God formed man of the dust of the ground," it will be conceded that this refers to his bodily frame. Other Scripture writers speak in a similar way respecting the formation of man's body from the dust. See Gen. 3: 19. Job

4: 19, and 33: 6. Ps. 103: 14. 1 Cor. 15: 47. 2 Cor. 4: 7, and 5: 1. We do not deny God's ability to form an immortal body from dust, but as this is no where asserted in Scripture, we ought not to assert it. Should this be asserted, the beasts were created immortal, for both men and beasts were formed from the same perishable materials. See Gen. 1: 24, 25, and 2: 7, 19. In this respect men and beasts are the same. See Eccles. 3: 19, 20. Both are from the dust, and both return to it. Solomon predicates the mortality of neither on Adam's sin, but on the original materials of which both were composed.

No promise was given to Adam that he should never die. If we infer his *immortality* from the silence of Scripture about his death, we ought to draw the same inference respecting all the other creatures which God made. If we say his immortality is implied in the threatening—"in the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die," we deny that this is a fair inference, for no man reasons so when human laws threaten the murderer with death. The Scriptures do not say if Adam had never sinned he would have lived forever. To predicate death on his sinning, and his immortality on his remaining innocent shows that at best his immortality was conditional, which is rather a singular kind of immortality. Besides, as the brutes never sinned, why should they die? Was their immortality suspended also on the ground of Adam's continuing a sinless being? I find nothing which proves all this in the Bible.

But perhaps Adam's immortality is inferred from his being created in the image of God. This will not answer, for Christ was the image of the invisible God, yet he died. Believers are created in Christ Jesus after the image of God. Col. 3: 10. Eph. 4: 24. But they die like other men. In short, mere innocence or freedom from all moral guilt, could not

prevent Adam from dying, for surely Jesus Christ had no sin, and if his innocence, yea, his perfect holiness did not render him immortal, how could mere innocence render Adam so?

But again. Adam in his innocent condition was to live by eating and drinking. The perishable nature of the things on which he subsisted, and his requiring such sustenance, showed he was created mortal. To support life by eating and drinking, implies that if these were withheld death would ensue, unless a constant miracle was wrought to preserve life without them. But a miracle could preserve our lives as well as his. It is apparent from Gen. 1, and 2, that Adam and the beasts were both to subsist on the produce of the earth. The perishable nature of the materials and the necessity of a constant supply, showed both were subject to decay and death. If Adam could have lived forever without food so could the beasts, and if a proper supply of food would have continued the life of Adam forever had he not sinned, why not also to the brute creation?

But further. Could not Adam have been bled to death? Would not a dose of poison have killed him? Or if a tree or a rock had fallen upon him would it not have crushed him to death? If all this is denied, it is evident sin altered the whole organization of man. But the Scriptures no where warrant such a conclusion. Adam, and all other creatures at their creation, were so organized that they were to live on the same principles of nutrition as we now do. Who can deny this, or that Adam ate, drank, and slept as we do? The history shows this.

But the passage says further, God—"breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul." See the following texts where the same or similar things are stated. Job 33: 4, and 27: 3. Acts 17: 25. Isai. 2: 22. Num. 16: 22. Zach. 12: 1.

). 12: 9. You will allow that Adam's body, form-
ut of the dust, was dead matter until God breath-
nto him. What he breathed into him, I presume
contend was an *immortal soul.* If it was not, it
be impossible for you to show that an immortal
was infused into him on any other occasion.—
the act of God, breathing into Adam, he was
e a living soul or person. But if you contend
this breath of life breathed into Adam was an
*ortal soul*, I ask 1st. Was it a conscious, thinking
g before God breathed it into Adam? If you can
e this, I shall admit man has an immortal soul.
if you do, you must then adopt the doctrine of
existent souls, yea, hold to the transmigration of
s. But does the Bible teach us that we had a
ious existence before our present existence?
any man a consciousness of any thing he thought,
, or did before his union with the body? The
g God breathed into Adam was "the breath of
" which was no more a thinking, conscious being,
the body into which it was breathed. It was
breath of life, breathed into the body and in
n with it, both were constituted a living soul or
on. I think you will not dispute this. Well,
nit me to ask 2d. If this *life* or *breath* was not an
*ortal soul*, which had a previous conscious exis-
e before it was breathed into Adam, how could it
his when breathed out of him at death? If it did
so exist in a pre-existent state, how can it so ex-
n a disembodied state? And if it did not, yea,
ld not suffer or enjoy before it was breathed into
, how can it suffer or enjoy after it is breathed
of him? And if it exists, suffers and enjoys, yea,
reform itself by "consideration and reflection"
r death, why not also contend that it did all this
pre-existent state before it entered the body? I
k you must be compelled to admit this, or show

how the mere union of life with the bodily frame transforms life into an immortal soul, a thinking, conscious being, which is to suffer or enjoy in a disembodied state. But this, Sir, would be to make the body confer immortality on the soul or life, by a few years residence in it. You told us, p. 66—"Paul makes the man complete without the body; as much so as an individual is without the house in which he resides." But I presume, Sir, you must adopt the opinion that the life becomes an immortal soul during its residence in the body, or be without an immortal soul altogether. If you ask why? I answer by asking you

1st. When does your immortal soul first become a thinking, conscious being? Is it before its union with the body? If so, then, beyond a doubt you must believe in pre-existent immortal souls. This is unavoidable. If it becomes a thinking, conscious being while in the body, how then can you avoid admitting that its union with the body constitutes it an immortal soul? That it was a thinking, conscious being before its union with the body, there is no proof from Scripture, our own consciousness, or any thing else. That it thinks, and is conscious while in union with the body is allowed on all hands. If its thinking depends on its union with the body, reason and common sense says its thinking will cease when this union is dissolved. It is certain you have offered no proof from Scripture, that the *life* or *soul* will continue to think after death. If its *thinking* does not depend on this union with the body, as you certainly believe it thinks after death, you are driven to the alternative of believing it pre-existed and thought before its union with the body.

2d. I ask is a soul *immortal* before it begins to *think*, *understand*, and *reason*? I presume you will say no, for you have defined the immortal soul to be

the mind, and surely that cannot be mind which neither thinks, understands, or reasons. But if this be true, then infants and idiots are without immortal souls. At what period then do you think the soul of an infant becomes immortal? For to talk of an *unthinking immortal soul* looks very like an absurdity. If you say they become immortal when they begin to think, then all infants who die before they begin to think, die before their souls were old enough to become immortal, hence can be neither happy nor miserable after death. It is evident then, they were not pre-existent immortal souls. If they were, they lost their immortality, in their short union with the body. But I take it for granted you do not believe in pre-existent souls. But if you do not, you must admit the thinking and reasoning of the soul or mind is inseparable from its union with the body. But admitting this, your punishment of souls in a disembodied state falls at once to the ground, for this depends on their thinking and suffering separate from the body.

The term *soul*, in this account of Adam's formation, proves nothing respecting his immortality, for the term *soul* is applied to the beasts. We also read of a fat soul, a lean soul, a thirsty soul, and even of a dead soul, as has been shown in my Essays. It simply means, that God breathed into Adam the breath of life, and he became a living soul or person. Nothing, Sir, is said about his *immortality*, either as to *soul* or *body*, any more than the beasts of the field. Nor is any intimation of *immortality* given to man, but in the gospel of Christ. Indeed, I will thank you to explain how Adam could become *mortal* if he was created *immortal*. Did sin produce a change from immortality to mortality? And if it was Adam's *immortal soul* that sinned, why did it not die? But it seems it retained its immortality, and the body had to die for its transgression. You say, p. 66, "that

Paul makes the man complete without the body; as much so as an individual is without the house in which he resides." Is it not then absurd enough, to punish the *body* for the sin of the *immortal soul?* Just as absurd, as to punish a house for the sins its resident committed in it. But if nothing was threatened with death but the body, this was a blessing to the immortal soul, for it is looked on only as a clog to it. It was idle for God to threaten the immortal soul with death, for if immortal it cannot die.

I now make an appeal to your candor, and the candor of all my readers. Does not this text, respecting man's formation, stand in direct opposition to your views of an immortal soul, and in favor of my opinions? If God did not impart to man an immortal soul when he made him, it is incumbent on you to show when, and on what occasion, he afterwards bestowed it. But to say it was communicated to Adam afterwards, is to say he lived sometime without an *immortal soul*, which is a new discovery from the Bible. But if you can show that God gave to Adam and his posterity immortal souls, I am satisfied, and will thank you for the information. But I might ask, does God impart an immortal soul to every infant? If so, at what period is it given? But was not man commanded to propagate his kind, as all other creatures were? And did not God bless them for this purpose? But do men propagate immortal souls? Or does God give immortal souls to the fruit of the most unlawful connexions?

We have seen what God breathed into man when he made him. Let us now see what man breathes out of him when he dies? Is it an *immortal soul?* No Sir; it is the very same thing God breathed into him. God just takes away what he gave, hence David says, Ps. 146: 4—"his breath goeth forth, he returneth to his earth; in that very day his thoughts

perish." See this text noticed already. But you may also consult the following texts, which show, that it is man's breath or life God takes away at death. Ps. 104: 29. Job 14: 10, and 17: 1. Dan. 5: 23. Ps. 90: 3. Gen. 3: 19. Job 34: 14. But I will thank you, Sir, to produce the text which says God at death takes away from man an *immortal soul:* or, that man at death breathes out his *immortal soul.* Yea, only name the text which says the soul is *immortal.* It is evident from the above texts, and others noticed previously, that man at death just returns to his original condition. Has it not been shown from Eccles. 3: 19—21, and other texts, that men and beasts "have all one breath" or spirit? See also Gen. 7: 22, 23. And surely no man can deny that the Scriptures are alike silent about either of them breathing out at death an immortal soul. In Gen. 5, it is said, a number of persons lived several hundred years, and that they died. But it is not intimated that they breathed out of them an *immortal soul.* Nor is it hinted that they had such souls to live in a disembodied state. Again; at the flood—"all in whose nostrils was the breath of life, of all that was in the dry land died, whether man or beast," Gen. 7: 22, 23. But, Sir, you ought to notice that there is just as little said about the *immortal souls* of the men as of the beasts which perished in the flood. Yet you seem very confident that the *immortal souls* of men who perished, were in hell when you wrote your Letters, and advocate from 1 Peter 3: 18, 19, that Christ's disembodied spirit went there and preached to them.

Further. I travel through both Old and New Testament in search of evidence for your immortal soul; but I can find none, that either such a soul was breathed into man, or is breathed out of any one at death. Nothing more departed from Rachel at death

but her breath or life, Gen. 35: 18. Nothing more departed from the child, mentioned 1 Kings 17: 21, 22. And nothing more departed from our Lord, Matt. 27: 50. See Dr. Campbell's note on this last text. What then, Sir, am I to do? Must I still believe the soul is *immortal?* This is impossible, unless I believe without evidence. But I turn to p. 70 of your Letters, already quoted, and find you tell me the law of Moses did not teach a future retribution or future existence, consequently could not teach your doctrine of an *immortal soul.* Why then do you believe it? Why, because it was taught in revelations which are now lost. But how do you know this? Why, because you *think so;* some others have *said so;* and chiefly because you cannot prove it in any other way. I pray thee have me excused from believing any thing of such importance, on such evidence as this.

It is likely you will object to the above remarks by saying,—"this only makes the soul of Adam to be *life.*" Answer. What right have you, Sir, to say it was an *immortal soul?* To assert it is, proves nothing, but is contrary to the Scripture usage of *nephish* and *psuhe* rendered soul in the Bible, for no Scripture writer calls the soul immortal. It is also contrary to the phrases both in the Hebrew and Greek, rendered *living soul.* Gen. 2: 7. The very same phrase is rendered *living creature* in other places. See Gen. 2: 19, and comp. Gen. 1: 21, 24. It is the false notion attached to the term *soul,* imbibed from education, which occasions so much perplexity to people on this subject. If any man will contend that the phrase rendered *living soul* means an immortal soul in man, let him show us why it does not mean the same when applied to the brutes. See the above texts, and Rev. 16: 3. Modern versions render this phrase—"*living person.*" And—"liv-

ing animal." See Geddes, Newcome, Improved Version, &c. Parkhurst, as quoted in my Essays, denies that the terms rendered *soul* means an *immortal soul*. Bates, in his Critia Hebrea, says—"*nephish* is never, that I know of, the *rational soul*. It is no more soul than the brain is the understanding, or the heart the will. They who leave the Scriptures and reason from the nature of *matter* to prove we have a soul, and that it is naturally *immortal*, are paving the way to a disbelief of both points." Whether, by leaving your Bible, and reasoning on lost revelations to prove the soul immortal, is not paving the way to a disbelief in the Scriptures, I leave to your own sober reflections.

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# LETTER X.

SIR,

THIS letter shall be directed to an investigation of the origin and progress of your opinions respecting the *immortality of the soul* and *its condition after death*, from the earliest times to the first introduction of philosophy into Rome. It has been the burden of your song throughout your book, that "*the Scriptures were addressed*" to such as believed these opinions, and in p. 70 of your Letters you declared the law of Moses does not teach either a *future life* or *a future retribution*, consequently cannot teach the immortality of the soul or its condition after death. It would then be idle to look into the Scriptures to find the *origin* of such doctrines.

From what source then did the "*immortality of the soul* and *its condition after death* originate? You have

contended, that these doctrines had their origin in revelations which are now lost. In refutation of such a position enough was said in preceding letters. But in further refutation of it, and also of your position that the Gentiles derived such opinions from the Jews, I refer you to Dr. Enfield's History of Philosophy, vol. i. p. 20, 21; and vol. ii. p. 210—221.—What he says in these pages is a complete refutation of both these positions, and on which your system rests for support. Dr. Enfield justly remarks, "as to the traditionary law, which the Jewish writers suppose to have been the ground of their cabbala, if it were not a mere invention of later times, it must have been given by divine revelation, and can furnish no argument in defence of the philosophy of Moses. Much less can any argument for this purpose be derived from writings which are confessedly lost, and which have not been proved to have ever existed." Before you can establish your system from lost revelations, two new revelations are necessary; one, that those revelations did exist, and another, that your opinions were taught in them. But two facts, Sir, show that this ground on which you rest your cause is false. 1st. The heathen never alleged that their belief in the *immortality of the soul* and *its condition after death* originated in revelations which happened to get lost. 2d. On the contrary there is a profusion of evidence that the Jews derived their opinions respecting the soul and its condition after death from their intercourse with the heathen. It would be a waste of time to show this here. Evidence of it will appear in the sequel. See Dr. Campbell's 6th Dissertation with many other writers I might name, who all bear testimony to this fact.

You will then ask, whence could such opinions originate? It shall now be my business to show this: and before I begin, I premise two things which you

will not dispute. 1st. Men began at a very early period to speculate on divine revelation. Eve began to speculate on the prohibition, Gen. 3: 4, 5. For my views of the serpent, see Second Inquiry, sect. 2. "Immortality," "ye shall not surely die," and to be "as gods," are held up as the advantages which would result from transgression. Thus the human race, from the very beginning, "professing themselves to be wise became fools." That men in after ages went on to indulge their own wisdom, is too manifest to need any proof. At the flood "all flesh had corrupted their way upon the earth." In the family of Noah, the human race as it were, began anew; but in Abraham's day the world had relapsed again into idolatry. God called him out of Ur of the Chaldees, made him the father of the Jewish nation, and from whom the Messiah was to proceed. Among this nation the knowledge of true religion was to be preserved, amidst the idolatry and superstitions of the surrounding nations. God suffered all nations except the Jewish, to walk after their own ways, and to what extent in superstition and wickedness the indulgence of their own supposed wisdom led them, Rom. 1. shows. But it deserves special notice, that whatever were the opinions of the Chaldeans and Egyptians, in the days of Abraham and Moses, respecting the immortality of the soul or its condition after death, they could not have learned them from the Jews. Enfield, in the pages referred to above, tells us "that Thoth, Hermes, Trismegistus, the Chaldean Zoroaster, and other founders of the ancient barbaric philosophy, were prior in time to Moses, and even to Abraham." What opinions the Chaldeans and Egyptians did hold, we shall see presently. But why Abraham and Moses did not teach their opinions, though brought up in Chaldea, and Egypt, and familiar with them, I leave you to ac-

count for, if they believed them of divine origin.—How do you account for this fact, for you allow Moses in his law teaches no such opinions?

2d. Permit me to premise, that none of the heathen had the least idea of future life by a resurrection from the dead. This remark I believe is without exception true. The very wisest of them deemed a resurrection incredible. It was mocked at when Paul preached it at Athens; Acts 17, and 26: 8.—Such a thing was contrary to all their observation and experience, and a divine revelation, they did not enjoy. If the heathen then speculated at all respecting a future life, or entertained any hope about it, it must have been about the soul. That they did speculate about the *immortality of the soul* and its *condition in a future state*, is certain. To their speculations I shall now call your attention, and in them we shall find the origin of your opinions. I have drawn my information from the best sources I could find, and if you know any better, I will thank you to point me to them. The sources of information on this subject are scanty, and Enfield accounts for it vol. i. p. 7—to which I refer you. But, Sir, scanty as these means are, my fear is, I shall not find room for all the materials I have collected. What I cannot quote, I shall condense, or refer to the pages where the information may be found. To understand more distinctly the quotations now to be introduced, it is proper to notice what Enfield says, vol. i. p. 15. He says—"the term barbarian was applied by the Greeks to all those nations who spoke a language different from their own." He adds—"it has long been a subject of dispute, whether philosophy first appeared among the barbarians, or among the Greeks." After showing, p. 15, 16, that the vanity of the Greeks led them to claim this honor, he adds, "on the other hand, the barbarian nations, in their turn,

treated the Greeks as barbarians, and looked upon them as children in philosophy. Plato, in his Timeus, introduces a barbarian as instructing the wise Solon, and saying, 'you Greeks are always children; there is not an old man among you: you have no such thing as gray headed wisdom.' They were the more confirmed in this persuasion when they understood that the most learned men and the most ancient philosophers among the Greeks had either been barbarians by birth, or instructed by barbarians: that Pythagoras, for example, was a Tuscan, Antisthenes a Phrygian, Orpheus a Thracian, Thales a Phenician; and that Thales, Pythagoras, Plato, and others, had derived their knowledge from Chaldean and Egyptian priests." He thus concludes, p. 17—"hence it is easy to perceive, that though the improvement of philosophy is to be ascribed to the Greeks, its origin is to be sought for among the barbarian nations."

In vol. i. chap. 2. Enfield treats of the philosophy of the ancient Hebrews. He denies that they were philosophers. See Enfield's work referred to above, p. 20, 21. He states the same in concluding this chapter, which I need not quote. He says nothing of their opinions respecting the soul; and you allow Moses did not teach your opinions.

In chapter 3, Enfield treats "of the philosophy of the Chaldeans." He says, p. 25—"Among the eastern nations, the most ancient people, next to the Hebrews, who appear to have been acquainted with philosophy (using the term in its more relaxed sense) are the Chaldeans. For, although the Egyptians have claimed the honor of being the more ancient nation, and contended that the Chaldeans were an Egyptian colony, and consequently derived all their learning from Egypt, there is reason to believe that the kingdom of Babylon, of which Chaldea was a part, flourished before the Egyptian monarchy;

whence it is probable, that, with respect to knowledge, the Egyptians were rather indebted to the Chaldeans, than the Chaldeans to the Egyptians.—There is little room, however, to doubt, that Chaldea had, from the most remote times, its own preceptors, and was not indebted for its wisdom to any other country."

He further says, p. 31—" it is universally acknowledged by the ancients, that Zoroaster was the founder of the Chaldean philosophy. But learned industry has in vain attempted to draw aside the veil of obscurity, which covers this celebrated name." Concerning their religious opinions he thus writes, p. 35, 36—" It appears, not only from the testimony of Diodorus, but from other ancient authorities collected by Eusebius, that the Chaldeans believed in God, the Lord and Parent of all, by whose providence the world is governed. And indeed, without this it is impossible to conceive, how their religious rites should ever have arisen ; for the immediate object of these rites was a supposed race of spiritual beings or demons, whose existence could not have been imagined, without first conceiving the idea of a Supreme Being, the source of all intelligence. Accordingly we find in fact, that not only the Chaldeans, but the Egyptians, and the whole heathen world, from the most remote times, believed in a Supreme Deity, the fountain of all the divinities which they supposed to preside over the several parts of the material world. This was the true origin of all religious worship, however idolatrous, not excepting even that which consisted in paying divine honors to the memory of dead men. Besides the Supreme Being, the Chaldeans supposed spiritual beings to exist, of several orders, gods, demons, heroes. These they probably divided into subordinate classes, as their practice of theology, or magic, required. The ancient eastern nations

in general, and among the rest the Chaldeans, admitted the existence of certain evil spirits, clothed in a vehicle of grosser matter; and in subduing or counteracting these, they placed a great part of the efficacy of their religious incantations."

Enfield thus concludes his account, p. 38.—"The sum of the Chaldaic cosmogony, as it is given by Berosus in his *Babylonica*, preserved by Syncellus, divested of allegory, is, that in the beginning all things consisted of darkness and water; that Belus, or a divine power, dividing this humid mass, formed the world; and that the human mind is an emanation from the divine nature." Remember, Sir, you have defined the *immortal soul* to be *the mind;* and in this quotation we have the first trace of speculation among the heathen concerning it. The Chaldeans called "the human mind an emanation from the divine nature." But nothing is yet said about its immortality or existence after death, either to suffer or enjoy. What is meant by its being—"an *emanation* from the divine nature" we shall see afterwards. Concerning the Chaldeans, he says, p. 30—"no one, who has a just idea of the nature and use of philosophy, can hesitate in dismissing them from the rank of philosophers, to their proper station among impostors.—Whatever share of knowledge they possessed, it is evident that they applied it to the purposes of superstition." The book of Daniel shows that this was the state of things in Chaldea in his day. In the first of these quotations, observe, Enfield says "there is little room, however, to doubt, that Chaldea had, from the most remote times, its own preceptors, and was not indebted for its wisdom to any other country." If this, Sir, be true, they did not derive their opinions respecting the soul from the Jews. And if they derived them from lost revelations, you must perceive those revelations did not contain your opin-

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count for, if they believed them of divine origin.—How do you account for this fact, for you allow Moses in his law teaches no such opinions?

2d. Permit me to premise, that none of the heathen had the least idea of future life by a resurrection from the dead. This remark I believe is without exception true. The very wisest of them deemed a resurrection incredible. It was mocked at when Paul preached it at Athens; Acts 17, and 26: 8.—Such a thing was contrary to all their observation and experience, and a divine revelation, they did not enjoy. If the heathen then speculated at all respecting a future life, or entertained any hope about it, it must have been about the soul. That they did speculate about the *immortality of the soul* and its *condition in a future state*, is certain. To their speculations I shall now call your attention, and in them we shall find the origin of your opinions. I have drawn my information from the best sources I could find, and if you know any better, I will thank you to point me to them. The sources of information on this subject are scanty, and Enfield accounts for it vol. i. p. 7—to which I refer you. But, Sir, scanty as these means are, my fear is, I shall not find room for all the materials I have collected. What I cannot quote, I shall condense, or refer to the pages where the information may be found. To understand more distinctly the quotations now to be introduced, it is proper to notice what Enfield says, vol. i. p. 15. He says—"the term barbarian was applied by the Greeks to all those nations who spoke a language different from their own." He adds—"it has long been a subject of dispute, whether philosophy first appeared among the barbarians, or among the Greeks." After showing, p. 15, 16, that the vanity of the Greeks led them to claim this honor, he adds, "on the other hand, the barbarian nations, in their turn,

treated the Greeks as barbarians, and looked upon them as children in philosophy. Plato, in his Timeus, introduces a barbarian as instructing the wise Solon, and saying, 'you Greeks are always children; there is not an old man among you: you have no such thing as gray headed wisdom.' They were the more confirmed in this persuasion when they understood that the most learned men and the most ancient philosophers among the Greeks had either been barbarians by birth, or instructed by barbarians: that Pythagoras, for example, was a Tuscan, Antisthenes a Phrygian, Orpheus a Thracian, Thales a Phenician; and that Thales, Pythagoras, Plato, and others, had derived their knowledge from Chaldean and Egyptian priests." He thus concludes, p. 17—"hence it is easy to perceive, that though the improvement of philosophy is to be ascribed to the Greeks, its origin is to be sought for among the barbarian nations."

In vol. i. chap. 2. Enfield treats of the philosophy of the ancient Hebrews. He denies that they were philosophers. See Enfield's work referred to above, p. 20, 21. He states the same in concluding this chapter, which I need not quote. He says nothing of their opinions respecting the soul; and you allow Moses did not teach your opinions.

In chapter 3, Enfield treats "of the philosophy of the Chaldeans." He says, p. 25—"Among the eastern nations, the most ancient people, next to the Hebrews, who appear to have been acquainted with philosophy (using the term in its more relaxed sense) are the Chaldeans. For, although the Egyptians have claimed the honor of being the more ancient nation, and contended that the Chaldeans were an Egyptian colony, and consequently derived all their learning from Egypt, there is reason to believe that the kingdom of Babylon, of which Chaldea was a part, flourished before the Egyptian monarchy;

how the mere union of life with the bodily frame transforms life into an immortal soul, a thinking, conscious being, which is to suffer or enjoy in a disembodied state. But this, Sir, would be to make the body confer immortality on the soul or life, by a few years residence in it. You told us, p. 66—"Paul makes the man complete without the body; as much so as an individual is without the house in which he resides." But I presume, Sir, you must adopt the opinion that the life becomes an immortal soul during its residence in the body, or be without an immortal soul altogether. If you ask why? I answer by asking you

1st. When does your immortal soul first become a thinking, conscious being? Is it before its union with the body? If so, then, beyond a doubt you must believe in pre-existent immortal souls. This is unavoidable. If it becomes a thinking, conscious being while in the body, how then can you avoid admitting that its union with the body constitutes it an immortal soul? That it was a thinking, conscious being before its union with the body, there is no proof from Scripture, our own consciousness, or any thing else. That it thinks, and is conscious while in union with the body is allowed on all hands. If its thinking depends on its union with the body, reason and common sense says its thinking will cease when this union is dissolved. It is certain you have offered no proof from Scripture, that the *life* or *soul* will continue to think after death. If its *thinking* does not depend on this union with the body, as you certainly believe it thinks after death, you are driven to the alternative of believing it pre-existed and thought before its union with the body.

2d. I ask is a soul *immortal*, before it begins to *think*, *understand*, and *reason?* I presume you will say no, for you have defined the immortal soul to be

the mind, and surely that cannot be mind which neither thinks, understands, or reasons. But if this be true, then infants and idiots are without immortal souls. At what period then do you think the soul of an infant becomes immortal? For to talk of an *unthinking immortal soul* looks very like an absurdity. If you say they become immortal when they begin to think, then all infants who die before they begin to think, die before their souls were old enough to become immortal, hence can be neither happy nor miserable after death. It is evident then, they were not pre-existent immortal souls. If they were, they lost their immortality, in their short union with the body. But I take it for granted you do not believe in pre-existent souls. But if you do not, you must admit the thinking and reasoning of the soul or mind is inseparable from its union with the body. But admitting this, your punishment of souls in a disembodied state falls at once to the ground, for this depends on their thinking and suffering separate from the body.

The term *soul*, in this account of Adam's formation, proves nothing respecting his immortality, for the term *soul* is applied to the beasts. We also read of a fat soul, a lean soul, a thirsty soul, and even of a dead soul, as has been shown in my Essays. It simply means, that God breathed into Adam the breath of life, and he became a living soul or person. Nothing, Sir, is said about his *immortality*, either as to *soul* or *body*, any more than the beasts of the field. Nor is any intimation of *immortality* given to man, but in the gospel of Christ. Indeed, I will thank you to explain how Adam could become *mortal* if he was created *immortal*. Did sin produce a change from immortality to mortality? And if it was Adam's *immortal soul* that sinned, why did it not die? But it seems it retained its immortality, and the body had to die for its transgression. You say, p. 66, "that

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perish." See this text noticed already. But you may also consult the following texts, which show, that it is man's breath or life God takes away at death. Ps. 104: 29. Job 14: 10, and 17: 1. Dan. 5: 23. Ps. 90: 3. Gen. 3: 19. Job 34: 14. But I will thank you, Sir, to produce the text which says God at death takes away from man an *immortal soul:* or, that man at death breathes out his *immortal soul.* Yea, only name the text which says the soul is *immortal.* It is evident from the above texts, and others noticed previously, that man at death just returns to his original condition. Has it not been shown from Eccles. 3: 19—21, and other texts, that men and beasts "have all one breath" or spirit? See also Gen. 7: 22, 23. And surely no man can deny that the Scriptures are alike silent about either of them breathing out at death an immortal soul. In Gen. 5, it is said, a number of persons lived several hundred years, and that they died. But it is not intimated that they breathed out of them an *immortal soul.* Nor is it hinted that they had such souls to live in a disembodied state. Again; at the flood—"all in whose nostrils was the breath of life, of all that was in the dry land died, whether man or beast," Gen. 7: 22, 23. But, Sir, you ought to notice that there is just as little said about the *immortal souls* of the men as of the beasts which perished in the flood. Yet you seem very confident that the *immortal souls* of men who perished, were in hell when you wrote your Letters, and advocate from 1 Peter 3: 18, 19, that Christ's disembodied spirit went there and preached to them.

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Paul makes the man complete without the body; as much so as an individual is without the house in which he resides." Is it not then absurd enough, to punish the *body* for the sin of the *immortal soul?* Just as absurd, as to punish a house for the sins its resident committed in it. But if nothing was threatened with death but the body, this was a blessing to the immortal soul, for it is looked on only as a clog to it. It was idle for God to threaten the immortal soul with death, for if immortal it cannot die.

I now make an appeal to your candor, and the candor of all my readers. Does not this text, respecting man's formation, stand in direct opposition to your views of an immortal soul, and in favor of my opinions? If God did not impart to man an immortal soul when he made him, it is incumbent on you to show when, and on what occasion, he afterwards bestowed it. But to say it was communicated to Adam afterwards, is to say he lived sometime without an *immortal soul*, which is a new discovery from the Bible. But if you can show that God gave to Adam and his posterity immortal souls, I am satisfied, and will thank you for the information. But I might ask, does God impart an immortal soul to every infant? If so, at what period is it given? But was not man commanded to propagate his kind, as all other creatures were? And did not God bless them for this purpose? But do men propagate immortal souls? Or does God give immortal souls to the fruit of the most unlawful connexions?

We have seen what God breathed into man when he made him. Let us now see what man breathes out of him when he dies? Is it an *immortal soul?* No Sir; it is the very same thing God breathed into him. God just takes away what he gave, hence David says, Ps. 146: 4—"his breath goeth forth, he *return*eth to his earth; in that very day his thoughts

perish." See this text noticed already. But you may also consult the following texts, which show, that it is man's breath or life God takes away at death. Ps. 104: 29. Job 14: 10, and 17: 1. Dan. 5: 23. Ps. 90: 3. Gen. 3: 19. Job 34: 14. But I will thank you, Sir, to produce the text which says God at death takes away from man an *immortal soul:* or, that man at death breathes out his *immortal soul.* Yea, only name the text which says the soul is *immortal.* It is evident from the above texts, and others noticed previously, that man at death just returns to his original condition. Has it not been shown from Eccles. 3: 19—21, and other texts, that men and beasts "have all one breath" or spirit? See also Gen. 7: 22, 23. And surely no man can deny that the Scriptures are alike silent about either of them breathing out at death an immortal soul. In Gen. 5, it is said, a number of persons lived several hundred years, and that they died. But it is not intimated that they breathed out of them an *immortal soul.* Nor is it hinted that they had such souls to live in a disembodied state. Again; at the flood—"all in whose nostrils was the breath of life, of all that was in the dry land died, whether man or beast," Gen. 7: 22, 23. But, Sir, you ought to notice that there is just as little said about the *immortal souls* of the men as of the beasts which perished in the flood. Yet you seem very confident that the *immortal souls* of men who perished, were in hell when you wrote your Letters, and advocate from 1 Peter 3: 18, 19, that Christ's disembodied spirit went there and preached to them.

Further. I travel through both Old and New Testament in search of evidence for your immortal soul; but I can find none, that either such a soul was breathed into man, or is breathed out of any one at death. Nothing more departed from Rachel at death

but her breath or life, Gen. 35: 18. Nothing more departed from the child, mentioned 1 Kings 17: 21, 22. And nothing more departed from our Lord, Matt. 27: 50. See Dr. Campbell's note on this last text. What then, Sir, am I to do? Must I still believe the soul is *immortal?* This is impossible, unless I believe without evidence. But I turn to p. 70 of your Letters, already quoted, and find you tell me the law of Moses did not teach a future retribution or future existence, consequently could not teach your doctrine of an *immortal soul.* Why then do you believe it? Why, because it was taught in revelations which are now lost. But how do you know this? Why, because you *think so;* some others have *said so;* and chiefly because you cannot prove it in any other way. I pray thee have me excused from believing any thing of such importance, on such evidence as this.

It is likely you will object to the above remarks by saying,—"this only makes the soul of Adam to be *life.*" Answer. What right have you, Sir, to say it was an *immortal soul?* To assert it is, proves nothing, but is contrary to the Scripture usage of *nephish* and *psuhe* rendered soul in the Bible, for no Scripture writer calls the soul immortal. It is also contrary to the phrases both in the Hebrew and Greek, rendered *living soul.* Gen. 2: 7. The very same phrase is rendered *living creature* in other places. See Gen. 2: 19, and comp. Gen. 1: 21, 24. It is the false notion attached to the term *soul,* imbibed from education, which occasions so much perplexity to people on this subject. If any man will contend that the phrase rendered *living soul* means an immortal soul in man, let him show us why it does not mean the same when applied to the brutes. See the above texts, and Rev. 16: 3. Modern versions render this phrase—"*living person.*" And—"liv-

ing animal." See Geddes, Newcome, Improved Version, &c. Parkhurst, as quoted in my Essays, denies that the terms rendered *soul* means an *immortal soul*. Bates, in his Critia Hebrea, says—"*nephish* is never, that I know of, the *rational soul*. It is no more soul than the brain is the understanding, or the heart the will. They who leave the Scriptures and reason from the nature of *matter* to prove we have a soul, and that it is naturally *immortal*, are paving the way to a disbelief of both points." Whether, by leaving your Bible, and reasoning on lost revelations to prove the soul immortal, is not paving the way to a disbelief in the Scriptures, I leave to your own sober reflections.

# LETTER X.

SIR,

THIS letter shall be directed to an investigation of the origin and progress of your opinions respecting the *immortality of the soul* and *its condition after death*, from the earliest times to the first introduction of philosophy into Rome. It has been the burden of your song throughout your book, that "*the Scriptures were addressed*" to such as believed these opinions, and in p. 70 of your Letters you declared the law of Moses does not teach either a *future life* or *a future retribution*, consequently cannot teach the immortality of the soul or its condition after death. It would then be idle to look into the Scriptures to find the *origin* of such doctrines.

From what source then did the "*immortality of the soul* and *its condition after death* originate? You have

contended, that these doctrines had their origin in revelations which are now lost. In refutation of such a position enough was said in preceding letters. But in further refutation of it, and also of your position that the Gentiles derived such opinions from the Jews, I refer you to Dr. Enfield's History of Philosophy, vol. i. p. 20, 21; and vol. ii. p. 210—221.—What he says in these pages is a complete refutation of both these positions, and on which your system rests for support. Dr. Enfield justly remarks, "as to the traditionary law, which the Jewish writers suppose to have been the ground of their cabbala, if it were not a mere invention of later times, it must have been given by divine revelation, and can furnish no argument in defence of the philosophy of Moses. Much less can any argument for this purpose be derived from writings which are confessedly lost, and which have not been proved to have ever existed." Before you can establish your system from lost revelations, two new revelations are necessary; one, that those revelations did exist, and another, that your opinions were taught in them. But two facts, Sir, show that this ground on which you rest your cause is false. 1st. The heathen never alleged that their belief in the *immortality of the soul* and *its condition after death* originated in revelations which happened to get lost. 2d. On the contrary there is a profusion of evidence that the Jews derived their opinions respecting the soul and its condition after death from their intercourse with the heathen. It would be a waste of time to show this here. Evidence of it will appear in the sequel. See Dr. Campbell's 6th Dissertation with many other writers I might name, who all bear testimony to this fact.

You will then ask, whence could such opinions originate? It shall now be my business to show this: and before I begin, I premise two things which you

will not dispute. 1st. Men began at a very early period to speculate on divine revelation. Eve began to speculate on the prohibition, Gen. 3: 4, 5. For my views of the serpent, see Second Inquiry, sect. 2. "Immortality," "ye shall not surely die," and to be "as gods," are held up as the advantages which would result from transgression. Thus the human race, from the very beginning, "professing themselves to be wise became fools." That men in after ages went on to indulge their own wisdom, is too manifest to need any proof. At the flood "all flesh had corrupted their way upon the earth." In the family of Noah, the human race as it were, began anew; but in Abraham's day the world had relapsed again into idolatry. God called him out of Ur of the Chaldees, made him the father of the Jewish nation, and from whom the Messiah was to proceed. Among this nation the knowledge of true religion was to be preserved, amidst the idolatry and superstitions of the surrounding nations. God suffered all nations except the Jewish, to walk after their own ways, and to what extent in superstition and wickedness the indulgence of their own supposed wisdom led them, Rom. 1. shows. But it deserves special notice, that whatever were the opinions of the Chaldeans and Egyptians, in the days of Abraham and Moses, respecting the immortality of the soul or its condition after death, they could not have learned them from the Jews. Enfield, in the pages referred to above, tells us "that Thoth, Hermes, Trismegistus, the Chaldean Zoroaster, and other founders of the ancient barbaric philosophy, were prior in time to Moses, and even to Abraham." What opinions the Chaldeans and Egyptians did hold, we shall see presently. But why Abraham and Moses did not teach their opinions, though brought up in Chaldea, and Egypt, and familiar with them, I leave you to ac-

count for, if they believed them of divine origin.—How do you account for this fact, for you allow Moses in his law teaches no such opinions?

2d. Permit me to premise, that none of the heathen had the least idea of future life by a resurrection from the dead. This remark I believe is without exception true. The very wisest of them deemed a resurrection incredible. It was mocked at when Paul preached it at Athens; Acts 17, and 26: 8.—Such a thing was contrary to all their observation and experience, and a divine revelation, they did not enjoy. If the heathen then speculated at all respecting a future life, or entertained any hope about it, it must have been about the soul. That they did speculate about the *immortality of the soul* and its *condition in a future state*, is certain. To their speculations I shall now call your attention, and in them we shall find the origin of your opinions. I have drawn my information from the best sources I could find, and if you know any better, I will thank you to point me to them. The sources of information on this subject are scanty, and Enfield accounts for it vol. i. p. 7—to which I refer you. But, Sir, scanty as these means are, my fear is, I shall not find room for all the materials I have collected. What I cannot quote, I shall condense, or refer to the pages where the information may be found. To understand more distinctly the quotations now to be introduced, it is proper to notice what Enfield says, vol. i. p. 15. He says—"the term barbarian was applied by the Greeks to all those nations who spoke a language different from their own." He adds—"it has long been a subject of dispute, whether philosophy first appeared among the barbarians, or among the Greeks." After showing, p. 15, 16, that the vanity of the Greeks led them to claim this honor, he adds, "on the other hand, the barbarian nations, in their turn,

treated the Greeks as barbarians, and looked upon them as children in philosophy. Plato, in his Timeus, introduces a barbarian as instructing the wise Solon, and saying, 'you Greeks are always children; there is not an old man among you: you have no such thing as gray headed wisdom.' They were the more confirmed in this persuasion when they understood that the most learned men and the most ancient philosophers among the Greeks had either been barbarians by birth, or instructed by barbarians: that Pythagoras, for example, was a Tuscan, Antisthenes a Phrygian, Orpheus a Thracian, Thales a Phenician; and that Thales, Pythagoras, Plato, and others, had derived their knowledge from Chaldean and Egyptian priests." He thus concludes, p. 17—"hence it is easy to perceive, that though the improvement of philosophy is to be ascribed to the Greeks, its origin is to be sought for among the barbarian nations."

In vol. i. chap. 2. Enfield treats of the philosophy of the ancient Hebrews. He denies that they were philosophers. See Enfield's work referred to above, p. 20, 21. He states the same in concluding this chapter, which I need not quote. He says nothing of their opinions respecting the soul; and you allow Moses did not teach your opinions.

In chapter 3, Enfield treats "of the philosophy of the Chaldeans." He says, p. 25—"Among the eastern nations, the most ancient people, next to the Hebrews, who appear to have been acquainted with philosophy (using the term in its more relaxed sense) are the Chaldeans. For, although the Egyptians have claimed the honor of being the more ancient nation, and contended that the Chaldeans were an Egyptian colony, and consequently derived all their learning from Egypt, there is reason to believe that the kingdom of Babylon, of which Chaldea was a part, flourished before the Egyptian monarchy;

whence it is probable, that, with respect to knowledge, the Egyptians were rather indebted to the Chaldeans, than the Chaldeans to the Egyptians.—There is little room, however, to doubt, that Chaldea had, from the most remote times, its own preceptors, and was not indebted for its wisdom to any other country."

He further says, p. 31—"it is universally acknowledged by the ancients, that Zoroaster was the founder of the Chaldean philosophy. But learned industry has in vain attempted to draw aside the veil of obscurity, which covers this celebrated name." Concerning their religious opinions he thus writes, p. 35, 36—"It appears, not only from the testimony of Diodorus, but from other ancient authorities collected by Eusebius, that the Chaldeans believed in God, the Lord and Parent of all, by whose providence the world is governed. And indeed, without this it is impossible to conceive, how their religious rites should ever have arisen; for the immediate object of these rites was a supposed race of spiritual beings or demons, whose existence could not have been imagined, without first conceiving the idea of a Supreme Being, the source of all intelligence. Accordingly we find in fact, that not only the Chaldeans, but the Egyptians, and the whole heathen world, from the most remote times, believed in a Supreme Deity, the fountain of all the divinities which they supposed to preside over the several parts of the material world. This was the true origin of all religious worship, however idolatrous, not excepting even that which consisted in paying divine honors to the memory of dead men. Besides the Supreme Being, the Chaldeans supposed spiritual beings to exist, of several orders, gods, demons, heroes. These they probably divided into subordinate classes, as their practice of theology, or magic, required. The ancient eastern nations

in general, and among the rest the Chaldeans, admitted the existence of certain evil spirits, clothed in a vehicle of grosser matter; and in subduing or counteracting these, they placed a great part of the efficacy of their religious incantations."

Enfield thus concludes his account, p. 38.—"The sum of the Chaldaic cosmogony, as it is given by Berosus in his *Babylonica*, preserved by Syncellus, divested of allegory, is, that in the beginning all things consisted of darkness and water; that Belus, or a divine power, dividing this humid mass, formed the world; and that the human mind is an emanation from the divine nature." Remember, Sir, you have defined the *immortal soul* to be *the mind;* and in this quotation we have the first trace of speculation among the heathen concerning it. The Chaldeans called "the human mind an emanation from the divine nature." But nothing is yet said about its immortality or existence after death, either to suffer or enjoy. What is meant by its being—"an *emanation* from the divine nature" we shall see afterwards. Concerning the Chaldeans, he says, p. 30—"no one, who has a just idea of the nature and use of philosophy, can hesitate in dismissing them from the rank of philosophers, to their proper station among impostors.—Whatever share of knowledge they possessed, it is evident that they applied it to the purposes of superstition." The book of Daniel shows that this was the state of things in Chaldea in his day. In the first of these quotations, observe, Enfield says "there is little room, however, to doubt, that Chaldea had, from the most remote times, its own preceptors, and was not indebted for its wisdom to any other country." If this, Sir, be true, they did not derive their opinions respecting the soul from the Jews. And if they derived them from lost revelations, you must perceive those revelations did not contain your opin-

ions, for not a word is said about the Chaldeans believing in the *immortality* of the soul, or *its punishment after death.* Their idea looks more like the Scripture account of it, though corrupted by idle speculation.

In chapter 4, Enfield gives us an account "of the philosophy of the Persians." Concerning it he says "it is difficult to form a satisfactory judgment on account of the objectionable sources of our information." He says—"philosophy was introduced, or rather revived and corrected among the Persians by Zoroaster." He thinks "that the Chaldean and Persian Zoroaster were different persons, and that the latter lived at a much later period than the former. He says the book called the *Zend*, ascribed to the Persian Zoroaster—"was probably written about the fourth or fifth century." The fragments of a work entitled "*the oracles* of Zoroaster," with "Patricius' larger collection, containing 323 verses, with the commentaries of the Platonic philosophers," he thinks "were written by some Platonist, about the beginning of the second century: a period when nothing was more common than to attempt to support the falling credit of Gentile philosophy by spurious writings." After giving us an account of the worship and opinions of the Persians from various sources he says, p. 50, "if these authorities be carefully compared, it will appear probable, that Zoroaster, adopting the principle commonly held by the ancients, that from nothing nothing can be produced, conceived light, or those spiritual substances which partake of the active nature of fire and darkness, or the impenetrable, opaque, and passive mass of matter, to be emanations from one eternal source; that, to the derived substances he gave the names, already applied by the Magi to the causes of good and evil, Oromasdes and Arimanius; and that the first foun-

tain of being, or the supreme divinity, he called Mithras. These active and passive principles he conceived to be perpetually at variance; the former tending to produce good, the latter evil; but that, through the *mediation* or intervention of the Supreme Being, the contest would at last terminate in favor of the good principle. According to Zoroaster, various orders of spiritual beings, gods or demons, have proceeded from the deity, which are more or less perfect, as they are at a greater or less distance, in the course of emanation, from the eternal fountain of intelligence; among which, the human soul is a particle of divine light, which will return to its source, and partake of its immortality; and matter is the last and most distant emanation from the first source of being, which, on account of its distance from the fountain of light, becomes opaque and inert, and whilst it remains in this state is the cause of evil; but being gradually refined, it will at length return to the fountain whence it flowed. This doctrine of emanation afterwards produced many fanciful opinions in theology."

We have seen above that the Chaldeans taught "that the human mind (your immortal soul) is an emanation from the divine nature." But observe, we are now told that "*the human soul is a particle of divine light.*" That it is one of the spiritual beings proceeding "*in the course of emanation from the eternal fountain of intelligence which will return to its source, and partake of its immortality.*" From these accounts the Chaldean Zoroaster gave the first hint respecting your immortal soul, but which is now vastly improved by the Persian Zoroaster. But observe, he still holds it on the principle of *emanation* in common with gods, demons, and matter, which all emanated from the deity and will return to him. In this quotation, the first hint is given that the soul is *immortal*, but still nothing is said respecting its existing to suffer or

enjoy in a disembodied state. The world is much indebted to the family of the Zoroasters, for from them have come the doctrines of an immortal soul and a personal devil, which have so long existed in the Christian church. See Second Inquiry respecting the devil and satan.

In chapter 5, Enfield proceeds to "the philosophy of the Indians." He says, p. 51, "from whatever quarter India, the country which, as adjacent to Persia, next comes under our notice, received its wisdom, there can be no doubt that its wise men very early obtained a high degree of reputation. We find that it was visited for the purpose of acquiring knowledge, by Pythagoras, Anaxarchus, Pyrro, and others, who afterwards became eminent philosophers in Greece." In p. 55, 56 he gives us the following account of their doctrines. "God is light, not such as is seen, like the sun on fire, but intelligence and reason; that principle, through whose agency the mysteries of knowledge are understood by the wise. He never produced evil, but light, and life, and souls, of which he is the sole Lord. The former and governor of the universe pervades it, and is invested with it, as with a garment: he is immortal, and sees all things; the stars, the moon, and the sun, are his eyes. He is beneficent, and preserves, directs, and provides for all. The human mind is of celestial origin, and has a near relation to God. When it departs from the body, it returns to its parent, who expects to receive back the souls which he has sent forth. Besides the supreme divinity, inferior deities, proceeding from him, are to be worshipped, but not with the sacrifice of harmless animals, nor in temples, and upon altars adorned with gold and gems, but with eyes lifted up towards heaven, and with minds free from criminal passions.

"The notions which the ancient Indians seem to

have had of God, approach so near to the tenets of the Persian Zoroaster on this subject, that it is very probable that his doctrine passed over to India, and was, in part at least, received among them. In speaking of the universe as the garment of God, their idea seems to have been, that the intellectual principle, which animates all things, is contained within the sphere of the universe. They conceived God to be the soul of the world, a rational and intellectual light, whence all good is produced, and the chief seat of whose divinity is the sun. Their notion of divine providence, deduced from that of the soul of the world, probably extended no farther, than that this principle is necessarily the first spring of all motion, life, and enjoyment; and fell far short of that wise, and gracious voluntary superintendence, which is the Christian idea of providence. The human soul they represented as of divine original, because, with all the other eastern nations, they conceived it to be a particle, or an emanation, of that intellectual fire, by which they believed the universe to be animated. Their doctrine of the return of the soul to God, which some have confounded with the Christian doctrine of the resurrection, seems to have meant nothing more, than that the soul, after being disengaged from the grosser material body, would be re-united to the fountain of all being, the soul of the world. It is an opinion still found among the Indians, and probably of very ancient date, that there is in nature a periodical restitution of all things; when, after the return of all derived beings to their source, they are again sent forth, and the whole course of things is renewed. Inferior divinities were, doubtless, worshipped among them as emanations from the first spring of life."

You may perceive from this quotation, that Zoroaster is allowed to have been the author of your doctrine of an *immortal soul* among the Indians, and they

like others, held it on the principle of emanation. Enfield here declares that "with all the other eastern nations they conceived it to be a particle, or an emanation, of that intellectual fire, by which they believed the universe to be animated." And "when it departs from the body it returns to its parent, who expects to receive back the souls which he has sent forth." Besides—"their doctrine of the return of the soul to God—meant nothing more, than that the soul, after being disengaged from the grosser material body, would be re-united to the fountain of all being, the soul of the world." And you may also see what were their notions of a "*restitution of all things.*" It is obvious, Sir, that they had no idea of your immortal soul, which has a distinct existence from the body, to suffer or enjoy after death. No Sir, "after being disengaged from the grosser material body," it was to "be re-united to the fountain of all being, the soul of the world." This, Sir, comes much nearer to the Scripture view of the soul than it does to your system. If derived then from early revelations now lost, their opinions about the *soul* do not favor your theory.

In chapter 6, Enfield gives us some account "of the philosophy of the Arabians." He says, p. 59—"their religion consisted in the worship of the sun, stars, and planets, and resembled the ancient Chaldean superstition; which is not at all surprising, considering how extensively the Chaldean tenets were spread through the east. Their system of opinions was an heterogeneous mass, which must have been the produce of a period much later than that of which we are now treating."

Enfield, chapter 7, adverts to "the philosophy of the Phenicians" but says nothing respecting their views of the soul. He merely observes—"that the Phenicians like the other eastern nations, philosophis-

ed in the barbaric manner," which leads to the conclusion that their views were similar to those of the nations already mentioned.

In chapter 8, Enfield gives us an account of "the philosophy of the Egyptians." To the whole chapter I must refer the reader; and particularly to p. 66—68, for an account of the darkness in which the ancient opinions of the Egyptians are involved. It is too lengthy for quotation. He thus writes respecting their opinions concerning the soul and its condition after death, p. 82—84. "The opinion of the Egyptians concerning the human soul is very differently represented by different writers. It is indeed universally agreed, that they believed it to be immortal. Herodotus asserts, though perhaps without sufficient ground, that they were the first people who taught this doctrine: and Diodorus Siculus relates, that the Egyptians, instead of lamenting the death of good men, rejoiced in their felicity, conceiving that, in the invisible world, they would live forever among the pious. To the same purport is the account which he gives of the custom of bringing the characters of the deceased under a public trial, and offering up prayers to the gods on behalf of those who were adjudged to have lived virtuously, that they might be admitted into the society of good men. But it has been a subject of debate, into what place, according to the Egyptian doctrine, the souls of men passed after death. Plutarch speaks of the *amenthes* of the Egyptians, corresponding to the *hades* of the Greeks, a subterraneous region, to which the souls of dead men were conveyed. With this agrees the account given by Diodorus Siculus of the funeral customs of the Egyptians. It is also confirmed by a fact, related by Porphyry, upon the authority of Euphantus, that the Egyptians, at their funerals, offered up this prayer in the name of the deceased: 'Thou sun, who rulest

all things, and ye other powers, who give life to man, receive me and grant me an abode among the immortal gods.' Herodotus, on the contrary, gives it as the opinion of the Egyptians, that, when the body decays, the soul passes into some other animal, which is then born; and that after it has made the circuit of beasts, birds and fishes, through a period of three thousand years, it again becomes an inhabitant of a human body. Diogenes Laertius, after Hecateus, relates, that according to the tenets of the Egyptians, the soul after death continues to live, and passes into other bodies.

"These different notions concerning the state of the soul after death were probably held by different colleges of priests, some of whom were advocates for the doctrine of transmigration, while others held, that the souls of good men, after wandering for a time among the stars, were permitted to return to the society of the gods. Or, the seeming inconsistency of these opinions may be reconciled by means of a conjecture, which naturally arises from the doctrine, that God is the soul of the world, from which all things came, and to which they will return. According to this doctrine it may be conceived, that all souls, being portions of the universal mind, must return to the divinity; but that since different minds, by their union with the body, are stained with different degrees of impurity, it becomes necessary that, before their return, they should pass through different degrees of purgation, which might be supposed to be accomplished by means of successive transmigrations. According to this system, bad men would undergo this *metempsychosis* for a longer, good men for a shorter period; and the *amenthes*, or *hades*, may be conceived to have been the region, in which departed souls, immediately after death, received their respective designations."

It is easily perceived from this quotation, that something like your system now begins to makes its appearance. Let us notice the similarity of your opinions to those held by the ancient Egyptians. 1st. The Egyptians believed the souls of men were *immortal.* So do you. 2d. They believed the soul to have a distinct conscious existence after death, and that it should either suffer or enjoy, according to the character and conduct of its possessor in this world. So do you. 3d. The Egyptian *amenthes* and the Greek *hades*, are only different names for the same *repository of souls after death.* It is "*a subterranean region, to which the souls of dead men were conveyed.*"—The Egyptian *amenthes*, and your "*place of departed spirits,*" is precisely the same. Dr. Allen adopted the whole of this Egyptian notion, and could tell us where *hades* is. You only tell us it is "*somewhere.*" But, do the Scripture writers ever speak of *sheol* or *hades* as a repository of souls after death? Dr. Whitby, we have seen above, denies this. 4th. At death the Egyptians were much concerned about the future fate of the soul, and offered up prayers for its future welfare. So do our orthodox brethren, and if you do not, it is certain you ought to do it. 5th. The Egyptians believed in the purgation of souls after death. So do you; and only differ a little from them about the mode of accomplishing it. They purged souls by a series of *transmigrations.* You do it by "*consideration and reflection.*" The Egyptians believed *souls* after death made the whole circuit of transmigrations in beasts, birds, and fishes, in "*a period of three thousand years.*" But the souls of those who perished in the flood were still in hell when you wrote your Letters, which is more than three thousand years. The Egyptian mode of purging souls after death, is then more efficacious than yours, and in my apprehension it is more rational. A polluted

soul in the round of its transmigrations, certainly has a better chance of hearing of Jesus Christ, than to be shut up in your "*infernal prison.*" And could certainly *consider* and *reflect* to as much advantage, in a horse or an ass, as in your hell. The Egyptians and you are of one mind—"that since different minds, by their union with the body are stained with different degrees of impurity, it becomes necessary, that, before their return (to God) they should pass through different degrees of purgation." This, Sir, is precisely your system, and you only differ from the Egyptians about the means of this purgation. I will really feel obliged to you, to show us from the Bible, that it teaches your means of purging souls after death, but does not teach that of the Egyptians. 6th. It appears from the above quotation, that "different notions concerning the state of the soul after death, were probably held by different colleges of priests among the Egyptians." But this, Sir, is nothing strange, for are not "*different notions concerning the state of the soul after death,*" held "*by different colleges*" of Christian priests? You know one college holds that the punishment of the soul after death is to be endless. Another holds it is to be limited in its duration. One holds the punishment is to be by literal fire and brimstone. Another holds it is to be by "*painful mental reflections,*" and no punishment is to be inflicted by "*the immediate hand of God.*" Sir, are any of these opinions a whit more rational or Scriptural than those held by the Egyptians? "Some of whom were advocates for the doctrine of transmigration, while others held, that the souls of good men, after wandering for a time among the stars, were permitted to return to the society of the gods." In fact, Sir, are not the opinions of Christian priests, as various, as unscriptural, and as irrational, as the notions of the Egyptian priests on this subject? Had you

broached your system in Egypt, it would have met with more opposition than mine does, from you and others in the present day, so far as your mode of purifying souls after death is concerned. The Egyptians would have told you that you were indebted to them for the radical features of your system, but as to the mode of purifying souls after death, you are far from being *orthodox* in your opinions. The chronology of the cases show that Christians are indebted to the Egyptians, and not the Egyptians to them, for all the radical features of this system of future punishment of souls after death. 7th. Enfield thinks "the seeming inconsistency of the Egyptian opinions may be reconciled by means of a conjecture, which naturally arises from the doctrine, that God is the soul of the world, from which all things came, and to which they will return." Permit me to say, "the seeming, or rather real inconsistency of the Christian opinions," may be reconciled by returning to the Scripture doctrine, that the only hope revealed to man of future life is in being raised from the dead in the resurrection at the last day. Return to this, Sir, and it puts to rest forever the jarrings, contentions, and contradictions among all sects of Christians. I despair of ever seeing peace restored among them until this takes place.

In chapter 9, Enfield gives an account "of the philosophy of the Ethiopeans." He says their opinions on many subjects were similar to those of the Egyptians, but says nothing definitely on the points in question.

In chapter 10, he gives us an account "of the philosophy of the Celts, including the Gauls, Britons, Germans, and northern nations." He says, p. 88, "the history of the Celtic nations is involved in great obscurity, not so much from the unavoidable depredations of time, as from the total want of ancient

records." He further says, p. 92, "so offensive were their savage customs to the Romans, that Augustus prohibited the use of their religious ceremonies in Gaul, and Tiberius and Claudius issued edicts for the abolition of the druidical order." He adds, p. 93, "the same religious tenets, which the Persians had received from the Scythians, were probably also embraced by the Celts, and by them transmitted, in their migrations through Germany, Gaul and Spain." Concerning their religious tenets he thus writes, p. 98—101, "these northern nations conceived of the human soul as of divine original, rational and immortal. And that this was the universal doctrine of the Celts, whether Gauls, Britons, Germans, or other nations, is unanimously attested by the Greek and Roman writers, and by the remains of northern antiquities. Cæsar relates, that the first doctrine of the Gallic Druids was, that the soul of man is immortal: and Pomponius Mela, that one of their doctrines which is divulged among the people in order to inspire them with martial courage, is, that the soul is immortal. This account is confirmed by Valerius Maximus, Strabo, and other historians, and the fables every where received among the Celts, concerning a future state, leave no room to doubt, that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul was generally received among them.

"Such was the actual effect which this doctrine had upon the minds of the Celts, that we find no people superior to them in the magnanimous contempt of death. Valerius Maximus extols the brave and hardy spirit of the Cimbrians and Celtiberians, who, in the midst of the hazards of battle, exulted in the expectation of going to a more glorious and happy life. He also speaks of a Thracian people, with whom it was the custom to celebrate the birth of a man with tears, but his funeral with joy; because the end of

life is better than the beginning. Of the Hipsani, who were a Celtic colony, Silius Italicus says:

> "This hardy race, still lavish of their breath,
> The flow'r of youth once past, rush on to death;
> Scorning life's path with toti'ring steps to tread,
> With their own hand they cut the fatal thread.

"The history of all the northern nations abounds with facts, which prove their contempt of death to have originated from an expectation of immortality.

"What kind of immortality these nations expected is not clearly ascertained. According to Cæsar and Diodorus Siculus, they thought that the soul, at death, passes from one body to another. This doctrine of transmigration is also ascribed to them by Lucan:

> "If dying mortals doom they sing aright,
> No ghosts descend to dwell in dreadful night:
> No parting souls to grisly Pluto go,
> Nor seek the dreary silent shades below:
> But forth they fly, immortal in their kind,
> And other bodies in new worlds they find:
> Thus life forever runs its endless race,
> And, like a line, death but divides the space.

"On the contrary Pomponius Mela represents the Celts as expecting to pass, after death, into the invisible world. And this notion best agrees with the authorities already cited on this subject, and with the accounts which are given, by various writers, of the funeral ceremonies practised in the northern nations, particularly that of committing to the funeral pile, or to the sepulchre, whatever had been dear to the deceased. It is also most consonant to the mythological language of the ancient Edda, which every where represents the future life, as an assembly of good or bad men, in a state of reward or punishment, and only speaks of a return to life for the purpose of re-uniting the soul and body, after the soul has passed

through a necessary course of purification, previously to its admission into the regions of the happy. From this state of purgation none were to be excused, except those who had voluntarily exposed themselves to death in battle: and hence it was, that they who fell in war were deemed to have made a glorious and happy exit from life, whilst they who died by sickness were thought to have perished shamefully and wretchedly. To those brave spirits who died in battle, the gates of the palace of Odin were immediately opened; and they were to live in his hall (Valhalla) in the full enjoyment of every thing which delighted them on earth. Others, who had lived a pious, just, and temperate life, and at last died by sickness, were to be admitted, after the necessary purification, into Gimle, a bright and happy mansion, where they should live forever; whilst they who had, in this life, been guilty of great crimes (among which perjury, adultery, and assassination, were reckoned the most heinous) were to be consigned to *hela*, where they should remain in punishment, till the *twilight of the gods;* a term by which is denoted a general restitution of all things, when after the burning of the world, a new period of existence would commence.

"The similarity of the Celtic doctrines to those of the eastern nations already considered, favors the conjecture, that the northern mythology is derived from oriental traditions, which accompanied the migrations of the Scythians towards the northern and western parts of Europe."

On this quotation it may be remarked, 1st, that those northern nations believed the soul rational and immortal, and a subject of reward and punishment after death. This accounts for such opinions being so prevalent and deep-rooted in those nations to this day. But observe, Sir, this doctrine was used for

military purposes, for "Pomponius Mela" declares "that one of their doctrines which is divulged among the people *in order to inspire them with martial courage*, is, *that the soul is immortal.*" More proof of this I shall adduce immediately.

2d. Those nations had their *hela*, which I presume is only another name for your *hell*, in which to punish sinners after death. "They who had, in this life, been guilty of great crimes (among which perjury, adultery and assassination were reckoned the most heinous) were to be consigned to *hela*, where they should remain in punishment till the *twilight of the gods;* a term by which is denoted a general restitution of all things, when after the burning of the world, a new period of existence would commence." Those northern nations like you, sent *great* sinners to hell or *hela*. But these great sinners, could pay off the whole score by dying in the field of battle, just as easily as the thief on the cross by a few hours penitence and suffering. But it seems those who did go to hell, were to remain there in punishment till the *twilight of the gods*, or until after the burning of the world, when a new period of existence would commence. But you carry your punishment beyond this, for you tell us, God after this is to destroy both soul and body in gehenna; and without mentioning any *twilight of the gods*, after this, when they shall be released from their punishment. When, Sir, is your twilight of the gods to commence after the resurrection of the dead?

3d. From a state "of purgation after death none were to be excused," except those "*who fell in war.*" To "those brave spirits who died in battle the gates of the palace of Odin were immediately opened; and they were to live in his hall (Valhalla) in the full enjoyment of every thing which delighted them on earth." To die, covered with *glory* in the field of

battle, was a better passport for this heaven, than piety or justice, for it is added, "others, who had lived a pious, just, and temperate life, and at last died by sickness, were to be admitted, after the necessary purification, into *gimle*, a bright and happy mansion, where they should live forever." But why all this preference to persons who died in the field of battle? The following quotation from Mosheim, vol. i. chap. 1. not only explains this, but shows both the origin and intention of the ancient religions of the heathen. He says—"when, from the sacred rites of the ancient Romans, we pass to a review of the other religions that prevailed in the world, we shall find, that the most remarkable may be properly divided into two classes, of which the one will comprehend the religious systems which owe their existence to *political* views; and the other, those which seem to have been formed for *military* purposes. In the former class may be ranked the religions of most of the eastern nations, especially of the Persians, Egyptians, and Indians, which appear to have been solely calculated for the preservation of the state, the supporting of the royal authority and grandeur, the maintenance of public peace, and the advancement of civil virtues. Under the *military* class may be comprehended the religious system of the northern nations; since all the traditions that we find among the Germans, the Britons, the Celts, and the Goths, concerning their divinities, have a manifest tendency to excite and nourish fortitude and ferocity, an insensibility of danger, and a contempt of life. An attentive inquiry into the religions of these respective nations will abundantly verify what is here asserted." This is fully verified by Enfield's statements above; and Mosheim and Enfield mutually testify that those religions were got up for *state* and *military purposes*. That your system in its radical features, is the same

as theirs, you will not deny, for it has been your theme throughout your book, that the heathen believed in the immortality of the soul and a future retribution. You have gloried in this, that you were of the same faith with them on these subjects. Look then, my dear Sir, at the origin of your system.—Consider well by whom, and for what purposes it was first invented. I trust in God that this free and enlightened country will never need your *hell* for "*supporting of the royal authority and grandeur, the maintenance of a public peace and the advancement of civil virtues*, or *urging on its soldiers to death and heaven in a field of battle.*" But has not the Christian hell been often used for these purposes? Yes Sir, even in the island of Great Britain, the idea has been held up to the soldiery, that if they died covered with glory in the field of battle they were sure of heaven.

In chapter 11, Enfield gives an account "of the philosophy of the Etrurians and Romans." He says nothing respecting their views of the soul or its condition after death.

Chapter 12, gives an account of "the philosophy of the Scythians, including the Thracians and Gete." In p. 107, 108, he gives an account of their religious opinions. But they are similar to those among the Celtic nations mentioned above, who migrated from the Scythians. He says, p. 111, 112, that the most celebrated name among the Scythians was Zamolxis. Concerning him he says—"from the general testimony of the ancients it appears, that Zamolxis was a Thracian, who, in a very remote period, taught the Scythians the doctrine of the immortality of the soul; whose name they, after his death, enrolled among the divinities, and with whom they assured themselves that they should dwell in the invisible world. Herodotus relates, that, on certain festal solemnities, they chose by lot several persons, who were to be

sent as messengers to Zamolxis, and that they put them to death by throwing them up into the air, and catching them, as they fell, upon the points of their spears; a story, which is the more credible, as it is well known that the practice of offering human sacrifices prevailed among the Scythians and Thracians."

On the same page in concluding his account of the barbaric philosophy, he says—"from all that we have been able to collect concerning the state of knowledge in the several nations which have passed under our notice, we must conclude, that the barbaric philosophy was very different, in its leading characters, from the philosophy afterwards studied and taught among the Greeks. It was indeed employed upon important subjects, both divine and human; but instead of investigating truth from clear principles, and by legitimate methods of reasoning, it relied chiefly upon tradition, and gave its simple and easy assent to doctrines and fables transmitted to posterity by the priests."

Such is Enfield's account of the barbaric philosophy. I have quoted every thing material said of the opinions held by those nations, respecting the soul and its condition after death. I leave the reader to judge of the occasional remarks made, and add many to them, which for want of room I must omit. I should swell my book beyond all reasonable bounds, to put on paper all the remarks which have occurred in the course of this investigation.

In vol. i. book 2, chap. 1, Enfield proceeds to the "fabulous philosophy of the Greeks." By consulting p. 113—115, you will see, that the Greeks "received the elements of knowledge from barbarians." That "Greece was first civilized by colonies from Egypt, Phenicia, Thrace, and other countries." And "whatever dogmas they had been taught, in their respective countries, concerning things divine and hu-

man, they delivered to those new formed societies, with the design of bringing them under the restraint of virtuous discipline. Hence the aspect of sacred philosophy was very different in different parts of Greece. Phoroneus and Cecrops being Egyptians, Cadmus a Phenician, and Orpheus a Thracian, each of these would, of course, bring into Greece, with their several colonies, the religious and philosophical tenets of their respective nations, and thus lay the foundation of diversity of opinion." They had seen the uses to which religious tenets had been put in their own countries, and Enfield admits they were used for state purposes among the Greeks. He adds: "it was not possible" says Strabo "to lead a promiscuous multitude to religion and virtue by philosophical harangues; this could only be effected by the aid of superstition, by prodigies and fables. The thunderbolt, the egis, the trident, the spear, torches and snakes, were the instruments made use of by the founders of states to terrify the ignorant vulgar into subjection." The Egyptian *amenthes*, and the Celtic *hela*, were powerful instruments, "to terrify the ignorant vulgar into subjection." The orthodox *hell* is an improvement on all the instruments before used "to terrify the ignorant vulgar into subjection." Your *hell*, Sir, is only a modification of theirs, too strong for common nerves to bear; but both, in the present day, seem in a great measure to have lost their power to terrify.

Enfield says, p. 115—"the first of the Greeks who is said to have taught philosophy and the arts, is Prometheus." Again, p. 116, he says, "Orpheus, the most celebrated of all the Greeks in the fabulous ages, distinguishes himself as a teacher of religion and philosophy. His name is as illustrious among the Greeks, as that of Zoroaster among the Persians, Buddas among the Indians, or of Thoth or Hermes

among the Egyptians." On p. 118, he adds, "the instruments which Orpheus made use of in governing and instructing the ignorant Greeks, were poetry, music, medicine, magic, and astrology, which he had learned in Egypt. Having been accustomed, both here and in his own country, to the allegorical mode of instruction, he communicated to them the doctrine of religion in a mythological form. He was probably the author of the Eleusinian and Panathenean mysteries, and other religious institutions." Concerning Orpheus' opinions respecting the soul, he thus writes p. 121, 122, "the human soul, Orpheus, after the Thracians and Egyptians, from whom he derived his philosophy, held to be immortal. Diodorus Siculus relates, that he was the first who taught (that is among the Greeks,) the doctrine of the future punishment of the wicked, and the future happiness of the good. That this doctrine was commonly received among the followers of Orpheus appears from the following anecdote. A priest of Orpheus, who was exceedingly poor and wretched, boasting to Philip of Macedon, that all who were admitted into the Orphic mysteries would be happy after death, Philip said to him, 'why then do you not immediately die, and put an end to your poverty and misery?' The planets and the moon, Orpheus conceived to be habitable worlds, and the stars to be fiery bodies like the sun: he taught that they are animated by divinities; an opinion, which had been commonly received in the east, and which was afterwards adopted by the Pythagoreans, and other Grecian philosophers."

What this "*priest of Orpheus*" boasted of, is precisely what Christian priests, and Christian people boast of in our day, in regard to the Christian mysteries. Believe an orthodox creed, and join an orthodox sect, and little doubt is entertained of your happiness after death. But like this priest of Orpheus,

few of them ever end their days, to get to heaven, which shows they have no greater confidence in their doctrine than he had in the truth of his. Yet some of these people say—"if they believed as Universalists do, they would end their days by suicide, and get out of this miserable world." It is not the hope of heaven leads them to commit suicide, but the terror of *hell*, and the present age abounds with so many cases of this kind, that it ought to rouse the whole community into alarm, about that system of religion which has such a tendency. I am surprised that this fact does not lead sensible orthodox men to reflect, that there must be something wrong about their system. What Scripture writer's preaching ever led one of their hearers to commit suicide?

Enfield further says, p. 126, 127—"there were perhaps, different opinions among the ancient cosmogonists, concerning the first cause of nature.—Some might, possibly, ascribe the origin of all things to a generating force, destitute of thought, which they conceived to be inherent in matter, without looking to any higher principle. But it is probable, that the general opinion among them was that which had prevailed among the Egyptians and in the east, and was communicated by tradition to the Greeks, that matter, or chaos, existed eternally with God, that by the divine energy of emanation, material forms were sent forth from him, and the visible world arose into existence. This principle being admitted, the whole system of the ancient theogonies appears consistent, and a satisfactory explanation may be given of most of the Grecian fables. Upon this supposition, the sum of the doctrine of the theogonies, divested of allegory and poetry, will be as follows:

"The first matter, containing the seeds of all future being, existed from eternity with God. At length, the divine energy upon matter produced a motion

among its parts, by which those of the same kind were brought together, and those of a different kind were separated, and by which, according to certain wise laws, the various forms of the material world were produced. The same energy of emanation gave existence to animals and men, and to gods who inhabit the heavenly bodies, and various other parts of nature. Among men, those who possess a larger portion of the divine nature than others, are hereby impelled to great and beneficent actions, and afford illustrious proofs of their divine original, on account of which, they are after death raised to a place among the gods, and become objects of religious worship.

"Upon the basis of these notions, it is easy to conceive, that the whole mythological system, and all the religious rites and mysteries of the Greeks, might be founded."

The eternity of matter was almost universally believed in the heathen world. "From nothing nothing can come," was a maxim generally adopted. I submit it for consideration, if Gen. 1: 1, was not directed against this maxim. "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." Or as some render the words, "in the beginning God created the substance of the heavens, and the substance of the earth." It is manifest, that throughout the Bible, the true God and his wisdom is often set in contrast to the heathen gods and their superstitious maxims and worship.

On p. 128, he says—"the immortal Homer flourished before any other poet, whose writings are now extant. The time of his birth, after all that has been written to ascertain it is still disputed. It is probable that he lived about 900 years before the Christian era." He adds, p. 129, "but his works were written merely as a display of poetical genius, without any design of delivering precepts of religion,

philosophy, or the arts, further than as they accidentally arose from his subject."

In chapter 2, he proceeds to "the political philosophy of the Greeks," and in p. 131, strongly confirms what was stated above, that the heathen religions were got up for state and military purposes. He says—"one principal end of the religious rites and mysteries which the first founders of the Grecian states introduced, was, unquestionably, the support of civil authority; and the management of the affairs of religion and of those of government, were, at first, in the same hands." It is so to this day in most nations of the earth. In chapter 3, Enfield proceeds to the different sects of philosophy among the Greeks and begins with

"*The Ionic sect.*" It was founded by Thales; concerning whom he says, p. 149, 150—"a principle of motion, wherever it exists, is, according to Thales, mind. Hence he taught, that the magnet, and amber, are endued with a soul, which is the cause of their attracting powers. The soul, in all beings (as Aristotle represents his doctrine) is a moving power having the cause of motion within itself, and is always in action. It was one of his tenets, that all nature is full of demons, or intelligences proceeding from God. It is easy to conceive, that these opinions might have been derived from the notion, that the deity is the soul of the world, and the source of all motion and intelligence."

Concerning Anaxagoras he says, p. 156—"being asked, just before his death, whether he wished to be carried for interment to Clazomene, his native city, he said: it is unnecessary; the way to the regions below is every where alike open." And adds, on p. 159—that "Anaxagoras was the first among the Greeks who conceived mind as detached from matter, and as acting upon it with intelligence and de-

sign in the formation of the uviverse." He says further on p. 161, Archelaus, of Miletus, taught—"that the earth was at the beginning a muddy mass, whence living animals were produced and nourished; and that animals have souls which differ in their powers according to the structure of the bodies in which they reside."

"*The Socratic school or sect.*" See chapter 4. Enfield says, p. 185, 186—"concerning the human soul, the opinion of Socrates, according to Xenophon, was, that it is allied to the divine being, not by a participation of essence, but by a similarity of nature; that man excels all other animals in the faculty of reason, and that the existence of good men will be continued after death, in a state in which they will receive the reward of their virtue. Although it appears that, on this latter topic, Socrates was not wholly free from uncertainty, the consolation which he professed to derive from this source in the immediate prospect of death, leaves little room to doubt that he entertained a real belief and expectation of immortality. The doctrine which Cicero ascribes to Socrates, on this head, is, that the human soul is a divine principle which, when it passes out of the body, returns to heaven; and that this passage is most easy to those who have, in this life, made the greatest progress in virtue."* It is well known that Socrates was unjust-

* Concerning the confidence of Cicero and Socrates in the truth of the soul's immortality, and their arguments in support of this doctrine, let us hear professor Stuart. He says in his Essay on *aion* and *aionios*, published in a late number of "the Spirit of the Pilgrims," p. 407, 408, "Cicero, incomparably the most able defender of the soul's immortality of which the heathen world can yet boast, very ingenuously confesses, that after all the arguments which he had adduced in order to confirm the doctrine in question, it so fell out, that his mind was satisfied of it, only when directly employed in contemplating the arguments adduced in its favor. At all other times, he fell unconsciously into a state of doubt and darkness.

"It is notorious, also, that Socrates, the next most able advocate among the heathen for the same doctrine, has adduced arguments to

ly condemned to death by the Athenians. Enfield, p. 180—182, gives an account of his last moments, to which I refer the reader. "A story," says Cicero, "which I never read without tears."

From the school of Socrates many sects arose. In chapters 5, 6, and 7, Enfield gives an account of the Cyrenic sect, the Megaric or Eristic sect, and the Eliac and Eretric school, but says nothing respecting their views of the soul. These sects were of short duration.

In chapter 8, he gives an account "of the Academic sect," and sect. 1, "of Plato and his philosophy." Enfield says, p. 211—"when other sects fell into oblivion, the Platonic philosophy, united with the Peripatetic, still flourished. Even to the present day, Plato has many followers: his writings still give

establish the never-ceasing existence of the soul, which will not bear the test of examination. Such is the argument by which he endeavors to prove, that we shall always continue to exist because we always have existed; and this last proposition he labors to establish, on the ground that all our present acquisitions of knowledge are only so many *reminiscences* of what we formerly knew, in a state of existence *antecedent* to our present one. Unhappy lot of philosophy, to be doomed thus to prop itself up, with supports so weak and fragile as this! How can the soul be filled with consolation, in prospect of death, without some better and more cheering light than can spring from such a source? How can it quench its thirst for immortality, by drinking in such impure and turbid streams as these? Poor wandering heathen! How true it is—and what a glorious, blessed truth it is—that 'life and immortality are brought to light in the gospel!' It is equally true, that they are brought to light *only* there." And may I not be permitted to say—"poor wandering Christian," who still goes back to the heathen, yea, to lost revelations, to support the doctrine of the immortality of the soul and a future retribution? It is indeed a "glorious, blessed truth" that "life and immortality are brought to light in the gospel." But if—"they are brought to light *only* there," I call on Messrs. Stuart and Hudson to show if they can, that any other life or immortality are brought to light in the gospel, except life and immortality by a resurrection from the dead. Either show that there is a life and immortality founded on the immortality of the soul revealed in the gospel, or renounce this doctrine. If the reasons of Cicero and Socrates in its support, "will not bear the test of examination," produce yours, that we may see if they are any better.

a tincture to the speculations and language of philosophy and theology." This part then demands attention.

It was asserted by you that the ancient heathen derived their opinions from the Jews. It seems this was asserted also respecting Plato. But if you consult Enfield from p. 214—218, you will see that he formally refutes this opinion. And on p. 232, 233, declares, that Plato—"collected the tenets of other philosophers which were, in many particulars, contradictory, and could by no exertion of ingenuity be brought to coalesce; and that, out of this heterogeneous mass he framed a confused system, destitute of form or consistency." In p. 234, he says—"wisdom in the strict Platonic sense of the term, is the knowledge of those things which truly exist and are comprehended by the intellect, particularly those which respect God, and the human soul as distinct from the body." He adds, p. 235—"in meditation, the soul converses with itself; thought flows through the lips by means of the vocal organs. Intellection is the operation of the understanding contemplating intelligible forms, or ideas. It is two-fold; the first, that of the soul contemplating ideas before it descends into the body; the other, that which it exercises after it is immersed in the body, which may be also termed natural knowledge. This kind of knowledge consists in the recollection of those things which the mind had known in its pre-existent state, and differs from memory in the object; memory being employed upon sensible things, reminiscence upon things purely intelligible."

But Enfield, p. 246—248, gives us the following account of Plato's opinions respecting the soul.—"Plato refers to the head of the philosophy of nature his doctrine concerning the human soul; a doctrine which he treats obscurely, on the ground of his

[illegible]othesis concerning spiritual emanations [illegible]ivine nature. He appears to have taught, [illegible]e soul of man is derived by emanation from [illegible]d; but that this emanation was not immediate, but through the intervention of the soul of the world, which was itself debased by some material admixture; and consequently, that the human soul, receding further from the first intelligence, is inferior in perfection to the soul of the world. He conceived the soul of man to be, in the material parts of its nature, formed for conversing with sensible objects, and, in its intellectual part, capable of spiritual contemplation, but what he meant by *ohema*, the material vehicle of the soul, is uncertain. The relation which the human soul, in its original constitution, bears to matter, Plato appears to have considered as the source of moral evil. Since the soul of the world, by partaking of matter, has within itself the seeds of evil, he inferred, that this must be the case still more with respect to the soul of man. Upon the great question, in what manner the soul acts upon the body, Plato speaks obscurely and inconsistently, but it is probable that, as he conceived the soul of the world to produce the motion of the earth, and the heavenly bodies, by means of that part of its nature which is material; so he supposed the power of moving bodies, which belongs to the human soul, to be the effect of its material principle.

"To account for the origin and present state of human souls, Plato supposes, that when God formed the universe, he separated from the soul of the world inferior souls, equal in number to the stars, and assigned to each its proper celestial abode; but that these souls (by what means, or for what reason, does not appear) were sent down to the earth into human bodies, as into a sepulchre or prison. He ascribes to this cause the depravity and misery to which hu-

man nature is liable; and maintains, that it is only by disengaging itself from all animal passions, and rising above sensible objects to the contemplation of the world of intelligence, that the soul of man can be prepared to return to its original habitation.

"Not consistently with the preceding doctrine, our philosopher frequently speaks of the soul of man as consisting of three parts; the first, the seat of intelligence; the second, of passion; the third, of appetite; and assigns to each its proper place in the human body. The first of these *portions* or *faculties* of the soul (for Plato speaks of them under both these denominations) he conceived to have been derived from God; the second and third, from matter. The irrational parts of the soul, in the Platonic system, are not, however, to be confounded with the blood and nerves, which they were supposed to inhabit, and to move.

"Lastly, Plato teaches, in express terms, the doctrine of the immortality of the rational soul; but he has rested the proof of this doctrine upon arguments, drawn from the more fanciful parts of his system. For example: in nature, all things terminate in their contraries; the state of sleep terminates in that of waking; and the reverse: so, life ends in death, and death in life. The soul is a simple indivisible substance, and therefore incapable of dissolution, or corruption. The objects to which it naturally adheres are spiritual and incorruptible; therefore its nature is so. All our knowledge is acquired by the reminiscence of ideas contemplated in a prior state; as the soul therefore must have existed before this life, it is probable, that it will continue to exist after it. Life being the conjunction of the soul with the body, death is nothing more than their separation. Whatever is the principle of motion, must be incapable of destruction. Such is the substance of the arguments

for the immortality of the soul, contained in the celebrated dialogue of the Phædo."

Concerning Plato's opinions on this subject he says further, p. 250—"the only power in human nature, which can acquire a resemblance to the supreme good is reason. The minds of philosophers are fraught with valuable treasures; and, after the death of the body, they shall be admitted to divine entertainments; so that, whilst, with the gods, they are employed in surveying the fields of truth, they will look down with contempt upon the folly of those who are contented with earthly shadows." He adds on the same page: "it is necessary to be convinced, that the body is a prison, from which the soul must be released, before it can arrive at the knowledge of those things which are real and immutable." Such, Sir, were Plato's notions concerning the soul, and such the arguments by which he supported its immortality. Bad as they are, they are rather better than yours, founded on *lost revelations*. Did he obtain his system from this source? If he did, they are certainly a strange jumble of opinions to be called a revelation from God. Why you and others should hold Plato's opinions concerning *disembodied souls*, yet reject his notion of *pre-existent souls* is rather strange. What proof can you give us that *disembodied souls* can *think* but that Plato's pre-existent souls could not?

In section 2, Enfield says—"the school of Plato long continued famous, but passed through several changes, on account of which it was successively distinguished into the old, the middle, and the new academy." But he gives us nothing different respecting their opinions concerning the soul or its condition after death from those taught by Plato. See the whole section.

In chapter 9, we have an account "of Aristotle and the Peripatetic sect." He says, p. 304—"nothing

is to be met with in the writings of Aristotle, which decisively determines, whether he thought the soul of man mortal or immortal: but the former appears most probable, from his notion of the nature and origin of the human soul, which he conceived to be an intellectual power, externally transmitted into the human body from an eternal intelligence, the common source of rationality to human beings. Aristotle does not inform his readers what he conceived this universal principle to be; but there is no proof, that he supposed the union of this principle with any individual to continue after death."

Among the successors of Aristotle, he says, p. 312—"Strato also taught that the seat of the soul is in the middle of the brain; and that it only acts by means of the senses." And adds on the same page, concerning Dicearchus, "his tenets were, that there is no such thing as mind, or soul, either in man or beast; that the principle by which animals perceive and act is equally diffused through the body, is inseparable from it, and expires with it."

In chapter 10, Enfield gives us some account "of the Cynic sect." But the following is all he says respecting their opinions concerning the soul or its condition after death. Diogenes "hearing one of his friends lament that he should not die in his own country, he said 'be not uneasy; from every place there is a passage to the regions below,'" p. 329. And on p. 332, says—"in Menedemus, of Lampsacus, the spirit of the Cynic sect degenerated into downright madness. Dressed in a black cloak, with an Arcadian cap upon his head, on which are drawn the figures of the twelve signs of the zodiac, with tragic buskins on his legs, with a long beard, and with an ashen staff in his hand, he went about like a maniac, saying, that he was a spirit returned from the infernal regions to admonish the world." This man's

philosophy, and some people's religion in the present day, produce similar effects. It makes no great difference, whether a person is made crazy with philosophy or religion.

In chapter 11, Enfield gives an account "of the Stoic sect." He says it resembled in its principles the sects from which they were borrowed, p. 340. And p. 356, 357, adds—"portions of the etherial soul of the world being distributed throughout all bodies, hence arise, in the system of the Stoics, inferior gods and demons, with which all nature is peopled. All these divinities they considered as derived from the soul of nature, and as limited in their duration. 'Chrysippus and Cleanthes,' says Plutarch, 'taught, that the heavens, the earth, the air, and the sea, are full of demons (the devils who possessed persons mentioned in the New Testament) were divided by the Stoics into superior and inferior; the superior, those which inhabited the sun and stars, which they considered as *ousias psuhikas*, animated substances; the inferior, human souls separated from the body, or heroes.' 'Illustrious men,' says Cicero, 'whose souls survive and enjoy immormortality, are justly esteemed to be gods, since they are of an excellent and immortal nature. As the Stoics held, that all inferior divinities are portions separated from the soul of the world; so they conceived, that a period would arrive, when they would return into the first celestial fire, and supposed that, at the same time, the whole visible world would be consumed in one general conflagration.'" He says further, p. 362, 363, "from this brief account of the Stoic doctrine of the final conflagration, it evidently appears, that it differs in several essential particulars from the Christian doctrine on this head. It is the work of fate performed by natural and mechanical laws, and repeated eternally at certain periods,

without any good reason, since with every revolution the same disorders and vices return. Philo justly ridicules this dogma; remarking, that the Stoics make their deities act like children, who raise up piles of sand only for the pleasure of beating them down. Several of the Stoics themselves were aware of the absurdity of this system, and rejected it; particularly Boethius, Posidonius, Diogenes the Babylonian, and Panætius.

"It is a necessary consequence of this doctrine, of the conflagration and subsequent restoration of all things, that the race of men will return to life.—Whence it appears in what sense we are to understand the Stoic doctrine of a resurrection, upon which Seneca has written with so much elegance; and what meaning we are to annex to his words, when he says, 'death, of which we are so much afraid, and which we are so desirous to avoid, is only the interruption, not the destruction, of our existence; the day will come, which will restore us to life.' This tenet is not to be confounded with the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body; for, according to the Stoics, men return to life, not by the voluntary appointment of a wise and merciful God, but by the law of fate; and are not renewed for the enjoyment of a better and happier condition, but drawn back into their former state of imperfection and misery. Accordingly Seneca says, 'this restoration many would reject, were it not that their renovated life is accompanied with a total oblivion of past events.'" On the same page, and p. 364, he adds—"Concerning the duration of the soul of man, the Stoics entertained very different opinions. Cleanthes thought, that all souls would remain till the final conflagration. Chrysippus was of opinion, that this would only be the lot of the wise and good; and Seneca seems to have entertained the same notion. Epicte-

tus and Antoninus asserted, that as soon as the soul is released from the body, it returns to the soul of the world, or is lost in the universal principle of fire. Some were so absurd as to believe, that the human soul, consisting of a fiery spirit condensed by its union with air, is capable of being extinguished.—Whilst others, with equal absurdity, conceived that the human soul, shut up within the gross body, could not, at death, find a free passage, but remained with the body till it was entirely destroyed. The only idea of the immortality of the soul, which seems to have been entertained by the Stoics, was that of a renovation of being, in that fated circuit of things which we have seen to be one of their fundamental doctrines. In the universal restoration of nature, some imagined that each individual would return to its former body; whilst others conceived, that, after a revolution of the great year, similar souls would be placed in similar bodies. Those who held the existence of the soul after death, supposed it to be removed into the celestial regions of the gods, where it remains, till, at the general conflagration, all souls, both human and divine, shall be lost in the deity. But many supposed, that before they were admitted among the divinities, they must purge away their inherent vices and imperfections, by a temporary residence in the ærial region between the earth and the moon itself. With respect to depraved and ignoble souls, it was a common opinion, that after death they were agitated in the lower region of the air, till the fiery parts were separated from the grosser, and rose by their natural levity to the orbit of the moon, where they were still further purified and refined: a kind of mechanical purgatory, which very well agreed with the mechanical principles of the Stoic philosophy. These fancies are treated with ridicule by Epictetus and Seneca, who frequently speak of

the happiness of good men after death in terms, which might have suited a better system. Seneca, consoling Marcia under the loss of her son, says, 'the sacred assembly of the Scipios and Catos, who have themselves despised life, and obtained freedom by death, shall welcome the youth to the region of happy souls. Your father himself (for all are there known to all) shall embrace his grand-son, and shall direct his eyes, now furnished with new light, along the courses of the neighboring stars, with delight explaining to him the mysteries of nature, not from conjecture, but from certain knowledge. Like a welcome guide in an unknown city, he will unfold to the inquiring stranger the causes of the celestial appearances.'"

These quotations afford matter for many remarks. I shall only notice the following. 1st. Have not Christians learned from Seneca how to console people under the loss of their relations by death? Where Sir, do you find any Scripture writer administering this kind of consolation? 2d. Were not the Stoic notions about the soul, and the means of its reformation after death, as rational, and as Scriptural as yours? And surely, they quote just as much of the Bible as you have done, in proof of your means of purifying souls after death. 3d. But in those days such fancies were "treated with ridicule by Epictetus and Seneca." And Enfield tells us, p. 382, 383, "Panetius, a Rhodian, was a polite and respectable philosopher" but "he treated astrological predictions, and divinations of every kind with contempt, and seems to have rejected the doctrine of the immortality of the soul." Ought your system to be any better treated now? Its popularity is its safety against this. Is it not a pity, Sir, that notions should be retained by Christians in the nineteenth century,

which the heathen themselves laughed at and treated with contempt?

In chapter 12, sect 1. Enfield gives us an account "of the Italic or Pythagoric sect." But what is said in reference to the soul or its condition after death is similar to what has been already quoted. See the whole section, particularly p. 385—387. 418—423. He says, p. 420, 421—"subordinate to the deity, it was taught in the Italic school, that there are three orders of intelligence, gods, demons, heroes, who are distinguished by their respective degrees of excellence and dignity, and by the nature of the homage which is due to them; gods being to be preferred in honor to demi-gods or demons, and demons to heroes, or men. These three orders, in the Pythagorean system, were emanations at different degrees of proximity from the supreme intelligence, the particles of subtile ether assuming a grosser clothing the further they receded from the fountain. The third order, or heroes, were supposed to be invested with a subtile material clothing. Hierocles defines a hero to be, a rational mind united with a luminous body. If to these three species we add a fourth, the human mind, we have the whole scale of divine emanation, as it was conceived by this sect of philosophers. All these they imagined to proceed from God, as the first source of intelligence, and to have received from him a pure, simple, immutable nature. God, being himself one, and the origin of all diversity, they represented him under the notion of Monad, and subordinate intelligences, as numbers derived and included in unity. Thus the numbers or derived intelligences of Pythagoras agree with the ideas of Plato, except, perhaps, that the latter were of a nature perfectly spiritual, but the former were clothed with a subtile etherial body.

The region of the air was supposed by the Pytha-

goreans to be full of spirits, demons, or heroes, who cause sickness or health to man or beast, and communicate, at their pleasure, by means of dreams, and other instruments of divination, the knowledge of future events. That Pythagoras himself held this opinion cannot be doubted, if it be true, as his biographers relate, that he professed to cure diseases by incantations. It is probable that he derived it from the Egyptians, among whom it was believed that many diseases were caused by demonical possessions."

Again he says, p. 422, "concerning man, the Pythagorians taught, that, consisting of an elementary nature, a divine or rational principle, he is a microcosm, or compendium of the universe; that his soul is a self-moving principle, composed of two parts, the rational, which is a portion of the soul of the world, seated in the brain, and the irrational, which includes the passions, and is seated in the heart; that man participates in both these with the brutes, which, from the temperament of their body, and their want of the power of speech, are incapable of acting rationally; that the sensitive soul, *thumos*, perishes, but the rational mind, *fren*, is immortal, because the source whence it is derived is immortal; that after the rational mind is freed from the chains of the body, it assumes an etherial vehicle, and passes into the regions of the dead, where it remains till it is sent back to this world, to be the inhabitant of some other body, brutal or human; and that after suffering successive purgations, when it is sufficiently purified, it is received among the gods, and returns to the eternal source from which it first proceeded. The doctrine of the Pythagoreans, respecting the nature of brute animals, and the *transmigration of souls*, were the foundation of their abstinence from animal food, and of the exclusion of animal sacrifices from their

religious ceremonies." I suspect, Sir, you derived your "*vehicle*" for souls after death from the Pythagorean philosophy. It is certain you did not learn it from the Bible. Here you may also see the origin of demonical possessions.

In section 2, he gives us some account "of the disciples and followers of Pythagoras." Concerning Alemon, he taught—"the sun, moon, and stars are eternal, and are inhabited by portions of that divine fire, which is the first principle in nature. The moon is in the form of a boat, and when the bottom of the boat is turned towards the earth, it is invisible. The brain is the chief seat of the soul." Concerning Empedocles he says, p. 430, 431, that he taught—"many demons, portions of the divine nature, wander through the region of the air, and administer human affairs. Not only man, but brute animals are allied to the divinity; for that one spirit which pervades the universe unites all animated beings to itself, and to one another. It is therefore unlawful to kill or eat animals, which are allied to us in their principle of life." And p. 432—"the soul of man consists of two parts; the sensitive, produced from the first principles with the elements; and the rational, a demon sprung from the divine soul of the world, and sent down into the body as a punishment for its crimes in a former state, to remain there till it is sufficiently purified to return to God. In the course of the transmigration to which human souls are liable, they may inhabit not only different human bodies, but the body of an animal or plant. All nature is subject to the immutable and eternal law of necessity." And p. 434, 435, Ocellus taught—"since there is nothing exterior to the universe, it is impossible that any thing which now exists should ever have been produced from, or should ever be reduced to, nothing: individual beings, however, are of limited duration, being subject

to the changes of birth, increase, and decay, in perpetual succession. Human beings do not undergo this kind of circuitous change, but at death suffer entire dissolution. Every region of nature is filled with inhabitants; the heavens with gods, the air with demons, and the earth with men. The race of man is perpetual. The parts of the earth, and its inhabitants, are changed and perish; the earth itself always remains." See the whole section.

Chapter 13, gives an account "of the Eliatic sect." Enfield says, p. 446, that Parmenides taught—"the first men were produced from mud, by the action of heat upon cold; that the frame of the world is liable to decay, but the universe itself remains the same; and that the chief seat of the soul is the heart." He adds, p. 448, "that all bodies are composed of four elements, heat and moisture, cold and dryness; and that the body of man is from the earth, and his soul an equal mixture of these four elements." And p. 458, 459, Democritus taught—"men were at first from water and earth. Our knowledge of the existence of man arises from consciousness. The soul, or principle of animal life, and motion, is the result of a combination of round and fiery particles: it consists of two parts, the one seated in the breast, which is the rational; the other diffused through the whole body, which is irrational. The soul is mortal, and perishes with the body; but human bodies, which perish, will revive." And adds, p. 460—"the notion of Democritus concerning the reviviscence of human bodies seems to have been misunderstood by Pliny. This philosopher can only be supposed, consistently with his system, to have meant, that the atoms of which any human soul had consisted, after being separated and dispersed through infinite space, would in some distant period meet again, and recover their former life."

Enfield, chapter 14, gives an account "of the Heraclitean sect." He says, p. 471, that Heraclitus taught, that "human souls are liable to perpetual changes; and when they are loaded with moist vapors, they pass into the watery mass and perish; but if they are purified from these, they return into the soul of the universe." And p. 472, "that human life is in fact the death of the soul, as, whilst it continues in the body, it is confined and depressed, and never gains its true freedom and activity, till it returns to the divine nature from which it comes." And p. 475, Hippocrates taught that "a portion of the primary principle of heat, uniting itself to the human body, forms the soul. The gods have established all nature in a certain order, and always conduct it well."

In chapter 15, Enfield gives us an account "of the Epicurean sect." From page 502—505, he gives us, among other less important matter, the following respecting Epicurus' views of the soul. "The soul is a subtile, corporeal substance, composed of the finest atoms; for if it were not corporeal, it could neither touch nor be touched, and consequently could neither act nor suffer. The soul is only capable of exercising its faculties of sensation by means of the bodily organs; and although, whilst they are united, the body partakes of the sensations of the soul, upon their separation it becomes wholly insensible; whence it appears, that sensation is the result of their union." He adds, p. 514—"philosophy instructs us to pay homage to the gods, not through hope or fear, but from veneration of their superior nature. It moreover enables us to conquer the fear of death, by teaching us, that it is no proper object of terror; since, whilst we are, death is not, and when death arrives, we are not: so that it neither concerns the living nor the dead." To the same result must all

come, who know not, or who reject revelation; for life and immortality are only brought to light in the gospel.

In chapter 16, Enfield gives an account "of the Phyrrhonic or Sceptical sect." But they held no opinions whatever, but this one, that every thing is uncertain, and truth on no subject can be attained. See p. 531, 532.

Enfield thus concludes his first volume: p. 536—539—"we have now completed the *first period* of the History of Philosophy, Barbaric and Grecian. The latter we have followed from its infancy, through every stage of its growth, till it was transferred to Rome; and, as far as the numerous difficulties and obscurities, which, after every effort to clear them away, still hang over the subject, would permit, we have delineated the peculiar features of the several sects, and given a summary of their respective systems. It only remains that we conclude this part of our work with remarking, in a few words, the fate of the Grecian philosophy in countries foreign to Greece, where it was disseminated and professed, excepting among the Romans, among whom the fortune it experienced through a long course of years is so interesting as to require a particular discussion.

"The Grecian philosophy was at first confined, as we have seen, within the limits of Greece, and the neighboring regions, except the Italic school, instituted by Pythagoras in Magna Græcia. Several eminent philosophers, it is true, travelled into Egypt; but it was chiefly in the infancy of philosophy, and rather for the purpose of acquiring, than of communicating, knowledge. But after Egypt, and almost all Asia, was brought under the Grecian yoke by the conquests of Alexander, the Grecian philosophy passed, as might naturally be expected, from the conquerors to the nations whom they had subdued. Al-

exander himself, who had been early initiated into philosophical studies, and inspired with respect for philosophers by his master Aristotle, enlarged the boundaries of philosophy, by carrying with him, wherever he went, a train of philosophers, (among whom were Calisthenes and Anaxarchus) whom he treated with great respect, and employed in conciliating the affections of the people to their conqueror. Notwithstanding the reverence which the orientalists unquestionably entertained for their ancient doctrines, there can be little doubt that, when Alexander, in order to preserve, by the arts of peace, that extensive empire, which he had obtained by the force of arms, endeavored to incorporate the customs of the Greeks with those of the Persian, Indian, and other eastern nations, the opinions as well as the manners of this feeble and obsequious race would, in a great measure, be accommodated to those of their conquerors. The influence of the Grecian upon the oriental philosophy continued long after the time of Alexander, and was one principal occasion of the confusion of opinions which we shall find in the subsequent history of the Alexandrian and Christian schools.

"It was in Alexandria chiefly, that the Grecian philosophy was ingrafted upon the stock of ancient oriental wisdom. The Egyptian method of teaching by allegory was peculiarly favorable to such an union. We have already seen that the philosophy and religion of the Egyptians early underwent a material change of this kind, when Cambyses, in conquering this country, introduced the doctrine and theology of the Persians. Under the government of the Greeks, there were similar innovations; the priests of Egypt endeavoring, as well as they were able, to form a coalition between the ancient religion of their country and the doctrine and philosophy of their conquerors.

"Alexander, when he built the city of Alexandria, with a determination to make it the seat of his empire, and peopled it with emigrants from various countries, opened a new mart of philosophy, which emulated the fame of Athens itself. A general indulgence was granted to the promiscuous crowd assembled in this rising city, whether Egyptians, Grecians, Jews, or others, to profess their respective systems of philosophy and religion without molestation. The consequence was, that Egypt was soon filled with religious and philosophical sectaries of every kind; and particularly, that almost every Grecian sect found an advocate and professor in Alexandria.

"The family of the Ptolemies, who, after Alexander, obtained the government of Egypt, from motives of policy encouraged this new establishment. Ptolemy Lagus, who had obtained the crown of Egypt by usurpation, was particularly careful to secure the interest of the Greeks in his favor; and, with this view, invited people from every part of Greece to settle in Egypt, and removed the schools of Athens to Alexandria. This enlightened prince spared no expense to raise the literary, as well as the civil, military, and commercial credit of his country. In order to provide, in Alexandria, a permanent residence for learning and philosophy, he laid the foundation of a library, which, after his time, became exceedingly famous; granted philosophers of every class immunity from public offices; and encouraged science and literature by royal munificence. Demetrius Phalereus, who was eminent in every kind of learning, especially in philosophy, assisted the liberal designs of the prince, by his judicious advice and active services. Ptolemy Philadelphus adopted, with great ardor, the liberal views of his predecessor, and afforded still further aid to philosophy, by enriching the Alexandrian library with a vast collection of books in every

branch of learning, and by instituting a college of learned men, who, that they might have leisure to prosecute their studies, were maintained at the public expense.

"Under the patronage, first, of the Egyptian princes, and afterwards of the Roman emperors, Alexandria long continued to enjoy great celebrity as the seat of learning, and to send forth eminent philosophers of every sect to distant countries. It remained a school of learning, as well as a commercial emporium, till it was taken, and plundered of its literary treasures, by the Saracens.

"Philosophy, during this period, suffered a grievous corruption, from the attempt which was made by philosophers of different sects and countries, Grecian, Egyptian, and oriental, who were assembled in Alexandria, to frame, from their different tenets, one general system of opinions. The respect which had long been universally paid to the schools of Greece, and the honors with which they were now adorned by the Egyptian princes, induced other wise men, and even the Egyptian priests and philosophers themselves, to submit to this innovation. Hence arose an heterogeneous mass of opinions, of which we shall afterwards take more particular notice under the name of Eclectic philosophy; and which we shall find to have been the foundation of endless confusion, error and absurdity, not only in the Alexandrian school, but among Jews and Christians; producing among the former that spurious kind of philosophy, which they called their cabbala; and, among the latter, innumerable corruptions of the Christian faith."

Such is the history of your opinions, from the earliest accounts, until the time philosophy was introduced into Rome. Any additional remarks I have to make shall be reserved as a conclusion to my next Letter.

# LETTER XI.

Sir,

In my last Letter, I brought down the history of your opinions, respecting *the immortality of the soul and its condition after death*, to the period when philosophy was first introduced into Rome. In this Letter I shall take a brief view of their progress from that period to the present times.

Enfield, volume 2, says, "the rise of philosophy in Rome may be dated from the time of the embassy, which was sent from the Athenians to the Romans, deprecating a fine of five hundred talents, which had been inflicted upon them for laying waste Oropii, a town of Sicyonia." He adds, it is probable this happened about "156 years before Christ." He further says, "Lelius Furius and Scipio, young men of the first distinction and highest expectations, discovered an earnest desire to enlist themselves under the banners of philosophy." But "Cato the censor," being "apprehensive that the introduction of philosophical studies into Rome would effeminate the spirits of its young men, and enfeeble those hardy virtues which were the foundation of their national glory" disapproved of it "and philosophy was sternly dismissed. A spirit of inquiry was however raised among the Roman youth," which "Cato could not suppress. During the consulship of Strabo and Valerius, a decree of the Senate passed—requiring the prætor Pomponius to take care that no philosophers were resident in Rome." And "some years afterwards, the censors, as if resolved at once to shut the door against philosophy and eloquence, issued a

similar edict against rhetoricians and this edict was afterwards revived in the year of Rome 662, about 91 years before Christ. But at length philosophy under the protection of those great commanders who had conquered Greece, prevailed; and Rome opened her gates to all who professed to be teachers of wisdom and eloquence," p. 2, 3. He adds, p. 6—"the Greek philosophy having been thus transplanted, flourished with vigor in its new soil." He further adds, p. 7, "hence Greece which had submitted to the arms, in her turn subdued the understandings of the Romans; and contrary to that which in these cases commonly happens, the conquerors adopted the opinions and manners of the conquered." See the whole of chapter 1. Under such favorable circumstances, philosophy being introduced among the Romans, our attention in this Letter, shall be principally directed to the following points of investigation.—Philosophical opinions, particularly that of the immortality of the soul and punishment after death, among the heathen nations, subject to the Romans: the influence of those opinions on the Jewish nation: and, how they came to be incorporated with Christianity.

1st. Let us examine the philosophical opinions, particularly that of the soul's immortality and its suffering after death, among the nations subject to Rome, and indeed in all the then known world. In chap. ii. sect. 1, Enfield gives an account of the general state of philosophy under the emperors. He says, p. 31, "the sentiments and language of almost all the Roman poets were tinctured with the philosophy of some Grecian sect." He mentions Virgil, Horace, Ovid, Manelius, Lucan, Persius, and Seneca, whose poetry received embellishment from the Grecian philosophy, but from which nothing can be certainly proved as to their real views of the soul or its condi-

tion in a future state. Among historians he mentions Livy, Sallust, Tacitus, and others, who were also tinctured with the Grecian philosophy. And he mentions Canius Julus, who—"met the death inflicted upon him with Stoic firmness, expressing his satisfaction that he was so soon to make the experiment which would determine whether the soul is immortal."

In section 2, he gives us an account "of the philosophers who revived the Pythagoric sect." But nothing is said respecting the soul or its condition after death, which deserves notice. The same remark applies to section 3, which gives an account, "of the state of the Platonic philosophy under the emperors."

In section 4, Enfield gives an account "of the Eclectic sect," which deserves particular notice, on account of its influence on Christianity in subsequent ages. Concerning it, Enfield says, p. 59, "upon the foundation of the Platonic philosophy, with an abundance of heterogeneous materials collected from every other sect, was erected an irregular, cumbrous, and useless edifice, called the Eclectic school." On the same page he adds—"the Eclectic sect took its rise at Alexandria, in Egypt; a country, which, in more remote periods, had admitted foreign dogmas and superstitions, particularly after the invasion of the Persians. On p. 60, he says—"the present state of the several Grecian sects was in no small degree favorable to the coalescing plan of the Eclectic philosophy." And adds, on p. 60, 61, "the Christian religion, too, which had now found its way to Alexandria, became, incidentally, the occasion of encouraging and promoting this coalition of opinions. For when the heathen philosophers perceived that this new establishment, supported by the splendor of its miracles, and the purity of its doctrines, was daily gaining credit even in the schools of Alexandria;

and saw that, like the rising sun, it was likely soon to eclipse every inferior light; despairing of being able either to refute its claims by argument, or to stem its progress by authority, they determined to oppose it by every effort of ingenuity and artifice. In order to support the declining credit of their own schools, they incorporated Christian ideas and principles into their new system. Several fathers of the Christian church themselves, such as Pantænus, Clemens Alexandrinus, and the author of the work called the Shepherd of Hermas, by studying philosophy in the Alexandrian school, injudiciously favored the views of their opponents, and from their sacred magazine contributed their share towards that confused mass of opinions, Egyptian, Oriental, Pythagoric, Platonic, and Christian, which, about the close of the second century, rose up into the Eclectic system."

On p. 61, he says "the first projector of this plan appears to have been Potamo, a platonist." And adds, p. 62, "the complete constitution of the Eclectic sect must be referred to Ammonius, surnamed, from the kind of life which he followed, Sacca. He was born of Christian parents, and was early instructed in the catechetical schools established at Alexandria. Here, under the Christian preceptors, Athenagoras, Pantenus, and Clemens Alexandrinus, by whom this school was successively conducted, and who themselves united Gentile philosophy with Christian doctrine, he acquired a strong propensity towards philosophical studies, and became exceedingly desirous of reconciling the different opinions which at that time subsisted among philosophers." And on p. 63, says, "Ammonius had many eminent followers, and hearers, both Pagan and Christian; who all, doubtless, promised themselves much illumination from a preceptor who undertook to collect into a focus all the rays of ancient wisdom." But this course land-

ed him in infidelity, for Enfield says, Ammonius apostatised from Christianity, and went over to the Pagan religion, p. 62, 63.

On p. 65, we are told—"the school of Ammonius was continued, and the Eclectic system completed, by the most celebrated of his disciples, Plotinus, the chief of the Alexandrian Platonists, from whom the school afterwards took its name. Plotinus was born at Lycopolis in Egypt, in the year two hundred and five. After attending lectures in the different schools with which Alexandria at this time abounded, he attached himself to Ammonius, and continued to prosecute his philosophical studies under this master eleven years; probably because he found in Ammonius a disposition towards superstition and fanaticism, similar to his own." Concerning him he says, p. 67—"it was another proof of the fanatical spirit of Plotinus, that, though well skilled in the medical art, he had such a contempt for the body, that he could never be prevailed upon to make use of any means to cure the diseases to which his constitution was subject, or to alleviate his pain. He had learned from Pythagoras and Plato, that the soul is sent into the body, for the punishment of its former sins, and must in this prison, pass through a severe servitude, before it can be sufficiently purified to return to the divine fountain from which it flowed. Such was his contempt of the corporeal vehicle in which his soul was inclosed, that he would never suffer the day of his birth to be celebrated, or any portrait to be taken of his person."

On p. 68, he says of Plotinus—"when he found his end approaching, he said to Eustochius, 'the divine principle within me is now hastening to unite itself with that divine being which animates the universe:' herein expressing a leading principle of his philosophy, that the human soul is an emanation from

the divine nature, and will return to the source whence it proceeded Plotinus died in the year two hundred and seventy, aged sixty-six years." I have deemed it of importance to state these things particularly concerning Plotinus on account of what Enfield says in the following paragraph, p. 68, 69. "From the life and writings of this philosopher it clearly appears, that he belonged to the class of fanatics. His natural temper, his education, his system all inclined him to fanaticism. Suffering himself to be led astray, by a violent imagination, from the plain path of good sense, he poured forth crude and confused conceptions, in obscure and incoherent language. Sometimes he soared, in extatic flights, into the regions of mysticism. Porphyry relates, that he ascended through all the Platonic steps of divine contemplation, to the actual vision of the deity himself, and was admitted to such intercourse with him, as no other philosopher ever enjoyed. They who are well acquainted with human nature will easily perceive, in these flights, unequivocal proofs of a feeble or disordered mind, and will not wonder that the system of Plotinus was mystical, and his writings obscure. The truth seems to be, that this philosopher made it the main scope and end of his life to dazzle his own mind, and the minds of others, with the meteors of enthusiasm, rather than to illuminate them with the clear and steady rays of truth. How much is it to be regretted, that such a man should become, in a great degree, the preceptor of the world, and should, by means of his disciples, have every where disseminated a species of false philosophy, which was compounded of superstition, enthusiasm, and imposture! The muddy waters, sent forth from this polluted spring, were spread through the most celebrated seats of learning, and were even permitted, as we

shall afterwards see, to mingle with the pure stream of Christian doctrine."

Enfield says the Eclectic sect went so far, that "they even imagined that the soul of man, properly prepared by previous discipline, might rise to a capacity of holding immediate intercourse with good demons, and even to enjoy, in exstasy, an intuitive vision of God: a point of perfection and felicity, which many of their great men, such as Plotinus, Porphyry, Jamblichus, and Proclus, were supposed actually to have attained," p. 91. Have not some Christians in our day, supposed they had attained this point of perfection? But from p. 91—93, Enfield adds—"in order to account still further for some of the more striking features of the Eclectic sect, it is necessary particularly to remark the arts which the leaders of this sect employed to obstruct the progress of the Christian religion. By combining into one system all the important tenets, both theological and philosophical, which were at that time received, either in the Pagan or the Christian schools, they hoped to confirm the heathen in their attachment to their old superstitions, and to reconcile the Christians to Paganism." See the whole of page 92, where other of their arts are stated. Enfield then adds—"in the infancy of the Alexandrian school, not a few among the professors of Christianity suffered themselves to be so far deluded by the pretensions of this sect, as to imagine that a coalition might, with great advantage be formed between its system and that of Christianity; and this union seemed the more desirable, as several philosophers of this sect became converts to the Christian faith. But the consequence was, that Pagan ideas and opinions were by degrees mixed with the pure and simple doctrine of the gospel; the fanatical philosophy of Ammonius corrupted the pure religion of Christ; and his

church became a field of contention, and a nursery of error."

From p. 94—98, Enfield gives us an account of the opinions of Plotinus and Jamblichus. But they are very similar to those already detailed in the preceding Letter. Suffice it to say, Plotinus believed "the human soul is derived from the supramundane soul, or principle of life, and is in this respect sister to the soul of the world. After death, the souls of men pass into other animals, or ascend into superior regions, and are converted into beings of an higher order, according to their present degree of defilement or purification." See the whole account in the pages referred to, which is too long for quotation, and too absurd to deserve any notice.

Enfield concludes thus, p. 100, 101—"but it is wholly unnecessary to dwell longer upon the visionary subtleties of the Alexandrian philosophy. The facts and opinions which we have laid before the reader respecting the Eclectic sect will, we doubt not, be thought abundantly sufficient to justify this general conclusion: that the Plotinian school, by combining systems which were originally distinct from each other; by personifying abstract conceptions, and speaking of them as real beings; by inventing strange fictions concerning the Supreme Being, and concerning subordinate divinities; and by raising upon these fictions the baseless fabric of enthusiasm and fanaticism, introduced infinite confusion into philosophy, and fatally obstructed, instead of promoting, the progress of useful knowledge. The pernicious influence of the Eclectic system, both upon opinions and manners, through many succeeding ages, will be seen in the sequel."

Plotinus did more evil to Christianity, than Calvin ever did it good, as Mosheim and other writers abundantly show. And it deserves notice, that fa-

naticism accompanies the system of this man to the present day.

In section 5, Enfield gives an account "of the state of the Peripatetic philosophy under the Roman emperors." He says—"whilst Platonism, and the Eclectic sect, which rose out of Platonism, flourished at Alexandria and Athens, and had many advocates in Rome, the other ancient sects still continued to exist in their respective forms, and to be supported by able patrons. Julius Cæsar, and Augustus, patronized the Peripatetic philosophy; the former in the person of Sosigines, the latter in that of Nicolaus." Respecting the soul, he says nothing, excepting the following, taught by Alexander Aphrodiseus. "In his book concerning the soul, he maintains that it is, not a distinct substance by itself, but the *form* of an organized body."

In section 6, we have an account "of the state of the Cynic sect under the Roman emperors," but nothing is said of the opinions then entertained respecting the soul or its condition after death.

In section 7, Enfield gives us an account "of the state of the Stoic sect under the Roman emperors." He says nothing respecting their opinions concerning the soul. P. 116, shows, how the "Stoic philosophy" obtained so much authority during the Roman republic, and how Christianity contributed to this.

In section 8, we have an account "of the state of the Epicurean philosophy under the Roman emperors." He says, p. 137, "the Epicurean sect, though degenerated from the simple manners of its founder, continued to flourish through a long course of years under the Roman emperors." Nothing is said of their opinions respecting the soul. The same remark applies to section 9, in which he gives an account "of the state of the Sceptic sect." Nothing could be expected from this sect, for Enfield shrewdly remarks,

"few persons were found, who were willing to sacrifice interest, or fame, to the empty profession of the science of knowing nothing."

In chapter 3, Enfield proceeds to an account "of the oriental philosophy." He says, p. 147—"having completed the history of the Grecian philosophy, during the period of the Roman republic and empire, before we pass on to the consideration of the state of philosophy among the Jews, Arabians and Christians, it will be necessary that we endeavor to trace the remains of barbaric philosophy in the east." See the whole chapter. See also what is said of the oriental philosophy in the preceding Letter. He says, p. 148, it is certain a "metaphysical system, chiefly respecting the derivation of all natures, spiritual and material, by emanation from the first fountain, was, before the commencement of the Christian era, taught in the east, whence it gradually spread through the Alexandrian, Jewish, and Christian schools." After going on to show this, p. 148, 149, he adds—"the uninterrupted continuance of the oriental philosophy may be further inferred from the sudden rise, and rapid spread, of those numerous heresies, which, under the ostentatious name of Gnosticism, over-ran the churches of the east." The system of Gnosticism he says originated in Zoroaster.

I shall add here what he says respecting the state of philosophy among the Saracens and Arabians. It will prevent any interruption, in considering the influence which philosophy had, on the Jews and Christians in the sequel. In book v. chap. 1, he gives an account "of the origin and progress of philosophy among the Saracens or Arabians, but says nothing of their religious opinions on the points in question. In chapter 2, he gives an account "of the nature and spirit of the Saracenic philosophy;" and the following is all which deserves notice. Concerning Aver-

roes he says, he—"denied the distinct existence and immortality of the human soul," p. 250. He adds, p. 252, "the Zabii, believing in the resurrection of the dead, at the funeral of a departed friend killed a camel upon his tomb, that at the resurrection he might not be without a beast to ride on." It is well known that Origen was called out of Egypt to suppress what was called the Arabian heresy, that the soul was not immortal.

In the above account of the nations, after philosophy was introduced into Rome, little is said of their religious opinions. There was no need of this, for Enfield had detailed them in volume 1, and of which we have given some account in the foregoing Letter, to which it is presumed the reader has attended.

2d. Let us now attend to the philosophical and religious opinions which were embraced by the Jews, and particularly their views of the soul and its condition after death. You have allowed, Sir, that Moses in his law did not teach the immortality of the soul, or any future retribution. I beg you and all my readers now to notice, when, how, and from whom they derived these and similar opinions. If Moses nor the prophets did not teach them, it is of no small importance to ascertain from what masters, and at what schools they learned them. I might here refer at once to Dr. Campbell's 6th Dissertation and dismiss this topic. But I choose to lay open this matter to the reader in the following detail. In book iv. chap. 1. Enfield gives us an account of the Jewish philosophy, from the time of the return from the Babylonian captivity to the destruction of Jerusalem. Referring the reader to all Enfield says, I can only give a few brief extracts. In the preceding Letter we have seen, he declares the ancient Jews had nothing to do with philosophical opinions, and Mr. Hudson, with many others, allow that Moses in his law,

did not teach any thing about the immortality of the soul or its punishment in a disembodied state. But Enfield now says, p. 158—"the changes which took place in the Jewish nation, after the Babylonish captivity, produced material alterations in their philosophical and religious tenets. Two events in the Jewish history must be particularly noticed, on account of the great influence which they had upon the state of opinions: the one, the separation of the Samaritans from the Jews, which began in the time of Esdras; the other, the settling of a colony of Jews in Egypt under Alexander the Great, which was afterwards so increased by their successors, that the Jews in Egypt were little inferior, either in number or consequence, to those in Judea."

From p. 158—167, Enfield goes on to show how these two events affected the religious opinions of the Jews. On p. 166, he says—"from this period, there can be no doubt that the doctrine of the Jews was known to the Egyptians; and, on the other hand, that Pagan philosophy was known to the Jews. Grecian wisdom, corrupted by being mixed with the Egyptian and oriental philosophy, assumed a new form in the Platonic school of Alexandria. This school, by pretending to teach a sublimer doctrine concerning God and divine things, enticed men of different countries and religions, and among the rest the Jews, to study its mysteries, and to incorporate them with their own. The symbolical method of instruction which had been in use from the most ancient times among the Egyptians, was adopted by the Jews; and it became a common practice among them to put an allegorical interpretation upon their sacred writings. Hence, under the cloak of symbols, Pagan philosophy gradually crept into the Jewish schools; and the Platonic doctrines, mixed first with the Pythagoric, and afterwards with the Egyptian and orien-

tal, were blended with their ancient faith in their explanations of the law and the traditions."

Enfield adds, on p. 167—"the preceding narrative of facts clearly shows in what manner the purity of divine doctrine became corrupted among the Jews in Egypt. Enticed by the promise of new and hidden treasures of wisdom concerning God and divine things, they admitted, under the disguise of allegory, doctrines never dreamed of by their ancient lawgivers and prophets, and adopted a mystical interpretation of the law, which converted its plain meaning into a thousand idle fancies. This corruption, which began in Egypt about the time of Ptolemy Philadelphus, soon spread into Palestine, and every where disseminated among the Jews a taste for metaphysical subtleties and mysteries."

But on p. 168, he proceeds thus: "from Egypt we shall now pass over into Judea, to inquire into the state of philosophy among its inhabitants. Soon after their return from the Babylonish captivity, they forsook the ancient simplicity of their sacred doctrine, and listened to the fictions of human fancy.—This change happened, not through any intercourse which the Jews had, during their captivity, with the Chaldean mãgi (for it does not appear that they borrowed any tenets from these) but in consequence of the conquests of Alexander and his successors, which obliged them, contrary to their ancient habits, to mingle with foreigners. A circumstance, which, left to its natural operation, would have led them imperceptibly into the adoption of foreign opinions and customs. But their conquerors hastened this change by compulsion; for we are informed that Antiochus Epiphanes commanded them to forsake their ancient religious ceremonies; and although the greater part of the nation bravely resisted this unjust and tyrannical command, there were some among them so un-

faithful to their country and their God, as to show an inclination to court the favor of the conqueror by mixing Pagan tenets and superstitions with their own sacred doctrines and ceremonies. The influence of example in their Alexandrian brethren, who had already caught the infection of gentilism, doubtless, concurred with the circumstances of the times, to introduce corruption into the schools of Judea. Accordingly we find, in fact, that a taste for Grecian philosophy and Egyptian mysteries so far prevailed in the joint reign of Aristobulus and Hyrcanus, that some of the zealous advocates for the purity of the Jewish faith and worship thought it necessary to denounce *anathema* upon any one who should teach the Grecian wisdom to his children. No *anathema*, however, could prevent the spread of Grecian learning among the Jews."

On p. 170, Enfield says—"the seeds of the cabbalistic doctrine were first sown under the Ptolemies, when the Jews began to learn the Egyptian and oriental theology, and to incorporate these foreign dogmas with the ancient creed." He then adds: "having said thus much concerning the introduction of Gentile philosophy among the Jews both in Egypt and Palestine, the way is prepared for inquiring into the rise and progress of their domestic sects." 1st. *The sect of the Sadducees.* He says it arose about two hundred years before Christ. The Sadducees treated "*the traditionary law*" of the Pharisees with contempt and adhered to the written law. The chief heads of the Sadducean tenets were these: "all laws and traditions, not comprehended in the written law, are to be rejected as merely human inventions.—Neither angels nor spirits have a distinct existence, separate from the corporeal vestment. The soul of man, therefore, does not remain after this life, but expires with the body. There will be no resurrec-

tion of the dead, nor any rewards and punishments after this life." Enfield repels the accusation, which some have brought against the Sadducees, that they rejected all the Scriptures except Moses' law. On their creed I would remark,

1st. Our Lord, Luke 22, did not blame the Sadducees for not believing that the soul is immortal, and is to exist in a disembodied state. No Sir, not a syllable is said about this, or that they erred in not agreeing with the Pharisees who held your opinions. Our Lord blamed them for not believing there would be a resurrection of the dead, and referred them to their Scriptures from whence they might have learned it. Their error about this, lay, in not knowing the Scriptures or the power of God. But if you are correct in your views, he ought to have told them—"they erred not knowing what your lost revelations contained, or not believing in the traditionary law of the Pharisees." But where, Sir, did Jesus Christ ever reprove a single individual, for not believing in doctrines not revealed in Scripture, but handed down by tradition?

2d. They denied the resurrection of the dead, yea, all future existence. But they did right in not believing this, if what you have said in your book be true. Have you not, Sir, labored hard to show that the Old Testament does not teach the doctrine of the resurrection? And did you not tell us explicitly in your Letters that Moses did not even teach a future existence? I then ask you, as a candid man, to say, how could they help believing as they did, if these statements of yours be true? Why should our Lord blame them for not believing, what you yourself contend was not revealed in their Scriptures? If our Lord blamed them at all, he ought to have blamed them for not believing in your lost revelations, from which you say your opinions originated. If the doc-

trine of the resurrection is not taught in the Old Testament as you contend, they had no Scripture grounds for such a belief, for the New Testament was not then written. If they had believed, it must have been faith in your lost revelations, handed down by tradition, a thing the Sadducees treated with contempt. But observe, Sir, they were not censured by our Lord for treating *traditions* with contempt, but for neglect of the Scriptures.

3d. The Sadducees in that day, held what every true hearted Protestant contends for in this—"that all laws and traditions not comprehended in the written law, are to be rejected as merely human inventions." But this principle it seems you have abandoned, and sorry am I, that a Universalist in the nineteenth century, should with the Sadducees, deny the doctrine of the resurrection is taught in the Old Testament, and with the Pharisees hold to traditions not found in the written law of God.

2d. The sect of the Karæites. The name denotes "a textuary or Scripturist, and seems intended to distinguish those who followed the written law alone, from those who admitted the authority of traditionary precepts. The origin of this sect is, therefore, to be referred to the time when the traditionary, or oral law was introduced, and with it the allegorical interpretation of the written law," p. 174. He adds, p. 175, "it is exceedingly probable that the Sadducean tenets were highly offensive to many pious men, who, nevertheless, were not disposed to join those who received the traditionary institutions. These adhering simply to the letter of the Mosaic law, but at the same time refusing to adopt the doctrine of the Sadducees, would of course become a separate sect, which would be distinguished by some name expressive of their leading principle. It is not improbable that the opposite party gave them, in derision, the

name of Scripturists, or Karæites. In this manner we conceive that this sect arose at the same time with those of the Sadducees and Pharisees." On p. 176, he says—"the distinguishing tenets of the sect of the Karæites are: that there is no other rule of faith and worship than the writings of Moses and the prophets; that all oral traditions, and all allegorical and mystical interpretations of the law are to be rejected; that all material beings were created by an uncreated Deity, of whom no resemblance can be found in any thing which he has made; that he knows all things, and exercises a constant providence over all his works; that the human mind is subject to divine influence, but at the same time remains free in its volitions; that true penitence takes away guilt; that, after death, the soul, if it be worthy, ascends to the intellectual world to live there forever, but if it be guilty, it is consigned to a state of pain and ignominy; that God alone is to be worshipped; and that fasts are to be strictly observed." Had you lived among the Karæites, you could have told them, Moses' law did not teach a future existence, and that what they believed about the soul and its condition after death was a great mistake.

3d. The sect of the Pharisees. This was "the most celebrated of the Jewish sects; and arose soon after the return from the Babylonish captivity, in consequence of the introduction of traditionary institutions and allegorical interpretations," p. 177. He adds, p. 178—"although the exact time of the first appearance of the Pharisaic sect cannot be ascertained, its origin may be easily traced back to the same period in which the Sadducean heresy arose. From the time that the notion of supernumerary acts of self-denial, devotion, and charity, was introduced under the sanction of the traditionary law, a wide door was opened for superstition, religious pride, and hy-

pocrisy." On p. 179, he says—"the principal dogmas of the Pharisees were these: the oral law, delivered from God to Moses on mount Sinai, by the angel Metraton, and transmitted to posterity by tradition, is of equal authority with the written law.—By observing both these laws, a man may not only obtain justification with God but perform meritorious works of supererogation. Fasting, alms-giving, ablutions, confessions, are sufficient atonements for sin. Thoughts and desires are not sinful, unless they are carried into action. God is the creator of heaven and earth, and governs all things, even the actions of men, by his providence. Man can do nothing without divine influence; which does not, however, destroy the freedom of the human will. The soul of man is spiritual and immortal. In the invisible world beneath the earth, rewards and punishments will be dispensed to the virtuous and vicious. The wicked shall be confined in an eternal prison; but the good shall obtain an easy return to life. Besides the soul of man, there are other spirits, or angels, both good and bad. The resurrection of the body is to be expected." Enfield immediately adds—"it appears from many passages in the writings of the Jewish rabbis, that they held the doctrine of the migration of souls from one body to another: and it is probable that they derived it from the ancient Pharisees, and these from the oriental philosophers. This *metempsychosis* is, however to be understood in the Pythagoric and not in the Stoic sense. The Jews, probably, borrowed this error from the Egyptians." On this account I remark 1st. The Pharisees believed in the immortality of the soul and its punishment after death. So do you. 2d. They believed—"the oral law, delivered from God to Moses on Mount Sinai, by the angel *Metraton* and transmitted to posterity by tradition, is of equal authority with the written law."

And do you not, Sir, like them, believe in, yea, derive from a traditionary law or lost revelation, your opinions? And do you not also, like them, consider it "of equal authority with the written law? This you cannot deny. The Pharisees could tell us when, where, and by whom their oral or traditionary law was given; but from what mountain or by what angel was your traditionary revelations delivered? But if the Pharisees had known any thing about your lost revelations, why did they not avail themselves of them, for this might have superseded the necessity of theirs? 3d. Observe, Sir, that—"supernumerary acts of self-denial, devotion, and charity" were "introduced under the sanction of the traditionary law," and from that time—"a wide door was opened for superstition, religious pride, and hypocrisy." Supernumerary Scripture, or traditions of men, have always been, and always will be, attended with similar effects. Look at the Catholic church, for their system of meritorious works of *supererogation* seems to have been copied from the ancient Pharisees. 4th. The Pharisees' heaven and hell after death, is precisely the Egyptian *amenthes*, the Greek *hades*; the very place to which you sent the rich man and Lazarus. It is "the invisible world beneath the earth," which you say is "*somewhere*," but seem shy in describing its location. But why so shy? For on the very same authority that you tell us it exists, you can also tell us where it is to be found. But 5th. Permit me to remind you, Sir, that the Pharisees were the very men to whom our Lord said, that they had made void God's law by their traditions; and against whom much of what he said was directed. I beseech you to consider if your are not following in their footsteps, in making void God's law by your lost revelations.

4th. The sect of the Essenes. Concerning their

origin the learned are much divided in opinion. Josephus says they flourished one hundred and sixty years before Christ. In many of their habits and manners they resembled the Shaking Quakers in our day, a quiet inoffensive and singular people. As to their views of a future life, Enfield says, p. 184, "they held, that the body is perishable, but the soul immortal; that the soul, formed of a subtile ether, is imprisoned in the body, and is never happy till it is released from its prison; that the good, will, after death, be removed to a tranquil and delightful region beyond the ocean; but the bad, to a dark habitation, which resounds with never-ceasing lamentations; and that all things are under the direction of divine providence." I shall only observe here, that the opinions of the Essenes and other sects of the Jews, respecting the soul and its condition after death, smell strongly of heathen origin, yea, are for substance the same as held by the heathen, and noticed in the preceding Letter. The family likeness is very visible.

Besides the four principal sects of the Jews, the Karæites, the Sadducees, the Pharisees, and the Essenes, several others are mentioned by ancient writers; but they are either wholly fictitious, or of little consequence. I may add that Mosheim, vol. i. chap. 2, gives a similar account of the opinions of the above sects. See vol. i. p. 43.

In chapter 2, Enfield gives us an account of "the state of the Jewish philosophy from the destruction of Jerusalem to modern times." And in chap. 3, proceeds to "the Jewish philosophy, exoteric and cabbalistic." He says, p. 207—"two methods of instruction were in use among the Jews; the one public or exoteric; the other, secret or esoteric. The exoteric doctrine was that which was openly taught the people from the law of Moses, and the traditions of the fathers. The esoteric was that which treated

of the mysteries of the divine nature, and other sublime subjects, and was known by the name of the cabbala. The latter was, after the manner of the Pythagorean and Egyptian mysteries, taught only to certain persons, who were bound, under the most solemn *anathema* not to divulge it." On p. 208, he adds—"it may serve to give the reader some idea of the low state of moral philosophy among the Jews in the middle age, to add, that of the two hundred and forty-eight affirmative precepts, only *three* were considered as obligatory upon women; and that, to obtain salvation, it was judged sufficient to fulfil any one single law in the hour of death: the observance of the rest being deemed necessary, only to increase the felicity of the future life."

On p. 209, 210, Enfield gives the following account of their "popular theoretical tenets" respecting the soul. "The world was created from nothing, had a beginning, and will have an end. All human souls were created at the beginning of the world, and existed in a happy state before they were sent down into the body. Besides these, there are other created spirits, good and bad, of various names and classes. The bad angels are coporeal, their bodies consisting of the two elements of air and fire. The heavens are animated; and the stars are rational beings, endued with the powers of intelligence and volition; they have an influence upon human affairs, and even upon inferior animals, plants, and minerals, and communicate to men the knowledge of future events. Different regions of the earth, and even individual men, have their ministering angels. Two archangels were the leaders of a rebellion against God; and the rebels were cast out of heaven. The fallen angels, procreating with the daughters of men, produced giants and devils. The cause of natural death, and of all the calamities of mankind, is the fall of our first

parents. No human being can attain to perfection; but good works are entitled to reward; and the pardon of sin may be obtained by fastings, prayers, confessions, and bodily sufferings. All the laws of Moses are eternal and immutable. The soul of man is a thinking substance, having three faculties; the vegetative, the sensitive, and the rational; it is possessed of liberty, and is immortal. After death it is not immediately admitted to celestial joys, but wanders in this world, chiefly about its body, during which time it is tormented by evil demons; in this purgatory it is cleansed from its stains: after which it passes into other bodies of men, or inferior animals. There will be a resurrection of the bodies of dead men, and an universal judgment, which will be succeeded by a state of retribution. The good will enjoy eternal life in paradise, and the wicked will be consigned to the infernal regions; the Jew for a time, but the infidel forever. The world will be destroyed; but the materials of which it is composed will remain."

Enfield says, p. 211, 212—"the esoteric or concealed doctrine of the Jews was called the cabbala, from the word *cabal*, which signifies, *to receive*, because it had been received by tradition. Concerning the miraculous origin and preservation of the cabbala, the Jews relate many marvellous tales.—They derive these mysteries from Adam; and assert, that whilst the first man was in paradise, the angel Rasiel brought him a book from heaven, which contained the doctrines of heavenly wisdom; and that when Adam received this book, angels came down to him to learn its contents, but that he refused to admit them to the knowledge of sacred things, intrusted to him alone; that after the fall, this book was taken back into heaven; that, after many prayers and tears, God restored it to Adam; and that it

passed from Adam to Seth. The Jewish fables go on to relate, that the book being lost, and the mysteries it contained almost forgotten, in the degenerate age before the flood, they were restored, by special revelation, to Abraham, who committed them to writing in the book Jezirah; that the revelation was renewed to Moses, who received a traditionary and mystical, as well as a written and preceptive, law from God; that being again lost amidst the calamities of the Babylonish captivity, it was once more revealed to Esdras; that it was preserved in Egypt, and has been transmitted to posterity through the hands of Simeon ben Setach, Elkanah, Akibha, Simeon ben Jochai, and others."

Here, Sir, is a revelation, which has been several times lost. Is this the lost revelation for which you have been contending, and from which your opinions originated? I presume it is the best revelation you ever will find for them. I am sorry my limits forbid me quoting all that Enfield says from p. 214—224. He refutes the notion that such a system was a revelation from God. And he gives a pretty long specimen of cabbalistic nonsense, from which I can only quote the following respecting the soul. He says, p. 220, 221—"the human soul, proceeding by emanation from the deity is an incorporeal substance, of the same nature with the divine intellect. Being united to the body, one complex nature is produced, endued with reason and capable of action. The human soul consists of four parts, *nephish*, or the principle of vitality; *ruach*, or the principle of motion; *neschamah*, or the power of intelligence; and *jechidah*, a divine principle, by means of which it contemplates superior natures, and even ascends to the ensophic world. All souls were produced at once, and pre-existed in Adam. Every human soul has two guardian angels, produced by emanation, at the time

of the production of souls. The mind of man is united to the divine mind, as the radius of a circle to its centre. The souls of good men ascend above the mansion of the angels, and are delighted with the vision of the first light, which illuminates all the worlds."

On p. 221, Enfield says—"it is impossible to review the mass of conjectures and fictions, called the Jewish cabbala, without perceiving that it could not be derived from the pure source of divine revelation; or to compare the cabbalistic doctrine with the oriental and Egyptian philosophy, without discovering that they are the same system." Who that compares it with the tenets of the ancient philosophy detailed in the preceding Letter, can refuse his assent to this conclusion? Enfield goes on to make this comparison to the end of the chapter, which for the want of room I forbear quoting. But enough has been given as a specimen.

From what has been stated above, is is easily perceived, that all nations of the earth were in a deplorable condition, at the time our Lord appeared. Ignorance, wickedness, and the most ridiculous religious notions abounded, both among Jews and Gentiles. Mosheim says, chapter 2, "the state of the Jews was not much better than that of the other nations at the time of Christ's appearance in the world. They were governed by Herod, who was himself a tributary to the Roman people." He adds—"Judea, governed by Herod, groaned under all that corruption, which might be expected from the authority and the example of a prince, who though a Jew in outward profession, was in point of morals and practice, a contemner of all laws, human and divine. Their own rulers multiplied their vexations, and hindered them from enjoying any little comforts that were left to them by the Roman magistrates. The leaders of

the people, and the chief priests, were, according to the account of Josephus, profligate wretches, who had purchased their places by bribes, or by acts of iniquity, and who maintained their ill-acquired authority by the most flagitious and abominable crimes. The multitude, set on by these corrupt examples, run headlong into every sort of iniquity, and by their endless seditions, robberies, and extortions, armed against them both the justice of God and the vengeance of men." Such was the nation in which the Son of God appeared, and from among whom the first converts to his cause were made. This leads us to the important inquiry

3d. The influence, which the philosophical and religious opinions of Jews and Gentiles had on Christianity. We have seen that nearly a century before Christ appeared, all sects of philosophy were introduced into Rome and were encouraged and embraced by the greatest men throughout the empire. Mosheim, in the first sentence of his history says—"a great part of the world was become subject to the Roman empire, when Jesus Christ made his appearance on earth." See the whole of chapter 1, for the then state of the world. He says—"there were two kinds of philosophy which prevailed among the civilized nations. One was the philosophy of the Greeks, adopted also by the Romans; and the other, that of the orientals, which had a great number of votaries in Persia, Syria, Chaldea, Egypt, and even among the Jews." He says further—"and as to what regarded the rewards of virtue and the punishment of vice after this present life, the general notions were partly uncertain, partly licentious, and often more proper to administer indulgence to vice, than encouragement to virtue. Hence the wiser part of mankind about the time of Christ's birth, looked upon this whole system of religion as a just object of ridicule

and contempt." He adds—"if the discerning few saw the cheat, they were obliged, from regard to their own safety, to laugh with caution, since the priests were ever ready to accuse, before a raging and superstitious multitude, those who discovered their religious frauds, as rebels against the majesty of the immortal gods." Respecting the Jews, he says, vol. i. chap. 2—"they were all horribly unanimous in excluding from the hopes of eternal life all the other nations of the world; and, as a consequence of this odious system, treated them with the utmost rigor and inhumanity, when any occasion was offered them. And besides these corrupt and vicious principles, there prevailed among them several absurd and superstitious notions concerning the divine nature, invisible powers, magic, &c. which they had partly brought with them from the Babylonish captivity, and partly derived from the Egyptians, Syrians, and Arabians, who had lived in their neighborhood." You see, Sir, that in this paragraph, Mosheim contradicts what you asserted, that the Jews did not believe in endless misery. They not only believed it endless, but excluded all other nations of the earth from salvation.

In book vi. chap. 1, Enfield proceeds to "the philosophy of Christ and his apostles." On p. 268, he says—"the founder of the Christian faith was early ranked, both by the enemies and the friends of Christianity, among philosophers. Lucian classes him with Pythagoras, Apollonius Tyaneus, and Alexander. Several of the Platonic philosophers speak of him as a man animated by a divine demon, and sent from heaven for the instruction of mankind. The Jews early accused him of practising magical arts. Some of the Pagan adversaries of Christianity even asserted that Christ was indebted for his doctrine to the heathen philosophers, and particularly to Plato."

If Jesus Christ taught, what has been called Christianity for ages, no doubt he was a philosopher, and Plato and other philosophers were his masters. But to impute this to him or his doctrine, borders on blasphemy, and shows, that the man who asserts this, never read the New Testament with any attention.

In chapter 2, he proceeds to "the philosophy of the Christian fathers considered in general." Enfield says, p. 271—"after the example of the apostles, their immediate followers, who are distinguished by the name of *apostolic* men, were more desirous to teach the divine doctrine which they had received from Jesus Christ in simplicity and truth, than to render themselves illustrious by any display of human learning. They had no other design, than to spread the knowledge of Christ and his gospel in the world; and they executed this design with simplicity, fidelity and magnanimity, without the aid of rhetorical embellishments, or philosophical refinement." While this state of things continued, the churches were in peace, and Christianity prospered. But this did not long continue, for Enfield tells us, p. 272—"the fathers of the Christian church soon departed from the simplicity of the apostolic age, and corrupted the purity of the Christian faith. This is chiefly to be ascribed to two causes: first, the practice, which at that time so generally prevailed, of clothing the doctrines of religion in an allegorical dress; and secondly, the habit of subtile speculation, which the more learned converts from Paganism brought with them from the schools of philosophy." He adds on p. 273—"in the same manner in which Philo and other Alexandrian Jews had corrupted the Jewish church, Clemens Alexandrinus, Origen, and other disciples of the Alexandrian school, in the second century, introduced error and corruption into the church of Christ." From these extracts it ought to

:d, 1st. That philosophy had no place among trines of Christ, his churches, or their teachers :ommencement of Christianity. Had it been ; has long been asserted, that philosophy is ndmaid of religion, no doubt but Jesus Christ have appointed her the handmaid. 2d. So the religion of Christ was taught by simple men, without any display of human learning, ɔered; but when philosophy was introduced ıandmaid, the handmaid usurped the place of stress, religion became corrupted, and the of Christ became the mother of harlots and ıations of the earth. 3d. The professed friends istianity, have done it more harm, in attempt- ıdorn it with the trappings of the wisdom of ırld, than has ever been done to it by avowed . People now look back to the *fathers*, with itious veneration, but if many of them lived in y, and held the same opinions, they would be ced by orthodox people as heretics.

ıapter 3, Enfield proceeds to "the philosophy Christian fathers in particular." He says, p. the Christian fathers may be divided into two ; those who flourished before, and those who ıed after the institution of the Eclectic sect: s distinction is of considerable consequence in sent inquiry. The first class commences with Martyr; the second, with Origen." Enfield ds to show, that all those fathers were embued e philosophical opinions of the day, and by ans the Christian religion was corrupted. In o fact is more fully established, or more gen- acknowledged than this. It would be idle to in detail. Such as wish to see this shown at may consult this chapter of Enfield, Mosheim's ı History, vol. i, and Mr. Ballou's Ancient y of Universalism, where ample evidence of it

may be found. Indeed the quotations already made sufficiently establish it.

In book 7, Enfield gives us an account "of the philosophy of the Christians in the middle age." In chapter 1, we have his account "of the philosophy of the Greek Christians, from the seventh century to the taking of Constantinople by the Turks. And in chapter 2, he gives an account of the philosophy of the western Christians, from the seventh to the twelfth century." During this period, mysticism, senseless disputes, and ignorance abounded. Some idea may be formed of the state of society from the following statement. Enfield says, p. 333—"of the state of knowledge at this period some judgment may be formed, from the eighth canon of the council of Toledo, which required that every clergyman should be able to read and chaunt the psaltery, and to perform the ceremony of baptism. The best singer was at this time reckoned the most accomplished priest." He adds, p. 340—"both sacred and profane learning were become obsolete, and the clergy were scarcely able to stammer out the words of the sacrament; and he who understood grammar was admired by the rest as a prodigy of learning." He further says, p. 338—"beyond the precincts of the cloisters and schools, the name of learning was scarcely known: military exploits were the business, and gross luxury the amusement of the nobles; the inferior laity were sunk into extreme indolence, and never dreamed of acquiring a reason for their religious belief or prejudices; and the clergy and monks had no desire to awaken that spirit of inquiry, which is so hostile to superstition and spiritual tyranny."

Chapter 3 is taken up in giving an account "of the scholastic philosophy." Concerning it Enfield says, p. 386, "the leading character of the scholastic philosophy was, that it employed itself in an ostenta-

tious display of ingenuity, in which axioms assumed without examination, distinctions without any real difference, and terms without any precise meaning, were made use of as weapons of assault and defence, in controversies upon abstruse questions, which, after endless skirmishes, it was impossible to bring to an issue, and which, notwithstanding all the violence of the contest, it was of no importance to determine.—The scholastic logic is not to be confounded with the genuine art of reasoning, from which it differs, as much as dross from pure gold. These disputants made use of dialectics, not to assist the human understanding in discovering truth conducive to the happiness of man, but to secure to themselves the honors of conquest in the field of controversy. John of Salisbury complains, that the scholars of his time consumed, not ten or twenty years, but their whole lives, in these disputes; and that when, through old age, they became incapable of any other amusement or pleasure, these dialectic questions dwelt upon their tongues, and dialectic books still remained in their hands."

During the period called the *middle age*, darkness covered the earth, and gross darkness the people. To have questioned the immortality of the soul or its punishment after death, would have subjected the offender to death in some of its cruelest forms. The church of Rome reigned triumphant, and the chief trade carried on was *in the souls of men*. The immortality of the soul, and its susceptibility of suffering after death, is the very foundation of the whole Catholic system. It is the grand doctrine, by means of which, kings and priests have enslaved the souls and bodies of men, both in the heathen and Christian world. Let any man read the kingcraft and priestcraft practised on mankind by means of this doctrine and then say—can it be the doctrine of God? By it

the children of men were made for ages the mere playthings of the priests. They were disposed of at pleasure, not only in this world but after death and forever.

Enfield in book viii. chap. 1, proceeds to "the influence of the revival of letters upon philosophy." He says, p. 399, "at length genius was awakened, rational inquiry was resumed, and the night of the scholastic age was succeeded by a bright day of learning and true philosophy." Enfield goes on to show, by what means this was effected, and in chap. 2, describes "the influence of the reformation of religion upon the state of philosophy." He says, p. 418—"the leader in this arduous and meritorious undertaking was the great reformer Martin Luther, born at Eislaben, in Saxony, in the year one thousand four hundred and eighty-three. He was early initiated in the Peripatetic philosophy, but soon opened his eyes to discover its defects." He wrote two letters to "Jodocus, a zealous Aristotelian, who had been his preceptor in the university at Erford." In the last of these, "he boldly gave it as his opinion, that it would be impossible to reform the church, without entirely abolishing the canons and decretals, and with them the scholastic theology, philosophy, and logic, and instituting others in their stead." Accordingly—"he therefore rejected both the scholastic and Aristotelian philosophy, as not only irreconcilable with the Christian system, but the cause of endless controversies in the Christian church." Luther labored to remove these evils, as we shall presently see, yea, opposed the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. But alas! They were too deeply rooted in the soil, for even this *Hercules* of reformation to pull up entirely by the roots.

Before the council of Florence, in the year 1439, under pope Eugenius 4th, the current doctrine, both

of the Greek and Latin churches was, that "the souls of the saints were *in obditis receptaculis*, or as some of them expressed it, *in exterioribus atriis*, where they expected the resurrection of their bodies, and the glorification of their souls; and though the fathers believed all of them to be happy, yet they did not think they would enjoy the beatific vision before the resurrection." See bishop Taylor's Liberty of Prophesying, p. 152.

But pope Eugenius got the patriarch of Constantinople and some of his clergy to attend him in a council held at Ferrara and adjourned to Florence,* in which the following canon was consented to. "If the truly penitent shall depart this life, in the love of God, before they have made sufficient satisfaction for their sins of commission and omission, by fruits worthy of repentance, their souls are purged by the pains of purgatory, namely, by sacrifices of the mass, prayers, and alms, which according to the ordinances of the church are wont to be performed by the faithful, in the behalf of the faithful; but the souls of those, who, after baptism, have incurred no stain of sin, as also those souls, which have contracted the stain of sin, whether in their bodies or divested of their bodies, have been purged as above-mentioned, *are received into heaven immediately, and clearly behold the triune God as he is*; but some of them more perfectly than others, according to the difference of their merits." Caranza. Sum. Concil. 454, f. v. 12mo.

The compilers of this canon saw, no doubt, the ab-

* See Geddes' introductory discourse, prefixed to Varga's Letters. And the Greek history of this council published by Creyghton, 1660. The eastern bishops pleaded poverty, and that they could not afford the expense of attending the council in Italy. But *Eugenius*, determined to have them at any rate, undertook to bear their charges, and even to defray the expenses of the emperor who accompanied them: for which purpose he sold all his plate, and pawned the pontifical tiara to the Florentines for forty thousand crowns of gold. See Journal des Scavans, an. 1675, p. 94.

surdity of supposing, that those souls which had undergone the purgatorial purification, should still remain *in abditis receptaculis*, perhaps in a state of insensibility, as some of the fathers held, or *in exterioribus atriis*, in a state of mere expectation. But purgatory was to be supported at all events, and the poor Greeks, on this occasion, were obliged to desert the most eminent lights of their own church, for which, however, some of them were sufficiently mortified when they got home."* It is probable this alteration in the church's doctrine might give occasion to the philosophical inquiries and disputes we read of, no long time after, in the city of Rome itself, concerning the immortality of the soul. These disputes afforded one pretence at least to pope Paul 2d, (his pontificate began in the year 1464, and ended, 1471) to abolish the college of *Abbreviators* and to persecute the members of it, of whom Platina was one, and the celebrated Pomponius another. The pope objected to them that they disputed upon the immortality of the soul, &c.

According to Sleidan, lib. ii. p. 37, the immortality of the soul being openly called in question in the year 1513, pope Leo the 10th and the church endeavored to check it, in the following canon enacted in the Lateran council, a council, which Luther says was laughed at by the Romanists themselves.—"Whereas in these our days, some have dared to assert concerning the nature of the reasonable soul, that it is mortal, or one and the same in all men; and

* Joseph, the patriarch, died at Florence suddenly in the night, having just time to leave a rescript behind him, importing his full agreement with the church of Rome, particularly in the articles of the Roman pontiff's supremacy, and the doctrine of purgatory. This was well contrived, and was no doubt instrumental to the procuring the subscription of his associates. It is said on their return they were disowned by the church of Constantinople, were excommunicated, and even denied Christian burial.

some rashly philosophising, declare this to be true, at least according to philosophy, we, with the approbation of the sacred council, do condemn and reprobate all those who assert that the intellectual soul is mortal, or one and the same in all men, and those who call these things in question; seeing that the soul is not truly, and of itself, and essentially the form of the human body, as it is expressed in the canon of pope Clement 5th, published in the general council of Vienne; but likewise immortal, and, according to the number of bodies into which it is infused, is singularly multipliable, multiplied, and to be multiplied. Which manifestly appears from the gospel; seeing that our Lord saith *they cannot kill the soul:* and elsewhere, *he who hateth his soul in this world*, &c. and also because he promises eternal pain (rather rewards) and eternal torments to those who are to be judged according to their merit in this life. Otherwise, the incarnation, and other mysteries of Christ, would not profit us, nor were a resurrection to be expected; and the saints and righteous would, according to Paul, be most miserable of all men.—And seeing that *truth never contradicts truth*, we determine every assertion, which is contrary to revealed faith, to be false; and we strictly inhibit all from dogmatising otherwise, and we decree that all who adhere to the like erroneous assertions, shall be shunned and punished as heretics." Such was the way truth was then determined. One of the *other* mysteries of this council, was *purgatory*, which they perceived was at an end, if the immortality of the soul was proved false. They also thought, or at least affected to think, a resurrection was not to be expected, unless the immortality of the soul was admitted. It was *orthodoxy* then to believe the soul—"essentially the form of the human body," and is "singularly multipliable, multiplied, and to be multiplied."

Now, we should be deemed heretics, for believing such opinions. The soul required to be of some *form* in those days, for without this it could not undergo the pains of purgatory. You seem inclined, Sir, to return to the doctrine of *substantial forms*, for you hint to us, that the soul after death is clothed with some "*vehicle*." Hold on to this, for if you give it up, it will be impossible for you to show, how souls, *naked souls*, can be punished in your hell. The Catholic clergy foresaw their *purgatory* was ruined, if the doctrine of substantial forms was given up. So must your *hell* in an intermediate state, if you abandon it.

But it seems, Peter Pomponatius, a philosopher of Mantua, was not intimidated by this Lateran thunder. He published a book in the year 1516, in which he exposed the futility of the arguments in proof of the immortality of the soul, and in his last chapter comes to this conclusion: "The immortality of the soul, being a problematical question, we can have no assurance of the thing, but from revelation, and that they who would build immortality upon any other foundation, only verify the character given to certain self-sufficient reasoners by the apostle, namely, '*professing themselves wise, they became fools.*'" By this book, Pomponatius drew down upon him the vengeance of the popish clergy, and the epithets heretic, impious, Epicurean and Atheist were liberally bestowed upon him. You have given me and others a little of this spice, both in your Letters and present book. But, I am just as little intimidated by your Westminster thunder, as Pomponatius was with the Lateran thunder.

In the year 1520, Luther published a defence of his propositions condemned by a bull of Leo 10th, which were in number 41. The 27th runs thus—"It is certain that it is not in the power of the church

or the pope to establish articles of faith, or laws for morals or good works. But I permit the pope to make articles of faith for himself and his faithful, such as, *the bread and wine are transubstantiated in the sacrament. The essence of God neither generates, nor is generated. The soul is the substantial form of the human body. The pope is the emperor of the world, and the king of heaven, and God upon earth.* THE SOUL IS IMMORTAL, with all those monstrous opinions, to be found in the Roman dunghill of decretals, that such as his faith is, such may be his gospel, such his disciples, and such his church, that the mouth may have meat suitable for it, and the dish, a cover worthy of it." Oper. Tom. ii. fol. 107. Wertembergæ, 1562. This ironical hit at the pope, particularly alludes to the canon of the Lateran council quoted above, in which the immortality of the soul was established by its authority. Some have doubted whether Luther in this passage intended only to reprobate the *school* doctrine of the immortality of the soul, or deny the thing itself. Cardinal du Perron, supposes Luther denied the immortality of the soul, for the sake of the effect the contrary doctrine would have upon the practice of invocating saints. At the time Luther wrote this defence of his articles, he had not quite laid aside the practice of invocation. Luther afterwards espoused this doctrine upon a Scripture foundation, and *then* made use of it in confutation of purgatory and saint-worship, and continued in the belief of it to the last moments of his life. In his commentary on Ecclesiastes, which was published in the year 1532, he is in favor of the doctrine that the soul is not immortal. Cardinal du Perron says Luther "held, that the soul died with the body, and that God would hereafter raise both the one and the other." Mr. Bayle was displeased at this, and judging it a calumny, applied to a divine of Augsburgh,

desiring to know of him "if there were any pretext, that could occasion du Perron's speaking as above."* The answer of this Lutheran minister is found in Bayle's dictionary. But it is evident from comparing it with Luther's commentary on Eccles. 9: 10. Gen. 4: 9, &c. that he wished to draw a veil over Luther's real sentiments. He says "the origin of the calumny is in a letter Luther wrote to Amsdorf, in the year 1522, in which he appears much inclined to believe that the souls of the just sleep to the day of judgment, without knowing where they are, &c. He does not pretend to say that they are dead in this interval, but only lay in a profound rest and sleep, in which opinion he followed many fathers of the ancient church." In this apology for Luther, it not only leaks out, that he held the sentiment du Perron imputed to him, but also, that in this "opinion he followed many fathers of the ancient church." But his apologist says, Luther rectified—"this opinion in process of time," which is contrary to the following facts. It is certain he held this opinion ten long years, for it is admitted he held it in a letter he wrote to Amsdorf in 1522, and he held it in 1532 in his commentary, which was published this year. Besides, John, elector of Saxony, died of an apoplexy, immediately upon his returning from the chase, that same year: and Luther's reflection on his death shows he felt no disposition to retract the opinion in question. He says—*Deus, illievenire fecit, quod pueris, qui absque cura nascuntur, vivunt et exspirant; cum resurrecturus est (elector) in die novissimo, putabit se ex saltu Lochaviensi, ubi venabatur venire.*"—Seckendorf. Hist. Luth. lib. iii. p. 30. "God has caused that to happen to the elector, as to new born infants who just live and then die. When he shall

* Art. Luther, Rem. (D. D.)

be raised again, in the great day (new day) he will think that he has just come from the hunting ground." Besides, the Catholics objected to Luther's sentiment—his not believing the soul to be immortal, and in proof that he held such an opinion, refer to his defence of his articles against pope Leo's bull cited above, and his comment upon Eccles. 9: 10. Luther's apologist says, he with "many fathers of the ancient church" believed the dead "lay in a profound rest and sleep." By holding this opinion, the fathers destroyed the *demon-worship* of the pagans, and by holding it, Luther destroyed the saint-worship of popery. By holding this doctrine in our day an end would be put to many evils in the Protestant churches.

It is certain the general prejudice was against Luther's opinion, respecting the sleep of the soul between death and the resurrection. The article of the *intercession* of saints, which led directly to the practice of *invocation*, stuck long with many Protestants, yea, with some whole churches, and Luther was obliged to compromise matters with them as well as he could, even so late as the year 1539. Luther acknowledges he was sometimes obliged to take methods of expounding Scripture, which he did not approve. And it was in consequence of disputes among his followers upon the question—what becomes of the soul after death? That he assigns as the reason why he meddled with the question at all. These disputes he endeavored to silence by saying—"that nothing is revealed to us on that head, and that it is rash to affirm any thing about it, without the word of God." See his annotation on Isai. 64: 15, and compare it with what he says, Matt. 16: 25, and Gen. 25: 8. See also Seckendorf. U. S. lib. ii. p. 24, &c.

But it is indisputably proved that Luther not only taught the sleep of the soul in his writings but con-

tinued in this opinion to his last moments. Sleidan, lib. xvi. p. 488, speaking of Luther's behaviour on the day of his death, speaks of him, as representing "those who *will know* their friends in *that eternal life*, as in the same state that Adam was when Eve was first presented to him, namely, just awaked out of a deep sleep." The writer to whom I am indebted, concludes his account of Luther thus: "the misfortune was, that his more immediate disciples were in another persuasion, and therefore, instead of defending their master's doctrine, set themselves to prove he never held it; and thus leaving the main root of popery, in the ground, it is no wonder they should have been unsuccessful in pruning away the corrupt fruits which always have, and always will spring from it."

But that Luther did not believe in the immortality of the soul, appears from William Tyndall's defence of Luther, against Sir Thomas More's Dialogue, in the year 1530. More objected to Luther that he held—"that all soules lye and sleep till domes day." Had this been a false charge brought against Luther, no doubt but Tyndall would have denied it, and repelled it. But instead of this, he owns it for the doctrine of the Protestants. See Tyndall's works published by Fox, 1773, p. 324, where he thus answers More. "And ye in putting them [departed souls] in heauen, hell, and purgatory, destroy the argumentes wherwith Christ and Paul proue the resurrection. What God doth with them, that shall we know when we come to them. The true faith putteth the resurrection, which we be warned to looke for euery houre. The heathen philosophers denying *that*, did put, that the soules did euer liue. And the pope ioyneth the spirituall doctrine of Christ, and the fleshly doctrine of philosophers together, things so contrary that they cannot agree, no more

then the spirite and the fleshe do in a Christen man. And because the fleshly minded pope consenteth unto heathen doctrine, therefore he corrupteth the scripture to stablish it. Moses saith in Deut. the secrete thinges pertaine unto the Lord, and the thynges that be opened pertaine unto us, that we [may] do all that is written in the booke. Wherefore, Sir, if we loued the lawes of God, and would occupy our selues to fulfill them, and woulde, on the other side be meeke, and let God alone wyth hys secretes, and suffer him to be wiser than we, we should make none article of the faith of this or that." And again, "if the soules be in heaven, tell me why they be not in as good case as the angels be? And then what cause is there of the resurrection.

"Again. More objects thus. 'What shall he care, how long he liue in sinne that belieueth Luther, that he shall after this life feele neyther good nor euil in bodye nor soule, untyll the day of dome?'—Tyndall answers, 'Christ and hys apostles taught no other, but warned to looke for Christe's comming agayne euery houre: which comming agayne, because ye beleue will neuer be, therfore haue ye fayned that other marchaundise.'"

These extracts show, not only what the first reformers were charged with by their opposers, but what they themselves avowed. Observe, Tyndall, like Luther, ascribes the immortality of the soul to the pope; and in saying, that *the pope joined the spiritual doctrine of Christ, and the fleshly doctrine of the philosophers together*, he plainly alluded to the proofs from Scripture alleged in the Lateran canon, to support the dogma of the *Peripatetics* that *the soul is the substantial form of the body;* which the Cartesians afterwards considered as inconsistent with its immortality. The papists in the canon of the Lateran council determined that if the soul was not immortal there

could be no resurrection of the dead. Some Protestants got alarmed also about this, and Tyndall is obliged to come forward with the following protestation:

"A protestation made by William Tyndall, touching the resurrection of the bodyes, and the state of the soules after this life; adstracted [abstracted] out of a preface of his that he made to the New Testament, which he set forth in the yeare 1534.

"'Concernyng the resurrection, I proteste before God and our Saviour Jesus Christ, and before the universall congregation that beleeueth in him, that I beleeue according to the open and manifest scriptures and catholicke faith, that Christ is risen agayne in the flesh which he receiued of his mother the blessed virgine Mary, and body wherein he died. And that we shall all, both good and bad, rise both flesh and body, and appear togither before the judgement seat of Christ, to receiue euery man according to his deedes. And that the bodies of all that belieue, and continue in the true faith of Christ, shal be indewed with like immortalitie and glory, as is the body of Christ.

"And I protest before God and our Saviour Christ and all that beleeue in him, that I hold of the soules that are departed, as much as may bee proued by manifest and open scripture, and thinke the soules departed in the faith of Christ, and loue of the lawe of God, to be in no worse case than the soule of Christ was, from the tyme that he deliuered his spirite into the handes of his father, untill the resurrection of his body in glory and immortalitie. Neuertheless, I confesse openly, that I am not perswaded, that they be already in the full glory that Christ is in, or the elect angels of God are in. Neither is it any article of my faith: for if it so were, I see not but then the preaching of the resurrection of the flesh, were a

thyng in uayne. Notwithstanding yet I am ready to beleeue it, if it may be prooued with open scripture.'"

It is very obvious what Tyndall's real sentiments were on this point, but he was intimidated from the situation in which he was placed, from speaking plainly all he thought about it. We should have had a better *reformation* from Luther, Tyndall, and others, had they not been deterred by their associates.

About the year 1534, two years after Luther had published the above commentary, Calvin had become famous in the world. He published a small tract at Orleans, called *psychopannychia*, by which is signified, that the soul wakes throughout the night of death with all the consciousness and sensibility necessary to the enjoyment of happiness. In this same year, and in this very city, the Franciscans conjured up a ghost, which played a number of pranks.—These ghosts supported the doctrine of purgatory, encouraged private masses, and brought in large profits to the priests. But Sleidan says—"after Luther's doctrine came to be understood, and had gained little strength, this kind of spectres by degrees vanished away. For Luther teaches from the Scriptures, that the souls of the dead are at rest, waiting for the final day of judgment; and that those disturbances, frightful noises, and phantoms, are raised by satan, who loses no opportunity of confirming men in the practice of impious rites, and the belief of false opinions, that he may render ineffectual the blessings conferred upon us by our Saviour Christ." It is evident that in proportion as Luther's doctrine bore down the trade of apparitions, that of Calvin, would encourage and promote it. Luther, by consigning *all* the dead to a state of rest and sleep, left no pretence for the appearance of human souls after death. But Calvin managed his matters so, that though he was willing to suppose the souls of the elect were in

such a state of felicity as would not admit of their being interrupted by worldly considerations, yet he left the sons of perdition to their liberty. He says "it is nothing to him what becomes of their souls; he would only be responsible for the faithful." Psychopan. fol. 50, of the Strasburgh edition, 1545. All the spectres of the monks were manufactured out of those *wicked* souls, and one of them has occasionally been worth more to a church or a convent, than a dozen of saints. This book of Calvin is hot, furious, and abusive. The Hypnologists, as he calls them, are *babblers*, *madmen*, *dreamers*, *drunkards*; in one word, *Anabaptists*, and *Catabaptists*, under which name, he says, are comprehended all sorts and kinds of wickedness. He charges the Anabaptists with first broaching the doctrine of the sleep of the soul in the latter days. He wrote two prefaces to two editions of this book, and in the last he allows what he did not in the first, that some who held this doctrine were good men; possibly having heard that Tyndall, Luther, and others, better men than himself, were of this opinion. In one of his prefaces he says that "they who hold the opinion he endeavors to confute, pay no regard to the Scriptures," and at the very moment he is laboring and sweating to set aside the force of a great number of texts they bring from thence.

Some of the first confessions of faith, made in the Protestant churches, are silent respecting the immortality of the soul, for the Protestants then were so far Catholics as to allow "that saints and angels intercede for us, and were therefore to be honored, but not invoked." And "we acknowledge, say the Wirtembergers, that the saints in heaven pray for us before God." The sleep of the soul after death was first condemned by the English reformers, who in the 40th of king Edward's articles, composed in the

year 1552, and published the year following, expressed themselves thus. "They who say that the souls of such as depart hence do sleep, being without all sense, feeling, and perceiving, until the day of judgment, or affirm that the souls die with the bodies, and at the last day shall be raised up with the same, do utterly dissent from the right belief declared unto us in the holy Scriptures." The same thing is condemned in the Helvetic and Scottish confessions.

In the year 1612, the confession of the *Remonstrants* appeared, and was censured by the Calvinists for omitting to mention the happy immortality of souls in heaven, after this life. Episcopius defends himself and his brethren by observing, "that the judgments of the greatest divines had formerly, and still did vary, concerning the state of departed souls; that the fathers seemed to be pretty well agreed, that no souls were admitted into paradise till our Saviour by his death, opened the door and went in, with the penitent thief in his company: that though all the fathers, down to the end of the fourth century, judged that the souls of the faithful were received into paradise after our Lord had opened it, yet they were far from agreeing what or where this paradise was. Some understood that it meant *heaven*, others *hades*, not the place of torment but a common receptacle where the souls of the good and bad were reserved till the last judgment, for which he cites Lactantius, lib. vii. cap. 21.—The Greek fathers, he says, "were unanimous in their opinion, that the souls of the saints did not enjoy the vision of God, nor were admitted into the fruition of glory, till the resurrection." Episcopius goes on to show that Calvin favored this opinion.

But to return; the above reply of Episcopius must have mortified the Calvinists, for its truth they could not deny. That the Protestants in those days, were puzzled and perplexed, and from what this arose,

the following account from Capellus will show.—"Some," says he, "perhaps may wonder, how it has happened, if our opinion is the more probable, that both Protestant and popish divines have agreed in that opinion which we oppose, viz. (that the souls of good men go immediately to heaven:) I answer, that both the one and the other have departed from the primitive opinion of the ancient fathers of the Christian church, and espoused this other, but with very different and contrary views. The papists, in order to support their erroneous practice of invocating the saints, thought it convenient, that the saints should be stationed, before the resurrection, in the third heaven, where the blessed enjoy the beatific vision of God, and where, in their fictitious mirror of the divine essence, they might behold all things which are transacted upon earth: and that being by this means nearer, and consequently more like unto God, they might seem to be properer objects of our prayers, vows and religious worship. It was therefore the spirit of superstition and idolatry, which drove the papists into this opinion. But the Protestants, having another popish error to oppose, namely purgatory, and the proper satisfaction for sin there to be made, which would have authorised the pope's indulgences; were afraid that, if they should grant that there was a *third* place appointed for the souls of the pious and holy after this mortal life, they might likewise be obliged to admit this fictitious purgatory. And therefore thought it safer absolutely to deny any middle state, than to expose themselves to the tricks and subtilties of the papists in supporting their purgatory, by granting such third or middle state."

From this quotation it is easily perceived, why the Protestant churches have all so widely departed from the opinions of the ancient fathers and settled down in the faith of only two states, namely, *heaven* and

*hell* after death. This departure from the fathers, and the endless divisions among themselves, have given the Catholics great advantage against all sects of Protestants. Had they taken the advice of *Joachim Stegman*, which was afterwards adopted by Chillingworth, to combat all error by Scripture only, this and many other errors might have been banished the Protestant churches. But they have settled down in the belief that the souls of men are immortal, and must go either to heaven or hell at death. Since the days of the reformation, in consequence of this error, Protestants have been as deeply engaged in saving men's souls before death as the Catholic priests ever were in saving them after it. They gave up the doctrine of a middle state between death and the resurrection, for the purpose of getting rid of purgatory. By so doing, they have lost all the revenue arising from saving souls after death, and at the expense of consigning wicked souls to hell without hope of release. It is high time men soberly consider—What saith the Scriptures on this subject?

It is only necessary to add, that although Protestants in general have held the doctrine of the soul's immortality and its punishment between death and the resurrection, yet this has not been a universal belief among them. Some, ever since the reformation, men of the first talents and of high standing, have advocated the contrary opinion. And since, very eminent men, who have believed in the immortality of the soul, have owned, that it is a doctrine not expressed but rather implied in the Bible. A strange confession, concerning one of the most important doctrines held by the Protestant churches.

From the preceding history of opinions, it appears beyond all reasonable doubt, that your doctrine of an immortal soul and its punishment after death, is of heathen origin. Its beginning was small, but its lat-

ter end greatly increased. This cloud which arose in the east, not larger than a man's hand, increased in size and blackness, until it shrouded the world in darkness during the middle ages. At first, the heathen held this doctrine on the principle of emanation. They had no idea that the soul was immortal, and had a distinct conscious existence after death. This was an improvement on the original idea, that the soul of man was a part of the soul of the world, and at death returned to its original source. Should you ask—how came the heathen by the first hint? The apostle answers "professing themselves to be wise they became fools." What was to prevent the heathen inventing this idea, any more than your inventing that souls in hell are to be reformed by "*consideration and reflection?*" Paul, Rom. 1, informs us the heathen were great inventors in religion, and the preceding history of their opinions shows this.

It is notorious from the preceding history, that various opinions were entertained among the heathen respecting the soul. Some believed it immortal, and others did not; and their wisest men had their doubts about it. Such as believed it immortal, and that it existed after death, generally believed in its pre-existence, and also in its transmigration. But, Sir, can you show, that the immortality of the soul and its punishment after death, are orthodox tenets according to your lost Bible, but that its pre-existence and transmigration are heterodox opinions? Are not all these opinions from the same heathen source, and supported precisely by the same authority? Your lost Bible, mere heathen speculation, is the source of them all. Why then, Sir, adopt the doctrine of the soul's immortality, yet reject the doctrines of its pre-existence and transmigration? And why do you adopt a different mode from the heathen of purifying souls after death? Is your new mode, either more

rational or more efficacious? And how do you know but your departures from their opinions are departures from the doctrines taught in your lost revelations? Besides, why should you believe their doctrines respecting the immortality of the soul, and reject their doctrine of devils or demons?* You could defend the doctrine of demons with more plausibility from the New Testament, than the immortality of the soul and its punishment after death. I cannot conjecture, on what rational and Scriptural ground you adopt one and reject the other of these doctrines. Both are supported by the same heathen authority; had the same origin, and the one you reject, has more appearance of being taught in the New Testament than the one you advocate. I hardly think you will risk your reputation to assert, that the doctrine of demons is a mere notion, and deny that the Christian hell is not the Greek *hades*, the Celtic *hela*, the Egyptian *amenthes*, and also originated in heathenism. Are not both these doctrines fairly and fully shown in the preceding history, to have originated from the same source, and that from the statements of men who believed in the immortality of the soul and its punishment after death?

If you choose to call heathen speculations or traditions lost revelations, do it; but no man can deny

* The question is sometimes asked, how comes it to pass, that we read so much about persons being possessed with devils or demons in the New Testament, but hear nothing about this in the Old? The preceding history answers this question The heathen, as we have seen, believed in various kinds of demons, but the ancient Jews had little intercourse with heathens, nor had they imbibed their opinions. This accounts for the silence of the Old Testament on this subject. But after the Babylonian captivity, the Jews from their intercourse with the heathen imbibed their opinions, and accounts for so much being said about demons or devils in the New. So also of other heathen opinions, such as, that *hades* is a repository of souls and a place of punishment after death, Luke 16 Many persons not attending to this fact, adopt as articles of their creed, the mere allusions to these heathen opinions, and think them doctrines of Christianity.

that your doctrine of an immortal soul and its punishment after death appeared first among the heathen. The Christian hell, and your hell which is for substance the same as theirs, was well known among the heathen, long before it was known to Jews or Christians. And they had their modes of purifying souls after death, before your "*consideration and reflection*" was invented. What, Sir, can be more evident than that Jews and Christians learned such opinions from the heathen? Nor need you be at all ashamed of this, if you can prove, that all those opinions are to be found in your lost Bible. What I maintain is, that no man is bound to give the slightest attention to your opinions, until you find this book, or in some way prove that it once existed, and that your opinions are contained in it. I am perfectly satisfied with my present Bible, I try to understand it, and shall not be very easily persuaded to lay the study of it aside, to go in pursuit of your lost revelations. When you have found them, as a matter of curiosity I should like to look into them. Until then, I shall find employment enough to meditate on the written law of the Lord I have already in my hands.

No facts can hardly be better established, than that the Jews imbibed a variety of opinions from the heathen; and that Christianity was early corrupted with a mixture of Jewish and heathen opinions. This is evident from the above history. Is it not then, Sir, an imperious duty on every Christian, to endeavor to separate the chaff from the wheat? This I have attempted to do, and I have shown, that your doctrine of an immortal soul and its punishment after death, is but heathen chaff, which the wind of free inquiry and investigation into the Scriptures must ere long blow away. Popular opinion and lost revelations, may for a time prevent this, but go it must, *unless* free inquiry is retarded, or some very new

discovery is made from the Bible. The very rage for immortal soul-saving in the present day, is calculated to hasten this desirable event. Intelligent reflecting men naturally ask—is it true, that the heathen have immortal souls, and are they in such danger of being lost, as orthodox people represent? This is already strongly doubted by many in the community. And, Sir, will they not also naturally look into the evidence which is afforded them, that such statements are true? And how must it strike them, when they come to learn, that from the fathers of those very heathen, whose souls they wish to save, Christians first learned men had immortal souls, and that they are to be punished after death. And it must increase their astonishment to find, that in support of this very doctrine, you have recourse to lost revelations, or in other words to heathen traditions.

The fact is little known in our day, by the mass of people calling themselves Protestants, that Martin Luther, the great reformer, rejected the doctrine of the soul's immortality and its punishment in a disembodied state. But this fact ought to be universally known among them, that they may see what Luther believed and what he wished to accomplish in his reformation. Luther perceived that this doctrine was the very soul of all the corruptions in the Romish church, as it has since been in the Protestant churches. But he found the doctrine of an immortal soul, and its punishment in an intermediate state, too deeply rooted even among his followers for him to pull up by the roots. Let us be grateful to God for what he did accomplish, and perhaps the Lord may yet raise up another Luther to lash the popery of Protestants, and scourge this and other heathen doctrines out of the Protestant churches.

# LETTER XII.

Sir,

It has been observed by some, that whoever contends for an immortal soul in man, must either allow that life and mind are the effects of organization, or deny that God can so modify and organize matter as to live and think. But will you say that this is impossible with God? If you admit it possible, can you prove he has not so made man? It is admitted, that what we call *sagacity* or *instinct* in brutes, is the effect of organization. But are you sure, Sir, that a brute is God's masterpiece, the utmost limits of his organizing power? May not man be, with all his superiority of powers, only a more wonderful piece of God's workmanship? David says, Ps. 139: 14—"I will praise thee; for I am fearfully and wonderfully made," but gives no intimation that an immortal soul constituted any part of this wonderful piece of God's workmanship.

Believers in an immortal soul, deny that God has so made man. To deny that matter can be so organized as to be capable of living, thinking, and reasoning, is necessary to their system. But, Sir, Locke, Berkely, and others, believers in an immortal soul, seem to admit that such a modification of matter is possible. The former says—"if God cannot join portions of matter together, by means inconceivable to us, we must deny the existence and being even of matter itself." The latter says—"could it have been thought that sulphur, which is an inflammable substance, and oxygen, so necessary to the *maintenance* of flame, could have formed an acid,

which actually lowers the temperature of snow; or that particles of heat could have been concealed in the coldest bodies? *Let us not, therefore, presume* that the living qualities of animals, are different from the qualities of matter." But some have said—"Wherever we see life, we will at once admit the existence of an immaterial principle, whether in the European, the negro, or the oyster." But, Sir, have oysters immortal souls?

I have noticed in the course of my study and observation, that when any part of Scripture is correctly understood, it is never contradicted, but confirmed by facts. This I think is found true on the subject of discussion between us. What facts, Sir, can you produce, showing that the soul is immortal, and thinks, suffers, or enjoys after the dissolution of the body? None that I know of, and it is certain you have appealed to none. My principal object in this Letter, is to present you with some facts and circumstances, which confirm the views I have advanced. I shall not be particular as to order in bringing them forward.

1st. When we compare man with other animals of this lower creation, the comparison results in favor of my opinions, and against yours. That these animals have life, and sagacity approaching to what we call mind, or understanding and reason, in man, no one denies. Permit me then to ask, how are such powers accounted for in the camel, the elephant, the dog, the monkey, and other creatures, unless you admit that they have immortal souls? If man's mental powers are not the effect of organization, how do you make it appear, that all these powers in brutes are? Because their powers do not equal man's, we call it *sagacity* and *instinct;* but why should we not call the inferior powers of a Hottentot, *instinct*, when compared with the powers of some men in civilized, culti-

vated society? Have not many brutes memory, deliberation, will, judgment, affections? Do not some of them show a degree of calculation and reasoning in conducting their affairs, not much more below some men, than some men are below others? And does not man, with all his boasted powers, often degrade himself below the brute creation in his actions? Is not man, Sir, often in Scripture, sent to the brutes to learn wisdom and obedience? For example, witness the art and calculations of the fox; the ingenuity of the beavers, who in the erection of their houses and plan of their towns, are said to exist under a well regulated form of democratical government. The sagacity, fidelity, and affection of the dog are proverbial. And Humboldt says of mules, that in traversing the Andes, the mountaineers judge not of the animal whose step is the surest, but him—"*who reasons best.*"

2d. Anatomists inform us, that the degree of mental powers, manifest themselves both in men and brutes, in correspondence with the degree of developement in the brain. But why is this the case, if man's superior powers arise from his possessing an immortal soul? Do you believe that an inferior immortal soul has taken up its abode in a Hottentot, or a negro, to tha of a European, or an American? If so, what must be the inferiority of the immortal soul in an idiot, compared with the soul of Sir Isaac Newton? And may I not ask, must not some brutes have something in them, call it by what name you may, little inferior to the immortal souls of some tribes of men? But it has been observed by anatomists, that all this difference of intellect, whether among brutes or men, can be traced to a more or less perfect organization of their brain. They tell us, that the dog, the elephant, and some other brutes, *excel* all other brute animals in having a more per-

fect cerebel structure. And in proportion as their brain approaches in its structure to man's, they approach to him in intellect or sagacity. Such are the facts as stated in books, and attested by men of high standing in the medical profession, with whom I have conversed on the subject. The difference then between men and brutes, and the diversity of intellect which appears in both, is easily and rationally accounted for by organic structure. But I fear, Sir, you never will be able to account for the difference in either case, on the theory, that man has, but brutes have not, an immortal soul.

3d. It is indisputable, that the mental faculties depend on the growth of the body, the health of the body, and particularly on the sound, healthy state of the brain. They grow with its growth and strengthen with its strength. They gradually decay with the body, and cease, to all human observation, when it dies. Some cases indeed occur, but they are rare, where the faculties of the mind, are seemingly in vigor when the body is diseased, yea, is near death. But if the doctrine of an immortal soul is admitted, this ought always, not sometimes, to be the case, for the weaker the body, which is only considered a clog to it, and the nearer its release from it, the more vigorous it ought to become. Instances of great vigor of body occur at the time of dissolution, and if vigor of mind at this period, proves the soul immortal, why should not vigor of body prove that it is immortal? It is true the fact of death proves it mortal, but what fact, Sir, proves that the soul exists after it in a conscious, thinking state? None; and unless divine revelation had informed us, we never could have known that we shall live again by being raised from the dead. The instances of great vigor of mind just before death, are easily accounted for, if the mental powers depend on the sound state

of the brain. If the cause which produces death, does not affect this part of the system, the mental powers may retain their vigor to the last. That the mental powers depend on the sound state of the brain, is universally admitted, and is proved by facts. The brain being injured has sometimes totally suspended the exercise of the mental faculties; in some cases has produced derangement, and in others totally destroyed them. That insanity arises from a diseased brain, has been proved by dissection. Medical treatment often cures insanity, as it often does other diseases of the body. We call a person in this state mentally deranged. But if the mind be your immortal soul, as you affirm, then we have got melancholy immortal souls, and immortal souls raving mad.—Preaching and praying, in this case, would be more suitable for such persons than medical treatment, and the doctor of divinity rather than the doctor of physic ought to take charge of such patients. In time past such a course has been but too often pursued, to the injury, if not the death of the unhappy sufferers.

Again; anatomists inform us, that the brain has been discerned in a fetus, the size of which was not larger than a pin's head. But was there an immortal soul, Sir, connected with this homunculus? At any rate I may be permitted to ask—at what time does an immortal soul take possession of its clay tenement? Is it before birth or after it? Before, say the Catholic church, hence they have ordered, where death is apprehended, that children should be baptized in their mother's womb. Why? Because, if the poor infant died unbaptized its immortal soul must go to perdition. Had it not been for your doctrine of an immortal soul, this superstition, so grossly indelicate, would never have existed. But for your doctrine of immortal souls, the trade of saving immortal souls either before or after death among Catholics

and Protestants, would not have been carried on. Sorry am I, that you, or any Universalist, should exert himself to prevent its abolition.

Medical men have often been accused as leaning towards infidelity, and paying little regard to religion. But is it any wonder they have, if a religion is presented to them which is contradicted by facts, which their profession developes to them? Can you expect them to believe in the immortality of the soul or its existence after death in a disembodied state, doctrines so contrary to facts, their own experience, and observation; and which they find the teachers of them are unable to prove from the Bible? Do you think that men of sense, reading, and reflection will believe doctrines contrary to evidence, which would satisfy most men's minds on other subjects?

4th. Another fact is, all our observation and experience are against your views and in favor of my opinions on this subject. Man, Sir, is born a weak helpless being, but our observation proves that he is a living being. But does our observation teach us that he is an immortal being, or has an immortal soul within him? No Sir, we should never think of such a thing, were it not for our false teaching on this subject. It is only our observation and experience, which teaches us that this helpless babe will in a few years develope astonishing powers of mind.—But our observation also teaches us, that these powers are developed, as this babe advances from infancy to childhood, and from childhood to manhood. As the body advances towards perfection, so does the powers of the mind, in vigor and perfection. And as we see mind and body gradually grow up to perfection together, so we see them gradually decay together. And that the growth of the body does not depend on the growth of the powers of the mind, is proved from the following fact. Idiots grow in body,

but their powers of mind do not, but continue with them the same through life.

But further; neither our observation or experience teaches us that our mental powers existed or ever will exist but in connexion with the body. No observation or experience teaches that they had a pre-existence, and all observation and experience are against the conclusion, that they survive the dissolution of the body. All facts, observation, and experience prove that they depend for their strength and activity on the perfection of the organization of the brain, and the health and activity of the whole system. Moreover, the development and extent of the powers of the mind, are also dependant on the education and advantages the person enjoys.

But again; we see every day persons suddenly, and others gradually, sink into the grave. So far, Sir, as observation or experience teaches, we ought to conclude that there is a total and everlasting extinction of their existence. Who ever perceived an immortal soul leave the body at death? Who would ever conclude that any thing left the body which exists to suffer or enjoy after death? The man that draws such a conclusion, draws it on the ground of his previous habits of thinking, and not from observation or experience.

5th. Let every man make the appeal to his own consciousness, and he will find it against your views and in favor of my opinions. Every man has the most perfect consciousness, that he exists, thinks, and is composed of body and mind. But permit me to ask, has any man the consciousness that he possesses an immortal soul? If he thinks he has, it entirely arises from the religious creed he has believed, and not from any natural, innate consciousness. But does any man need to be taught a religious creed of any kind to have a consciousness that he is a living,

thinking being? No, this is found in all men, but you will find every man's consciousness respecting his having an immortal soul modified and shaped just according to the religious creed he has embraced. But if this consciousness was natural, and innate to all men, it would be the same in all men, as is their consciousness of their personal existence. But the history in the two preceding Letters, of the immortality of the soul shows how different the consciousness of the heathen was about this.. And your consciousness about this, in some degree differs from that of our orthodox brethren. No man, except from education, can have any more consciousness that he shall exist after death, than that he existed prior to his formation in the womb. All before this, and all after death, is to him an entire blank. There is not, nor do we see how there can be any more consciousness in the one case than in the other. It will not answer to say, as many do, that the strong desire man feels for immortality, proves that the soul is immortal. No; for does a strong desire to live long, prove that a man shall live to the age of Methuselah? Or, does a strong desire after riches prove that a man shall not die in the alms-house? And who ever thought, that a strong desire after health, proves that a man shall never be sick?

6th. The doctrine of an immortal soul is not taught in the Scriptures, and if you admit it true, it occasions much perplexity to the mind in understanding them. You do not pretend to say that the Bible calls the soul immortal, nor do you attempt to prove this from it, but take it for granted. Had the Bible taught the immortality of the soul, archbishop Tillotson would not have said that "the immortality of the soul is rather supposed, or taken for granted, than expressly revealed in the Bible." Sermons, vol. 2. As a specimen of the perplexity which this doctrine

occasions, let us ask, is it the whole man that sins? If it is, why should not the whole man die? If you should say, it is the soul only which sins, I then ask, why should not the soul only die? Is it just or reasonable, that the body should die for the sins of an immortal soul? Should you say, it is the body which sins, I then ask why the soul should suffer for its transgressions, either in a disembodied state, or after the resurrection of the dead? Why should the body be allowed to leave the poor soul in the lurch at death to suffer for its transgressions, and itself rest free of all pain in the grave? But should you say, body and soul are both jointly concerned in sinning, I then ask, why do you not make them both jointly concerned in punishment for it? Why release the body at death from all pain, yet send the poor soul to hell to suffer alone for thousands of years in an intermediate state? Where is the justice or reason in all this conduct towards body and soul?

Your system teaches us, that we are partly mortal and partly immortal; or are both mortal and immortal at the same time. Hence it is common for believers in an immortal soul, to speak of their *mortal* and *immortal* part, and that at death the immortal part has taken its flight to God in heaven, or has sunk into hell beneath. But I ask, is the mortal part animated by the immortal? If this be true, there is no death in the case. Death is only the removal of an immortal soul from dead matter, which many have considered merely as a clog to the soul. And if the man is as complete without the body, as he is without the house he resides in, the immortal soul ought to be thankful when it gets quit of the body. And instead of believing in or hoping for a resurrection of it from the dead, the soul ought to pray and hope that such a thing may never take place. And if the man, the immortal soul is complete without the body

as you affirm, there is just as little propriety in raising it to punish it after the resurrection, as in punishing the house in which a man commits murder. In fact, Sir, if this doctrine of yours be true, the judge ought to condemn the immortal soul to be hung instead of the body, for the body was no more to be blamed for the murder, than the dagger is with which the horrid deed was done. But your doctrine of an immortal soul is not only at war with the principles of the Bible, but with that of reason, justice, and common sense.

7th. Let any man put this question to himself—on what evidence do I believe that the soul is immortal, and is to suffer in a disembodied state? If I am not greatly mistaken, he will find his faith rests on mere popular opinion. He was taught this from his infancy, and he believes it, but his mind has no Scripture grounds on which he rests its truth. And if he will take the trouble to examine, he will find that heathen philosophers and Catholic and Protestant creeds can be quoted, but not the Bible in proof of this doctrine. Some learned men have attempted to prove the immortality of the soul from reason. But Pearce has, I think, shown that its immortality never can be proved by reason. You make no attempt in this way, which leads me to infer that you have no hope of establishing the doctrine by reason. And it is well known that Taylor, Law, Priestly, and many others have abandoned the doctrine of the soul's immortality, as indefensible from either Scripture or reason. It is a pity, Sir, that they did not know about your lost revelations, for they might have saved them from scepticism on this subject.

# LETTER XIII.

SIR,

IT has long been, and still is a subject of deep lamentation—the endless contentions and divisions which exist among Christians. Infidels observe it, and despise Christianity. And a certain writer says—"for many a year to come, Babylon shall hush to silence and to terror. such of her children as may prove restless and inquisitive, by pointing to the dismal condition of subdivided churches—if you will not lie still, and slumber in my bosom, yonder is your fate."

To remove this evil, the first thing is, to inquire, what is the cause of such divisions? To remove the cause is the first step towards removing the effect. What then was the cause which produced them? Let it be noticed 1st. That different *sects* arose among the Jews from their imbibing heathen opinions.—While they strictly adhered to their written law, and kept themselves from the notions of the heathen, sects were unknown. But no sooner did they become acquainted with the heathen speculations, than strife, division, and sects multiplied in the Jewish nation. It is not more certain that sects arose among the Jews, than that they originated from this source.

2d. It is equally evident from the above history, that sects were unknown among Christians, until they imbibed heathen opinions. Whilst honest, unlettered men, taught the simple doctrines of Christ, love and union adorned the church of Christ. Happy had it been for her, and the world, had she shut her doors, as Rome did her gates, against philosophers and their opinions; for, from the hour they entered, *Ichabod* was written upon her. With them entered

strife, contention, sects, and every evil work, as her own historians testify. Paul foresaw these evils, warned Christians against them, and expressly named the source from whence they should arise, Col. 2: 8. "Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ." That Christians are *spoiled through philosophy;* that there are *divisions* and *sects* among them, all admit and lament; and various means have been resorted to, for removing these evils. Union prayer meetings have been held; Christian love and forbearance have been recommended; and occasional communion and interchange of religious services have been practised; but without producing any great, or lasting good effects. And why? Because heathen opinions, the cause of all the mischief, are still allowed to remain. All this apparent love and union proceeds on the principle, that each sect shall retain unmolested their own share of these opinions, each believing himself right and his neighbor wrong, but without considering the general heathen source from which they all originated. The church may lament these strifes and divisions and long for peace. But as Jehu said—"what hast thou to do with peace?" so long as these heathen notions are believed. When the thorn produces grapes, and the thistle figs, then will peace and love reign among men, produced by such heathen opinions.

To the sentiments advanced in the preceding pages, it may be objected—1st. Your views present the gloomy prospect of unconscious existence, for thousands of years between death and the resurrection; but the common opinion holds up to man continued existence, and if the soul is saved before death, immediate happiness after it. Answer. This objection arises from previous feelings and prejudices.

which never can determine what is truth on this subject. Besides, I have adverted to it in my Essays, to which I refer the reader. I would here add, 1st. Most people sleep six or eight hours each night, and are in a state of unconscious existence. But does any man view going to sleep a gloomy prospect? No. And why not? Because he hopes to awake in the morning. Why then should falling asleep at death be viewed by a Christian a gloomy prospect, for he hopes to awake from the sleep of death at the resurrection? A million of years and an hour, are the same to those either asleep or dead, for both are alike unconscious as to time or the events of our world. See Luther's remarks above, respecting John, elector of Saxony. 2d. But is not the body in a state of unconsciousness between death and the resurrection? Why is not this a gloomy prospect? And why not urge it as proof that the body exists between death and the resurrection? 3d. Unless the common opinion can be proved true from Scripture, the pleasant prospect it holds out, is a mere phantom. Besides, the immediate happiness it holds out, depends on the certainty that the soul is saved before death. But the doubts, fears, and anxieties of the best Christians, show, how little certainty there is about this, and that this doctrine gives them no solid satisfaction. But unless it is *certain* the soul is saved before death, this pleasant prospect is changed into the dismal prospect of endless and inconceivable misery after death. It is true, you tell us not to be too much cast down, for the punishment of hell is not to be endless, and inform us how we may reform ourselves there, by consideration and reflection. But is not this, Sir, even a more gloomy prospect than that which my views present?

2d. It has been said also by way of objection—"that the body is to the *immortal soul*, what an organ

is to the player; and it would be wrong to conclude, though we have never seen the player, that when the organ ceases playing, that the organist was dead and incapable of playing any more." But this objection injures the cause it is intended to assist. How can the soul play without its body any more than the organist without his organ? It may be of some use to those who believe in transmigration, for after the soul leaves its present body, on which it plays, it finds another organ perhaps in a horse or an ass. This objection is ruinous to your system, for it supposes the soul after death cannot play, any more than an organist without his organ. Did you foresee this difficulty, hence provided some kind of "*vehicle*," for it after death on which to play? But as you merely *assert* this, it deserves no notice; for what Scripture writer says the soul is immortal, and after death is furnished with a body of any kind whatever? The spiritual body in the resurrection, is the only body after death, of which I read in Scripture.

3d. It may also be objected, that although Christians have imbibed many heathen opinions, it may still be questioned, if the immortality of the soul and its punishment after death be of the number. No man I think can question that they are, who has attended to the history given in the tenth and eleventh Letters. And this is confirmed by Dr. Campbell in his Sixth Dissertation. He says—"from the time of the captivity, more especially from the time of the subjection of the Jews, first to the Macedonian empire, and afterwards to the Roman; as they had a closer intercourse with pagans, they insensibly imbibed many of their sentiments, particularly on those subjects whereon their law was silent, and wherein, by consequence, they considered themselves as at greater freedom. On this subject of a future state, we find a considerable difference in the popular opin-

ions of the Jews in our Saviour's time, from those which prevailed in the days of the ancient prophets. As both Greeks and Romans had adopted the notion, that the ghosts of the deceased were susceptible both of enjoyment and of suffering, they were led to suppose a sort of retribution in that state for their merit or demerit in the present. The Jews did not indeed adopt the pagan fables on the subject, nor did they express themselves entirely in the same manner; but the general train of thinking in both came pretty much to coincide. The Greek *hades* they found well adapted to express the Hebrew *sheol*. This they came to conceive as including different sorts of habitations for ghosts of different characters," &c. Who can doubt, Sir, after this and much more said above, that the immortality of the soul and its condition after death, were opinions derived by the Jews from the heathen? It has been repeatedly noticed, that you contend the ancient Jews had no such opinions taught them in their Scriptures, and to support your views you have recourse to lost revelations.

In concluding this discussion, permit me to ask—what good the doctrine of an immortal soul and its existence in a disembodied state, has ever done the world? It did the heathen no good, who were the original inventors of it. Cicero and Socrates, two of their greatest men, were left in doubt and uncertainty about it, and led Mr. Stuart to say—"*poor wandering heathen.*" It did the Jews no good, and has done Christians as little since they embraced it. for most of them are all their life time in bondage through fear of death, and some of them die by their own hands to rid themselves of their bondage. I can see no good the doctrine has ever done, and the evils it has produced are innumerable. The apostles preached through Jesus the resurrection from the dead, and it produced the most beneficial effects. Their doc-

trine gave immediate peace and joy to the mind, inspired it with hope of future immortality, and purified the hearts and conduct of all who believed it. They said—"Blessed be the God and father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who according to his abundant mercy, hath begotten us again unto a lively hope, by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead." On the fact that Christ was risen from the dead, their hope rested for an inheritance incorruptible, undefiled, and which fadeth not away, reserved in heaven. But no Christian ever blessed God for begetting him to a hope of any life in your *hades*, founded on the immortality of his soul. Primitive Christians did not drink hope and consolation at such a turbid stream as this, but at the well of salvation which gave them unceasing consolation and good hope through grace. No man, Sir, having drank of this old wine, will straightway desire your new, for he saith the old is better.

To conclude. Should any new and important evidence occur to you, please communicate it. Conscious of my liability to err, I hold myself in readiness to correct my opinions, when truth appears.—But until some new discovery is made from the Bible, I must continue to believe you are mistaken in your views on the subject we have been discussing.

I am yours, &c.

W. BALFOUR.

THE END.

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